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Abstract 
This thesis explores the various ways in which Woolf’s oeuvre engages with new theories of 
materiality, focusing in particular on conceptualisations of sex, animal and life. This entails 
considering Woolf’s work in both textual and extra-textual, human and nonhuman, contexts, and 
placing her in dialogue with theoretical debates which have marked a shift since the mid-90s from 
the focus on language and discourse to questions of materiality and ontology. I read Woolf 
alongside well-known theorists and philosophers including Gilles Deleuze (solo and with Félix 
Guattari), Rosi Braidotti, Donna Haraway, and Jacques Derrida, as well as other important 
contemporary thinkers such as Matthew Calarco, Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, and Eugene 
Thacker. The most prominent of these throughout is Deleuze who, despite being a key figure of 
poststructuralism and citing Woolf’s writing as exemplary of some of his most famous concepts, 
has only emerged in recent years (much later than the likes of Lacan, Kristeva and Derrida) as 
someone demanding serious consideration in dialogue with Woolf. Also prominent is Braidotti, 
who refers to Woolf as an important influence on her thought and yet has also been understudied 
by Woolf scholars. After an opening chapter which seeks to extend and complicate the theoretical 
import of Woolf’s own well-known figuration taken from the natural world – ‘granite and 
rainbow’ – by considering relevant passages across the span of her writing including Night and 
Day and ‘Sketch of the Past’, I go on to consider questions concerning: sexual difference in A 
Room of One’s Own and To the Lighthouse (chapter two); sexuality and desire in Orlando 
(chapter three); human-animal relations in Flush (chapter four); and quantum philosophy-physics 
and posthuman life in The Waves (chapter five). Whilst these texts form the basis of each chapter, 
I also refer throughout to Woolf’s other novels, essays, short stories, diaries, letters and 
autobiographical writing. Focusing on these wide-ranging but interrelated issues, this thesis 
attempts to open up a broader discussion on what precisely is at stake, and what new perspectives 
can be offered, in theorising Woolf today. By reading Woolf alongside but also inside theoretical 
writings (and vice versa), my aim is not only to provide a new perspective on Woolf’s writings or 
to demonstrate the ways in which her texts help elucidate the subversive potential (and 
limitations) in these current theoretical contexts; it is also to explore some of the aesthetic, 
political, ethical, historical and conceptual links between modernist literature and contemporary 
theory. More specifically then, and building on the premise reached by poststructuralist and 
postmodernist criticism that Woolf radically destabilises essential differences based on binary 
oppositions (Moi, Minow-Pinkney, Bowlby, Caughie), I ask: what precisely are the models of 
materiality, and indeed subjectivity, made possible by Woolf’s texts and by the complex 
contemporary cultures and theories her writing has so clearly affected? 
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Introduction:  
Virginia Woolf and the Materiality of Theory 
 
Sketching the Materiality of Theory 
I reach what I might call a philosophy; at any rate it is a constant idea of mine; that 
behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we – I mean all human beings – are 
connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of 
art. Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this vast mass that we call the world. 
But there is no Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven; certainly and emphatically there is no 
God; we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself. (MB 85) 
 
When Virginia Woolf, in this famous passage from her posthumously published memoir 
‘Sketch of the Past’ (1976), outlines her ‘philosophy’ or ‘constant idea’, she presents us 
with a ‘conception’ of life that is entangled in materiality: a ‘pattern’, ‘hidden behind the 
cotton wool of daily life’ (MB 85). It is, as Mark Hussey has recently put it, a form of 
theorising which is ‘grounded’ and ‘embodied’.1 In providing a clear example of Woolf 
herself philosophising or theorising in concrete terms – embedding her thoughts on 
subjectivity firmly in the material world – this moment in Woolf’s writing speaks directly 
to key issues I will focus on in this thesis concerning theory and materiality (and the 
materiality of theory).2 Before going on to outline in more detail the specific ways in 
which I will explore these issues throughout Woolf’s writings, I want to stay with this 
passage for a moment to highlight some of the particular issues concerning subjectivity 
and materiality that it raises, especially where critics have placed emphasis on its 
                                                 
1 Mark Hussey. ‘Virginia Woolf: After Lives.’ Virginia Woolf in Context, ed. Jane Goldman and Bryony 
Randall. Cambridge: CUP (In Press). Quoted with permission of the author. Hussey also ends with this 
quote from ‘Sketch of the Past’ in The Singing of the Real World: the Philosophy of Virginia Woolf’s 
Fiction. Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1986, p.154.  
2 ‘Theory’ is of course a contested term, and I primarily use it here as an umbrella term which includes 
theorists/philosophers from the latter half of the twentieth century to the present day, rather than to make 
any claims about what does or does not qualify as ‘theory’ as distinct from, say, ‘critical theory’ or 
‘continental philosophy’. My use of theory might therefore be a form of ‘transdisciplinary philosophizing’, 
to borrow Peter Osborne’s recent phrase. See ‘Philosophy After Theory: Transdisciplinarity and the New.’ 
Theory After ‘Theory’, ed. Jane Elliott and Derek Attridge. New York: Routledge, 2011: 19-33. For a 
summary of some of the multiple brands of ‘theory’ in use today, see Susan Stanford Friedman. ‘Theory.’ 
Modernism and Theory: A Critical Debate, ed. Stephen Ross. London: Routledge, 2009: 237-245. 
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formulation of human communality through language and art: Lorraine Sim, for example, 
writes of ‘a connective principle’ in Woolf’s ‘pattern’ which is revealed through art and 
society;3 Emily M. Hinnov claims, more explicitly, that ‘Woolf views aesthetics as a 
vehicle for social action that might bring about humanistic unity. In her search for 
coherence and interconnectivity, she speaks to the web-like linkage between all of 
humanity, accessible through our participation in art’;4 Bryony Randall suggests that ‘far 
from being a unified, self-sufficient, self-explanatory temporal unit’, Woolf’s ‘moment of 
being’ is an experience inextricably tied to reading and writing’;5 and Jane Goldman, 
aligning this passage with a Habermasian ‘intersubjectivity’ and a Bakhtinian ‘social 
origin’ of language, argues that ‘Woolf positions herself as part of a community of 
subjects, accessible through language but with no transcendent position outside it; […] 
Woolf’s insistence that “we are the words” suggests she understands language to be 
socially constructed and present only in its material utterances.’6  
Woolf’s focus here does indeed appear to be primarily on the question of art and 
particularly writing (‘I make it real by putting it into words’) as well as of the human 
communality behind this writing (‘we – I mean all human beings – are connected with 
this’) (MB 85), but I want to consider an additional ontological inflection to this excerpt 
from ‘Sketch of the Past’, one which extends the non-transcendent interconnectivity in 
Woolf’s theory of ‘philosophy’ beyond a concern solely with the human and language or 
art. That is, the ‘philosophy’ reached in the above passage hinges on a conceptualisation 
of the collective pronoun ‘we’ that expands as the passage continues. In the first instance 
‘we’ is clearly intended as representative of ‘all human beings’, yet the connection Woolf 
emphasises is one between this human ‘we’ with the ‘pattern’ or ‘vast mass we call the 
world’: ‘We’ are not only ‘the words’, but the ‘music’ and, crucially, the ‘thing itself’. 
We find, then, a communality that is extended beyond a primarily human concern – 
                                                 
3 Lorraine Sim. ‘Virginia Woolf Tracing Patterns through Plato’s Forms.’ Journal of Modern Literature 
28:2 (2005), p.43. 
4 Emily M. Hinnov. ‘“To give the moment whole”: The Nature of Time and Cosmic (Comm)unity in 
Virginia Woolf’s The Waves.’ Virginia Woolf and the Natural World: Selected Papers from the Twentieth 
International Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. Kristin Czarnecki and Carrie Rohman. Clemson: Clemson 
University Digital Press, 2011, p.218. 
5 Bryony Randall. Modernism, Daily Time and Everyday Life. Cambridge: CUP, 2007, p.157-158. 
6 Jane Goldman. The Feminist Aesthetics of Virginia Woolf: Modernism, Post-Impressionism, and the 
Politics of the Visual. Cambridge: CUP, 2001 [1998], p.46-48. 
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Woolf presents us with an interconnectivity in which boundaries between subjectivity and 
objectivity become somewhat blurred, and where language is not the only immanent 
feature (to single out language in this way is precisely to see it as, in some way, 
transcendent). In other words, we might say here that Woolf is concerned with world-
making, not simply a subject-making or word-making. This is further elucidated by the 
instance of ‘shock’ created by the embedded flower at St Ives: ‘I was looking at the 
flower bed by the front door; “That is the whole”, I said. I was looking at a plant with a 
spread of leaves; and it seemed suddenly plain that the flower itself was a part of the 
earth; that a ring enclosed what was the flower; and that was the real flower; part earth; 
part flower’ (MB 84). It may be that it is only through the human act of writing down 
(and indeed verbalising, as Woolf notes here) an instance such as this that Woolf feels 
she can ‘make it whole’ and find ‘satisfaction’ and ‘reason’, but the conceptual model of 
a non-hierarchical, intricately interconnected whole is embedded in the vitality and 
materiality of the ‘dominant’ sensation – over her ‘passive’ self (MB 85) – of the ‘real 
flower’ that was ‘part earth; part flower’ (MB 84). To be sure, both the event of writing 
and the event of the flower itself are immanent, creative processes.  
What is emphasised by Woolf, then, is ‘intuition’7 that is ‘given to me, not made 
by me’ which, Goldman notes, ‘refers to her idea that there is a pattern behind things, and 
in telling us the origin of this idea, she suggests that it comes from the pattern itself’.8 As 
Woolf herself writes in a letter to Vita Sackville-West on 16th March 1926, ‘[a] sight, an 
emotion, creates this wave in the mind, long before it makes words to fit it; and in writing 
(such is my present belief) one has to recapture this, and set this working (which has 
nothing apparently to do with words)’ (L3 247). And in the two paragraphs following the 
‘we are’ refrain in ‘Sketch of the Past’, Woolf undercuts the notion of a language as 
primary event. She at first appears to outline the ‘far more necessary’ importance of 
writing over other activities by ‘spending the morning writing’ rather than, as one 
example she gives, ‘walking’. Following this Woolf states, however, that it was precisely 
                                                 
7 Critics have pointed to the Bergsonian resonance in Woolf’s use of ‘intuition’ here. See Randall 2007, 
p.158 and Laci Mattison. ‘The Metaphysics of Flowers in The Waves: Virginia Woolf’s “Seven-Sided 
Flower” and Henri Bergson’s Intuition.’ Virginia Woolf and the Natural World: Selected Papers from the 
Twentieth International Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. Kristin Czarnecki and Carrie Rohman. 
Clemson: Clemson University Digital Press, 2011: 71-77. 
8 Goldman 1998, p.47. 
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whilst on her ‘walk yesterday’ that she was ‘struck’ by the realisation ‘these moments of 
being of mine were scaffolding in the background; were the invisible and silent part of 
my life as a child’ (MB 86). She goes on to describe the ‘people’ who were at the 
‘foreground’ in her childhood, but these people, and therefore this foreground, are merely 
‘caricatures’ (MB 86). What is left in the foreground of the reader’s mind is the 
‘scaffolding’, the fact that ‘one is living all the time in relation to certain background rods 
of conceptions’ (MB 85). What I am therefore suggesting here, and what I will explore 
throughout this thesis, is the sense that Woolf’s writing is not so much concerned with a 
‘materiality […] which blots out the light’ of being, as Makiko Minow-Pinkney puts it,9 
as it is with illuminating materiality as precisely the possibility of being: the becoming of 
materiality. Woolf offers a ‘collective, contextually sensitive model of subjectivity’,10 and 
it is one that is also sensitive to the materiality of which the (human) subject is only one 
part. 
The aim of this thesis is to explore, throughout Woolf’s oeuvre, precisely the kind 
of issues raised in the above passage concerning materiality in relation to human and 
nonhuman life. My title, Virginia Woolf and the Materiality of Theory: Sex, Animal, Life, 
refers directly to my concern with situating Woolf’s theorising in relation to material – 
human and nonhuman – contexts, and points to three specific aspects of my study: 1) I 
critically engage with Woolf’s writing in the context of contemporary theoretical debates 
which have marked a shift in the past decade or so from the focus on language and 
discourse to questions concerning the material, biological, and ontological.11 The 
theoretical debates I place Woolf in dialogue with are all concerned with various forms of 
materialism and immanence rather than abstraction and transcendence – forming part of a 
turn towards new formulations of materiality in contemporary theory and philosophy.12 
Hitherto understudied by Woolf scholars, two important figures in the emergence of these 
new materialisms and the two most prominent theorists throughout this thesis – Gilles 
                                                 
9 Makiko Minow-Pinkney. Virginia Woolf & The Problem of the Subject. Sussex: The Harvester Press, 
1987, p.162.  
10 Goldman 1998, p.47. 
11 Martin Hägglund. ‘The Arche-Materiality of Time: Deconstruction, Evolution and Speculative 
Materialism.’ Theory After ‘Theory’, ed. Jane Elliott and Derek Attridge. New York: Routledge, 2011, 
p.265. 
12 See Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (eds.). New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics. Durham: 
Duke UP, 2010. 
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Deleuze and Rosi Braidotti – have been markedly influenced by Woolf’s modernist 
aesthetics and feminist politics, citing her as exemplary of central concepts in their 
thought. 2) I anchor my theoretical discussion throughout in thematic chapters which 
themselves involve, both seriously and playfully, some focus on material objects or forms 
of materiality, for example granites and rainbows in chapter one, paint and grass in 
chapter two, rings and motor-cars in chapter three, fur and flesh in chapter four, and 
matter, the very fabric of our material world, in chapter five. It is this form of embedded 
theorising that leads me to consider Woolf in the context of well-established debates in 
relation to feminism, sexual difference and sexuality, but also to emphasise the crucial 
role her writing has already played, and can continue to play, in emerging debates on the 
question of the animal and posthumanist conceptualisations of life. 3) I seek to unsettle 
the perceived opposition between historical and contemporary theoretical approaches to 
Woolf’s writings. Whilst the so-called ‘turn’ (or return) to the archive and historicism in 
modernist studies13 coincided with the diminishing influence of postmodernist or 
postrstructuralist theory (based on the largely misguided premise that this theory was 
anti-historical and not concerned enough with the material contexts), there are crucial 
questions concerning materialism in relation to the aforementioned issues of sexuality, 
animality and posthumanism that are currently being posed in contemporary theory and 
philosophy and which have still to be fully explored in Woolf’s oeuvre. Materiality is not 
only a concern for archivists, and the way we historicise is affected by how we theorise 
materiality and how theory is materialised. 
Working through these three stated concerns, this thesis attempts to open up a 
broader discussion on what precisely is at stake, and what new perspectives can be 
offered, in theorising Virginia Woolf today. Focusing on these wide-ranging but 
interrelated issues, and reading Woolf alongside but also inside theoretical writings (and 
vice versa), my aim is therefore not only to provide a new perspective on Woolf’s 
writings or indeed to demonstrate the ways in which Woolf’s texts help elucidate the 
subversive potential (and limitations) in these current theoretical contexts; it is also to 
explore some of the aesthetic, political, ethical, historical and conceptual links between 
                                                 
13 Peter Brooker and Andrew Thacker. ‘Introduction: Locating the Modern.’ Geographies of Modernism: 
Literatures, Cultures, Spaces, ed. Peter Brooker and Andrew Thacker. New York: Routledge, 2005, p.1. 
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modernist literature and contemporary theory. More specifically then, and building on the 
premise reached by poststructuralist and postmodernist criticism that Woolf radically 
destabilises essential differences based on binary oppositions, I will go on to ask: what 
precisely are the models of materiality, and indeed subjectivity, made possible by 
Woolf’s texts and by the complex contemporary cultures and theories her writing has so 
clearly affected? In order to further situate my approach within Woolf studies and also 
this new materialist turn in theory, I will use this introduction to draw out some important 
threads in Woolf criticism in relation to theory, before turning to a discussion of the 
stakes involved in reading Woolf in the context of emerging theories of materiality, 
focusing in particular the recent interest in the relationship between Woolf and Deleuze. I 
will end this introduction by providing an overview of the five chapters of this thesis.  
 
Woolf, Modernism and Theory 
The broader links between the modernist aesthetics, and cultures, that emerged in the first 
half of the twentieth century and those theoretical debates that proliferated in the second 
half have recently been emphasised by Stephen Ross in his edited collection, Modernism 
and Theory: A Critical Debate (2009). Ross claims that while scholars returning to the 
archives over the past fifteen years or so have widened the scope of what we now think of 
as the new modernist studies, it is unfortunate and somewhat puzzling that this has often 
coincided with the marginalisation of theory: 
 
The ironies attending this elision verge on modernist absurdity: theory’s challenge to 
predominant notions of the literary, canon formation, disciplinary formations, high and 
low culture, progress, civilisation, and imperialism helped make the new modernist 
studies possible. Also, theory’s concern with globalization, imperialism, gender and sex 
roles, race and racism, reason and superstition, enlightenment and benightedness, 
sovereignty and slavery, margins and peripheries, and ethical complexities continues, 
albeit in a different register, modernism’s already articulated concerns. Modernism’s 
critique of modernity animated theory’s invention of postmodernity, while theory’s anti-
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foundational stance extended modernism’s indeterminacy, linguistic complexity, and 
reflexivity.14 
 
Despite the temporal gap, theory dating from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s – whether 
phenomenological, psychoanalytic, poststructuralist or (‘third wave’) feminist – is, 
according to Ross, ‘integrally bound’ to modernism precisely because of shared aesthetic 
and political concerns but also because its philosophical roots are ‘either modernist (e.g. 
Heidegger, Husserl, Sartre, Wittgenstein) or shared by modernism (e.g. Kant, Hegel, 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard)’.15 Where our readings of Woolf are concerned 
we might add Henri Bergson, especially considering that in Virginia Woolf: A Study 
(1935), one of the earliest monographs on her writings, Ruth Gruber suggests that Woolf 
was ‘living in the Bergsonian atmosphere’ and was ‘too innately creative, too inherently 
Bergsonian to be called Bergson’s imitator.’16 Indeed, in the years since theory’s 
prominence began to wane in the mid-1990s, a renewed interest in Woolf studies in the 
theoretical and philosophical roots of modernism has been evident in several important 
monographs on Woolf. Notable examples include: Gillian Beer’s The Common Ground 
(1996), which considers wide-ranging influences on Woolf’s writing and includes essays 
on Darwin, Freud and prehistory, on Hume and Leslie Stephen, and on the advances 
made in the new physics; Ann Banfield’s meticulous study of Woolf in relation to 
Bertrand Russell’s theory of knowledge and Roger Fry’s aesthetic theory in The Phantom 
Table (2000);17 Holly Henry’s Virginia Woolf and the Discourse of Science (2003) which 
outlines how advances in astronomy and their popularization in the 1920s and 1930s 
impacted on Woolf’s writing; and Christine Froula’s Virginia Woolf and the Bloomsbury 
Avant-Garde (2005) which places Woolf in dialogue with Emmanuel Kant, Bertrand 
Russell, Roger Fry, and Sigmund Freud (among others) in order to situate her at the heart 
                                                 
14 Stephen Ross. ‘Introduction: the Missing Link.’ Modernism and Theory: A Critical Debate, ed. Stephen 
Ross. New York: Routledge, 2009, p.1-2. 
15 Ross 2009, p.2. 
16 Ruth Grubar. Virginia Woolf: the Will to Create as a Woman. New York: Carroll and Graf, 2005, p.109. 
(Originally published as Virginia Woolf: a Study in 1935.) For more on Woolf and Bergson see James 
Hafley. The Glass Roof: Virginia Woolf as Novelist. New York: Russell & Russell, 1963; Shiv Kumar. 
Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel. London: Blackie & Son, 1962; Mary Ann Gillies. Henri 
Bergson and British Modernism. London: McGill-Queen’s UP, 1996, p.107-131. 
17 For a classic study of Woolf’s writing and Fry’s aesthetic theory see Allen McLauren’s Virginia Woolf: 
The Echoes Enslaved. Cambridge: CUP, 1973 [reprinted in 2010].  
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of European modernist debates about freedom and civilization. More recently, Angeliki 
Spiropolou’s Virginia Woolf, Modernity and History (2010) offers the first full-length 
monograph on Woolf and Walter Benjamin.18 These illuminating, contextualised readings 
have been largely focused on theoretical and philosophical debates contemporaneous to 
when Woolf herself was writing, and reinforce Goldman’s recent reflection that 
‘[c]ontextualising Woolf is not simply a historical turn. It entails a simultaneous return to 
theoretical and critical contexts, in which the processes of historicising and 
contextualising are always already placed’. In recent years then, theoretical contexts have 
not necessarily been opposed to historical analyses, and have helped shape the way we 
engage with Woolf’s modernism.19 
But where the aforementioned studies are primarily concerned with theoretical 
contexts contemporary to when Woolf herself was writing (sensitive to the risks of 
decontextualisation), the central tenet of Ross’ argument, and a key consideration in this 
thesis, is that it is also important to re-focus attention on the links between the modernist 
literature and the theoretical debates of the latter decades of the century. This is itself a 
matter of contextualisation: the historical, cultural, aesthetic and philosophical links 
between modernism and theory are strengthened by reading modernism and post-60s 
theory alongside one another in ways that involve not simply using theory as providing a 
particular methodology for readings of modernist texts or of modernism providing 
examples of theoretical concepts; rather modernism and theory might, as Ross puts it, be 
                                                 
18 See also Pamela Caughie (ed). Virginia Woolf in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. New York: 
Garland, 2000. For a helpful summary of further important interventions in Woolf studies since the mid-
1990s see Goldman. The Cambridge Introduction to Virginia Woolf. Cambridge: CUP, 2006. In addition to 
those texts cited above Goldman points to important contextualising scholarship that falls outside my own 
particular focus in this introduction, but which has nonetheless opened up Woolf’s writing to new 
theoretical contexts, some of which I touch on later in my thesis. For example, readings of Woolf in the 
context of race and Empire in Jane Marcus’ ‘Britannia Rules The Waves’ (1992) and in Kathy J. Phillips’ 
Virginia Woolf Against Empire (1994), which sparked interest in Woolf and postcolonial theory; Eileen 
Barrett’s and Patricia Cramer’s collection Virginia Woolf: Lesbian Readings (1997), which opened up fresh 
discussion on Woolf and theories of sexuality; the focus on questions of cosmopolitanism and community 
in Jessica Berman’s Modernist Fiction, Cosmopolitanism and the Politics of Community (2001); and 
important new feminist readings of Woolf’s politics and aesthetics in Jane Goldman’s The Feminist 
Aesthetics of Virginia Woolf (1998) and Naomi Black’s Virginia Woolf as Feminist (2004). More recently, 
we can also add insightful accounts of Woolf and the ‘everyday’ in Bryony Randall’s Modernism, Daily 
Time and Everyday Life (2007) and Lorraine Sim’s Virginia Woolf: the Patterns of Ordinary Experience 
(2010).  
19 Jane Goldman. ‘Avant-garde.’ Modernism and Theory: A Critical Debate, ed. Stephen Ross. New York: 
Routledge, 2009, p.227. 
  
9
thought of as ‘mutually sustaining aspects of the same project’ where ‘[m]odernist 
writing thinks theoretically and theory writes modernistically’.20 The extent to which this 
is true of all modernist writing, and indeed theory of the kind Ross focuses on, is of 
course contestable, but I want to take from his argument the emphasis on bringing 
together, or indeed ‘intercepting’ (a term that I turn to in my postscript when reflecting on 
the implications for considering different contexts together) modernism and theory, 
themselves historical movements and moments, which need not be thought of as a flight 
from, rather a rethinking of, material contexts. As Fredric Jameson states in his 
‘Afterword’ to the same volume: 
 
it is a reinvention of the historical situation alone that allows us to grasp the text as a 
vibrant historical act, and not as a document of the archives. And this is why even those 
texts which seemed to have become documents in a now distant past, like the one-time 
masterpieces of the modern, suddenly come alive as living acts and forms of praxis – 
aesthetic, social, political, psychoanalytic, even ontological – which imperiously solicit 
our attention.21 
 
As a theorist of the modern on her own terms, and someone who prompts us in ‘How it 
Strikes a Contemporary’ (1925) to ‘scan the horizon; see the past in relation to the future’ 
(CR1 241), Woolf, I argue, provides with her writing the ideal context ‘to ask not just 
what modernism can tell us about theory and what theory can tell us about modernism, 
but also what the nexus modernism/theory can tell us about the twentieth century’s 
preoccupations, tendencies, triumphs, and failures.’22  
In Woolf studies, the influence of poststructuralist and postmodernist readings of 
Woolf in the 1980s and 1990s testifies to the previous links made between modernism 
and the kind of theory Ross claims is now marginalised. Although I will go on to explain 
some of the important ways in which my thesis departs from such readings, my approach 
to Woolf does also build on several key aspects of these studies. I want to draw particular 
attention to four well-known texts by Toril Moi, Makiko Minow-Pinkney, Rachel 
                                                 
20 Ross 2009, p.2. 
21 Fredric Jameson. ‘Afterword.’ Modernism and Theory: A Critical Debate, ed. Stephen Ross. New York: 
Routledge, 2009, p.248. 
22 Ross 2009, p.15. 
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Bowlby and Pamela Caughie that provided my own grounding in the critical and creative 
potential in poststructuralist and postmodernist readings of Woolf. Firstly, the 
introduction to Moi’s Sexual/Textual Politics (1985), though not the first poststructuralist 
reading of Woolf,23 is commonly referred to as having provided a turning point in Woolf 
criticism.24 Introducing her wide-ranging analysis of Anglo-American and French 
feminisms, Moi places Woolf as a forerunner of feminist theory, and makes her often-
cited assertion that Woolf’s modernist aesthetics and feminist politics are not to be seen 
as mutually exclusive, that her feminist politics are located ‘precisely in her textual 
practice’.25 She advocates a Derridean and Kristevan approach to Woolf in order to argue 
that she creates a deconstructive form of writing that, contrary to the claims of Anglo-
American feminist critics such as Elaine Showalter, is sceptical of realist aesthetics and 
humanist formulations of identity. In particular, Moi claims that Woolf anticipates 
Kristeva’s formulation in ‘Women’s Time’ of a ‘third attitude’ or stage of feminism 
which challenges the oppositional conceptualisation of the feminist struggle, and is to be 
distinguished from – although not an erasure of – the first stage characterised by the 
demand for ‘insertion into history’ and for ‘equal footing with men’, and the second by 
the demand for ‘recognition of an irreducible identity, without equal in the opposite 
sex’26 (a point that I discuss in section 2.1 in relation to Woolf’s androgyny).27  
Having signalled an openness to poststructuralist readings of Woolf, Moi’s 
introduction is then followed by Minow-Pinkney’s Virginia Woolf and the Problem of the 
Subject (1987), the first book-length study to adopt this approach. Minow-Pinkney 
provides a more detailed focus on Kristeva and Derrida, and reads with and against 
Jacques Lacan, in her feminist poststructuralist psychoanalytic account of Woolf’s 
writing which seeks to find a new deconstructive understanding of subjectivity. Echoing 
                                                 
23 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. ‘Unmaking and making in To the Lighthouse.’ Other Worlds: Essays in 
Cultural Politics. London: Routledge, 1988 [1980]; Perry Meisel. The Absent Father: Virginia Woolf and 
Walter Pater. New Haven: Yale UP, 1980; and Peggy Kamuf. ‘Penelope at Work: Interruptions in A Room 
of One’s Own.’ Novel 16 (1982), 5-18.  
24 See Pamela L. Caughie. Virginia Woolf and Postmodernism: Literature in Quest and Question of Itself. 
Urbana and Chicago: U of Illinois P, 1991, p.1. The opening line of Caughie’s study emphasises the 
importance of Moi’s intervention by claiming that ‘In or about December 1985, Virginia Woolf criticism 
changed’. 
25 Moi 1995 [1985], p.16. 
26 Julia Kristeva. ‘Women’s Time.’ Feminisms: An Anthology of Literary Theory and Criticism (2nd 
Edition), ed. Robyn R. Warhol and Diane Price Herndl. New Jersey: Rutgers UP, 1997 [1981], p.864-865. 
27 See Toril Moi. Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory. London: Routledge, 1995 [1985]: 1-18. 
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Moi, Minow-Pinkney argues that Woolf’s modernist experimental aesthetics can ‘best be 
seen as a feminist subversion of the deepest formal principles – of the very definitions of 
narrative, writing, the subject – of a patriarchal social order.’28 She makes particular use 
of Derrida’s concept of différance, or the endless deferral of meaning,29 and his critique 
of ‘phonocentrism’,30 and she focuses on the radical potential of feminist psychoanalytic 
theorists (especially Kristeva) who  
 
start from psychoanalysis, but simultaneously go beyond it in deconstructing binary 
oppositions of presence/absence organised around the phallus as the Signifier (what 
Cixous terms ‘hierarchised oppositions’) […] They offer a theoretical understanding of 
femininity as the term which has been repressed into marginality and silence by the order 
of representation, thus constituting the very condition for the functioning of the symbolic 
order.31  
 
In another hugely influential study from this period, Virginia Woolf: Feminist 
Destinations (1988), Rachel Bowlby offers a broadly poststructuralist reading of Woolf’s 
feminism – albeit that she departs from the more technical analysis provided by Minow-
Pinkney – to  suggest that ‘issues of literary representation, historical narrative and sexual 
difference are inseparable throughout Woolf’s work’, and Bowlby argues that this is 
precisely what makes Woolf a feminist writer, one that questions ‘the very notion of 
straightforward directions and known destinations’.32 In the wake of these feminist 
poststructuralist and psychoanalytic readings of Woolf, Caughie’s Virginia Woolf and 
Postmodernism (1991) takes issue with those who would want to claim Woolf as 
primarily a modernist or a feminist and focuses on how various strands of 
postmodernist/poststructuralist theory and literature challenge the motivations and 
reading strategies with which we approach Woolf’s texts. Caughie does not seek to claim 
Woolf as a postmodernist avant la lettre, but to challenge orthodox modernist and 
                                                 
28 Minow-Pinkney 1987, p.x. Evidence of this book’s continued influence, it has been republished in 2011 
with Edinburgh UP. 
29 Minow-Pinkney 1987, p.25. 
30 Minow-Pinkney 1987, p.30-36. 
31 Minow-Pinkney 1987, p.16-17. 
32 See Feminist Destinations and Further Essays on Virginia Woolf. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1997, p.14-
15. It is this later edition of Bowlby’s 1988 text with additional essays which I cite from throughout this 
thesis. 
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feminist readings of her writings which fail, she claims, to move past various binary 
oppositions between ‘conventional and modern, masculine and feminine, appearance and 
reality, the external and the essence’.33  
Reflecting on these poststructuralist and postmodernist approaches to Woolf and 
to feminism, and acknowledging that self-identifying as either is now considered to be 
unfashionable (indeed, according to Moi’s own recent comments poststructuralist 
feminism is ‘an intellectual tradition that has been fully explored’ and that ‘the 
poststructuralist paradigm is now exhausted’),34 Caughie today maintains that there is still 
important work to be done concerning the relationship between Woolf’s writing and 
poststructuralist or postmodern theory: 
 
If I continue to ride that dead horse, it is because I believe that “things may stay true 
longer than they stay interesting.” There remains the need for a feminist intervention 
informed by the insights of poststructuralist theory that would have us question notions of 
collective identity or action, end-oriented narratives, or the past as redeemable. Where a 
notion of progress returns in our history of theory is not in the notion of ends, as if there 
is a goal to be realized, but in the realization that feminism is what cannot pass, or 
become passé.35 
 
Theory may well have been, to some extent, marginalised over the past fifteen years or so 
in the expansion of the new modernist studies, but there is little doubt that by opening up 
readings of Woolf to new critical and theoretical contexts (including fields recognised 
today as cultural studies, gender studies and queer theory) these postmodernist and 
poststructuralist readings continue to be important in challenging our assumptions – 
whether from a theoretical or historical/cultural perspective – about the stability of 
                                                 
33 Caughie 1991, p.5. Other critics have argued that a re-classification of Woolf’s oeuvre as ‘postmodern’ is 
justified – for example see Ann Marie Hebert. ‘“What Does it Mean? How Do You Explain it All?” 
Virginia Woolf: A Postmodern Modernist.’ Virginia Woolf Miscellanies: Proceedings of the First Annual 
Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. Mark Hussey and Vera Neverow-Turk. New York: Pace UP, 1992: 10-
18. 
34 Toril Moi. ‘“I Am Not a Feminist, But…”: How Feminism Became the F-Word.’ PMLA 121:5 (2006), 
p.1740; p.1735. 
35 Pamela L. Caughie. ‘Time’s Exception.’ Modernism and Theory: A Critical Debate, ed. Stephen Ross. 
London: Routledge, 2009, p.108. See also Pamela Caughie. ‘Poststructuralist and Postmodernist 
Approaches to Virginia Woolf.’ Palgrave Advances in Virginia Woolf Studies, ed. Anna Snaith. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007: 143-68.  
  
13
intentionality, language, meaning and identity. These approaches have helped to illustrate 
that reading Woolf does not entail a choice between seeing her as only concerned with 
modernist experimentation or with a feminist literary tradition, but rather that her feminist 
politics and modernist aesthetics form part of the same project. Moreover, and as I noted 
at the beginning of this introduction, my approach builds on their radical destabilisation 
of hierarchical binary oppositions and challenges to essentialism – aspects which have 
been crucial to the way I have read Woolf from my first encounters with her texts. 
However, if these poststructuralist or postmodernist readings of Woolf continue to 
be important in drawing attention to some of the continuities between modernism and 
theory, helping us to reassess, as Ross puts it, the ‘preoccupations, tendencies, triumphs, 
and failures’ of the twentieth century, then they also lead us, I suggest, to new theoretical 
concerns and conceptual paradigms which have evolved from these approaches and 
which impact on how we think about the relationship between modernism and theory at 
the beginning of the twenty-first. This shift is evident in chapter one of this thesis where I 
attempt to unsettle a number of binary oppositions usually associated with Woolf’s 
granite/rainbow term, such as fact/fiction, solidity/intangibility and 
objectivity/subjectivity. But in the process – and this marks a key departure point of my 
own approach – I also begin to challenge the opposition between materiality/theory, and 
tthe primacy of language and textuality over materiality, which becomes more significant 
in my subsequent chapters when I focus on the ways in which Woolf’s conceptualisations 
of sex, animal and life are embedded in questions of embodiment and environment, and 
in nature as much as culture, in the nonhuman as much as the human. Crucially then, 
whilst my approach in this thesis is theoretical, and whilst influenced by poststructualism, 
I depart in particular from the above poststructuralist or postmodernist approaches to 
Woolf’s modernism and feminism in their emphasis on psychoanalytic structures of 
subjectivity and desire (something I discuss more fully in section 2.2.2 and in chapter 
three), and of language and discourse. As I will explain in the following section of this 
introduction, this is precisely to take account of the changing nature of ‘theory’ since the 
predominance of poststructuralism and postmodernism in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
where materiality has become the grounds for important theoretical debates that seek to 
re-evaluate how we think of our material contexts. That this is still linked to 
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poststructuralism rather than a complete break from it is emphasised by the fact that the 
work of Deleuze (both solo and with Guattari) is crucial to these new theories of 
materiality. As a key figure of  ‘high’ (poststructuralist) theory and someone who was 
profoundly influenced by modernist literature, Deleuze, as I will explain below, has only 
recently come to prominence in modernist studies and Woolf studies, much later than 
other poststructuralist thinkers such as Derrida, Lacan, Kristeva and Foucault. But rather 
than simply aiming to fill a gap in Woolf studies where her work has still to be 
considered alongside Deleuze, I place my reading of Woolf in the context of 
contemporary dialogues on materialist theories of sex, animal and life that have been 
inspired by, and have also produced challenges to, his thought (for example the sceptical 
reactions of feminist theorists to the concept of ‘becoming-woman’, discussed in chapter 
two, or the conflicting ways that theorists have responded to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
writings on the animal, discussed in chapter four). When I focus on important materialist 
theorists of the following generation(s), including Braidotti, Donna Haraway, Matthew 
Calarco, Karen Barad, and Jane Bennett, I do so not to suggest that what is revolutionary 
in contemporary theory can be characterised simply by the shift from one set of thinkers 
to another, but to situate my readings of Woolf in the context of ongoing and contentious 
theoretical debates concerning new and nonanthropocentric conceptualisations of 
materiality.  
Following poststructuralism, there may well be a ‘contemporary theoretical 
astuteness’, as Claire Colebrook puts it, ‘consisting of acknowledging the provisional 
status of one’s position’ and an awareness of ‘some textual mediating condition – there is 
no sex in itself, race in itself, history in itself’, but the way in which this awareness passes 
through diverse fields and disciplines sometimes ‘avoids the problem of theory’.36 In this 
thesis I am not simply concerned with imposing a theoretical framework onto Woolf’s 
texts but in tackling the problem of doing theory itself, focusing of the ways in which in 
Woolf’s texts are themselves theorised and theorising. Such an approach entails, of 
course, choosing to read Woolf in certain contexts, emphasising one set of debates rather 
than another. This points to a limitation in the kind of postmodernist approach Caughie 
                                                 
36 Claire Colebrook. ‘Extinct Theory.’ Theory After ‘Theory’, ed. Jane Elliott and Derek Attridge. New 
York: Routledge, 2011, p.63. 
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advocates in her earlier book, in that her polemical critique of dualisms too easily falls 
back on a ‘refusal to choose’, a phrase that recurs throughout Virginia Woolf and 
Postmodernism,37 as itself a subversive act rather than exploring the ways in which 
specific choices – whether made by or for us – can lead us to find heterogeneity and 
multiplicity in Woolf’s texts. Whilst not wishing to reduce Woolf’s writings to any one 
theoretical framework, in this thesis I have chosen to focus on specific thematic concerns 
and commit Woolf’s texts to particular theoretical alliances. That is, whilst any 
theoretical approach to Woolf will, to some extent, be partial, it seems to me that rather 
than simply suspending or deferring commitment to close reading and sustained analysis 
of her texts, we can conceive of committed but open readings in a similar way to the 
notion of ‘swift marriages’ Woolf uses in ‘Craftsmanship’ (1937) to describe the 
powerful but changeable combinations words create in different contexts (a notion I 
explore more fully in chapter one in relation to her figuration of ‘granite and rainbow’), 
where ideas and choices would be brought together in a certain context whilst remaining 
aware that ‘the truth they try to catch is many-sided’, and so will require change, revision, 
and future perspectives (E6 97).  
Despite premature obituaries then, theory has far from disappeared (just as, vice 
versa, historicism is hardly a nascent activity). As Jane Elliott and Derek Attridge’s 
recent intervention in Theory After ‘Theory’ suggests, the role of theory itself is at an 
exciting stage, ‘returning’ in new and unexpected forms: 
 
Since the mid-1990s, the story goes, theory has continued to diversify, drawing on the 
work of a range of new figures and examining a host of new archives and arenas, but its 
newer incarnations offer at most a kind of afterlife of the once vital object that was 
‘Theory’, a diluted form lacking in both intellectual substance and institutional 
prominence. [...But] where theory continues to thrive, it increasingly adopts positions that 
challenge some of the fundamental intellectual stances that once defined ‘Theory’ […] 
new work is being produced that mounts such challenges from within theory’s now much 
wider institutional and discursive boundaries.38  
                                                 
37 Caughie herself worries over, and defends, her use of this phrase in the book’s conclusion. See Caughie 
1991, p.194 – 210. 
38 Jane Elliott and Derek Attridge. ‘Introduction: Theory’s Nine Lives.’ Theory After ‘Theory’, ed. Jane 
Elliott and Derek Attridge. New York: Routledge, 2011, p.1. 
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If we are to consider the relationship between Woolf and theory today then, it has not 
simply to be a return to the poststructuralist or postmodernist readings of Woolf that were 
so influential in the 1980s and 1990s but to new theoretical paradigms. My own position 
here then is that much of the important work still to be done within Woolf studies in 
relation to theory involves close analysis of her texts in the context of our own 
contemporary theoretical debates – whether those conversations on new materialist 
conceptualisations of sex, animal and life that I engage with in this thesis or the others 
that have been beyond the scope of this study – that are influenced by both 
poststructuralist theorists and by Woolf herself. More broadly speaking then, it is at the 
intersection of these two concerns – on the revitalising of the relationship between 
modernism and theory and of theory after ‘Theory’ – that my own reading of Woolf and 
the materiality of theory can be situated.  
 
Woolf, New Materialisms and Deleuze 
Considerations of the relationship between Woolf’s writing and materiality is itself 
nothing new to Woolf studies. Michèle Barrett, in her 1979 introduction to Virginia 
Woolf: Women and Writing, makes clear that Woolf is both a theorist39 and concerned 
with the material conditions of women: ‘She argued that the writer was the product of her 
or his historical circumstances, and that material conditions were of crucial importance. 
Secondly, she claimed that these material circumstances had a profound effect on the 
psychological aspects of writing, and that they could be seen to influence the nature of 
the creative work itself.’40 Barrett cites a famous passage from A Room of One’s Own 
(1929) to support her argument: ‘these webs are not spun in mid-air by incorporeal 
creatures, but are the work of suffering human beings, and are attached to grossly 
material things, like health and money and the houses we live in’ (RO 53). Yet, contrary 
to other feminist critics such as Jane Marcus,41 Barrett was uncomfortable with claiming 
                                                 
39 Michèle Barrett. ‘Introduction.’ Virginia Woolf: Women & Writing, ed. Michèle Barrett. London: The 
Women’s Press, 1979, p.2. 
40 Barrett 1979, p.5. 
41 See Jane Marcus. ‘Thinking Back Through Our Mothers.’ New Feminist Essays on Virginia Woolf, ed. 
Jane Marcus. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1981: 1-30, Jane Marcus. ‘Storming the Toolshed.’ Feminisms: An 
Anthology of Literary Theory and Criticism (2nd Edition), ed. Robyn R. Warhol and Diane Price Herndl. 
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Woolf’s ‘materialist’ argument as Marxist.42 Writing twenty years later in Imagination in 
Theory (1999)  – and having noted the ‘intimate blow’ dealt to many of the ‘working 
assumptions’ of Marxist materialism by poststructuralism’s anti-humanism, its critique of 
teleological thought, and its insistence on the constructed nature of linguistic meaning43 – 
Barrett reinforces the ‘ambiguity’ she finds in Woolf’s materialism.44 Intriguingly, she at 
the same time notes the ambiguity in Woolf’s relationship to humanism, claiming that 
Woolf displays an ‘agnostic kind of not-humanism’ in contrast to the more pointed ‘anti-
humanism’ of Louis Althusser or of the poststructuralists.45 
In this thesis I seek to further explore – and, I hope, further complicate – the 
relationship between Woolf’s writing and non-humanist, or even ‘posthumanist’  (a term 
I discuss more fully in chapter five), conceptualisations of materiality, including the ways 
in which this offers a challenge to the modelling of subjectivity. While Barrett is hesitant 
to go beyond agnosticism and ambiguity, partly as a result of her worries over the 
political impotence that she fears for such a position,46 my own reading of Woolf places 
her in the politically and ethically charged context of debates which, following 
poststructuralism, have emerged in recent years and mark, as Rosi Braidotti puts it, ‘a 
shift away from anthropocentrism, in favour of a new emphasis on the mutual 
interdependence of material, biocultural, and symbolic forces in the making of social and 
political practices […] a reconsideration of the concept of subjectivity in terms of “life-
forces”.’47 In the wake of the poststructuralist emphasis on discourse and subjectivity, 
and ‘the ontological and epistemological presumptions that have supported modern 
approaches to the material world’, Diana Coole and Samantha Frost argue in New 
Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (2010) that ‘it is now time to subject 
                                                                                                                                                 
New Jersey: Rutgers UP, 1997 [1982], p.263-278. Jane Marcus. ‘Quentin’s Bogey.’ Critical Inquiry 11:3 
(1985), 486-497. 
42 Barrett 1979, p.23.  
43 Michèle Barrett. Imagination in Theory: Essays on Writing and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, 
p.19-20. Barrett also reflects here on the ways that she herself becomes increasingly critical of Marxist 
feminism in texts including Women’s Oppression Today (1980) and The Politics of Truth (1992). 
44 See also Barrett 1999, p.62-67. 
45 Barrett 1999, p.196.  
46 Barrett’s preference for an ‘agnostic not-humanism’ reflects her sense that anti-humanism jeopardises 
‘art, religion, pleasure, the emotions, the senses, political agency – in short, most of the important things in 
life’. Barrett 1999, p.6. 
47 Rosi Braidotti. ‘The Politics of “Life Itself” and New Ways of Dying.’ New Materialisms: Ontology, 
Agency, and Politics, ed. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost. Durham: Duke UP, 2010, p.203. 
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objectivity and material reality to a similarly radical reappraisal.’48 They outline three 
themes of these ‘new materialisms’: the view of matter as itself having agency, a view 
that is tied to posthumanism; the status of ‘life’ and related bioethical and biopolitical 
issues; and a ‘nondogmatic’ critical reengagement with ‘the material details of everyday 
life and broader geopolitical and socioeconomic structures […] An important 
characteristic shared by all three components is their emphasis on materialization as a 
complex, pluralistic, relatively open process and their insistence that humans, including 
theorists themselves, be recognized as thoroughly immersed within materiality’s 
productive contingencies.’49 
Jane Bennett has noted in Vibrant Matter (2010) that this move towards a 
nonanthropocentric conceptualisations of materiality, coupled with conceptualisations of 
a non-theological, immanent vitalism, offers a further challenge to Marxism:  
 
How did Marx’s notion of materiality – as economic structures and exchanges that 
provoke many other events – come to stand for the materialist perspective per se? Why is 
there not a more robust debate between contending philosophies of materiality or 
between contending accounts of how materiality matters to politics?  
 For some time political theory has acknowledged that materiality matters. But 
this materiality most often refers to human social structures or to the human meanings 
“embodied” in them and other objects. Because politics is itself often construed as an 
exclusively human domain, what registers on it is a set of material constraints on or a 
context for human action. Dogged resistance to anthropocentrism is perhaps the main 
difference between the vital materialism I pursue and this kind of historical materialism.50 
 
These emerging materialisms therefore involve an engagement with materiality that 
departs from poststructuralist emphases on language and discourse, but has nonetheless, 
as Jason Edwards puts it, grown out of ‘powerful criticisms made by poststructuralism of 
the concepts of the subject and of historical teleology provided an unanswerable 
challenge to the humanist and historicist Marxism that tended also toward economic 
                                                 
48 Diana Coole and Samantha Frost. ‘Introducing the New Materialisms.’ New Materialisms: Ontology, 
Agency, and Politics, ed. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost. Durham: Duke UP, 2010, p.2-3. 
49 Coole and Frost 2010, p.7. 
50 Jane Bennett. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke UP, 2010, p.xvi. 
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determinism.’51 As Coole and Frost stress, ‘coming after poststructuralism and its 
criticisms, no workable version of Marxism can advance a historical metanarrative, aspire 
to the identification of determining economic laws, valorize an originary, pristine nature, 
or envisage communism as history’s idealized material destiny.’52 The move towards 
post-Cartesian and affirmative (rather than dialectical) materialism ‘sees its task as 
creating new concepts and images of nature that affirm matter’s immanent vitality’, 
therefore complicating how we conceive of causation and emphasising multiple 
entanglements of agency.53 The challenge with the new materialist ontologies then ‘is to 
give materiality its due while recognizing its plural dimensions and its complex, 
contingent modes of appearing.’54 
Throughout this thesis I encounter various different theories of materiality. I begin 
in chapter one with Woolf’s own theory of ‘granite and rainbow’ which, I argue, is 
entangled in a vibrant, multiple and creative engagement with the material world. In the 
subsequent chapters I go on to consider the ways in which various aspects of her 
conceptualisation of sex, animal and life might be illuminated alongside Braidotti’s 
materialist nomadic feminism (chapter two), Braidotti’s ‘polymorphous vitalism’ and 
Colebrook’s ‘queer vitalism’ (chapter three), Haraway’s ‘mud philosophy’ (chapter four), 
and Bennett’s theory of ‘vital materialism’ alongside Barad’s quantum-inspired, material-
discursive ‘intra-action’. All these theories are in one way or another influenced by 
Deleuze (and Guattari). Therefore, by reassessing the much-discussed questions of sexual 
difference and sexuality in Woolf’s writing alongside the more recently emerging debates 
on animality and life itself, I am interested not only in the more classically ‘materialist’ 
arguments Woolf puts forward in texts such as A Room of One’s Own and Three Guineas 
(1938), but also the possibility that throughout her writing she theorises a 
nonanthropocentric or, to use the term that I turn to later in this thesis, ‘posthumanist’ 
conceptualisation of materiality. I want to argue that throughout her writings, Woolf 
displays a theoretically sophisticated engagement with materiality which impacts on her 
use of language, her modelling of subjectivity and her conceptualisation of external 
                                                 
51 Jason Edwards. ‘The Materialism of Historical Materialism.’ New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and 
Politics, ed. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost. Durham: Duke UP, 2010, p.296.  
52 Coole and Frost 2010, p.30. 
53 Coole and Frost 2010, p.8-9. 
54 Coole and Frost 2010, p.27. 
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realities. Woolf’s politics is not so much situated in her textual practice or limited to the 
material concerns with having ‘five hundred a year and a room with a lock on the door’ 
(RO 137) – although these are of course crucial – but consists in a wide-ranging 
reconceptualisation of materiality and subjectivity in her novels, short stories and essays 
as well as her autobiographical writings.  
As mentioned above, a central figure throughout my reading of Woolf is Deleuze 
(both solo and with Guattari). Although a key figure of poststructuralist thought, the 
interest in Deleuze in literary studies, as well as in Anglophone continental philosophy, 
developed later than figures such as Derrida, Foucault, Kristeva and Lacan.55 In the 
poststructuralist readings of Woolf outlined in the previous section of this introduction, 
Deleuze is almost entirely absent from consideration. When he is briefly referred to by 
Minow-Pinkney, it is to dismiss his anti-dialectical position and refusal to place language 
as the primary concern of subject-formation. Deleuze and Guattari are ‘one-sided 
theorists’ who ‘fetishise the moment of de-structuration and a-signification’.56 But in 
recent years Deleuze and Guattari have been hugely influential in new theories of 
materiality precisely because, unlike other poststructuralist perspectives, they do not 
fetishise language. As Colebrook helpfully summarises:  
 
At a time when political, film, literary and feminist theory were dominated by 
‘discourse’, ‘representation’ and ‘signification’, Deleuze’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
emphasis on life was incommensurable with the dominant style of criticism. Today, 
however, the turn to Deleuze has both created and been enabled by […] an emphasis on 
‘life’ and the sciences of life in literary, social, political and film theory. […] Deleuze is a 
valuable thinker for just this reason: not only does he refuse to regard discourse, 
signification, representation or systems as adequate starting points for theory, he also 
explains why thinking is seduced into the illusion of transcendence.57 
 
                                                 
55 For the most part there is also a longer delay before translations of Deleuze’s texts in comparison with 
Derrida’s. For further details see Paul Patton and John Protevi. ‘Introduction.’ Between Deleuze and 
Derrida, ed. Paul Patton and John Protevi. London: Continuum, 2003, p.9.  
56 Minow-Pinkney 1987, p.20. 
57 Claire Colebrook. Deleuze: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum, 2006, p.154. 
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For Deleuze then it is not simply a case of the endless deferral of meaning, but of ‘freeing 
the concept of sign and expression from linguistics, from their reduction to the dualism 
signifier/signified.’58 
To be sure, this is not to say that Deleuze shared no affinities with other 
poststructuralists.59 ‘Affinity’ is precisely the word used by Derrida, for example, in his 
eulogy for Deleuze (following Deleuze’s death in 1995), where he writes that he felt ‘a 
proximity or a near total affinity’ with Deleuze in terms of the thesis ‘concerning an 
irreducible difference that is in opposition to dialectical opposition, a difference “more 
profound” than a contradiction (Difference and Repetition), a difference in the joyously 
repeated affirmation (“yes, yes”)’.60 In chapter four of this thesis I turn to Derrida’s 
writings on the animal, and read him alongside Deleuze. But a key difference in their 
approaches is that where Derrida has been characterised as displaying ‘a sort of anxiety 
of influence […] leading to the redoubtable caution and reflexive awareness of his 
writing’, Deleuze’s affirmative philosophy is focused on the creation of the new.61 This 
affirmative mode of creation is captured by Deleuze in Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962):  
 
To affirm is still to evaluate, but to evaluate from the perspective of a will which enjoys 
its own difference in life instead of suffering the pains of the opposition to this life that it 
has itself inspired. To affirm is not to take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what 
is, but to release, to set free what lives. To affirm is to unburden: not to load life with the 
weight of higher values, but to create new values which are those of life, which make life 
light and active.62 
                                                 
58 André Pierre Colombat. ‘Deleuze and Signs.’ Deleuze and Literature, ed. Ian Buchanan and John Marks. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2000, p.21-22. 
59 For insightful discussion on the relationship between Deleuze and Foucault see Cary Wolfe. Critical 
Environments: Postmodern Theory and the Pragmatics of the “Outside”. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
1998, p.87-128; on Deleuze and Lacan see Daniel W. Smith. ‘The inverse side of the structure: Zizek on 
Deleuze on Lacan.’ Criticism 46:4 (2004), 635-650; on Deleuze and Derrida see Patton and Protevi 2003 
and Pheng Cheah. ‘Non-Dialectical Materialism.’ New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, ed. 
Diana Coole and Samantha Frost. Durham: Duke UP, 2010: 70-91; on Deleuze and Kristeva see Catherine 
Driscoll. ‘The Woman in Process: Deleuze, Kristeva and Feminism.’ Deleuze and Feminist Theory, ed. Ian 
Buchanan and Claire Colebrook. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2000, 64-85. Driscoll’s article also discusses 
Woolf’s feminism. 
60 Jacques Derrida. ‘I’ll have to wander all alone’, trans. David Kammerman. 
http://www.usc.edu/dept/comp-lit/tympanum/1/derrida.html 
61 Patton and Protevi 2003, p.6. 
62 Gilles Deleuze. Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson. London: Continuum, 2006 [1983], 
p.174. 
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The divergences between both Derrida and Deleuze’s notion of difference are also 
marked by their key influences. Derrida’s différance, promoting the free play of signifiers 
where, as he writes in Writing and Difference (1978), terms are bound up in ‘infinite 
implication, the indefinite referral of signifier to signifier’,63 is ‘post-phenomenological’ 
and therefore the likes of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger are engaged with in much more 
detail than they are in Deleuze’s ‘material and forceful’ difference.64 Deleuze turns more 
to Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche and Bergson, all of whom are linked, he argues, by ‘their 
critique of negativity, their cultivation of joy, the hatred of interiority, the externality of 
forces and relations, the denunciation of power’.65 As Pheng Cheah helpfully glosses: 
 
Derrida also broke away from dialectical negation through the thought of an originary 
movement of difference (iterability/ différance). But whereas for Derrida originary 
difference intimates a radical alterity that is not of the order of presence and actuality and, 
thus, is neither negative or positive, Deleuze characterizes the movement of originary 
difference as […] a plane of immanence that generates actuality. […] Unlike Derrida, 
what is affirmed [by Deleuze] is not a form of haunting or afterliving (sur-vie) that 
interrupts and dislocates the organic form of a living being but the pulsing force of a 
nonorganic and impersonal life that has infinitely greater vitality than any organism.66  
 
Difference for Deleuze, as I will explore further at various points in this thesis, is a vital, 
generative, ontologically primary force (see for example section 1.4 and 5.2.3). Deleuze 
himself distances his own approach to texts from Derrida’s ‘deconstructive’ method: 
‘With regard to the method of deconstruction of texts, I see well what it is, I admire it 
greatly, but I don’t see it having anything to do with my own…A text, for me, is only a 
little wheel in an extra-textual practice. It is not a question of commenting on a text by a 
method of deconstruction…or by any other method; it is a question of seeing what use a 
                                                 
63 Jacques Derrida. Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass. London: Routledge, 2001 [1978], p.29. 
64 Patton and Protevi 2003, p.5. 
65 Gilles Deleuze. ‘Letter to a Harsh Critic.’ Negotiations: 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin. New York: 
Columbia UP, 1995, p.6. 
66 Cheah 2010, p.83-84; 87. 
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text is in the extra-textual practice that prolongs the text.’67 In chapter one of this thesis I 
draw both an inter-textual and extra-textual mapping of Woolf’s famous ‘granite and 
rainbow’ term as an example of the difference embodied by the terms she uses in her own 
theorising, and in the chapters that follow I go on to discuss other materials for theory 
Woolf provides us with in her texts which survive and continue to act on questions of 
sexual difference and sexuality, animality, and posthuman life. 
As alluded to above, central to Deleuze’s view of literature is that it involves more 
than linguistic signs: his work ‘cannot’, John Hughes notes, ‘be identified with perhaps 
more familiar post-structuralist and deconstructive work, and its fixation on the 
scrupulous delineation of textual aporias.’68 Linguistic signs do not, for Deleuze, take a 
higher status than other types of signs. In Proust and Signs (1964), for example, Deleuze 
discusses ‘several kinds of signs’69 that all imply ‘a heterogeneity of relation’70 and in A 
Thousand Plateaus (1980) Deleuze and Guattari refer to ‘heterogeneous regimes of 
signs’:71  
 
A regime of signs constitutes a semiotic system. But it appears difficult to analyze 
semiotic systems in themselves: there is always a form of content that is simultaneously 
inseparable from and independent of the forms of expression, and the two forms pertain 
to assemblages that are not principally linguistic. However, one can proceed as though 
the formalization of expression were autonomous and self-sufficient. Even if that is done, 
there is such diversity, that it is impossible to attach any particular privilege to the form 
or regime of the “signifier.” If we call the signifying semiotic system semiology, then 
semiology is only one regime of signs among others, and not the most important one.72  
 
Deleuze outlines the heterogeneity of these signs in three particular ways in Difference 
and Repetition (1968): ‘first, in the object which bears or emits them, […] secondly, in 
                                                 
67 qtd. in Bruce Baugh. ‘Making the Difference: Deleuze’s Difference and Derrida’s Différance.’ Social 
Semiotics 7:2 (1997), p.143. Baugh provides a thorough analysis of the differences between Deleuze’s 
concept of difference and Derrida’s différance.    
68 John Hughes. Lines of Flight: Reading Deleuze with Hardy, Gissing, Conrad, Woolf. Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1997, p.16. 
69 Gilles Deleuze. Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard. London: Continuum, 2008 [1972], p.12. 
70 Deleuze 2008 [1972], p.15. 
71 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi. London: Continuum, 2004 [1988], p.93. 
72 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.123-124. 
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themselves, since a sign envelops another “object” within the limits of the object which 
bears it, and incarnates a natural or spiritual power (an Idea); finally, in the response they 
elicit, since the movement of the response does not “resemble” that of the sign.’73 As 
Colebrook posits, this presents an opportunity to re-think modernist literature:  
 
If “theory” has been dominated by an attention to the limits of language and structure, 
then modernism of a certain mode has been its default aesthetic, for modernism discloses 
signs as signs. If, however there is another mode of theory – such as Deleuze’s 
commitment to the smallest and most inhuman of perceptions – then it is possible to 
consider modernism not as reflection or interpretation of systems of signs, but as 
positively creative of new differences, new styles and new signs.74 
 
Where Deleuze has hitherto been read in modernist context, he has been 
considered much more widely alongside the likes of Franz Kafka, Antonin Artaud, 
Samuel Beckett, and Marcel Proust than Woolf. On the one hand this reflects the fact that 
these authors are the ones Deleuze himself wrote about most fully, yet in a collection of 
essays on Deleuze and Literature (2000), for example, Woolf is mentioned only once in 
passing when one of the essays lists some of the Anglo-American writers who influenced 
Deleuze – a list that includes Lawrence, Miller and Melville, among others.75 But 
Woolf’s influence on Deleuze should not be overlooked, as he cites her writing, and life, 
as an important consideration for his philosophical thought in texts spanning from the 
1970s to the end of his life in 1995 – including his Dialogues (1977) with Claire Parnet 
and A Thousand Plateaus and What is Philosophy? (1991) with Félix Guattari – where 
she is variously cited as exemplary of terms I will explore throughout this thesis 
including the key concepts of ‘becoming’ (see for example section 2.1.3 and 4.4) and 
‘haecceity’ (see section 5.2.2). Woolf also provides rare examples of Deleuze’s 
                                                 
73 Gilles Deleuze. Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton. London: Continuum, 2004 [1994], p.25. 
74 Claire Colebrook. ‘Woolf and “Theory”.’ Virginia Woolf in Context, ed. Jane Goldman and Bryony 
Randall. Cambridge: CUP (In Press). 
75 See T. Hugh Crawford. ‘The Paterson Plateau: Deleuze, Guattari and William Carlos Williams.’ Deleuze 
and Literature, ed. Ian Buchanan and John Marks. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2000, p.57. 
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references to a female author.76 In modernist studies, the first consideration of Woolf and 
Deleuze was in 1997 (and thus after the height of theory’s power in modernist literary 
studies) in John Hughes’ Lines of Flight, which focuses on Deleuze’s empiricism and 
provides readings of Thomas Hardy, George Gissing, Joseph Conrad along with a chapter 
on The Voyage Out (1915). Hughes’ Deleuzian reading of Woolf’s first novel also 
involves a discussion of Bergson’s ‘duration’ in an exploration of ‘movement’, which he 
outlines as ‘not simply a function by which a body changes its position in space, but a 
function of ontological relatedness in which the body’s qualities change as a function of 
their association within a larger open and changing whole’.77 Whilst focused solely on 
The Voyage Out, Hughes’ reading is important in opening the dialogue between Woolf 
and Deleuze at the same time as pointing to the links with Bergson, a key influence on 
Deleuze and someone who, as noted above, has received critical attention from Woolf 
scholars. Following Hughes’ study, Jean-Jacques Lecercle’s Deleuze and Language 
(2002) contains an acute analysis of Woolf’s ‘Kew Gardens’, paying close attention to 
the textuality of Woolf’s short story, Jessica Berman reads Woolf’s (ethical) writing 
alongside Mieke Bal’s reconceptualisation of the Deleuzian ‘fold’ for feminist studies,78 
and Beatrice Monaco’s Machinic Modernism (2008) aligns Deleuze with what she sees as 
metaphysical aspects of modernist literature. Alongside chapters on Lawrence and Joyce, 
Monaco offers two chapters on Woolf, providing a reading of immanence and 
transcendence in To the Lighthouse (1927), and form and rhythm in The Waves (1931) 
and Orlando (1928). In addition to this scholarship, in the time since I began writing this 
thesis a handful of further essays have begun to make further connections between the 
writings of Woolf and Deleuze: Jason Skeet has provided a Deleuzian reading of The 
Waves and Woolf’s essay ‘The Cinema’ (1926),79 Laci Mattison has offered an elegant 
reading of To the Lighthouse through Deleuze’s conceptualisation of ‘the fold’,80 Gina 
                                                 
76 Mary Bryden notes, however, the irony in the fact that Deleuze refers to Woolf in part because of her 
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Potts has used Deleuze to outline Woolf’s ‘nomadic, anti-authoritarian politics’ in Three 
Guineas,81 Carrie Rohman has considered Deleuze’s conceptualisation of ‘the refrain’ in 
her analysis of the inhuman in The Waves,82 Colebrook has considered, as mentioned 
above, the new possibilities Deleuze offers for our readings of Woolf and of modernist 
literature more generally,83 and Judith Allen has made insightful reference to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ‘rhizome’ in her discussion of ‘wildness’ in Woolf’s writing,84 and to 
Deleuze’s notion of ‘repetition’ in the context of Woolf’s repetition of words.85   
Deleuze then, has emerged in recent years as someone who demands serious 
consideration in dialogue with Woolf’s writings. Building on the growing interest in the 
relationship between Woolf and Deleuze, in this thesis I situate my reading in the wider 
context of critical debates in Woolf studies as well as contemporary theoretical debates 
that engage with Deleuze’s writings (and Deleuze studies is itself a growing discipline), 
including a focus on those aforementioned theorists/philosophers who have yet to be read 
alongside Woolf. That is, I do not intend to simply impose Deleuzian concepts on 
Woolf’s texts, but show how her writing is already engaging with similar issues, 
something that is borne out in the fact that, as I will demonstrate in the following 
chapters, recent debates in Woolf studies and in contemporary theory already share many 
concerns. Having said that, and aware of the impossibility in capturing multiplicity in all 
its variety in one thesis, any single reading of Woolf will always of course be limited in 
scope. In the particular theoretical context in which I read Woolf I do not wish to 
foreclose the significance of Woolf’s texts as ‘Deleuzian’ or any other such term, but 
rather to open up new perspectives and conceptual paradigms that might then provoke 
new conversations on the position of Woolf in theory and theory in Woolf – especially 
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the relationship between materiality and the three terms in my sub-heading: sex, animal, 
life. Virginia Woolf and the Materiality of Theory aims to revitalise theoretical readings 
of Woolf showing that they are as much a part of contextualising her writing as historical 
or archival perspectives are. Theorising materiality, and materialising theory, through 
Woolf need not be seen as a violent act of de-contextualisation at odds with historical and 
cultural approaches to her writing, but an affirmative acknowledgement that any reading 
of Woolf today comes from our own historically situated and culturally mediated 
moment, 70 years after the ‘curtain rose’ and Woolf’s last novel, Between the Acts 
(1941), was published (BTA 197). 
 
Chapter Overview 
The five chapters of this thesis are concerned with Woolf’s exploration of subjectivity 
and materiality in distinct but interrelated fields of debate, focusing on questions of the 
sexual difference, sexuality and desire, animality, quantum philosophy-physics, 
posthumanism and the concept of life itself. I make use of a wide-range of Woolf’s 
writing, especially her ‘middle novels’ of To the Lighthouse (1927), Orlando (1928), The 
Waves (1931), Flush (1933), and her modernist feminist manifesto A Room of One’s 
Own, but I also refer to her other novels, short stories, essays, diaries, letters and 
autobiographical texts. The thesis begins by focusing in chapter one on Woolf’s key 
figuration of ‘granite and rainbow’ in ‘The New Biography’ (1927), but argues that the 
significance of this term is complicated and extended throughout Woolf’s writing. 
‘Digging’ and ‘chasing’ these terms, coupled and uncoupled, in a range of texts including  
The Voyage Out, Night and Day (1919), ‘Sketch of the Past’, and several essays and 
letters, as well as touching on the understanding of granites and rainbows in the natural 
sciences of geology and physics, I argue that this term has something to tell us about 
Woolf’s resistance to totalising meanings, and her exploration of the natural world. I go 
on to suggest here that Woolf’s multiple granites and rainbows not only complicate 
binary oppositions of fact and fiction, solidity and intangibility – indeed materiality and 
theory – but move beyond a framework of opposition and towards a paradigm of 
polygamous ‘swift marriages’, a term taken from ‘Craftsmanship’. By starting with 
Woolf’s own ‘theory’ of granite and rainbow, and only later in the chapter introducing 
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Braidotti and Deleuze, I emphasise that my consideration of the materials for theory 
found in Woolf’s writing begins first of all with her own texts, and not the imposing of 
theoretical frameworks onto her work.  
Chapters two and three focus on long-standing issues in Woolf studies concerning 
feminism, sexual difference and sexuality. My second chapter is divided into two parts, 
the first of which concentrates on the issue of sexual difference in relation to Woolf’s 
much-discussed theory of androgyny in A Room of One’s Own. I place Woolf in 
conversation with Braidotti’s model of a feminist nomadic subjectivity (a model which 
she distances from the notion of androgyny) as well as Deleuze and Guattari’s 
controversial ‘becoming-woman’ concept (which is partly influenced by Woolf) in order 
to explore the ways in which Woolf’s androgyny might point to a subjectivity which 
takes us beyond the impasse of constructivism vs. essentialism. Woolf’s androgynous 
subject, I suggest, is therefore materially embedded but non-unitary, and does not adhere 
to exclusive categorisations of identity based on oppositional models of sexual difference. 
In the second part of this chapter I analyse Woolf’s handling of subjects and objects in To 
the Lighthouse in light of Deleuzian concepts such as the ‘rhizome’, ‘smooth’ and 
‘striated’ spaces, and ‘becoming’, a reading which I frame by introducing my neologism 
‘tri-subjectivities’, or tri-s, as a way of formulating the nonoppositional but also 
nonoedipal triangular relations found in this novel. In particular, I go on to consider the 
importance in To the Lighthouse of the sea, trees, grass, and paint in Woolf’s attempt to 
articulate an inclusive form of sexual politics. Moving to issues of sexuality and desire, 
chapter three focuses on Orlando and opens with a reading of Braidotti’s discussion in 
Transpositions (2006) of Vita Sackville-West and Virginia Woolf’s relationship, which 
she claims does not represent a powerful story of lesbian desire, but rather goes beyond a 
politics of identity and towards a formulation of love and desire as de-personalised and 
shared, and all the more subversive as a result. I then perform my own ‘queering’ of 
Orlando by focusing not simply on the relationship between human subjects but on a 
desire that includes nonhuman objects such as rings and motor-cars, and which has 
something to say about our conceptualisation of history itself. Following Deleuze’s 
writing on love, desire and sexuality, I argue that Woolf offers a reconceptualisation of 
desire which is not founded on lack and understood within psychoanalytic paradigms, and 
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I demonstrate the ways in which Orlando rejects the notion of a plural self measured by 
quantity in favour of a multiplicitous subjectivity engaged in qualitative creation. 
 In chapters four and five I turn to the more recent, growing areas of interest 
concerning animality, posthumanism and the philosophical implications of quantum 
physics. Chapter four explores the complex and contested spaces shared by humans and 
animals in Flush: A Biography. Rather than viewing Woolf’s fictional biography 
allegorically as many Woolf critics have tended to, I focus on its canine protagonist in 
order to open onto a wider discussion of the question of the animal, and of human-animal 
relations. This entails a reading of Flush in light of contemporary theories of the animal, 
including Derrida’s feline-inspired treatise and Haraway’s ‘companion species’ and 
‘becoming-with’, as well as Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘becoming-animal’. Here I consider 
issues of nudity, mirrors, and gaze, all of which are usually seen as dividing human from 
animal, but which instead, I argue, are central to Woolf’s challenging of our preconceived 
notions of human-animal difference. Taking into account the potential pitfalls of 
anthropomorphism, I nonetheless claim that Flush: A Biography offers a distinctly 
nonanthropocentric, symbiotic vision of human – animal relations. Woolf, I suggest, 
creates what I term an ‘Animalous Society’, in contrast to the exclusive and hierarchical 
organisation of the Spaniel Club described in the opening pages of the novel. I finish this 
chapter with a brief discussion of vulnerability, flesh and cows. Finally, in chapter five I 
focus on The Waves, with the first part specifically concerned with the novel’s 
engagement with the philosophical implications of quantum physics, and the second part 
centring on the concept of ‘life’. I begin by outlining some of the ways in which Woolf 
herself was influenced by developments in the first decades in quantum physics, before 
turning to a reading of The Waves alongside Karen Barad’s recent work on ‘quantum 
philosophy-physics’, and her theorising of a feminist, posthuman form of agency and 
realism founded in ‘intra-actions’. Following this, I turn to Eugene Thacker’s 
consideration of the distinction between ‘Life and the living’, Jane Bennett’s ‘vital 
materialism’ and Deleuze’s ‘univocity’ or ‘pure immanence’, and argue that The Waves 
presents us with an immanent, posthuman ontology of life. 
 In Transpositions (2006), Braidotti, following Deleuze and Guattari, demonstrates 
that ‘the axes of classical “difference” […] are currently being transposed into lines of 
  
30
“becoming”. Sexualization, racialization and naturalization transpose into becoming-
woman/other/animal/earth’.86 By arranging my chapters around key theoretical debates 
relevant to our own materially situated moment, specifically concerning sexual 
difference, sexuality, animality, and the materiality and conceptuality of life, I attempt to 
create a cartography of these lines of becoming in my reading of Woolf. Far from treating 
these as distinct issues in contemporary debate or in Woolf’s writings that must be 
resolved into clear consensus, this involves working through the blurring of disciplinary 
and conceptual boundaries so as to ascertain, as Caughie puts it, ‘how to go on in the face 
of conflict and in the absence of consensus’,87 or as Braidotti writes, to form ‘alliances 
[…] precisely on the understanding that no common agreement can be reached on matters 
of content. What can be agreed upon is the need for a common project’.88 
 
 
                                                 
86 Braidotti 2006, p.42. 
87 Caughie 1991, p.207.  
88 Braidotti 2006, p.139. 
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1 
 
Materials for Theory: 
Digging Granite and Chasing Rainbows 
 
This chapter builds from Woolf’s theory of ‘granite and rainbow’ in ‘The New 
Biography’ and opens onto an analysis of how these terms are extended and complicated 
throughout her writings, offering a model of theorising that is embedded in the material 
world. This involves mapping Woolf’s use of ‘granite’ and ‘rainbow’, together and apart, 
in texts spanning her writing life, from early diary entries and her first novels The Voyage 
Out and Night and Day, to various essays and letters and her posthumously published 
‘Sketch of the Past’. But ‘digging’ granite and ‘chasing’ rainbows – as the materials for 
Woolf’s theory – also entails a consideration of modern scientific developments in 
geology and physics, as well as in art and mythology. In the final section I will introduce 
Deleuze’s concept of ‘repetition’ and Braidotti’s ‘transposition’ as theories that offer a 
fresh perspective on how we might in the future think about and use Woolf’s ‘granite and 
rainbow’ term. Rather than representing two sides of reality (the material, factual world 
and the intangible sphere of personality) I argue that Woolf’s multiple granites and 
rainbows are always already pointing beyond binary models of language and thought, and 
have something to tell us about Woolf’s resistance to totalising meanings, and her 
exploration of the material world. 
 
1.1 Recontextualising ‘The New Biography’ 
[I]f we think of truth as something of granite-like solidity and of personality as something 
of rainbow-like intangibility and reflect that the aim of biography is to weld these two 
into one seamless whole, we shall admit that the problem is a stiff one (E4 473).  
 
Perhaps her most famous figuration taken from the natural world, Virginia Woolf’s 
‘granite and rainbow’ (E4 478) appears to capture both halves of a ‘neatly split up’ 
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question concerning the aims of biography (E4 473). Her 1927 essay ‘The New 
Biography’ assimilates granite with the ‘hard facts’ of reality: it is ‘truth in its hardest, 
most obdurate form; it is truth as truth is to be found in the British Museum’ (E4 473). In 
Woolf’s view this is characteristic of Sir Sidney Lee’s A Life of William Shakespeare 
(1898) and King Edward VII: A Biography (1925), books which are ‘dull’ and 
‘unreadable’ respectively and which, typical of Victorian biographies, are ‘stuffed with 
truth’ but not ‘those truths which transmit personality’ (E4 473). In contrast, the rainbow 
is assimilated with the ‘artful or highly coloured’ (E4 473) which ‘consists in personality’ 
(E4 474), and Woolf provides the earlier example of James Boswell’s The Life of Samuel 
Johnson Ll.D (1791), arguing that upon reading it ‘we are aware that there is an 
incalculable presence among us which will go on ringing and reverberating in widening 
circles however times may change and ourselves’ (E4 474). This ability to bring the 
personality of the biographical subject to life tells us that we ‘can no longer maintain that 
life consists in action only or in works. […] Something has been liberated beside which 
all else seems odd and colourless’ (E4 474).1 The successful mixing of both granite and 
rainbow, fact and personality, has yet to be found, however. Harold Nicolson’s Some 
People (1927) is an example of the new twentieth century biography which ‘is not fiction 
because it has the substance, the reality of truth’ and ‘is not biography because it has the 
freedom, the artistry of fiction’ (E4 476), but the combination between granite-like fact 
and rainbow-like personality ultimately jars in Some People – the author takes centre-
stage and the biographical figures are ‘below life size’ (E4 477) – even if Nicolson 
‘waves his hand airily in a possible direction’ (E4 478). 
Granite and rainbow are then, as Kathryn Miles summarises, the constituent 
elements of ‘a theory of biography that seeks to reconcile the binaries of truth and fiction, 
or put another way, action and thought.’2 Miles uses Woolf’s theory of granite and 
rainbow as a way of reading her mock-biography Orlando, published almost exactly one 
year after ‘The New Biography’, a move which she claims ‘returns Orlando to […] its 
                                                 
1 For an in-depth discussion of the earlier development in Woolf’s interest in biography, see Julia Briggs. 
Reading Virginia Woolf. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006, p.25-41. Briggs argues that long before writing 
‘The New Biography’ Woolf ‘was committed to extending [biography’s] range and increasing its 
flexibility, to writing against it as well as within it.’ (25)  
2 Kathryn Miles. ‘“That perpetual marriage of granite and rainbow”: Searching for “The New Biography” 
in Virginia Woolf’s Orlando.’ Virginia Woolf & Communities: Selected Papers from the Eight Annual 
Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. Jeanette McVicker and Laura Davis. New York: Pace UP, 1999, p.212. 
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original theoretical rubric: Woolf’s own essays’. In dealing with ‘each binary’ as they 
‘exist at opposite ends of the spectrum of biography’, she interprets the starting point as a 
classic binary opposition, and understands the end goal to be the achievement of a 
‘seamless whole’.3 Miles concludes that Orlando is the ‘fictional praxis to underscore 
[Woolf ’s] theory’4, where the successful recognition by the ‘modern biographer’ of ‘his 
own subjective positioning’5 allows him to adopt this ironic tone in which he evokes both 
the historical changes in the facts of Orlando’s various environments (granite) at the same 
time as retaining that elusive quality in Orlando (rainbow) where there is always the 
possibility of letting slip ‘out of one’s grasp altogether’ (O 175). But where Miles uses 
‘The New Biography’ to illustrate the success of Orlando, Mitchell Leaska has used 
Woolf’s essay to explain the ‘failure’ of The Pargiters.6 In his 1978 introduction to 
Woolf ’s abandoned project, Leaska maps the theory of granite and rainbow onto Woolf’s 
initial intention to have essay segments interspersed with fiction and argues that Woolf 
‘gradually realised that all the factual matter which would constitute the essay portions 
was weighty substance that somehow collided with the artistic design she originally 
planned’, therefore meaning that ‘the truth of fact and the truth of fiction could not meet 
in felicitous alliance.’7 Confining Woolf’s term to an oppositional framework, Leaska 
argues that Woolf had to abandon The Pargiters ‘in despair’8 because she felt ‘the 
pressure of granite against rainbow’.9  
Specific readings of Orlando and The Pargiters are not my primary concern here, 
but as examples of the ways in which Woolf’s essay has been utilised by critics, they are 
important for two main reasons. Firstly, both Miles’ and Leaska’s appropriations of 
Woolf’s ‘granite and rainbow’ illustrates that the term can be extended and applied to her 
other writings rather than exclusively being read in relation to academic literature on 
                                                 
3 Miles 1999, p.212. 
4 Miles 1999, p.213. 
5 Miles 1999, p.217. 
6 Mitchell. A. Leaska. ‘Introduction.’ The Pargiters: The Novel-Essay Portion of The Years. London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1978, p.xviii. For more on his reading of The Years, see Mitchell Leaska. ‘Virginia Woolf, 
the Pargeter: A Reading of The Years.’ Bulletin of the New York Public Library 80 (Winter 1977): 172-210. 
For the significance of the verb ‘to parget’, meaning ‘to whitewash, patch over, suppress’, see Goldman 
2006, p.79. Leaska’s biography of Woolf also, of course, took the title Granite and Rainbow: The Hidden 
Life of Virginia Woolf (1998). 
7 Leaska 1978, xiv. 
8 Leaska 1978, xiv. 
9 Leaska 1978, vii. 
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biography10 - something that is also emphasised by the fact that Leonard Woolf chose 
Granite and Rainbow (1958) as the title for a posthumously published collection of 
Woolf’s essays;11 secondly, although using it to different ends, they both employ Woolf’s 
apparently oppositional theory without ever challenging the stability of the terms 
‘granite’ and ‘rainbow’ themselves. This also applies to Ann Banfield’s The Phantom 
Table, which aligns Woolf’s ‘granite and rainbow’ at various points to further 
dichotomies of being and existence, mysticism and logic, vibrant sexuality and 
sexlessness, and impersonality and personality.12 That is, this natural metaphor may be 
more or less amalgamated but remains, from the start, as two distinct elements working 
within a binary framework. Rather than understanding this dual term as a fixed and stable 
metaphor, I would like to argue that the complexity and usefulness of Woolf’s theory of 
granite and rainbow has yet to be fully realised. Little critical attention has been paid to 
the appearance of the first conditional in the quotation from ‘The New Biography’ with 
which I opened this chapter (signalled by Woolf’s use of ‘if’ and ‘shall’), but, dealing in 
likelihood and conditionality rather than certainty, this tense allows Woolf to commit to 
her theory whilst also maintaining a level of ambiguity and doubt, features Mark Hussey 
feels are crucial to her writing: ‘Beyond doubt, as far as Woolf is concerned, lies not 
certainty but more doubt […] It is acting in the state of radical doubt that characterises 
                                                 
10 In a recent article, Ray Monk laments that Woolf’s essay is probably the most cited in this field. He 
claims that Woolf’s theory of biography is very closely tied to her thoughts on fiction, but rather than 
recognising the potential for using ‘The New Biography’ to explore both biography and fiction alike, he 
argues that the essay shows Woolf’s ‘fundamentally flawed’ thoughts. He maintains that her writing is 
characterised by an unwillingness to blur boundaries at all – her ‘determination to keep the two (“truth of 
fiction” and “truth of fact”) separate’ – and indeed he labels any readings which suggest that Woolf felt 
positive potential in the confusion of fact and fiction to be ‘strained’ and ‘perverse’. See ‘This Fictitious 
Life: Virginia Woolf on Biography and Reality.’ Philosophy and Literature 31:1 (2007), 1-40. Focusing on 
Woolf’s later ‘The Art of Biography’ (1939) has led other critics to conclude that Woolf does indeed reject 
the idea that fact and fiction can intermix. Again a frustration with the incompatibility of oppositions as 
necessarily negative and a failure of unity is seen in the comments of Thomas Lewis: ‘There is a note of 
resignation here; granite and rainbow are not to be.’ See ‘Combining “The Advantages of Fact and 
Fiction”: Virginia Woolf’s Biographies of Vita Sackville-West, Flush, and Roger Fry.’ Virginia Woolf: 
Critical Assessments (vol.II). East Sussex: Helm Information, 1994 [1983], p.396. In any case, Elizabeth 
Cooley reminds us that Woolf’s own frustrations whilst writing Roger Fry may have clouded her argument 
in the later essay. See ‘Revolutionizing Biography: Orlando, Roger Fry, and the Tradition.’ Virginia Woolf: 
Critical Assessments (vol.II). East Sussex: Helm Information, 1994 [1990]: 398-407. 
11 Virginia Woolf. Granite and Rainbow: Essays. London : the Hogarth Press, 1958. 
12 Ann Banfield. The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry, Russell and the Epistemology of Modernism. Cambridge: 
CUP, 2000, p.153; p.191-198; p.201; p.382. 
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Woolf’s work.’13 In the remainder of this chapter I am interested in asking if, and in what 
ways specifically, Woolf’s ‘granite and rainbow’ enacts this kind of radical doubt. I 
attempt, therefore, to extend Woolf’s theory not by simply applying its dual premise, but 
by analysing her use of the terms ‘granite’ and ‘rainbow’, both coupled and uncoupled, 
throughout her writing. Digging granite and chasing rainbows in Woolf’s texts will also 
lead me to consider the significance of these terms in relation to the natural sciences of 
geology and physics, drawing links between materiality and theory.  
Returning briefly to Leaska’s reading of The Years (1937) as a kind of unwanted 
offspring of The Pargiters, it seems that he fails to take account of the self-reflexive 
qualities of Woolf’s theory of ‘granite and rainbow’ by refusing to see beyond the 
granite-like fact of this opposition. As Pamela Caughie has noted, ‘Leaska relies on 
distinctions between fact and fiction, essay and novel, “didactic discourse” and dramatic 
discourse’.14 She insists that ‘it is not a form Woolf abandons but a motive’, and this 
failure of motive rather than form is because granite and rainbow in The Pargiters is a 
‘given distinction’, rather than an ‘operational distinction’.15 For Caughie, The Pargiters 
was not finished because the premise of the book relied on ‘generalised polarities’ that 
Woolf herself was suspicious of, and as this distrust grows we see that ‘the essays begin 
to sound more and more like the novel chapters’, evidence that ‘Woolf could not persist 
in the clear-cut divisions between essays and scenes that were meant to reveal the deep 
ideas beneath the surface forms. Nor could she persist in the dichotomy of genuine 
feelings and false conventions that inspired the essay-novel divisions.’16 Where Leaska 
sees The Pargiters as ‘a new experiment in form’ which creates ‘an imaginary audience’, 
concentrates on ‘the restrictions imposed upon a woman who chooses writing as a 
profession’, and is interspersed with segments ‘explaining how the woman novelist deals 
with certain principal controlling ideas from factual life and transforms them into 
fiction’,17 Caughie rightly questions how new this really was (could it not describe A 
                                                 
13 Mark Hussey. ‘“Hiding Behind the Curtain”: Reading (Woolf) Like a Man.’ Virginia Woolf: Texts and 
Contexts: Selected Papers from the Fifth Annual Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. Beth Rigel Daugherty 
and Eileen Barrett. New York: Pace UP, 1996, p.13-14. 
14 Caughie 1991, p.95. 
15 Caughie 1991, p.96.  
16 Caughie 1991, p.98-99. 
17 Leaska 1978, xvi. 
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Room Of One’s Own, for example?).18 Following Caughie’s reading, I therefore view 
Woolf’s unfinished project of The Pargiters as a positive disavowal of the static 
distinction between granite and rainbow, fiction and fact. More than that, it becomes an 
affirmative recognition of the difficulties one is bound to encounter when attempting to 
subvert a binary framework without challenging the stability of the particular 
oppositional terms in play (a point I will return to in subsequent chapters). Taking notice 
of Woolf’s use of the first conditional to frame her theory in ‘The New Biography’ opens 
up potentiality and flexibility as a fundamental element of the ‘granite and rainbow’ 
figuration, and not as proof of its failure. Moreover, Caughie’s reading of this essay is in 
line with her wider argument that Woolf’s theorising should be viewed as 
experimentation: ‘She does not start with a theory to be expressed and then discover the 
appropriate form; rather, she articulates theories as they evolve from her fictional 
experiments.’19 But while Caughie’s emphasis is on ‘testing out the possibilities of 
literature’20 she misses an opportunity to read this experimentation back into ‘granite and 
rainbow’, instead leaving Woolf’s essay tantalisingly behind having pointed to what its 
most important sentence may be: ‘They have no fixed scheme of the universe, no 
standard of courage or morality to which they insist that [the subject] shall conform.’ (E4 
476) Where Leaska is perhaps guilty of viewing ‘The New Biography’ from the solid 
ground of granite-like fact, it could be argued that Caughie ends up performing a flight 
from its true complexity.  
From the second paragraph of ‘The New Biography’ Woolf is already blurring the 
distinctions between granite and rainbow. We learn that even granite-like scientific fact 
has ‘an almost mystic power. Like radium, it seems able to give off forever and ever 
grains of energy, atoms of light.’ And the rainbow-like intangibility of ‘that inner life of 
thought and emotion’ in fact ‘meanders darkly and obscurely through the hidden channels 
of the soul’ (E4 473). The inversion of dark and light properties appears to confuse the 
opposing granite and rainbow; the bland and dark shades of granite become mystic and 
filled with light, and the luminous colours of the rainbow become dark and obscure. 
Furthermore, when Woolf concludes that we cannot yet ‘name the biographer whose art 
                                                 
18 Caughie 1991, p.96. 
19 Caughie 1991, p.20. 
20 Caughie 1991, p.23. 
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is subtle and bold enough to present that queer amalgamation of dream and reality, that 
perpetual marriage of granite and rainbow’ (E4 478), self-reflexivity is again displayed; 
even in this very sentence she undermines the expected parallel by aligning ‘dream’ with 
‘granite’, ‘reality’ with ‘rainbow’. It is perhaps telling that the only other occurrence of 
Woolf deploying granite and rainbow in the same sentence also complicates the expected 
parallel, when in Orlando we are told: ‘Nature, who has played so many queer tricks 
upon us, making us so unequally of clay and diamonds, of rainbow and granite’ (O 46). 
In one sense, granite’s pairing with diamonds is no surprise – being hard, obdurate rocks 
– and, to a lesser extent, the symmetry of rainbow and clay works in the sense of clay’s 
transformative, non-fixed form. But delighting in ‘the muddle and mystery’ (O 46), 
Woolf is playing with the overlapping possibilities for these ‘queer’ couples whereby an 
argument could just as convincingly be made for the rainbow/diamonds symmetry 
(mysticism, beauty, rarity), and the clay/granite symmetry (as naturally occurring 
materials). Already we become vigilant to Caughie’s warning that ‘we cannot count on 
any one element meaning the same thing from one text to another.’21 Instead, we must 
open up the ‘case’ into which granite and rainbow have been ‘stuffed’ (O 46). As Woolf 
puts it in ‘Craftsmanship’:22 
 
It is only a question of finding the right words and putting them in the right order. But we 
cannot do it because they do not live in dictionaries, they live in the mind. And how do 
they live in the mind? Variously and strangely, much as human beings live, by ranging 
hither and thither, by falling in love, and mating together. It is true that they are much less 
bound by ceremony and convention that we are. (E6 96) 
 
We cannot conceive of a marriage of words as we do a conventional marriage between 
two people. Rather, there are many ‘swift marriages’ because words have a profound 
‘need of change’: ‘It is because the truth they try to catch is many-sided and they convey 
it by being themselves many-sided, flashing this way, then that. Thus they mean one 
thing to one person, another thing to another person […] it is because of this complexity 
that they survive’ (E6 97). 
                                                 
21 Caughie 1991, p.101. 
22 Broadcast on BBC radio on 29th April as part of their ‘Words Fail Me’ series. 
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Free to mate with many other words, Woolf’s granites and rainbows often appear 
uncoupled in her writings, and sometimes within the same text. Turning my attention to 
Woolf’s posthumously published autobiographical ‘Sketch of the Past’ as well as 
passages from Night and Day and a range of Woolf’s essays including ‘This is the House 
of Commons’ (1932), ‘The Novels of E. M. Forster’ (1927), and ‘The Sun and the Fish’ 
(1928), I would like to argue that the various ways in which Woolf’s multiple granites 
and rainbows ‘hang together’ (E4 96) with different words in different contexts 
demonstrates that we find solidity and intangibility, truth and fiction, are always already 
intermingled on the vast majority of occasions when Woolf writes these words. 
Methodologically, my search for granite and rainbow in Woolf’s writings recalls the 
different but complimentary approaches of Rachel Bowlby and Jane Goldman, to take 
two insightful examples, where they trace Woolf’s use of ‘in love’ and canine tropes 
respectively. Bowlby, for example, draws attention to the inverted (comma) occurrences 
of being ‘in love’ throughout Woolf’s novels by emphasising that ‘the line of “in love” is 
not a straight one, smoothly declining itself downhill all the way from ineffability at the 
beginning to commonplace at the end.’23 Not wishing to fall for a conclusive and 
overarching meaning of love in Woolf’s texts, she posits multiple possible and changing 
significances: speeches of love as ‘eerie insistent ghosts’ in The Voyage Out;24 ‘a state 
which may not have an object’ in Night and Day;25 and finally ‘in love’ as cliché in 
Between the Acts.26 In a similar vein, Jane Goldman follows Woolf’s canine tropes, 
emphasising that her signifying dog does not lead us towards any final meaning: ‘Woolf’s 
signifying dog is a constructed, monstrous, multivalent figure whose “referent” is 
certainly not just a dog’.27 As ‘marked and marking’,28 the dog for Goldman is associated 
with the non-fixed narrator of A Room of One’s Own, with slave, with woman, and  – as 
she demonstrates through careful reading of the ‘fine negress’ passage of Woolf’s 
                                                 
23 Rachel Bowlby. Feminist Destinations and Further Essays on Virginia Woolf. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 
1997, p.174. 
24 Bowlby 1997, p.175. 
25 Bowlby 1997, p.183. 
26 Bowlby 1997, p.190. 
27 Jane Goldman. ‘“Ce chien est á moi”: Virginia Woolf and the Signifying Dog.’ Woolf Studies Annual 13 
(2007), p.50. 
28 Goldman 2007, p.54. 
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manifesto29 – with men: ‘The dog as usual performs a number of vehicular tasks: its 
tenors are both men and women, English and African, coloniser and colonised.’30 It is a 
dog always simultaneously running through many different streets, in other words, and 
Goldman’s reading opens up possible routes rather than halting at any one signpost of 
meaning. In the following section I demonstrate that the ‘canine business’ of ‘digging’ 
and ‘chasing’ need not necessarily be tied to the collar of dogs.31  
Like both Bowlby and Goldman then, I want to explore Woolf’s use of specific 
terms in different contexts but without claiming any final meaning for these terms, a trap 
that some critics have fallen into. An early example of this is found in Jean Love’s tracing 
of Woolf’s ‘lighthouse’ throughout her novels, where, despite highlighting the diffuse 
nature of objects in a previous chapter of her book, Love traces a strikingly linear 
development of the symbolic meaning of the lighthouse. This approach resolves itself in 
the contentious claim that, whereas the meaning of Lily Briscoe’s painting at the end of 
To The Lighthouse explodes in possibilities, the lighthouse loses its multiple significance; 
to Love it is symbolic of conquering ‘the prototypical mother’: ‘The Lighthouse […] 
becomes more discrete in its meaning’.32 I prefer Gillian Beer’s view that To the 
Lighthouse is a ‘post-symbolist novel’ where symbolism may be evident but is 
‘consistently brought into question.’ Symbolism, Beer argues, ‘is the means by which we 
make things serve the human. Symbol gives primary to the human because it places the 
human at the centre, if not of concern, yet of signifying. […] By its means concepts and 
objects are loaded with human references.’33 Woolf’s often-cited comment about the 
symbolic significance of the lighthouse is therefore also relevant: ‘I meant nothing by 
The Lighthouse […] trusted that people would make it the deposit for their own emotions 
– which they have done, one thinking it means one thing another another. […] directly 
I’m told what a thing means, it becomes hateful to me.’34 I discuss To the Lighthouse in 
the following chapter, including the ways in which it offers a critique of totalisation in a 
                                                 
29 Goldman is here responding to Jane Marcus’ reading of the ‘fine negress’ passage in A Room of One’s 
Own. See Jane Marcus. ‘“A Very Fine Negress”.’ Hearts of Darkness: White Women Write Race. New 
Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2004: 24-58. 
30 Goldman 2007, p.67. 
31 Goldman 2007, p.51; 81. 
32 Jean O. Love. Worlds in Consciousness. London: U of California P, 1970, p.194. 
33 Gillian Beer. Virginia Woolf: The Common Ground. Edinburgh UP, 1996, p.41. 
34 Quentin Bell. Virginia Woolf: A Biography (vol.2). London: Hogarth, 1972, p.129. 
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different guise, namely that of resistence to ‘arborescence’, but throughout my digging 
and chasing of Woolf’s multiple granites and rainbows in the remainder of this current 
chapter I am keen to keep in mind precisely this resistance to totalising, and human-
centred, signification. Whilst Woolf’s ‘granite and rainbow’ is often seen as having a 
dualistic, symbolic or emblematic quality, I argue that her various usage of these terms 
instead points towards the limitations of binary, and totalising, models of language and 
thought. In the following sections I aim to demonstrate this by providing details of each 
instance in which ‘granite’ or ‘rainbow’ appears across the span of Woolf’s writings. 
Like many other Woolf scholars, in my efforts to verify these instances I am extremely 
grateful to Mark Hussey for his careful archival work in compiling the Woolf CD-ROM 
(1997). It is, I think, the perfect example of the ways in which important archival material 
can enable the type of theoretical approach I have taken in this chapter. As such, my 
digging and chasing of Woolf’s granites and rainbows provides in its very methodology 
an example of refusing the opposition between archive/theory and granite/rainbow. 
Below, this opposition between the historical or archival and theoretical is also 
challenged by considering modern advances in the geological study of granite and in the 
physics of the rainbow (where the rainbow is concerned I will also touch on its place in 
mythology, and in art). In order to allow for these creative connections to be made then, 
the following sections present a kind of cartography of granites and rainbows rather than 
a chronology of their appearances in Woolf’s work.  
 
1.2 Digging Granite 
1.2.1 Obduracy and Memorialisation 
Although I will go on to show the more complicated resonances in Woolf’s use of 
‘granite’ in various texts, it would be misleading to claim that there are no examples at all 
where Woolf offers a more conventional association of granite as assimilated with 
obduracy and memorialisation. Indeed, there are a few instances when granite is used as a 
figuration for unattractiveness and obduracy (contrasting greatly with her descriptions of 
Cornwall’s granite hills discussed below, for example), or where granite is linked to 
memorialisation. There are examples of the former in the published manuscript version of 
A Room of One’s Own when Woolf uses the simile ‘dour as a granite wall’ amongst a list 
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of various descriptions of rooms (WF 127),35 and in a letter to Vanessa Bell on 28th June 
1938 when Woolf describes ‘bathing sheds of granite’ in Oban (where she is writing 
from) as ‘grim’ (L6 249). The obduracy of granite is drawn on for Woolf’s description of 
Peter’s interruption of the kiss shared between Clarissa and Sally. This kiss was ‘the most 
exquisite moment of [Clarrisa’s] whole life […] she felt she had been given a present, 
wrapped up […] a diamond, something infinitely precious’, but when the ‘revelation’ is 
disturbed by Peter ‘[i]t was like running one’s face against a granite wall in the darkness! 
It was shocking; it was horrible!’ (MD 30). In addition, in a diary entry on 15th March 
1937 Woolf likens Julian Bell’s ‘set & rather self centred’ manner to the ‘grinding of an 
iron upon a Granite slab’ (D5 69), in a letter in 1904 to Violet Dickinson she writes that 
‘[t]his paper is like granite slabs to write upon’ (L1 131), in a 1924 letter to Jacques 
Raverat she describes his wife as ‘that granite monolithic Gwen[]’ (L3 136), in her diary 
in 1921 she writes that the ‘pertinacity’ of Mark Gertler ‘would bore holes in granite’ (D2 
150) and writing in 1931 to Ethyl Smyth, with comments on an article Smyth was writing 
on music criticism, Woolf uses the image of a ‘granite pillar’ in a self-deprecating 
manner, and to humorous effect:  
 
If I were you I'd train typists and street singers rather than go on whipping these gentrys 
hard and horny behinds. You will say however that I know nothing, feel nothing and 
understand less than nothing. So be it. I realise why I am so essential to you – precisely 
my quality of scratching post, what the granite pillar in the Cornish field gives the rough-
haired, burr-tangled Cornish pig – thats you. An uncastrated pig into the bargain; a wild 
boar, a savage sow, and my fate in life is to stand there, a granite pillar, and be scraped by 
Ethel's hoary hide. Yes, because not another soul in Woking but lies under you like sweet 
lavender; there you roll and trample and bellow. I'm the only friend you have who is 
thoroughly and disgustingly upright and blind and deaf and dumb. (L4 348-349) 
 
 On a few occasions Woolf displays a further conventional use of granite, which 
points to its links with memorialisation and war: in a diary entry in 10th February 1923 
she writes of the ‘several tons of granite crucifix’ used to memorialise Belgian soldiers 
                                                 
35 Virginia Woolf. Women and Fiction: The Manuscript Versions of A Room of One’s Own, ed. S.P. 
Rosenbaum. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
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(D2 233); in a letter to Julian Bell in 1936 she notes seeing some of the ‘granite crosses’ 
situated in and around Falmouth;36 in Between the Acts a line from the village pageant 
speaks of ‘granite and cobble/ From Windsor to Oxford/ Loud Laughter, low laughter/ Of 
warrior and lover/ The fighter, the singer’ (BTA 77); and in her 1925 essay ‘On Not 
Knowing Greek’, Woolf use granite to contrast the originality and vividness of characters 
in Greek as opposed to English literature: in the plays of ancient Greece, ‘[a] fragment of 
[…] speech broken off would, we feel, colour oceans and oceans of the respectable drama 
[…] we meet them before their emotions have been worn into uniformity’ (CR1 27), 
whereas we think about the famous figures of Renaissance literature ‘posed gracefully on 
granite plinths in the pale corridors of the British Museum’ (CR1 28). Similarly, in ‘“This 
is the House of Commons”’, first published in 1932, Woolf imagines that if statues are to 
be erected one day in the honour of MPs they will be ‘like granite plinths set on the tops 
of moors to mark battles’ (E5 327). 
Yet unlike the aforementioned examples, this later essay goes on to trouble the 
straightforward, conventional relationship between granite and solidity or truth. At first 
the House of Commons itself – ‘not in the least noble or majestic or even dignified’ – 
seems an apt setting for faceless, soon-to-be-granite politicians, where everything is 
predictable: ‘[w]herever one looks one says, “of course”’ (E5 324). But Woolf is quick to 
point, even in its apparent plainness, to an intangible aspect of the Chamber: ‘It has 
somehow a code of its own […] only those who are in the secret of the House can say. 
All we can be sure of is that a secret is there […] no assurance of virtue, genius, valour is 
here sure of success if something else – some indefinable quality – is omitted’ (E5 325). 
On one level this ‘indefinable quality’ is clearly the privileged position of being a man, 
an ironic jibe by Woolf in keeping with the tone of this essay; but Woolf specifically 
avoids linking the elusive quality (and sexual politics) simply to the personalities of men. 
Notwithstanding the future possibility of becoming granite plinths, part of the joke is that 
these men are already ‘featureless, anonymous’: ‘as [the Secretary of Foreign Affairs] 
spoke so directly, so firmly, a block of rough stone seemed to erect itself there on the 
Government benches’. The ‘secret’ of the House of Commons, the ‘code’ that unlocks 
                                                 
36 Virginia Woolf. Nineteen Letters to Eleven Recipients, ed. Joanne Trautmann Banks. Modern Fiction 
Studies 30 (1984), p.186. 
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these ‘[m]atters of great moment’ (E5 326) – everything that is mysterious about this 
patriarchal environment – is linked precisely to the ‘plain, featureless, impersonal’ 
qualities which are shared by ‘the machine itself and the man upon whom the stamp of 
the machine descends’ (E5 326-327). In other words, this more abstract and elusive 
‘machine’ is associated with solidity and fact, and without a necessarily fixed and 
discernible target granite-like truth becomes less certain.  
 
1.2.2 The Voyage Out and Night and Day 
The more nuanced, ambiguous figuration of ‘granite’ hinted at in the essay ‘“This is the 
House of Commons”’ is also apparent in Woolf’s first two novels, The Voyage Out and 
Night and Day. The important presence of granite in Woolf’s earlier writing has been 
highlighted by David Bradshaw in his contextual reading of a particular London space in 
The Voyage Out – the Victoria Embankment – which, he claims, is more revealing than 
initially seems the case. The word ‘granite’ actually appears only once in Woolf’s first 
novel, in a description of ‘massive granite rocks’ by the sea in chapter XVI (VO 218), but 
Bradshaw draws attention to the presence in the opening pages of Cleopatra’s Needle, ‘a 
granite obelisk eighteen metres high and weighing 186 tonnes, [which] was set in place 
on the Victoria Embankment “in a fit of imperial bravura” on 12 September 1878’ to 
commemorate Britain’s victory sixty-three years earlier over Napoleon.37 Bradshaw 
focuses his reading on the passage when we learn that Helen, walking on the 
Embankment,  
 
knew how to read the people who were passing her; there were the rich who were running 
to and from each others’ houses at this hour; there were the bigoted workers driving in a 
straight line to their offices; there were the poor who were unhappy and rightly 
malignant. Already, though there was sunlight in the haze, tattered old men and women 
were nodding off to sleep upon the seats. When one gave up seeing the beauty that 
clothed things, this was the skeleton beneath [.] (VO 4)  
                                                 
37 David Bradshaw. ‘“Great Avenues of Civilisation”: The Victoria Embankment and Piccadilly 
Circus Underground Station in the Novels of Virginia Woolf and Chelsea Embankment in Howards End.’ 
Transits: The Nomadic Geographies of Anglo-American Modernism, ed. Giovanni Cianci, Caroline Patey, 
and Sara Sullam. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010, p.192. For a brief summary of Cleopatra’s Needle, including 
its treacherous journey from Alexandria, Egypt, see http://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/England-
History/CleopatrasNeedle.htm 
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On the one hand the granite obelisk that would be looming over Helen here is an 
enduring emblem of imperialist bombast – a symbol of totalisation – but on the other 
hand it is linked to the meetings and passings-by of a wider-range of society: ‘Almost 
from the outset [] the Victoria Embankment became a space not just where London’s 
genteel and governing classes could disport themselves but, especially at night, an 
infinitely more abject environment where her myriad dispossessed congregated.’38 As 
Raphael Samuel describes: 
 
The Thames Embankment, the most spectacular of mid-Victorian ‘improvements’ in 
inner London, very soon became a by-word for the number of its tramps, some of whom 
filled the seats beneath the plane trees […] and other of whom used it as an all-night 
promenade. Its character was reinforced by the Shelters built at either end… [and] by 
charitable distributors of food (such as the Eustace Miles Food Barrow at Cleopatra’s 
Needle) […] by 1910 [the police were] treating the Embankment as a ‘kind of corral’ 
where large numbers of tramps were conveniently assembled under the direct observation 
of law and order.39 
 
The socio-political import of Woolf’s text, Bradshaw convincingly argues, is increased 
by an awareness ‘that the Embankment, especially at night, was a ‘corral’ of social 
deprivation, and bearing in mind that Helen’s distress becomes un-containable in the 
vicinity of Cleopatra’s Needle, where, twice a day, queues of destitute men and women 
had food doled out to them’.40 By focusing on this granite obelisk even though its granitic 
consistency is not actually mentioned at this point in the novel, Bradshaw’s reading 
illuminates a kind of invisible presence of granite (mixing granitic obduracy and 
elusiveness) in Woolf’s text where the realities associated with this granite are multiple 
and changing. 
In chapter XVIII of Woolf’s following novel, Night and Day, granite becomes the 
focal point for the very questioning of truth and reality. From the beginning of the chapter 
                                                 
38 Bradshaw 2010, p.192. 
39 Cited in Bradshaw 2010, p.192. 
40 Bradshaw 2010, p.195. 
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both Mary Datchet and Ralph Denham, walking together in the countryside, have 
moments of doubt concerning the object of love and of happiness. For Mary, it ‘seemed a 
mere toss-up whether she said, “I love you,” or whether she said, “I love the beech-trees,” 
or only “I love – I love.”’ (ND 208) And for Ralph: ‘“Unhappiness is a state of mind […] 
it is not necessarily the result of any particular cause.”’ (ND 210) Both characters doubt 
the object of their feelings, supporting Bowlby’s view that ‘Night and Day represents 
being in love as a state which may not have an object, may not be reciprocated and may 
not know a definite source of its feeling.’41 Indeed, even as Ralph apparently reconciles 
this with the realisation that ‘his unhappiness had been directly caused by Katherine’, he 
goes on to reveal that the whole matter of such emotion is always and already a balancing 
of illusions and delusions: ‘Like most people, I suppose, I’ve lived almost entirely among 
delusions, and now I’m at the awkward stage of finding it out. I want another delusion to 
go on with. That’s what my unhappiness amounts to’ (ND 210). This uncertainty is 
increased when the narrator reveals that Mary felt Ralph ‘was not speaking the truth.’ 
Moreover, elusiveness is separated from personality and attached to this uncertain 
‘actual’ as Katherine dissolves into ‘black particles’, and ‘the light of truth […] shines on 
a world not to be shaken by our personal calamities’ (ND 220). 
Whilst dissociating intangibility from personality (in keeping with what we see in 
‘“This is the House of Commons”’), the elusive ‘light of truth’ comes to focus on ‘a 
lonely spot marked by an obelisk of granite’ (ND 224) where the narrative viewpoint has 
now turned to William Rodney and Katherine Hilbery when they decide to disembark 
from their carriage at this obelisk, around two miles short of their return to Lampsher 
from Lincoln. In this scene the obelisk, I suggest, oversees the uncertainties of truth and 
becomes what we might think of as a non-symbolic or anti-symbolic feature of the text. 
In the first place, granite is linked here to ‘the gratitude of some great lady of the 
eighteenth century who had been set upon by highwaymen at this spot and delivered from 
death just as hope seemed lost’ (ND 224), but it soon sparks a narrative shift to a general 
seasonal description which seems to belong to neither the particular story of this woman 
nor to any precisely fixed moment:  
 
                                                 
41 Bowlby 1997, p.183. 
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In summer it was a pleasant place, for the deep woods on either side murmured, and the 
heather, which grew thick round the granite pedestal, made the light breeze taste sweetly; 
in winter the sighing of the trees was deepened to a hollow sound, and the heath was as 
grey and almost as solitary as the empty sweep of the clouds above it. (ND 225) 
 
‘Here’ it is that ‘Rodney stopped the carriage and helped Katherine to alight’, and the 
uncertainty of ‘Here’ is reiterated with mention of the very point that led to the 
uncertainty: ‘the couple standing by the obelisk’ (ND 225). Far from fitting with a view 
of Night and Day where, as Caughie suggests, the past is ‘stationary’, ‘standard’,  or 
‘absolute’;42 the past, the present, and the unknown collide as Katherine ‘read the writing 
on the obelisk […] She was murmuring a word or two of the pious lady’s thanks’ (ND 
225). Following this episode, when she later asks herself why she had agreed to marry 
Rodney when she did not wish to, Katherine thinks of it as ‘a desperate attempt to 
reconcile herself with facts – she could only recall a moment, as if waking from a dream, 
which now seemed to her a moment of surrender.’ In other words, the truth of her 
feelings now betrays the ‘fact’ that she had tried to acknowledge; severed from ‘fact’, 
truth of feeling becomes the realisation of ‘the illusion which sustains youth midway 
between heaven and earth’ (ND 229-230), or somewhere between the eighteenth century 
woman and the timeless granite obelisk.  
The uncertainty surrounding this obelisk is accentuated by the fact that, as 
Michael Whitworth has recently noted, Woolf’s chosen topography here ‘is that of classic 
realism, mingling actual places (Lincoln) with imaginary ones (Lampsher), and at this 
point on the road between the two we may not know whether we are in the actual or the 
imaginary.’43 This is reflected in the fact that there is a great deal of uncertainty over 
whether this obelisk alludes to a particular obelisk Woolf herself knew of in the same 
way she clearly knew Cleopatra’s Needle. Julia Briggs, for example, has suggested that 
                                                 
42 Caughie 1991, p.102. Caughie goes on to argue: ‘The world of Night and Day, as its title suggests, is 
substantial and orderly, the “and” marking the boundary between two realms, bringing them together while 
keeping them separate.’ My reading of this chapter – with its shifts in time and narrative viewpoint – 
suggests that Woolf’s second novel may not be as ‘based on distinct divisions’ (and certainly not show 
reality ‘as given and substantial’) as critics have previously argued. (105)  
43 Michael Whitworth. ‘Woolf, Context, and Contradiction.’ Contradictory Woolf: Selected Papers from 
the Twenty-first Annual International Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. Derek Ryan and Stella Bolaki, 
Clemson: Clemson University Digital Press (forthcoming 2012). Cited with permission from the author.  
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Woolf’s source is the Dunstan Pillar, built by Sir Francis Dashwood in 1751, and located 
a few miles to the south of Lincoln.44 But as Whitworth points out, ‘the Pillar fails to 
match Woolf’s obelisk in several respects: it is not a memorial to a specific incident of 
robbery; it is not an obelisk in form, and it is far taller than anything we might call an 
obelisk.’ Whitworth offers a second possibility of the Robbers’ Stone in Wiltshire, built 
in 1840 to record the attack and robbery of a Mr Dean of Imber by four highwaymen45 (a 
further stone marks the spot where one of the highwaymen died whilst being pursued), 
but concedes that the narrative fails to exactly match Woolf’s obelisk, as do the 
proportions and location of this stone. ‘Both might be sources,’ Whitworth notes, ‘but 
Woolf isn’t alluding to them in the conventional sense.’46  
 
1.2.3 Cornwall 
Written more than twenty years after The Voyage Out and Night and Day, doubts about 
solidity and intangibility, fact and fiction, are nowhere more closely associated with 
granite than in Woolf’s autobiographical ‘Sketch of the Past’. Here, Woolf remembers 
childhood days in the granite county of Cornwall, recalling ‘old men and women’ who 
‘danced round Knills Monument – a granite steeple in a clearing’ (MB 136). She 
describes everywhere seeing ‘walls [that] were thick blocks of granite built to stand the 
sea storms’ and supposes that the ‘town was then much as it must have been in the 
sixteenth century, unknown, unvisited, a scramble of granite houses’ (MB 133). 
Importantly then, the endurance of granite does not solidify the town’s meaning, instead 
adding to the sense of the ‘unknown, unvisited’, to a somewhat mysterious existence. It is 
granite that evades a stable entry into linear time: ‘The eighteenth century had left no 
mark upon St Ives, as it has so definitely upon every southern village. It might have been 
built yesterday; or in the time of the Conqueror.’ The Church, ‘like the houses’, was 
‘built of granite’ and therefore ‘ageless’ (MB 133). Indeed, it is a simultaneous endurance 
and intangibility of Cornish granite that also appears to be captured by D. H. Lawrence, 
when in ‘The Nightmare’ chapter of Kangaroo (1923) he describes the mysterious 
                                                 
44 Julia Briggs (ed.). Night and Day, by Virginia Woolf. London: Penguin, 1992, p.446. 
45 Whitworth 2012. See also http://www.geograph.org.uk/photo/535208 
46 Whitworth 2012. 
  
48
materiality of Cornwall’s ‘huge granite boulders bulging out of the earth like presences’ 
as ‘the mystery of the powerful, pre–human earth, showing its might’.47 
Woolf’s reflections of Cornish granite are in fact clear from the earliest to latest of 
her autobiographical writings. On the 11th of August 1905, during a summer holiday in 
Carbis Bay, near St. Ives, Woolf wrote in her journal about the ‘granite blocks in the 
earth’ as one element ‘which had impressed itself minutely upon our childish minds’ (PA 
281-282). Three days later Woolf starts a longer diary entry which she continues for 
many days (without keeping note of the exact date), and where she again returns to the 
‘granite hills’, noting that although they ‘loved the conflict’ of ‘a storm’, on ‘sunny days’, 
such as the one she is writing on, they contain a ‘curious creamy richness’ (PA 286). 
Later, she further complicates the notion of granitic solidity by describing how the 
arrangement of granite walls ‘keeps the land fluid’:  
 
The Cornish substitute for a gate is simple; in building a wall of granite blocks they let 
two or three jut out at convenient intervals so as to form steps; you often find these 
arranged beside a gate which is heavily padlocked, as though the farmer winked one eye 
at the trespasser. The system of course has its advantages for the native, or for one well 
acquainted with the lie of the country; it keeps the land fluid, as it were, so that the feet 
may trace new paths in it at their will [.] (PA 290) 
 
In her letters too Woolf makes reference to Cornish granite. In 1909 she writes to Clive 
Bell from Cornwall, this time deep in winter on the 26th December, about how she 
‘staggered up Tren Crom in the mist this afternoon, and sat on a granite tomb on the top, 
and surveyed the land.’ What she sees is ‘rocks comparable to couchant camels, and 
granite gate posts, with a smooth turf road between them’ (L1 416). And in early spring 
1921, whilst in Ponion, near Zennor, Woolf writes of ‘granite rocks’ and hills that ‘lie 
graceful’ and are ‘so subtly tinted; greys, all various with gleams in them; getting 
transparent at dusk’ (D2 105). The gleaming transparency in these granite hills was also 
emphasised by Woolf in a letter to Saxon Sydney-Turner two days previously, when she 
describes them as ‘half transparent’, elusive entities provoking the imagination and 
                                                 
47 D. H. Lawrence. Kangaroo, ed. Bruce Steele. Cambridge: CUP, 2002 [1923], p.225. 
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memories, reminding her of childhood (L2 462). There is little doubt that Woolf saw 
beauty in this granite: 
 
I’m not sure though that the beauty of the country isn’t its granite hills, and walls, and 
houses, and not its sea. What do you say? Of course its very pleasant to come upon the 
sea spread out at the bottom, blue, with purple stains on it, and here a sailing ship, there a 
red steamer. But last night walking through Zennor the granite was – amazing, is the only 
thing to say I suppose, half transparent, with the green hill behind it, and the granite road 
curving up and up. (L2 462) 
 
The aesthetic appeal and happiness provoked by these hills directly disrupts Woolf’s 
metaphor making in a later letter to Vita Sackville-West. On 30th August 1928, her use of 
granite as a metaphor this time slides into a memory of childhood in Cornwall: ‘my 
happiness is wedged like (but I am using too many metaphors) in between these granite 
blocks (and now that they are granite blocks I can compare my happiness to samphire, a 
small pink plant I picked as a child in Cornwall)’ (L3 521).  
In ‘Sketch of the Past’ Woolf elaborates on the mystery of these hills, ‘scattered 
with blocks of granite; some said of them to be old tombs and altars; in some, holes were 
driven, as if for gate posts’ (MB 138). Virginia Stephen and her siblings found great 
adventure in them, and Woolf alludes to the legend of the Logan Rock – an 80-ton 
rocking stone, finely balanced at the top of a cliff (so finely balanced that in April 1824 it 
had been tipped over by a disgraced Lieutenant Goldsmith before the locals demanded it 
be replaced!).48 Woolf expresses the childhood wonderment it evoked: ‘The Loggan rock 
was on top of Tren Crom; we would set it rocking; and be told that perhaps the hollow in 
the rough lichened surface was for the victim’s blood’ (MB 138). This description is 
strikingly similar to one in Jacob’s Room (1922): ‘These white Cornish cottages are built 
on the edge of the cliff; the garden grows gorse more readily than cabbages; and for 
hedge, some primeval man has piled granite boulders. In one of these, to hold, an 
historian conjectures, the victim's blood, a basin has been hollowed, but in our time it 
serves more tamely to seat those tourists who wish for an uninterrupted view’ (JR 47). 
                                                 
48 ‘Myths and Legends of Cornwall.’ Cornwall in Focus. 2010, http://www.cornwallinfocus.co.uk/history/ 
legends.php 
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Far from these hills always and already signifying their obdurate actuality, it was only her 
father’s ‘severe love of truth’, Woolf writes in ‘Sketch of the Past’, that attempted to 
reduce an already mysterious granite: he ‘disbelieved it; he said, in his opinion, this was 
no genuine Loggan rock, but the natural disposition of ordinary rocks’ (MB 138). It is 
precisely this notion of ‘natural disposition’, of a fixed and ready-made reality, that 
Woolf challenges by sharing her memory of this childhood event. The massive and yet 
tentative position of this granite rock is recalled and re-appropriated in the fight against 
patriarchy, and foregrounded are the pervading doubts about fact and fiction, about 
‘whether I mean anything real, whether I make up or tell the truth’ (MB 138). For Woolf 
these granite rocks are ‘at once real and imaginary’ (E4 475) – they do not signify one 
totalising meaning. As she notes plainly in a letter to Katherine Arnold-Forster in June 
1923: ‘I don’t like symbolical granite’ (L3 49)!49 
 
1.2.4 Granite Origins 
The stability of granite is, in fact, already challenged by modern advances in natural 
science. We do not need to dig too deep into our geological world to discover that whilst 
granite may be a hard, durable, and dense material, studies since the Enlightenment have 
led to a less than straightforward understanding of it. The epigraph of Wallace Pitcher’s 
book The Nature and Origin of Granite (1993) cites acclaimed geologist Joseph Beete 
Jukes speaking in 1863: ‘Granite is not a rock which was simple in its origin but might be 
produced in more ways than one’.50 The extent to which Woolf would have been aware 
of modern advances in geology, and in particular the controversy involved in accounting 
for the origin of granite, is unclear, but she did have a copy in her library of the second 
edition of Charles Darwin’s Journal of Researches into the Natural History and Geology 
of the Countries Visited during the Voyage of H.M.S. “Beagle” Round the World 
(1839).51 In this book Darwin writes of the granitic coastal rocks in Brazil, and reflects on 
the uncertainty over the formation of this granite: ‘Was this effect produced beneath the 
depths of a profound ocean? or did a covering of strata formerly extend over it, which has 
                                                 
49 This statement comes as a response to a question asked in a previous letter sent by Katherine Arnold-
Forster to Woolf, but I have been unable to trace what this precise question was. 
50 Wallace. S. Pitcher. The Nature and Origin of Granite. London: Blackie Academic & Professional, 1993, 
vii. 
51 http://www.wsulibs.wsu.edu/masc/onlinebooks/woolflibrary/woolflibraryonline.htm 
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since been removed? Can we believe that any power, acting for a time short of infinity, 
could have denuded the granite over so many thousand square leagues?’52 Darwin also 
writes of the granite mountains in Tres Montes, Chile:  
 
After breakfast the next morning a party ascended one of these mountains, which was 
2400 feet high. The scenery was remarkable. The chief part of the range was composed of 
grand, solid, abrupt masses of granite, which appeared as if they had been coeval with the 
beginning of the world. […] I took much delight in examining the structure of these 
mountains. […] Granite to the geologist is classic ground: from its widespread limits, and 
its beautiful and compact texture, few rocks have been more anciently recognised. 
Granite has given rise, perhaps, to more discussion concerning its origin than any other 
formation. We generally see it constituting the fundamental rock, and, however formed, 
we know it is the deepest layer in the crust of this globe to which man has penetrated. The 
limit of man’s knowledge in any subject possesses a high interest, which is perhaps 
increased by its close neighbourhood to the realms of imagination.53 
 
Woolf’s understanding of granite might be closely associated with her personal 
experience in Cornwall, but it seems at least possible that if Woolf did read this text by 
Darwin, the uncertainty surrounding the origin of this most deeply embedded material 
would have fed her imagination, perhaps partly accounting for some of the more 
complicated and conflicting uses of ‘granite’ throughout the span of her writing. 
As it turns out, there is even less excuse for us to fall into stable understandings of 
granite today, as Pitcher informs us of a resurgence of interest in the twentieth century 
‘stimulated by the thesis that granites image their source rocks in the inaccessible deep 
crust, and that their diversity is the result of varying global tectonic context’.54 With its 
truth both diverse and context-dependent, it is somewhat appropriate that granite should 
be formed from magma and contain potential metamorphic properties. As Guo-Neng 
Chen and Rodney Grapes outline in Granite Genesis: In-situ Melting and Crustal 
Evolution (2007), ‘the overwhelming opinion of most earth scientists is that granite is 
                                                 
52 Charles Darwin. Journal of Researches into the Natural History and Geology of the Countries Visited 
during the Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle. Cambridge: CUP, 2011, p.12. 
53 Darwin 2011, p.284. 
54 Pitcher 1993, p.v. 
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derived by partial melting of crustal rocks of various compositions. This idea essentially 
brings together the earlier competing explanations of granite genesis; magmatic (granites 
are igneous rocks resulting from the crystallization of magma) and metamorphic (granites 
are the result of a dry or wet granitisation process that transformed sialic sedimentary 
rocks into granite), because granites are the result of ultra-metamorphism involving 
melting (anatexis) of crustal rocks.’55 Due to the complexity of its formation, Pitcher 
highlights the intense difficulties in attempting to classify granites: ‘It could well be 
argued that any attempt to categorize the granite family on a natural basis is doomed to 
failure given the virtually infinite number of different types which might be generated in 
response to a variety of generative processes and possible source rock compositions.’56 
Indeed, as Chen and Grapes point out, ‘the number of “granite types” has proliferated 
from at least 20 schemes that have been proposed to classify them’.57 Although Pitcher 
concedes that ‘a proper order is obviously required for description and comparison’, he 
stresses that ‘the resulting arrangements are wholly static, often artificial, and lead 
nowhere along the path of understanding’. This sounds remarkably close to 
poststructuralist readings of Woolf which argue, as Caughie puts it, that categorisations 
‘are not necessarily discrete […] Rather, they are constructed to solve certain 
problems.’58 Like Caughie then, Pitcher emphasises what he calls ‘process based, 
dynamic classification.’59 
 
1.3 Chasing Rainbows 
1.3.1 ‘the paraphernalia of reality […] lit up’ 
As with her use of ‘granite’, there are a few instances in Woolf’s writing where ‘rainbow’ 
is conventionally employed, associated with beauty and vibrancy, and several occasions 
when Woolf’s use of this term appears in citations of another author’s work. In the 
following sections I will go on to consider some of the more nuanced, complicated 
appearances of rainbows in ‘The Sun and the Fish’ and ‘Sketch of the Past’, and I will 
                                                 
55 Guo-Neng Chen and Rodney Grapes. Granite Genesis: In-situ Melting and Crustal Evolution. Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2007, p.4. For more on the controversy over the origin of granite, see Davis A. Young. Mind 
Over Magma: the Story of Igneous Petrology. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003, p.81-103.  
56 Pitcher 1993, p.19. 
57 Chen and Grapes 2007, p.4. 
58 Caughie 1991, p.20. 
59 Pitcher 1993, p.19.  
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also reflect on the mythological and scientific implications of this term. Firstly, however, 
I want to briefly note these more conventional or expected figurations of the rainbow in 
Woolf’s letters and diaries, and highlight where we can see a slightly more unexpected 
association being made. This is evident in two different letters Woolf writes to Vanessa 
Bell, twenty years apart: on January 17th, 1918, Woolf speaks of plans ‘for establishing 
[Alix Sargant-Florence] in Ormond Street above Saxon [Sydney-Turner]’, in the hope 
that ‘[h]is gloom and her despair meeting may build a rainbow’ (L2 210), and on 9th June 
1938 Woolf writes that one of Bell’s paintings is ‘complete and entire, firm as marble and 
ravishing as a rainbow’ (L6 235; a phrase which evokes Woolf’s ‘granite and rainbow’ 
term). But Vanessa Bell herself disrupts the luminous resonance of the rainbow – in a 
letter to Woolf writes to Sydney Waterlow on May 3rd 1921 she refers to a party hosted 
by Clive Bell ‘to which all his ladies went in different colours of the rainbow’ and yet 
they were ‘utterly outshone by Vanessa in old lace’ (L2 467). Indeed, the colours of the 
rainbow are dimmed further by Woolf in a letter to Vita Sackville-West on March 2nd 
1926, when she writes of her mongrel fox terrier, Grizzle, who is at the vet (and as it 
turns out she is put down later that year) ‘with eczema, and a cough’ (L3 249) – the 
eczema described as ‘rainbow stripes across her back’ (they are, nevertheless, ‘sanguine 
on the whole’) (L3 246). Associated here with illness, in a diary entry dated 6th April 
1940 Woolf links the rainbow with the type of war memorialisation more often associated 
with granite (see section 1.2.1): ‘Whom did we meet in London this week? Bonamy 
Dobrée the very moment we arrived. Spick & span, clipped, grey, with a rainbow of 
medal ribbons across his breast’(D5 277). 
 As well as citing Lawrence’s The Rainbow (1915) in a letter to Lytton Strachey 
on the 28th Feb 1916 about a ‘private indecency press called the Rainbow, for the 
production of that and other works’ (L2 82), appearances of the word ‘rainbow’ appear as 
quotations in a range of Woolf’s essays. More straightforward examples of this are found 
in ‘The Duchess of Newcastle’ (1925) when Woolf quotes ‘the hangings of a Rainbow 
made that’s thin’ from the revised version of Margaret Cavendish’s ‘The Palace of the 
Fairy Queen’ (1664), a poem which showed the ‘fresh and delicate fancy’ of her early 
writings (CR1 74-75). In ‘Life and the Novelist’ (1926), the rainbow has a different 
import, when Woolf quotes Gladys Bronwyn Stern’s description in A Deputy Was King 
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(1926) of a Chinese coat as an example of her technique which is too focused on detail to 
allow character to emerge – we might say too much ‘fact’ and not enough on 
‘personality’ (E4 473): ‘Quality is added to quality, fact to fact, until we cease to 
discriminate and our interest is suffocated under a plethora of words’ (E4 404). Notably, 
however, in this instance the rainbow is on the side of fact and materiality, as we read that 
this coat has ‘a rainbow’ embroidered on it behind the ‘outstretched wings’ of a ‘silvery 
heron’ (E2 134). Both of these essays pre-date ‘The New Biography’ by a matter of just a 
couple of years, but in a citation from A Room of One’s Own, published two years after 
‘The New Biography’, the rainbow becomes both embedded, and encased, in solidity, 
when Woolf quotes Christina Rossetti’s ‘A Birthday’ (1857): ‘My heart is like a rainbow 
shell’ (RO 16).  
In the ‘Novels of E. M Forster’, Woolf quotes her contemporary and friend in his 
use of the term ‘rainbow bridge’ (a term I return to in the following section) in Howards 
End (1910): 
 
[Forster’s] concern is with the private life; his message is addressed to the soul. “It is the 
private life that holds out the mirror to infinity; personal intercourse, and that alone, that 
ever hints at a personality beyond our daily vision.” Our business is not to build in brick 
and mortar, but to draw together the seen and the unseen. We must learn to build the 
“rainbow bridge that should connect the prose in us with the passion.” (E4 495)60 
 
Indeed, earlier in the paragraph in which she quotes from Howards End, Woolf uses the 
word ‘rainbow’ herself when outlining Forster’s tendency towards both ‘the preachers 
and teachers’ and the ‘pure artists’ of literature (E4 494). At first she predictably aligns 
rainbows with aesthetics, the light surface which covers the true depth of the ‘message’: 
‘Behind the rainbow of wit and sensibility there is a vision which he is determined that 
we shall see’ (E4 495). Yet she immediately turns this on its head, and it is Forster’s 
grander ‘vision’ which is most evasive, for it ‘is of a peculiar kind and his message of an 
elusive nature.’ And yet, Woolf writes, the ‘soul’ which is Forster’s concern is actually 
found to have a quite tangible home: ‘The omnibus, the villa, the suburban residence, are 
an essential part of his design’ (E4 494); ‘the soul […] is caged in a solid villa of red 
                                                 
60 See E. M. Forster. Howard’s End. New York: Penguin, 2000 [1910], p.69; p.158.  
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bricks somewhere in the suburbs of London’ (E4 495). According to Woolf, however, 
neither Forster’s treatment of the truths of materiality nor the truths of the soul are fully 
successful: ‘if his books are to succeed in their mission his reality must at certain points 
become irradiated; his brick must be lit up; we must see the whole building saturated with 
light. We have at once to believe in the complete reality of the suburb and in the complete 
reality of the soul.’ Forster’s desired ‘combination of realism and mysticism’ (E4 495) 
certainly evokes Woolf’s ‘granite and rainbow’ figuration in ‘The New Biography’, but 
Woolf’s emphasis on bricks becoming ‘lit up’ – an image which is the inverse of 
Rossetti’s ‘rainbow shell’ – suggests that we cannot conceive of two separate and distinct 
elements coming together and creating a settled whole; rather it would seem to require 
more intense, even if less fixed, combinations. Citing Henrik Ibsen as the perfect 
example, Woolf observes that ‘the paraphernalia of reality have at certain moments to 
become a veil through which we see infinity’ (E4 495), a material reality that becomes 
‘luminously transparent’ (E4 496). Ibsen ‘gives us it by choosing a very few facts and 
those of a highly relevant kind. Thus, when the moment of illumination comes we accept 
it implicitly […] It has not ceased to be itself by becoming something else.’ Forster fails 
because he cannot capture this; it is always a choice between one and the other with a 
dichotomous arrangement, ‘the change from realism to symbolism’ (E4 496).  
 
1.3.2 ‘the world tinged with all the colours of the rainbow’ 
This ‘paraphenalia of reality’ that Woolf speaks of points towards a reality that 
necessarily emanates an element of elusiveness, where the intangibility of the ‘rainbow’ 
is assimilated with materiality. It is not a question of dimming the rainbow, but of 
realising that the vibrancy of the rainbow is always already infused in the material world. 
Returning to Woolf’s ‘Sketch of the Past’, this is seen in relation to the formation of 
subjectivity when, recalling the ‘bright colours’ and ‘many distinct sounds’ (MB 91) of 
childhood, Woolf emphasises an embodied ‘movement and change’, a complicated 
material ‘actual’ (MB 92) that involves an equally evasive sense of self, ‘the little 
creature’:  
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One must get the feeling of everything approaching and then disappearing, getting large, 
getting small, passing at different rates of speed past the little creature […] driven on as 
she was by the growth of her legs and arms, driven without her being able to stop it, or to 
change it, driven as a plant is driven up out of the earth, up until the stalk grows, the leaf 
grows, birds swell. That is what is indescribable, that is what makes all images too static. 
(MB 91) 
 
Following this, Woolf then appears to associate rainbows straightforwardly with the 
imagination; describing her first memory of her mother she recalls how ‘she told me to 
think of all the lovely things I could imagine. Rainbows and bells…’ (MB 93). But rather 
than the intangibility of her memory and imagination being an escape from reality, ‘these 
minute separate details’ are very much a part of the material life of the young Virginia 
Stephen (MB 93). For example, as Woolf remembers the elusiveness of her mother’s 
personality, Julia Stephen becomes not so much a ‘particular person’ as she is 
‘generalised; dispersed; omnipresent […] the creator of that crowded merry world’ (MB 
94).  
 
living so completely in her [mother’s] atmosphere that one never got far enough away 
from her to see her as a person […] She was the whole thing; Talland House was full of 
her; Hyde Part Gate was full of her […] She was keeping what I call in my shorthand the 
panoply of life – that which we all lived in common – in being. (MB 94) 
 
Crucially, Woolf is eager to avoid the notion of her mother as a totalising symbolical 
figure by adding, ‘[i]t is true that I enclosed that world in another made by my own 
temperament; it is true that from the beginning I had many adventures outside that world; 
and often went far from it; and kept much back from it’ (MB 96). In chapter two I return 
to this phrase when discussing To the Lighthouse by claiming that it provides a challenge 
to oedipal readings of Woolf’s texts (see section 2.2.5) but I would note here that this 
could also be regarded as a cautionary note to those who would argue that because Woolf 
is writing ‘autobiography’ then somehow we are perceiving the real ‘I’ that constituted 
Woolf’s childhood. Alex Zwerdling has written of ‘Sketch of the Past’ as though it takes 
away a pretence that is somehow evident in fiction and moves us nearer to the ‘truth’: 
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‘Woolf allows herself to write about her childhood more personally than she had ever 
done, without pretending that “I” could easily be translated into “we.”’61 De-linking 
‘granite and rainbow’ from a compulsory relationship with biographical writing frees it 
from its often restricted use, but the fact that the complexity of their relationship is then 
further illuminated by returning to autobiographical writing (in this instance Woolf’s 
‘Sketch’), reminds us that readings of auto/biography need not necessarily be treated 
differently from fiction, that Woolf’s letters, diaries, or autobiographical writings 
encourage us to trespass the boundaries between fact and fiction. 
Exploring the complexity of the granite/rainbow dynamic in ‘Sketch of the Past’ 
illuminates, to borrow a further phrase from that text, ‘the world tinged with all the 
colours of the rainbow’ (MB 55). A similar phrase can in also be found in Orlando:  
 
What is love? What friendship? What truth? but directly he came to think about them, his 
whole past, which seemed to him of extreme length and variety, rushed into the falling 
second, swelled it a dozen times its natural size, coloured it all the tints of the rainbow 
and filled it with all the odds and ends in the universe. (O 60) 
 
What is interesting here is that the rainbow is linked to variety and colour, but is also 
infused with history – ‘his whole past’ – and even a cosmic materiality: ‘all the odds and 
ends of the universe.’ In ‘The Sun and the Fish’,62 published the same year as Orlando, 
Woolf uses the image of the rainbow to draw this materialist world. In this essay she 
describes witnessing the total eclipse of 1927, and we see the world becoming filled in by 
colour as the sun slowly appears from behind the moon:  
 
at first, so pale and frail and strange the light was sprinkled rainbow-like in a hoop of 
colour, that it seemed as if the earth could never live decked out in such frail tints […] 
But steadily and surely our relief broadened and our confidence established itself as the 
                                                 
61 Alex Zwerdling. Virginia Woolf and the Real World. Berkeley: U of California P, 1986, p.269. 
62 ‘Rainbow’ is also, of course, a kind of fish. In her essay ‘Herman Melville’ (1919) Woolf uses the phrase 
‘rainbow fish sparking in the water’ (E3 81).  
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great paint brush washed in woods, dark on the valley, and massed the hills blue above 
them. The world became more and more solid  (E4 522).63 
 
The link here between the ‘rainbow’ and materiality is pronouncedly non-transcendent, as 
the earth soon becomes the familiar and populous place of ‘farm-houses’, ‘villages’, and 
‘railway lines’, as the ‘rainbow-like’ sprinkles of light ‘modelled and moulded’ the 
‘whole fabric of civilisation’, before Woolf tells us of the true revelation: ‘But still the 
memory endured that the earth we stand on is made of colour; colour can be blown out’ 
(E4 522).64 It is both the earth as rainbow, and the earth as ‘ephemeral as a rainbow’ (TL 
20). 
 
1.3.3 Rainbows in Mythology and Art 
A comparison could be made here between Woolf’s ‘The Sun and the Fish’ and 
Lawrence’s The Rainbow, where at the end of his novel ‘a faint, vast rainbow’ appears to 
Ursala ‘mysteriously’ and is described as ‘great architecture of light and colour’ that 
‘stood on the earth’65 – a re-writing of Genesis, where the rainbow is presented to Noah 
as God’s covenant: ‘And the bow shall be in the cloud; and I will look upon it, that I may 
remember the everlasting covenant between God and every living creature of all flesh 
that [is] upon the earth.’66 But whilst Lawrence’s rainbow is more earthly, it does not 
entirely turn away from transcendental symbolism: ‘[Ursula] saw in the rainbow the 
earth’s new architecture, the old, brittle corruption of houses and factories swept away, 
the world built up in a living fabric of Truth, fitting to the overarching heaven’.67 We can 
not be sure whether or not Woolf had Lawrence’s novel or indeed Genesis in mind when 
writing ‘The Sun and the Fish’, but they do point to potential wider mythological and 
artistic resonances – much of which she would surely have been familiar with – to 
Woolf’s rainbows, which themselves complicate a strict opposition between on the one 
                                                 
63 For an in-depth analysis on Woolf and the 1927 eclipse (including ‘The Sun and the Fish’) see Goldman 
2001 [1998]. 
64 A description of the eclipse is also found in Woolf’s diary entry on 30th June 1927, although there is no 
mention there of a rainbow (see D3 143-144).  
65 D. H. Lawrence. The Rainbow, ed. Kate Flint. Oxford: OUP, 1998 [1915], p.493.  
66 Gen:16 http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/Genesis-Chapter-9 
67 Lawrence 1998 [1915], p.494. For an insightful discussion of The Rainbow and Genesis see Terence R. 
Wright. D. H. Lawrence and the Bible. Cambridge: CUP, 2000, p.84-109. 
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hand materiality or earthliness and on the other an intangible, transcendent rainbow. 
Given her knowledge of Greek mythology, for example, Woolf would likely have known 
that the rainbow goddess and also messenger of the gods, Iris, is, in some genealogies, the 
granddaughter of Gaea, Mother Earth.68 Furthermore, while Woolf initially links the 
rainbow to personality in ‘The New Biography’ in line with most Greek writers, 
Xenophanes was one of those who resisted anthropomorphising the rainbow, offering 
naturalistic explanations: “And she whom they call Iris, this too is by nature a cloud, 
purple, red and greenish-yellow to behold”.69 Anaxagoras puts it in similar terms – ‘we 
call the reflection of the sun in the clouds a rainbow’70 and Aristotle’s writing on the 
rainbow built from these insights. It is worth noting here that in her own writing Woolf 
never refers to Iris in the sense of the rainbow, but she does use it to refer to the iris 
flower, which takes its name from the Greek rainbow and aptly emphasises the vibrantly 
material import this term has taken on (as does the other surviving usage – the iris of the 
eye). The most well-known example of this is found in Orlando, when suitably enough 
the sight of ‘the red hyacinth, the purple iris wrought [Orlando] to cry out in ecstasy at 
the goodness, the beauty of nature’ (O 91).71 In addition to the Iris-rainbow, Raymond 
Lee and Alistair Fraser’s The Rainbow Bridge: Rainbows in Art, Myth, and Science 
(2001) helpfully outlines various understandings of the rainbow in Babylonian times, 
Judeo-Christian culture, ancient Greece and Egypt, and non-Western and Near Eastern 
antiquity cultures, highlighting both the emphasis that has been placed on it as a bridge to 
God, and the more materialist-oriented readings of the rainbow. 72 One example of a more 
tangible mythic rainbow that Woolf would likely not have been as familiar with is that 
                                                 
68 Raymond L. Lee and Alistair B. Fraser. The Rainbow Bridge: Rainbows in Art, Myth, and Science. 
Pennsylvania: the Pennsylvania State UP, 2001, p.18. 
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70 Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae: Fragments and Testimonia, ed. Patricia Curd. Toronto: U of 
Toronto P, 2007, p.74.  
71 For passing references to the iris flower see (L3 312) and (JR 85). For an extensive account of the iris 
and other flowers in Woolf’s writing see Elisa Kay Sparks. ‘“Everything tended to set itself in a garden”: 
Virginia Woolf’s Literary and Quotidian Flowers: A Bar-Graphical Approach.’ Virginia Woolf and the 
Natural World: Selected Papers from the Twentieth Annual International Conference on Virginia Woolf, 
ed. Kristin Czarnecki and Carrie Rohman. Clemson: Clemson University Digital Press: 42-60. Woolf’s 
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to Marchesa Iris Origo. 
72 See Lee and Fraser 2001, p.2-33. 
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the Siberian Yakuts and Buryats ‘identify it as a graceful, colourful arc of urine’, 
produced by ‘the she-fox’!73 
 In their discussion of the rainbow in visual art, Lee and Fraser draw attention to 
the importance of Albrecht Dürer in offering a more solid rendering of the rainbow. In his 
1511 painting, Adoration of the Trinity (see appendix A, fig. 1), Dürer includes a double 
rainbow – one on which God sits and rests his robes over, and one which is ‘solid 
enough’ to act as a stool for his feet. Whilst the two rainbows are far from naturalistic and 
still in a heavenly sphere, Lee and Fraser note that there is a curious mixture of 
materiality and unreality to them based on a ‘combination of unnatural rainbow solidity 
and coloring’: ‘Compared to the vividly colored clothes of the heavenly and earthly elect, 
the rainbows […] are wan indeed. Despite their ghostly coloration, though, they retain 
[…] solidity’.74 Whilst Woolf emphasises the luminosity of the non-transcendent 
rainbow, at the beginning of the sixteenth century it may have been necessary to dim the 
rainbow in order to subtly undermine its godly, transcendental status. There are of course 
rainbows elsewhere in Dürer’s work, and Lee and Fraser note that in his later, enigmatic 
engraving Melencolia I (1514) he ‘makes the outside of his […] rainbow darker than the 
inside – a subtle bit of realism that is superfluous to any purely symbolic reading’ (see 
appendix A, fig. 2). But where the rainbow in Adoration of the Trinity is particularly 
important is the way that Dürer ‘relegates it to the status of a minor prop’, so that ‘within 
a generation of Dürer’s death, artists’ use of the rainbow as a support for Father or Son 
declined rapidly. This decline is partly due to the increasing artistic energy devoted to 
pagan and secular images, yet it also reflects the passing from fashion of a powerful, 
centuries-old pairing of Christ and the rainbow.’75 Could Adoration of the Trinity have 
influenced the iconography of the rainbow in Woolf’s mind? Although Woolf mentions 
Dürer in an early essay ‘Impressions at Bayreuth’ (1909), comparing ‘a gigantic old 
woman, with a blue cotton bonnet on her head’ with ‘a figure like one of Dürer’s’ (E1 
290), and notes in a 1933 letter to Ethyl Smyth that the journalist Kingsley Martin has 
‘autotypes from Albert Durer’ on his wall (L5 242), she never refers specifically to this 
particular painting, nor to Dürer’s rainbows. Woolf did, however, have a copy in her 
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library of  Thomas Moore’s Albert Dürer (1905) where Adoration of the Trinity is 
reproduced, along with Melencolia I.76 
 
1.3.4 Woolf’s ‘double rainbow’ and the Art of Science 
The unweaving of Woolf’s ‘rainbow’ as solely signifying intangibility as opposed to the 
hard facts of our material reality has, of course, also been emphasised by centuries of 
scientific discovery, most famously by Descartes in Discourse on Method (1637) and also 
by Newton.77 We know today that on the one hand rainbows are multiplicities of colour 
and type: everyone is familiar with the reds and yellows, greens and blues, but there are 
also variations which include reflected and refracted rainbows, the supernumerary 
rainbow, and the ‘double rainbow’, as discussed above in Dürer’s Adoration of the 
Trinity. Indeed, Virginia and Leonard Woolf themselves witnessed a ‘double rainbow’ on 
their terrace in September 1930 – a spectacle that Woolf notes as interrupting her letter 
writing to Ethel Smyth:  
 
but look, I have written so much and at such a pace that the words scarcely cover the 
ideas – these are horrid splits, – and the writing is only an attempt to encircle a few signs. 
Do you ever show my letters? Do you ever quote them? Do what you like, but I rather 
hope not, because I am never able to write at leisure; (I'm trying to finish a good many 
things) and then I cannot be expressive (these interruptions are because of a double 
rainbow on the terrace – L. has dashed in from the rain to show me)  (L4 217).78 
 
In Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion, and the Appetite for Wonder (1998) 
Richard Dawkins describes this relatively rare phenomenon of seeing a double rainbow 
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as a ‘delightful complication’ where, instead of light from the sun entering a raindrop 
‘through the upper quadrant of the surface facing the sun, and leav[ing] through the lower 
quadrant’, it enters through the lower quadrant and so ‘[u]nder the right conditions, it can 
then be reflected twice round the inside of the sphere, leaving the lower quadrant of the 
drop in such a way as to enter the observer’s eye, also refracted, to produce a second 
rainbow, 8 degrees higher than the first, with the colours reversed.’79  
Dawkins reminds us then that the multiplicitous nature of rainbows is not solely 
due to their colours or types: ‘why do you see a complete rainbow? Because there are lots 
of different raindrops. A band of thousands of raindrops is giving you green light (and 
simultaneously giving blue light to anybody who might be placed above you, and 
simultaneously giving red light to somebody else below you.)80 Ad infinitum, so that there 
is never only one rainbow that we all see; Virginia and Leonard were not in fact seeing 
the same ‘double rainbow’. Dawkins wider argument is that ‘Science is, or ought to be, 
the inspiration for great poetry’, and he therefore takes issue with Keats’ famous 
disappointment in his 1819 poem ‘Lamia’ – a poem which Woolf of course knew (D2 
130) – that Newton had reduced rainbows to fully understood ‘common things’:  
 
Do not all charms fly 
At the mere touch of cold philosophy? 
There was an awful rainbow once in heaven: 
We know her woof, her texture; she is given 
In the dull catalogue of common things. 
Philosophy will clip an Angel’s wings, 
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line, 
Empty the haunted air, and gnomed mine – 
Unweave a rainbow, as it erewhile made 
The tender-person’d Lamia melt into a shade. 81 
 
Dawkins emphasises that science has multiplied the rainbow’s beauty and mystery: 
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far from being rooted at a particular ‘place’ where fairies might deposit a crock of gold, 
there are as many rainbows as there are eyes looking at the storm. Different observers, 
looking at the same shower from different places, will piece together their own separate 
rainbows using light from different collections of raindrops. Strictly speaking, even your 
two eyes are seeing two different rainbows […] A further complication is that the 
raindrops themselves are falling, or blowing about. So any particular raindrop might pass 
through the band that is delivering, say, red light to you then move into the yellow region. 
But you can continue to see the red band, as if nothing had moved, because new 
raindrops come to take the places of the departed ones.82 
 
Nor are rainbows, it should be added, always so evasively distant from us, and can even 
be seen ‘as a complete circle only a few feet in diameter, racing along the near side of a 
hedge as you drive by.’83 There is then a kind of solid intangibility, a granite-like illusion. 
As Dawkins states: ‘The illusion of the rainbow itself remains rock steady’.84 
 
1.4 Against Totalisation: Repetition and Transposition 
Having created an inter-textual mapping of Woolf’s multiple usage of ‘granite’ and 
‘rainbow’ above, as well as considering some of their extra-textual resonances, in the 
final section of this chapter I want to suggest that we might think about these various 
granites and rainbows as performing a kind of lexical polygamy. The many ‘swift 
marriages’ these terms create with other words (as well as each other) are, I would argue, 
part of a critique of totalisation that runs through Woolf’s texts (a critique which I will 
explore further, with different foci, in the following chapters). In her insightful work on 
Woolf and realism, Pam Morris has recently argued that Woolf’s rejection of totalisation 
is linked to her wariness ‘of aspects of subjective interiority and of the metaphorisation of 
language, even though these are often regarded as defining features of modernist 
writing’.85 Although not working with the ‘granite and rainbow’ figuration in her reading 
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of Woolf’s texts, Morris does imply the importance of considering granite-like reality 
alongside rainbow-like personality: Woolf’s ‘representations of public world, individual 
consciousness and inter-personal discourse retain a realist underpinning in conjunction 
with experimental form’.86 Drawing on Derrida’s critique of metaphor as supporting the 
idealist tradition in Western metaphysics, and working with Roman Jakobson’s 
definitions of metaphor as centripetal and metonymy as centrifugal, Morris therefore 
emphasises that where metaphor has a vertical structure, totalising meaning by turning 
heterogeneity into unity, metonymy (including synecdoche) is marked by horizontal 
contiguity, producing, as Morris puts it, ‘an unending chain moving through a diverse 
particularity’.87 In her reading of Mrs Dalloway (1925) and The Waves, Morris is keen to 
emphasise Woolf’s writing as characterised by an ‘inclusive metonymic syntax’ that 
reveals an ‘epistemological open-endedness and materiality’,88 and she therefore favours 
a ‘metonymic realism’ that is symptomatic of a contiguous materialism, insisting that 
Woolf seeks ‘outwardness as much as inwardness’.89 We could set this last point in 
contrast to Hussey’s phenomenological argument in The Singing of the Real World 
(1987) that  
 
Woolf’s art tells us not about an external, objective Reality, but about our experience of 
the world. […] Beginning with Woolf’s ideas of self and identity, we are led eventually 
to realise that her concept of the essential nature of human being was religious in 
character. Although an ardent atheist, Woolf gradually came to hold what can best be 
described as a faith, the essential element of which was belief in a “soul.”90  
 
Concerned with ‘the actual world beyond the text’ and not simply our subjective 
experience of that world,91 Morris argues that ‘Woolf’s artistic imagination is more 
metonymic than metaphoric or symbolic’, where ‘[s]ymbolism and metaphoric 
idealisation function to impose totality and universality upon diversity, to deny a 
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troublesome material heterogeneity by merging’ together. Morris argues that on an 
individual level this promotes ‘a seductive aggrandisement of the subjective self’, and on 
a social level ‘facilitates a dangerously totalising perception of complex actuality’.92  
 One of the most illuminating examples Morris provides of Woolf’s suspicion of 
metaphor comes during the scene where the car passes through Bond Street near the 
beginning of Mrs Dalloway, creating a ‘gradual drawing together of everything to one 
centre’ (MD 13). As Morris notes of this section of the novel, Woolf satirises ‘the 
pervasive willingness among people of all classes to metaphorically elevate the particular 
and concrete into symbols of the abstract and metaphysical’, and this is evident in the 
vehicles transformation into ‘the enduring symbol of the state’, ‘greatness’ and ‘the 
majesty of England’ (MD 14). There is a sinister aspect to this ‘metaphoric mode’, as 
Morris points out that ‘[t]he diverse faces of the passersby become rapt in uniformity’, 
seen when we are told that ‘they had heard the voice of authority; the spirit of religion 
was abroad with her eyes bandaged tight and her lips gaping wide’ (MD 12). The ‘ripple’ 
left behind from the car’s passing leads to verbal and physical violence, ‘a general 
shindy’ in ‘a public-house in a back street’ (MD 15), as well as men ‘with hands behind 
the tails of their coats’ standing perfectly straight in a display of obediant patriotism (MD 
16). Contrary to this symbolising of cars as abstract ideal, Morris argues that they 
function metonymically, acting as ‘denotative tracks’ leading us outside Woolf’s text ‘to 
the structures and processes of the social world’. 
 
There are references to motor vehicles on almost every page of Mrs Dalloway. Woolf 
humorously even calls two characters Mr Bentley and Mr Morris respectively. The names 
indicate the Woolfian opposition between realism and idealism. Mr Morris (who owns 
two cars) is, as the saying goes, down to earth, with a daughter going into the family 
business and a son with a scholarship at Leeds University (MD 135-6). Mr Bentley, in 
keeping with the elite connotations of the car, is an idealist seeing the plane over London 
as ‘a symbol of man’s soul’, of the desire to transcend the materiality of the body (MD 
24). Of another unnamed idealist in the text, the narrator comments, ‘Such are the visions 
which ceaselessly float up, …put their faces in front of, the actual thing’ (MD 49). In so 
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doing, the passage continues, they take away a sense of the earth, transforming the fever 
and multiplicity of life into a unified ideal order.93 
 
In this chapter I have tried precisely to show, in the fact they appear together in the same 
sentence only twice in Woolf’s writings and in the attachments each of the two terms 
make in other contexts, that it may be too easy to assume a ‘unified ideal order’ 
underlying Woolf’s granite and rainbow. Woolf’s refusal, as Morris has it, to impose a 
totalising metaphorical or symbolic meaning in her writing is important then in 
negotiating a move away from the dichotomous categorisation of traditional realism 
versus post/modernism, and the emphasis it places on the extra-textual aspects of Woolf’s 
writing. But I would like to suggest that my mapping of granite and rainbow poses 
problems for this form of metonymic realism as well as for metaphor. The ‘multiplicity of 
life’ Morris speaks of – ‘the multiplicity of the actual scene’ – is always restricted to the 
‘metonymic outward movement into the world’; wishing to argue against purely 
subjective versions of reality, she transfers authority onto an agreed and fixed reality. But 
if Woolf’s ‘granite and rainbow’ figuration might be transformed precisely through a 
kind of metonymical tracing into geological findings on the less solid and less fixed 
properties of granite or physicists discoveries of the materiality of rainbows, let alone the 
multiple contexts in which these terms appear throughout Woolf’s writings, then it would 
be problematic to pin down Woolf’s words as referring to part of an agreed whole, as a 
metonymic realism would seem to do.94 If ‘granite’ and ‘rainbow’ are the materials for 
Woolf’s theory of ‘The New Biography’, then these materials expand throughout her 
writings to form an inter-textual and extra-textual map of granites-rainbows that appears 
to end with neither the metaphorical nor metonymical; neither centripetal nor centrifugal; 
neither a flight into ‘idealisation’ nor a settling into ‘the actual non-fictional world.’95  
Where does this all leave us regarding how we as critics may think about and use 
Woolf’s ‘granite and rainbow’ term? I want to propose two theories that might help to 
crystalise my particular mapping of Woolf’s granites and rainbows, as well as further 
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extend the possible implications of Woolf’s terms. The first concerns Deleuze’s concept 
of ‘repetition’ which, he explains when introducing Difference and Repetition, is bound 
together with the production of difference: ‘on every occasion these concepts of a pure 
difference and a complex repetition […] connect and coalesce. The perpetual divergence 
and decentring of difference correspond closely to a displacement and a disguising within 
repetition.’96 Repetition, according to Deleuze, has nothing to do with resemblance and 
everything to do with the creation of difference, and therefore the creation of the new: 
‘To repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or 
singular which has no equal or equivalent. And perhaps this repetition at the level of 
external conducts echoes, for its own part, a more secret vibration which animates it, a 
more profound, internal repetition within the singular.’97 Passing through different 
contexts, mixing with different words, the decoupling of Woolf’s ‘granite and rainbow’ 
into a mapping of the repetition of each term in her writing shows how ‘granite’ and 
‘rainbow’ are complex terms that always already differ in themselves; an ‘internal 
repetition’ that is ‘a condition of action’,98 creating further external repetitions. This 
means that in Woolf’s writing ‘granite’ and ‘rainbow’ can be said to embody difference: 
they affirm a new difference each time they are repeated by Woolf. Judith Allen has 
recently argued that Woolf’s use of ‘But’ can similarly be understood through Deleuze’s 
‘repetition’ where ‘[w]ith each repetition, an incremental change takes place, altering the 
meaning in some substantial way – creating difference.’99 Where Woolf’s repetition of 
‘granite’ and of ‘rainbow’ are concerned, this would mean the acknowledgement that 
granite returns in her writing with a difference every time it is repeated, and crucially in 
the extra-textual dimension these signs take on – some of which I also explored above. 
Woolf’s multiple granites and rainbows cannot, therefore, be said to be a coherent 
emblem or symbol through Woolf’s writing, nor a totalising metaphor, because the 
complex singularity of each element is repeated in its difference each and every time it 
appears.  
                                                 
96 Deleuze 2004 [1994], p.xviii.  
97 Deleuze 2004 [1994], p.1. 
98 Deleuze 2004 [1994], p.113. 
99 Allen (forthcoming 2012). Quoted with permission of the author. 
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Woolf’s ‘granite’ and ‘rainbow’, then, are not then to be equated with ‘parts’ of a 
‘whole’ (either the whole of ‘granite’, the whole of ‘rainbow’, or of the combined 
‘granite and rainbow’ figuration) but as themselves always already containing differences 
that are brought into play when these terms are repeated. Deleuze and Guattari argue in 
Anti-Oedipus (1972): 
 
We no longer believe in the myth of existence of fragments that, like pieces of an antique 
statue, are merely waiting for the last one to be turned up, so that they may all be glued 
back together to create a unity that is precisely the same as the original unity. We no 
longer believe in a primordial totality that once existed, or in a final totality that waits us 
at some future date.100 
 
We see the example of granite coloured by the rainbow and ‘no longer believe in the dull 
gray outlines of a dreary, colourless dialectic of evolution, aimed at forming a 
harmonious whole out of the heterogeneous bits by rounding off their rough edges. We 
believe only in totalities that are peripheral.’101 Freeing Woolf’s granites and rainbows 
from an oppositional framework is to say that these terms do not depend on negation: 
‘differentiation’, Deleuze writes in Bergsonism (1966), ‘is never a negation but a 
creation, and that difference is never negative but essentially positive and creative.’102 
Decoupled ‘granite’ and ‘rainbow’ have an affirmative quality throughout Woolf’s 
writing where difference is repeated, so that when we do think of them as a couple, we 
can no longer, I would suggest, conceive of a straightforward opposition where each term 
negates the other, nor the dialectical resolution of contradictory term, but as the 
affirmation of the singularities of granite and of rainbow in all their multiplicity. It is not 
that Woolf’s granite or her rainbow repeats itself as a stable whole, nor that we see a 
plurality of granite or of rainbow which we can then say resembles each other: 
‘Repetition is no more the permanence of the One than the resemblance of the many.’103 
Seen in this light, my mapping of granites and rainbows attempts to affirm the different 
                                                 
100 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p.45. 
101 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p.46. 
102 Gilles Deleuze. Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Zone Books, 
1991, p.103. 
103 Deleuze 2004 [1994], p.153. 
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chains formed by each which challenge the oppositional arrangement of solidity and 
intangibility, fact and fiction, materiality and theory. Two chains of textual and extra-
textual signs are formed which are not linear and which are not teleologically driven, but 
where ‘[e]ach chain captures fragments of other chains’ and demonstrate ‘the ability to 
rearrange fragments continually in new and different patterns of configurations’.104 
Crucially, ‘[t]he error we must guard against is to believe that there is a kind of logical 
order to this string, these crossings or transformations.’105 Therefore, if ‘granite and 
rainbow’ represents ‘the Janus-like qualities’ of Woolf’s writings as Goldman posits, it is 
not just that she ‘combines’ the two. She is ‘as committed to fact as to imagination’106 as 
tools to wedge open a multiplicity doors, of gateways simultaneously offering escapes 
from unity and entrances into the affirmation of disjunction and diversity.  
I have been arguing here that Woolf’s multiple granites and rainbows form 
multiplicitous connections with other words and contexts; we can no longer treat her 
figuration as straightforward metaphor (with its tendency towards totalisation) or 
metonymy (where the part stands for the whole). This brings us to the second, related, 
theory I suggest might be useful here - Braidotti’s ‘transpositions’, which is 
conceptualised as an alternative to metaphor (and metonymy): ‘Transposing is a gesture 
neither of metaphorical assimilation nor of metonymic association. It is a style, in the 
sense of a form of conceptual creativity, like a sliding door, a choreographed slippage.’107 
In this chapter I have referred at various points to ‘assimilation’ and ‘association’, but 
transposition involves non-linear leaps, mobility and cross-referencing, ‘notions that drift 
nomadically among different texts’, and may better explain the relations between Woolf’s 
multiple granites and rainbows. For Braidotti, ‘the theory of transpositions offers a 
contemplative and creative stance that respects the visible and hidden complexities of the 
very phenomena it attempts to study.108 In all of this, Braidotti emphasizes that 
transposing ‘is no mere rhetorical device’;109 instead, it is ‘connecting philosophy to 
[science and] social realities; theoretical speculations to concrete plans’; they are 
                                                 
104 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p.42; p.7. 
105 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.275. 
106 Goldman 2009, p.227. 
107 Braidotti 2006, p.9. 
108 Braidotti 2006, p.6-7. 
109 Braidotti 2006, p.146. 
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‘discursive and also materially embedded’.110 It is by emphasising the multiplicitous and 
complex mixing of meaning-making and materiality (ideas I return to in the following 
chapters) that we can discover ‘the positivity of difference as a specific theme of its 
own’.111  
Braidotti takes music and genetics  – which she argues are both exemplars of non-
linear transfer, working as ‘dissociative shifts or leaps’ – as the ‘double source of 
inspiration’ for transpositions. Transposing Woolf’s multiple granites and rainbows onto 
this model, could they become ‘the double source of inspiration’112 for the complex inter-
, intra- and extra-textual map of her writings, where these terms are freed from the 
assignment of unification and from a priori associations, and where their heterogeneity is 
celebrated? As transpositions that are sustained and enduring precisely because of their 
fluidity, uncertainty and adaptability, granites and rainbows would, then, be considered as 
the ‘perpetual marriage’ becoming many ‘swift marriages’; a polygamy of 
syncronizations, or, to use Braidotti’s own words, ‘a joyful kind of dissonance’.113 
Perhaps it is transpositions that could help explain why when we are digging granite and 
chasing rainbows we are at the same time unearthing rainbows and – as Woolf writes in 
Jacob’s Room – ‘piercing the sky […] like granite cliffs’ (JR 61).   
                                                 
110 Braidotti 2006, p.7. 
111 Braidotti 2006, p.5. 
112 Braidotti 2006, p.5-6. 
113 Braidotti 2006, p.93. 
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2 
 
Sexual Difference in Becoming: 
A Room of One’s Own and To the Lighthouse 
 
Having explored the ways in which Woolf’s theory of ‘granite and rainbow’ is embedded 
in a complex and creative materiality that escapes totalising models of language and 
thought, in this chapter I turn attention to materialist, inclusive and affirmative 
formulations of sexual difference and subjectivity. This chapter is divided into two parts, 
approaching the question of materiality by revisiting Woolf’s much-discussed theory of 
androgyny in A Room of One’s Own before going on to analyse the sexual politics in To 
The Lighthouse. In the first part I focus on sexual difference by staging a dialogue 
between Woolf’s ‘androgyny’, Braidotti’s ‘nomadic subject’, and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
‘becoming-woman’ – three concepts with distinct relationships to the materiality of 
sexual difference but with shared concerns, and all entangled in the materiality of theory. 
Starting with a brief overview of the conflicting responses to Woolf’s androgyny, I go on 
to draw out some of the continuities and dissonances between these theories, emphasising 
the importance of each to contemporary feminist debates on sexual difference. Directly 
influenced by my discussion of androgyny and sexual difference, in the second part of 
this chapter I introduce my own concept of ‘tri-subjectivities’ or tri-s to frame my 
discussion of the various relations formed, and the sexual politics evident, in To the 
Lighthouse. Here I consider the striking connections between Woolf’s novel and several 
Deleuzian concepts including ‘schizoanalysis’, ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’ spaces, the 
‘rhizome’, and ‘becoming’. 
 
2.1 Sexual Difference in Three Concepts: Androgyny/Nomadism/Becoming-woman                                       
2.1.1 Androgyny and Contradiction 
Combining the Greek roots andro (male) and gyne (female), the term ‘androgyny’ has 
historical ties to a wide range of myths and religions, as well as philosophy, psychology 
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and literature. Critics have explored its links to the Yin and Yang of Taoism, the 
Upanishads and Puranas of Hinduism, various aspects of the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
and noted that versions of androgyny can be found in Plato’s philosophy, Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory, and Jung’s psychology.1 But it is to literature, and in particular 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, that Woolf points in her famous passage on androgyny in A 
Room of One’s Own:     
 
the sight of the two people getting into the taxi and the satisfaction it gave me made me 
also ask whether there are two sexes in the mind corresponding to the two sexes in the 
body, and whether they also require to be united in order to get complete satisfaction and 
happiness. And I went on amateurishly to sketch a plan of the soul so that in each of us 
two powers preside, one male, one female; and in the man's brain, the man predominates 
over the woman, and in the woman's brain, the woman predominates over the man. The 
normal and comfortable state of being is that when the two live in harmony together, 
spiritually co-operating. If one is a man, still the woman part of the brain must have 
effect; and a woman also must have intercourse with the man in her. Coleridge perhaps 
meant this when he said that a great mind is androgynous. It is when this fusion takes 
place that the mind is fully fertilised and uses all its faculties. Perhaps a mind that is 
purely masculine cannot create, any more than a mind that is purely feminine, I thought. 
(RO 127-128)2 
 
Woolf appears to see intrigue and subversive potential in the notion of an androgynous 
mind that is ‘resonant and porous’, ‘transmits emotions without impediment’ and is 
‘naturally creative, incandescent and undivided’ (RO 128), but if her ‘sketch’ of 
androgyny is clearly influenced by Coleridge, she is quick to point out that his thinking 
does not much concern women: ‘Coleridge certainly did not mean, when he said that a 
great mind is androgynous, that it is a mind that has any special sympathy with women; a 
mind that takes up their cause or devotes itself to their interpretation’ (RO 128). Indeed 
Woolf herself, as Bowlby notes, seems to betray an asymmetry in the way in which this 
                                                 
1 For a thorough discussion of these various links see Women's Studies 2:2 (1974).  
2 Woolf refers here to Coleridge’s statement that ‘a great mind must be androgynous’ in The Table Talk and 
Omniana of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1918) which she first wrote about in a review for the TLS in 1918. 
See ‘Coleridge as Critic’ (E2 221-225). 
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model of androgyny comes about, where the man would simply have a ‘woman part’ to 
his brain whereas the woman ‘must have intercourse with the man in her’ (RO 128): ‘the 
masculine dominates as whole to part, and we have returned to another version of the 
patriarchal structure.’3 The tension that is therefore created – between androgyny as 
promising creative potential beyond sexual divisiveness and Woolf’s appropriation of it 
in a context in which she is concerned with the material restrictions facing women writers 
– has led critics such Goldman and Hargreaves to view her theory as ‘contradictory’4, 
echoing Woolf’s narrator who in the British Museum scene contrasts her ‘contradictory 
jottings’ with ‘the reader next door who was making the neatest abstracts, headed often 
with an A or a B or a C’ (RO 38). At various points in Woolf’s text contradiction appears 
to be evident: Jane Austen and Emily Bronte are praised by writing ‘as women write, not 
as men write’ (RO 97) at the same time as stressing ‘the fully developed mind […] does 
not think specially or separately of sex’ (RO 129); Woolf’s narrator simultaneously 
claims that Proust, as a man, ‘is terribly hampered and partial in his knowledge of 
women’ (RO 108) and that he is ‘wholly androgynous, if not perhaps a little too much of 
a woman’ (RO 135); and Charles Lamb is listed as a writer who ‘never helped a woman 
yet’ (RO 99) and as a writer who is androgynous (RO 135).  
 The numerous conflicting responses to androgyny in terms of both its general 
relevance to feminism and its specific treatment by Woolf in the above ‘principal 
offending or inspiring passage’, to again borrow Bowlby’s words, are well known to 
Woolf scholars. The range of views in the 1970s include celebratory readings of 
androgyny as a liberating concept in classic studies by Carolyn Heilbrun and Nancy 
Topping Bazin. In Toward a Recognition of Androgyny (1973), Heilbrun argues that 
androgyny ‘defines a condition under which the characteristics of the sexes, and the 
human impulses expressed by men and women, are not rigidly assigned. Androgyny 
seeks to liberate the individual from the confines of the appropriate.’5 In looking for the 
‘signs of androgyny’ in myth and literature,6 she finds To the Lighthouse to be Woolf’s 
                                                 
3 Bowlby 1998, p.39. 
4 Jane Goldman 2006, p.100; Tracey Hargreaves. Virginia Woolf and Twentieth Century Narratives of 
Androgyny. PhD Thesis Submitted to University of London, 1994. p.52.  
5 Carolyn G. Heilbrun. Toward a Recognition of Androgyny. London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982 
[1973], p.x. 
6 Heilbrun 1982 [1973], p.x. 
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‘best novel of androgyny’.7 In Virginia Woolf and the Androgynous Vision (1973), Bazin 
sees the androgynous mind as the ability to ‘use and harmonize the masculine and 
feminine approaches to truth’ and reads this into Woolf’s life and writings.8 As she later 
remarks with Alma Freeman, ‘the Masculine and the Feminine must unite for the Rebirth 
of the new human being and the new society. This, in the widest possible sense, is the 
Androgynous Vision’.9 Responses to these accounts of an unproblematically inspiring 
androgyny include pessimistic assessments by Cynthia Secor, who dismisses the term as 
‘essentially a male word’ that fails to dispose of gender/sexual dualisms,10 and by Daniel 
Harris, who notes that androgyny has always been aligned with sexism and heterosexism 
from the ‘Greek and Roman usage of the interchangeable terms “androgynous” and 
“hermaphroditic”’ to its English usage where it is often ‘used to signal fear of 
homosexual and others who do not conform to male norms’.11 Where Woolf is 
concerned, Harris therefore sees the passages on androgyny as ‘a compromise, a retreat 
from the more radically feminist fury Woolf feared to express’,12 a comment echoed by 
Elaine Showalter’s notorious accusation that ‘Androgyny was the myth that helped 
[Woolf] evade confrontation with her own painful femaleness and enabled her to choke 
and repress her anger and ambition.’13  
When, in 1985, the radical potential of androgyny is revisited by Moi in her 
introduction to Sexual/Textual Politics, she criticises not only Showalter for writing off 
the ‘abstract merits’ of androgyny and for claiming that Woolf was guilty of ‘the 
separation of politics and art’;14 Moi is also critical of Heilbrun for distinguishing 
Woolf’s androgyny from her feminism and of Bazin for positing a simple union of 
                                                 
7 Heilbrun 1982 [1973], p.156. 
8 Nancy Topping Bazin. Virginia Woolf and the Androgynous Vision. New Jersey: Rutgers UP, 1973, p.3. 
9 Nancy Topping Bazin and Alma Freeman. ‘The Androgynous Vision.’ Women's Studies 2:2 (1974), 
p.212. 
10 Cynthia Secor. ‘Androgyny: an Early Reappraisal.’ Women's Studies 2:2 (1974), p.162. 
11 Daniel A. Harris. ‘Androgyny: the Sexist Myth in Disguise.’ Women's Studies 2:2 (1974), p.174. 
12 Harris 1974, p.175. Whilst sharing some of these concerns and claiming that Woolf’s androgyny is ‘an 
ambivalent and limited concept’, Marilyn Farwell argues that Woolf also provides us with ‘the tools to go 
beyond that’. See ‘Virginia Woolf and Androgyny.’ Contemporary Literature 16:4 (1975), p.451. 
13 Elaine Showalter. A Literature of Their Own: From Charlotte Brontë to Doris Lessing. London: Virago, 
1982 [1977], p.264. In this respect Showalter precedes critics such as Alex Zwerdling who see Woolf as 
compromising her artistic integrity to appease men in a short term strategy of conciliation in order to 
achieve political goals and Jane Marcus who holds Woolf up as a ‘guerrilla fighter in a Victorian skirt’. See 
Zwerdling 1986, p.259 and Jane Marcus. ‘Thinking Back Through Our Mothers.’ New Feminist Essays on 
Virginia Woolf, ed. Jane Marcus. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1981: 1-30.  
14 Showalter 1982 [1977], p.288. 
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dualities of masculinity and femininity ‘that retain their full essential charge of meaning’. 
She instead argues that Woolf’s feminist politics and modernist aesthetics are closely 
bound, therefore ‘locating the politics of Woolf’s writing precisely in her textual 
practice’,15 and suggests that Woolf anticipates Kristeva’s third ‘attitude’ of feminism as 
outlined in her hugely influential essay ‘Women’s Time’ (where the first was the demand 
for ‘insertion into history’ and for ‘equal footing with men’, and the second the demand 
for ‘recognition of an irreducible identity, without equal in the opposite sex’).16 Here, 
Kristeva writes, binary oppositions are overcome: 
 
In this third attitude, which I strongly advocate – which I imagine? – the very dichotomy 
man/woman as an opposition between two rival entities may be understood as belonging 
to metaphysics. What can “identity”, even “sexual identity” mean in a new theoretical and 
scientific space where the very notion of identity is challenged? I am not simply 
suggesting a very hypothetical bisexuality which, even if it existed, would only, in fact, 
be the aspiration toward the totality of one of the sexes and thus an effacing if difference. 
What I mean is, first of all, the demassification of the problematic of difference, which 
would imply, in a first phase, an apparent de-dramatization of the “fight to the death” 
between rival groups and thus between the sexes […] in order that the struggle, the 
implacable difference, the violence be conceived in the very place where it operates with 
the maximum intransigence, in other words, in personal and sexual identity itself, so as to 
make it disintegrate in its very nucleus.17 
 
In A Room of One’s Own, Mary Carmichael’s writing certainly appears indicative of this 
‘third attitude’, where ‘Men were no longer to her “the opposing faction”; she need not 
climb on to the roof and ruin her peace of mind longing for travel, experience and a 
knowledge of the world and character that were denied her. Fear and hatred were almost 
gone’ (RO 120). And later, just after the narrative shifts from Mary Beton, Woolf more 
directly addresses this viewpoint: ‘All this pitting of sex against sex, of quality against 
quality; all this claiming of superiority and imputing of inferiority, belong to the private-
                                                 
15 Moi 1995 [1985], p.16. 
16 Kristeva 1997 [1981], p.864-865. 
17 Kristeva 1997 [1981], p.875. 
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school stage of human existence where there are ‘sides’, and it is necessary for one side 
to beat another side […] Praise and blame alike mean nothing’ (RO 138). 
The emphasis on moving beyond ‘this pitting of sex against sex’ is evident in an 
array of poststructuralist and postmodern approaches to Woolf’s androgyny which, 
alongside Moi, advocate its potential to destabilise or leave behind binary constructions 
of identity. Moi was not, of course, the first critic to point to the combining forces of 
Woolf’s aesthetic and feminist vision, as in 1979 Mary Jacobus had understood Woolf’s 
androgyny to be ‘a mind paradoxically conceived of not as one, but as heterogeneous, 
open to the play of difference’, but also as the perfect description of ‘Woolf’s own 
prose’.18 Following Moi and Jacobus, Minow-Pinkney sees androgyny as the ‘rejection of 
sameness’ which ‘aims to cultivate difference on an individual level’ and therefore resist 
‘a cultural impulse to reduce the two sexes into something which is seemingly neither, 
but in actuality male’;19 for Caughie it is a ‘refusal to choose’, where Woolf is ‘testing out 
the consequences of different concepts of language and identity’ without settling on any 
position;20 and, pointing out that ‘Woolf does not settle on where androgyny’s dualism 
might be located, claiming simultaneously that distinguishing two sexes is an effort, that 
two sexes are not sufficient, and that there must be “two sexes in the mind corresponding 
to the two sexes in the body”’, Catherine Driscoll suggests that androgyny might be 
linked with Deleuze’s ‘becoming-woman’ (something I will consider further in section 
2.3): ‘[f]or Woolf, as for Deleuze’, Driscoll claims, ‘woman is an infinitive, a process of 
event, a speaking position perhaps but not an identity.’21 One thing these readings share is 
the view that Woolf’s androgyny does more than attempt to carve out a neutral or 
balanced sexual identity, that ‘test[ing] what one meant by man-womanly, and conversely 
by woman-manly’ (RO 128) is more complicated than the bringing together of two sets 
of otherwise clearly defined ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ traits. But given that Moi has 
now claimed that for feminism and theory alike ‘[t]he poststructuralist paradigm is now 
exhausted’,22 the question becomes whether the subversive potential signalled by 
                                                 
18 Mary Jacobus. ‘The Difference of View.’ Women Writing and Writing About Women, ed. Mary Jacobus. 
London: Harper & Row, 1979, p.20. 
19 Minow-Pinkney 1987, p.9. 
20 Caughie 1991, p.82, p.80. 
21 Driscoll 2000, p.80. 
22 Toril Moi 2006, p.1735. 
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poststructuralist readings of Woolf’s androgyny has been fully realised. Indeed, Brenda 
Helt has recently argued that not only is androgyny not a useful term for feminists but 
Woolf herself was always resistant to this ‘male-promoting concept’, with her comments 
on Coleridge providing evidence that she ‘engaged in encouraging women to write 
history, psychology, even science from a woman’s perspective, not an androgynous 
one.’23 Curiously enough, these recent interventions by Helt and Moi seem to be 
motivated by concerns similar to the aforementioned feminists writing in the 1970s; Helt 
is focused on ‘social realities of gendered embodiment’24 in Woolf’s writing, and Moi’s 
vision for a new feminism grounded in ‘everyday problems’ facing women. 
As well as acknowledging the importance of a focus on the everyday lives of 
women, and indeed Woolf’s emphasis on material concerns, in the first half of this 
chapter I want to reconsider Woolf’s androgyny as a theoretically agile term which still 
has something to add to feminist considerations of sexual difference.25 I therefore look at 
some of the specific ways in which Woolf’s androgyny extends into contemporary 
feminist debates, especially concerning Braidotti’s nomadic model of sexual difference 
which pays attention to precisely the lived realities of female embodied subjectivity that 
Moi and Helt worry over, and feminist responses to Deleuze and Guattari’s controversial 
‘becoming-woman’ concept (which Deleuze and Guattari themselves find evidence of in 
A Room of One’s Own). My aim is to  consider how we might think of androgyny as 
relevant to our own material realities at the same time as, following 
poststructuralist/postmodern readings, it points beyond theories of sexual difference 
which rely on oppositional frameworks. Ultimately, I want to suggest that Woolf’s 
reasons for writing about the material necessity of having ‘five hundred a year and a 
room with a lock on the door’ (RO 137) at the same time as theorising a move beyond 
                                                 
23 Brenda S. Helt. ‘Passionate Debates on “Odious Subjects”: Bisexuality and Woolf’s Opposition to 
Theories of Androgyny and Sexual Identity.’ Twentieth Century Literature 56:2 (2010), p.132; p.151. She 
adds: ‘The mind’s ability to “make these distinctions” is extremely important to Woolf. They make a 
woman with her “single-sexed mind” psychologically a woman’. 
24 Helt 2010, p.132. 
25 I focus primarily, although not uncritically, on ‘sexual difference’ rather than ‘gender’ in this chapter, 
following the preferred term used by Braidotti, who is interested in the epistemological and ontological 
workings of sexual differences that do not pertain to the separation of essentialist/constructivist, 
material/discursive, sex/gender. In addition, in the texts I focus on here, Deleuze and Woolf discuss ‘sex’ 
and not ‘gender’.  
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sex-consciousness and becoming androgynous might be thought of as complementary 
rather than contradictory aspects of A Room of One’s Own.  
 
2.1.2 Nomadism and Sexual Difference 
If there was one sense in which Showalter was right, it was in warning against the notion 
of a utopian androgynous mind as somehow an escape from materiality. According to 
Braidotti too, the concept of androgyny is associated with the type of fleeing from 
material realities that led some of the critics cited in the previous section to distrust the 
concept so much. In Transpositions, she warns against ‘blurring the boundaries of sexual 
difference, in the sense of a generalized androgynous drive’,26 and in Nomadic Subjects 
(1994) she specifically opposes androgyny to the embodied female feminist subject: ‘we 
come to opposing claims: the argument that one needs to redefine the female feminist 
subject’ versus the argument that ‘the feminine is a morass of metaphysical nonsense and 
that one is better off rejecting it altogether, in favour of a new androgyny.’27 Braidotti 
does not refer directly to Woolf in her invocations of androgyny here, but given Woolf’s 
association with the term and Braidotti’s references to her on various other occasions (see 
in particular chapter 3.1 of this thesis), it seems fair to suggest that Woolf is probably not 
far from her mind. In addition, the dichotomous choice she presents recalls the 
disagreements critics have had about Woolf’s own notion of androgyny, on issues of 
materiality and theory, summarised above. In this current section I will outline Braidotti’s 
wider project of nomadic feminism, reflecting on her model of a non-unitary subjectivity 
which is nonetheless founded on a materially embodied sexual difference. Despite 
Braidotti distancing her nomadic feminism from androgyny, I will demonstrate that 
considering Woolf’s particular theorising of the term in the context of Braidotti’s thought 
is important in at least two ways: firstly, Woolf’s androgyny shares some valuable 
features with the figuration of the ‘nomadic subject’, helping us to think about it as both 
materially embedded and theoretically useful; secondly, far from limiting or misleading 
us in our understanding of Woolf’s feminism, androgyny can be a valuable concept to 
                                                 
26 Braidotti 2006, p.49. 
27 Braidotti 1994, p.153. 
  
79
think through some potential limitations in Braidotti’s model of sexual difference, raising 
issues crucial to contemporary debates. 
Braidotti’s affirmation of sexual difference as a subversive and necessary ‘fact’ 
permeates her work, evident in her first book Patterns of Dissonance (1991), and 
throughout her trilogy consisting of Nomadic Subjects, Metamorphoses (2002), and 
Transpositions. Her philosophical and political project rests on the attempt to negotiate a 
future for feminism, and for what she calls the ‘female feminist subject’28, that ‘offers a 
way out of the essentialism–constructivism impasse.’29 It is possible to see Braidotti’s 
aim as that of bringing together aspects of second- and third-wave feminisms in an 
attempt to move beyond this impasse, and her own rhetoric, especially in Nomadic 
Subjects, learns a lot from their respective militant and postmodern vocabularies: on the 
one hand her argument is founded on ‘the recognition of a band of commonality among 
women’30 or ‘the common world of women’31, but on the other is the emphasis that 
women ‘are not, in any way, the same’, we must acknowledge ‘the importance of 
rejecting global statements about all women’.32 Defining her project of nomadic 
feminism, Braidotti posits ‘sexual difference as providing shifting locations for multiple 
female feminist embodied voices.’33 This paradoxical, pragmatic and politically charged 
foregrounding of sexual difference is the foundational element of a non-unitary subject as 
a ‘nomadic, dispersed, fragmented vision, which is nonetheless functional, coherent and 
accountable, mostly because it is embedded and embodied.’34 At the heart of Braidotti’s 
theory of nomadism is her three-level ‘diagram’ or ‘methodological map’35 of sexual 
difference outlined in Nomadic Subjects, consisting ‘Sexual Difference Level 1: 
Difference Between Men and Women’36, ‘Sexual Difference Level 2: Differences Among 
Women’,37 and ‘Sexual Difference Level 3: Differences Within Each Woman’.38 
                                                 
28 Braidotti 1994, p.153. 
29 Braidotti 2006, p.185. 
30 Braidotti 1994, p.163. 
31 Braidotti 1994, p.168. 
32 Braidotti 1994, p.163. 
33 Braidotti 1994, p.172. 
34 Braidotti 2006, p.4. 
35 Braidotti 2011 [1994], p.151. 
36 Braidotti 1994, p.158. 
37 Braidotti 1994, p.162. 
38 Braidotti 1994, p.165.  
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Braidotti notes that this model is not intended to provide ‘dialectically ordained phases’ 
or ‘categorical distinction[s]’, though she maintains the urgency of viewing them ‘from 
the perspective of sexual difference’.39 Level 1 is the ‘will to assert the specificity of the 
lived, female bodily experience; the refusal to disembody sexual difference […] the will 
to reconnect the whole debate on difference to the bodily existence and experience of 
women.’40 Wishing to avoid the pitfalls of essentialism, Braidotti’s second level focuses 
on heterogeneity between women, their different lived experiences, and level 3 attempts 
to hone in on women’s ‘multiplicity in herself: split, fractured’ which entails ‘an 
imaginary relationship to variables like class, race, age, sexual choices.’41 As she states in 
Metamorphoses, ‘internal or other contradictions and idiosyncrasies are indeed 
constituent elements of the subject’.42 We have a model of subjectivity which therefore 
proposes a sexed female body ‘as the foundation of subjectivity’43 but which also refuses 
the notion of fixed foundations and locations; a subjectivity then that is irrevocably 
feminine and female, but where ‘[w]hat a female nature is must consequently be 
determined in each case and cannot be spelled out a priori’.44 On several occasions 
Braidotti cites Jinny’s statement in The Waves – ‘I am rooted, but I flow’ (W 83)45 – as 
exemplary of a nomadism which is ‘not fluidity without borders, but rather an acute 
awareness of the nonfixity of boundaries’.46  
Considering Woolf’s own use of androgyny alongside this shifting, non-unitary, 
but also situated and materialist, model of sexual difference, the question I am posing is 
whether and to what extent the subject created by Woolf’s theory of androgyny (primarily 
of course the writing subject, although her discussion has implications beyond this) fits 
the mould of nomadism. On the evidence of the many contradictory readings of 
androgyny, and readings of androgyny as contradictory, it is certainly a term which does 
not sit easily under one definition for long. But more than that, Woolf’s formulation of 
androgyny appears to anticipate the three levels of sexual difference that Braidotti lays 
                                                 
39 Braidotti 1994, p.158. 
40 Braidotti 1994, p.160. 
41 Braidotti 1994, p.165. 
42 Braidotti 2002, p.39. 
43 Braidotti 1994, p.103. 
44 Braidotti 2006, p.185. 
45 See Braidotti 2002, p.1; Braidotti 2006, p.199-200; Braidotti 2011 [1994], p.21. 
46 Braidotti 1994, p.36.  
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out. If we recall Mary Beton’s  vision of the ‘the girl and the young man’ getting into a 
taxi in A Room of One’s Own (RO 125) we might well view this as the bringing together 
of the sexes, where Woolf’s narrator goes on to extend an offer of ‘collaboration’ 
between woman and man ‘before the art of creation can be accomplished’ (RO 136). But 
throughout Woolf’s text there are also instances where differences between men and 
women are emphasised. That is, the first level of Braidotti’s paradigm is evident in the 
aforementioned remarks by Woolf’s narrator that Coleridge did not have women much in 
mind in his formulation of the androgynous mind, in the earlier discussion of the way in 
which ‘the values of women differ very often from the values which have been made by 
the other sex’ (and where ‘it is the masculine values that prevail’) (RO 95-96), where the 
‘mind’ (RO 99), the ‘shape’ of a ‘man’s sentence’ (RO 100), and the ‘nerves that feed the 
brain would seem to differ in men and women’ (RO 101), and in the context in which A 
Room of One’s Own itself is written, during such a ‘stridently sex-conscious’ (RO 129) 
age created largely because in writing ‘virility has now become self-conscious – men, 
that is to say, are now writing only with the male side of their brain’ (RO 132). More 
important than these differences, however, is the desire, exemplified in the famous ‘Chloe 
liked Olivia’ scene, to write ‘relationships between women’ rather than depicting women 
always ‘in their relation to men’ (RO 107), and therefore to provide ‘more complicated’ 
explorations of women, including the differences between them and within each of them. 
I will now briefly discuss some of these differences between women and within each 
woman – levels 2 and 3 of Braidotti’s model. 
Rather than setting women’s writing against men’s writing in a fixed and essential 
way, A Room of One’s Own continually explores differences between women writers. 
The ‘four famous names’ that are foregrounded in chapter IV, Jane Austen, Charlotte 
Brontë, Emily Brontë, and George Eliot, represent ‘incongruous characters’: ‘what had 
George Eliot in common with Emily Brontë? Did not Charlotte Brontë fail entirely to 
understand Jane Austen?’ (RO 85-86). When the narrator then describes the differences 
between Jane Eyre (1847) and Pride and Prejudice (1813), the differences between 
women are being described precisely by focusing on the moment in Brontë’s novel when 
she emphasises similarities between men and women both in the content of what she is 
writing (‘but women feel just as men feel’) and through her tone of ‘indignation’ (RO 
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90). Therefore, as Woolf’s narrator puts it earlier when realising the limitations of her 
own anger, she was ‘angry because he was angry’ (RO 44).47 Woolf, then, does not stop 
at writing the differences between women and men; rather she concurrently begins to de-
emphasise their differences (a point I will return to below). Therefore, when Woolf 
praises the ‘genius’ and ‘integrity’ of Austen and Emily Brontë writing ‘as women write, 
not as men write’ (RO 97), she is clearly not defining or prescribing a female or feminine 
sentence, an essentialist form of writing necessarily shared by all women – as these are 
only two ‘[o]f all the thousand women who wrote novels then’ – but a writing that does 
not define itself either for or against the ‘perpetual admonitions’ of patriarchy to ‘write 
this, think that’ (RO 97). Writing ‘as women write’ is itself changeable, seen later when 
Mary Carmichael had ‘broken up Jane Austen’s sentence’ so that ‘there was no likeness 
between them.’ Here too, by breaking ‘the sequence – the expected order’, Mary 
Carmichael wrote not ‘as a woman’ but ‘as a woman would, if she wrote like a woman.’ 
This somewhat odd sentence raises the question of who precisely ‘she’ refers to? But 
whether the ‘she’ is Mary Carmichael or ‘woman’, it is a ‘she’ separated from writing 
‘like a woman’, the term ‘woman’ being thrown into doubt (RO 119).   
The emphasis Woolf places on differences between women, then, is also apparent 
in her reluctance to offer a fixed definition of ‘feminine’ or ‘woman’. Indeed, in her essay 
‘Women Novelists’ written ten years before in 1918, Woolf touches on this issue in her 
remarks upon Brimley Johnson’s critique of women’s writing: ‘As Mr Brimley Johnson 
again and again remarks, a woman’s writing is always feminine; it cannot help being 
feminine; at its best it is most feminine: the only difficulty lies in defining what we mean 
by feminine’ (E2 316). Similarly, towards the end of A Room of One’s Own Woolf 
bemoans the view in ‘newspapers and novels and biographies that when a woman speaks 
to women she should have something very unpleasant up her sleeve. Women are hard on 
Women. Women dislike women. Women – but are you not sick to death of the word? I 
                                                 
47 Contrary to my reading, Jane Marcus has argued that anger is ‘a primary source of creative energy’ for 
female writers: ‘Rage and savage indignation sear the hearts of female poets and female critics.’ See ‘Art 
and Anger.’ Feminist Studies 4:1 (1978), p.94-95. Brenda Silver also comments that anger is ‘the most 
compelling source of our [feminism’s] strength’. See ‘The Authority of Anger: ‘Three Guineas as Case 
Study.’ Signs 16:2 (1991), 340-370. Lili Hseih has more recently offered a nuanced contribution to the 
debate on Woolf and anger where she argues the political merits of indifference in Three Guineas. See ‘The 
Other Side of the Picture: The Politics of Affect in Virginia Woolf’s Three Guineas.’ Journal of Narrative 
Theory 36:1 (2006), 20-54. 
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can assure you that I am’ (RO 145). Woolf’s assertion here should not be mistaken for a 
rejection of the concerns of women (and in the following paragraph she notes what she 
likes about women and turns on men) but rather a criticism of the ways in which 
‘Women’ – as with Brimley Johnson’s ‘feminine’ – are discussed and appropriated by 
patriarchal culture. In both of these examples the serious point underlying the arch tone is 
a suspicion that terms such as ‘women’ and ‘feminine’ are of limited subversive potential 
because they are always defined in relation to ‘men’ and the ‘masculine’ (and indeed 
often defined and discussed by men). Whilst continuing to use these words throughout 
her writing – after all they are signifiers that need to be re-appropriated and worked 
through rather than rejected out of hand – Woolf is keen to look beyond the traditional 
categorisations they have hitherto created. Pointing to the heterogeneity within the 
category ‘woman’, Woolf therefore refuses to present a common room of one’s own:  
 
One goes into the room – but the resources of the English language would be much put to 
the stretch, and whole flights of words would need to wing their way illegitimately into 
existence before a woman could say what happens when she goes into a room. The rooms 
differ so completely […] one has only to go into an room in any street for the whole of 
that extremely complex force of femininity to fly in one’s face. How should it be 
otherwise? (RO 113-114)  
 
As Peggy Kamuf comments in her reading of this passage, the dash in the opening 
sentence signifies a ‘punctuated hesitation’ creating doubt as to the identity of the ‘one’. 
The entry of women into a language from which they were previously excluded ‘will not 
simply substitute a “feminine” one for a masculine. Indeed, it cannot for a multiplicity 
already inhabits the site of this writing. […] In effect, Woolf displaces the issue of the 
“one” who enters the room by figuring in rapid succession a series of rooms to be 
entered, surveyed, plotted, described.’48 In her later, posthumously published essay 
‘Professions for Women’ (1942), Woolf also emphasises that whilst gaining ‘rooms of 
your own in the house hitherto exclusively owned by men’ is of the utmost importance 
for women, these rooms, and the women inside them, will differ: ‘But this freedom is 
only a beginning; the room is your own, but it is still bare. It has to be furnished; it has to 
                                                 
48 Kamuf 1982, p.16-17.  
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be decorated; it has to be shared. How are you going to furnish it, how are you going to 
decorate it? With whom are you going to share it, and upon what terms?’ (E6 483-484) 
As well as differences within the category ‘women’ there are also moments when 
emphasis is placed on differences within each woman in Woolf’s text. The inadequacy of 
language to express such non-unitary subjects is evident in the well-known discussion of 
the one-letter pronoun ‘I’, where its ‘dominance’ (RO 131) is linked to the patriarchal 
subject and male writer: ‘after reading a chapter or two a shadow seemed to lie across the 
page. It was a straight dark bar, a shadow shaped something like the letter ‘I’ […] the 
worst of it is that in the shadow of the letter ‘I’ all is shapeless as mist’ (RO 130). This 
often-cited passage places women in the shadow of this dominating ‘I’, and, I would 
suggest, shares similarities with the use Braidotti makes of it in her nomadic feminist 
subject: ‘According to this vision of a subject that is both historically anchored and split, 
or multiple, the power of synthesis of the “I” a grammatical necessity, a theoretical 
fiction that holds together the collection of differing layers’.49 As Goldman points out in 
her lucid reading of the above passage, the fact that ‘Pheobe’ (meaning ‘the bright one’) 
then enters as the woman who is in the shadow illuminates precisely such differing 
layers: ‘In describing woman both as a source of light and as imprisoned in shadow, this 
passage shows how women’s place historically has been conceptually marked out (or 
inscribed) as shadow by the discourse of masculine enlightenment, and how women’s 
emancipation yet lies with the very illumination of this shadow.’50 Interested in bringing 
women out of the shadow, Woolf’s use of ‘I’ throughout a book that has multiple 
narrators (although the narrative does at times shift to ‘we’ and ‘one’) creates not an ‘I’ 
that is an internalised fragmentation, collapsing in on itself, but a multiplicity open to 
attachments with other multiplicities, where ‘the experience of the mass is behind the 
single voice’ (RO 85) is brought to light. There is something playful in Woolf’s ‘I’, 
where she uses this one letter word ‘just for kicks’, to borrow a phrase from Deleuze and 
Guattari, re-appropriating it in each and every use, bringing out the multiplicity within the 
singular, injecting a lightness of touch to the ‘dark bar’ (RO 130) and showing that it does 
not have to remain a symbol of patriarchal dominance: ‘it is relatively easy to stop saying 
                                                 
49 Braidotti 2011 [1994], p.158. 
50 Goldman 2001 [1998], p.17. 
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“I,” but that does not mean that you have gotten away from the regime of subjectification; 
conversely, you can keep on saying “I,” just for kicks, and already be in another regime 
in which personal pronouns function only as fictions.’51 It is this lighter, more flexibile 
and fictionalised, less self-conscious – that is to say more androgynous – use of the letter 
‘I’ that holds potential for Woolf in A Room of One’s Own. After all, ‘“I” is only a 
convenient term for somebody who has no real being.’ (RO 5) That Woolf’s discussion of 
this ‘I’ immediately follows her most famous passage on androgyny serves as a reminder 
that becoming man-womanly or woman-manly – and also bearing in mind the unfixed 
nature of these sexed nouns – is not to cement a unitary ‘I’, but to reveal the multiplicity 
already within the androgynous subject. 
Woolf’s theory of androgyny, and her concerns for the marginalisation of women 
in writing and in their materially situated position ‘in the shadow’ of men, both aim their 
criticism at a misplaced over-consciousness of a rigid division between two sexes. This is 
emphasised when after sketching the theory of androgyny the first words to actually be 
written (in the sixth and final chapter of the text) on the piece of paper entitled ‘Women 
and Fiction’ are:  
 
it is fatal for anyone who writes to think of their sex. It is fatal to be a man or woman 
pure and simple; one must be woman-manly or man-womanly. It is fatal for a woman to 
lay the least stress on any grievance; to plead even with justice any cause; in any way to 
speak consciously as a woman. And fatal is no figure of speech; for anything written with 
that conscious bias is doomed to death […] it cannot grow in the minds of others.’ (RO 
136)  
 
Whilst the above passage clearly contains a further asymmetry in that the fatality of 
speaking as a woman has historically been dictated by patriarchy (it has clearly not been 
fatal in the same way for men to speak as men), Woolf is aware that maintaining this 
assymmetry is both pragmatically and theoretically limited in that it plays into the binary 
framework that keeps men and women apart. Her theory of androgyny is not, then, an 
unproblematic celebration of a subjectivity which dispenses with male and female 
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differences, but which multiplies differences to create a subject which is more 
complicated and which is not defined by an oppositional relation. The androgynous 
subject, like woman and man, is an emergent one with the potential to redraw the lines of 
asymmetry through collaboration. That is, the difference between Woolf’s androgyny and 
Braidotti’s nomadism is that where Braidotti maintains level 1 of her model – differences 
between men and woman – as a category seemingly undisturbed by the multiple 
differences between women (level 2) and within women (level 3), Woolf’s androgyny 
points the way to more complex levels and combinations which challenges any models 
which privilege ‘male vs. female’ difference.  
The very last words we hear from Mary Beton are even more revealing than the 
first ones that she would write: ‘the taxi took the man and the woman, I thought, seeing 
them come together across the street, and the current swept them away, I thought, hearing 
far off the roar of London traffic, into that tremendous stream’ (RO 137). The enduring 
image is not of the man and woman getting into the taxi but of the taxi cruising through 
the London traffic, and our attention is drawn to the material context in which this image 
first appeared. For Mary Beton did not simply observe the man and the woman standing 
together at the taxi; she saw them walking towards each other from the streets of London 
where ‘no two people are ever alike’ (RO 124), and she watched as ‘the cab glided off’ 
back into those streets. It is this movement towards and away from a partial, momentary 
connection that is the model in which androgyny is rooted, I would argue, where the 
further connections that these figures will make and have made before is brought into 
view, challenging the notion that this ‘girl in patent leather boots’ and this ‘young man in 
a maroon overcoat’ are emblems or symbols that stand in for all men and all women. If 
there is a ‘collaboration’ or a ‘marriage of opposites’ here – where ‘the mind celebrates 
its nuptials’ (RO 136) – then we are presented, I propose, with a model similar to my 
description of Woolf’s granites and rainbows in chapter one. That is, I think of ‘marriage’ 
here as the many ‘swift marriages’ Woolf describes in ‘Craftsmanship’, of becoming 
man-womanly or woman-manly as I did transposing granites-rainbows, where the coming 
together, or consummation, of these terms (in this instance ‘woman’ and ‘man’) does not 
represent two discrete entities creating one whole; rather we have the committed – but 
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partial and fleeting – attraction of two non-fixed terms which create their own distinct 
meaning in their own distinct textual and material contexts.  
Moreover, by including men in these nomadic ‘marriages’, Woolf’s androgynous 
feminist vision demonstrates a complex model of subjectivity that shares features of 
Braidotti’s nomadic subject, but ultimately goes further. Where Braidotti’s nomadic 
model of sexual difference often only has women in mind (where men are discussed they 
are invariable defined in opposition to women, as with level 1 of her model), Woolf 
considers, however ironically at times, differences between men and within each man. 
Therefore, one of the implications of considering Woolf’s theory of androgyny alongside 
Braidotti’s theory of nomadism is that we might extend Braidotti’s three-levelled model 
of sexual difference to include a fourth level of ‘differences among men’ and a fifth level 
of ‘differences within each man’. This fourth level can be seen from near the beginning 
of A Room of One’s Own when Woolf’s narrator cites ‘a direct contradiction’ between 
Pope and La Bruyère in their writings on women, and between such contrary figures as 
Napoleon and Dr Johnson, Goethe and Mussolini (RO 38). Where androgyny is 
concerned, certain male writers such as Shakespeare, Keats and Sterne are judged to have 
been man-womanly whilst many, epitomised by Mr A but also including Milton, 
Wordsworth and Tolstoi who had ‘a dash too much of the male in them’, were not (RO 
135). The fifth level is evident in the very fact that Woolf’s theory of androgyny is an 
inclusive one, therefore the ‘I’ that is multiple (described above) is also an ‘I’ that is open 
to those men who become androgynous. Adding these levels of male difference to 
Braidotti’s levels of female difference only further unsettles the first level of her model, 
where differences between men and women are always already in place. It is in this sense 
that I consequently think of Woolf’s feminism and her theory of androgyny as providing 
a positive model of complex, nomadic and non-unitary subjectivity – not just on a 
theoretical level, but also a strategic one – which points beyond the binary apparatus of 
sexual difference.  
In Undoing Gender (2004) Judith Butler considers both the subversive potential 
and limitations of Braidotti’s nomadism. In the first place, Butler does endorse Braidotti’s 
‘relentless search for what is mobile and generative’52 and her emphasis on multiplicity: 
                                                 
52 Judith Butler. Undoing Gender. London: Routledge, 2004, p.196. 
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‘Braidotti’s multiplicity is a way of understanding the play of forces that work upon one 
another and that generate new possibilities of life. Multiplicity is not the death of agency, 
but its very condition. We misconstrue where action comes from if we fail to understand 
how multiple forces interact and produce the very dynamism of life.’53 For Butler, 
however, sexual difference is something more elusive than Braidotti allows, a space from 
which to create questions rather than provide the firm basis for definitions, however 
mobile they may appear to be:  
 
sexual difference is the site where a question concerning the relation of the biological to 
the cultural is posed and reposed, where it must and can be posed, but where it cannot, 
strictly speaking, be answered. Understood as a border concept, sexual difference has 
psychic, somatic, and social dimensions that are never quite collapsible into one another 
but are not for that reason ultimately distinct. Does sexual difference vacillate there, as a 
vacillating border, demanding a rearticulation of those terms without any sense of 
finality? Is it, therefore, not a thing, not a fact, not a presupposition but rather a demand 
for rearticulation that never quite vanishes – but also never quite appears?’54 
 
Of course, according to Braidotti it is precisely this elusiveness which she finds 
problematic, and which she dismisses as ‘theoretical illusions of an infinitely malleable, 
free-floating gender’.55 But a question that Butler posed to Braidotti in an earlier 
interview on the subject remains pertinent: ‘what does it mean to establish that 
asymmetry [between men and women] as irreducible and irreversible, and then to claim 
that it ought to serve as a foundation for feminist politics? Doesn’t that simply reify a 
social asymmetry as an eternal necessity, thus installing the pathos of exclusion as the 
“ground” of feminism?’56 The paradox in Braidotti’s vision of sexual difference as ‘fact’ 
is that she is, of the two, the most firmly opposed to the anthropocentric landscape, the 
most fervent proponent of the positivity of difference, and the most committed to a 
                                                 
53 Butler 2004, p.193. 
54 Butler 2004, p.186. 
55 Braidotti 2006, p.185. Braidotti’s problems with the term ‘gender’ range from what she sees as its 
politically unfocused project, its Anglo-centric roots, and its academic institutionalisation. See Braidotti 
2011 [1994], p.141-150. 
56 Rosi Braidotti and Judith Butler. ‘Feminism by Any Other Name.’ Feminism Meets Queer Theory, ed. 
Elizabeth Weed and Naomi Schor (eds.). Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1997, p.43-44.  
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theorisation of non-unitary subjectivity that takes into account material relationships and 
interactions with animals, the environment, and with technology.57 These are all aspects 
that I will come on to discuss in later chapters, showing how Woolf’s writing elsewhere 
provides a positive account of difference in the complicated material entanglements 
produced by such relations. But for now I want to keep in mind this emphasis on 
multiplicitous agency, and the potential limitations of Braidotti’s model of sexual 
difference, to further consider the ways in which Woolf’s theory of androgyny in A Room 
of One’s Own might emphasise multiplicity as the very condition of writing sexual 
difference.  
 
2.1.3 Becoming-woman and  Minoritarian Writing 
In Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1975), Deleuze and Guattari outline three 
interrelated characteristics of a ‘minoritarian’ writing or ‘minor’ literature. Firstly, rather 
than ‘reterritorialising’ language within a dominant discourse, upholding its conventional 
utterances, minor literature involves writing with ‘a high co-efficient of 
deterritorialisation’ so that a major language speaks in new ways.58 Secondly, 
minoritarian writing is intensely political. Where major literature is focused on the private 
concerns of the individual and the relegation of the social, political, environmental 
context to mere background, minor literature’s ‘cramped space forces each individual 
intrigue to connect immediately to politics. The individual concern thus becomes all the 
more necessary indispensible, magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating within 
it. In this way, the family triangle connects to other triangles – commercial, economic, 
bureaucratic, juridicial – that determine its values.’59 And thirdly, minor literature is 
always concerned with collectives, ‘everything takes on a collective value.’60 With its 
deterritorialisation of the patriarchal “I”, its emphasis on the material, social, artistic and 
political struggles facing women, and its continued concern with collective relations 
between men and women ‘in relation to reality’ (RO 149), we might think of A Room of 
                                                 
57 Butler admits plainly in Undoing Gender that she is ‘not a very good materialist. Every time I try to write 
about the body, the writing ends up beings about language’. See Butler 2004, p.198.  
58 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan. Minneapolis: U 
of Minnesota P, 1986, p.16. 
59 Deleuze and Guattari 1986, p.17.  
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One’s Own as an example of such ‘minor’ – and therefore all the more subversive – 
literature, and in this section I will explain why I see Woolf’s theory of androgyny, with 
its deterritorialisation of terms such as ‘male’ and ‘female’, as an example of a specific 
form of minoritarian writing, what Deleuze and Guattari describe as the ‘becoming-
woman’ of writing.  
Deleuze and Guattari make reference to Woolf when discussing minoritarian 
writing and their concept of ‘becoming-woman’, to be understood not as being about 
representation of the woman as ‘molar entity […] defined by her form, endowed with 
organs and functions and assigned as a subject’, but as involving a deterritorialisation of 
subjectivity and the creation of ‘molecular’, multiplicitous, non-hierarchical 
attachments.61 In Dialogues, Deleuze suggests that Woolf forms such connections 
because she ‘forbade herself “to speak like a woman”’ and  ‘harnessed the becoming-
woman of writing all the more for this’.62 And in A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and 
Guattari allude to Mary Carmichael’s  writing ‘as a woman, but as a woman who has 
forgotten that she is a woman, so that her pages were full of that curious sexual quality 
which comes only when sex is unconscious of itself’ (RO, 121). They insist that ‘[Woolf] 
was appalled at the idea of writing “as a woman.” Rather, writing should produce a 
becoming-woman as atoms of womanhood capable of crossing and impregnating an 
entire social field, and of contaminating men, of sweeping them up in that becoming.’63 
Becoming-woman is therefore open to all, women and men, who form connections which 
are not based on models of opposition and ownership:  
 
the majoritarian as a constant and homogeneous system; minorities as subsystems; and 
the minoritarian as a potential, creative and created, becoming. The problem is never to 
acquire the majority, even in order to install a new constant. There is no becoming-
majoritarian; majority is never becoming. All becoming is minoritarian. Women, 
regardless of their numbers, are a minority, definable as a state or subset; but they create 
only by making possible a becoming over which they do not have ownership, into which 
                                                 
61 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.304. 
62 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet. Dialogues II, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. London: 
Continuum, 2006 [1987], p.32. This text translates Deleuze’s concept as ‘woman-becoming’ rather than the 
more common translation of ‘becoming-woman’. For consistency, I have changed all citations to 
‘becoming-woman’. 
63 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.304.  
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they themselves must enter; this is a becoming-woman affecting all of humankind, men 
and women both.64 
 
If, as I argued in the previous section, we consider Woolf’s androgyny as an attempt to 
overcome sex-consciousness founded on binary oppositions and instead to present a more 
complex model of sexual differences (where emphasis is on intra-category and intra-
subjective difference as much as it is on inter-category difference), then we can 
understand it in Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology as rejecting molar identities. 
Moreover, we can view the ‘man-womanly’ and ‘woman-manly’ formulation as the 
starting point of an attempt to articulate a becoming-minoritarian of both women and 
men, allowing for a multiplicity of different combinations, of different sexes where in the 
figuration of androgyny ‘the two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular combinations 
bringing into play […] the man in the woman and the woman in the man […] a thousand 
tiny sexes.’65 It may be, then, that there are more than ‘two sexes in the mind 
corresponding to two sexes in the body’. As we read later in A Room of One’s Own, ‘two 
sexes are quite inadequate […] For we have too much likeness as it is, and if an explorer 
should come back and bring word of other sexes looking through the branches of other 
trees at other skies, nothing would be of greater source to humanity’ (RO 114).66 
Considering that androgyny is so much about a rejection of patriarchy and 
phallogocentric (major) writing, I suggest that becoming androgynous and becoming-
woman form something of an affinity. 
Just as some the critics discussed above (see section 2.1.1) view Woolf’s 
androgyny as sitting uneasily with her feminist aims, however, so there has been criticism 
of Deleuze’s becoming-woman by feminist critics. Indeed, in a recent article Gillian 
Howie associates becoming-woman with androgyny (albeit that she is not referring 
specifically to Woolf’s formulation here) in her criticism of the term: ‘Becoming-woman 
suggests a radically androgynous transvaluation of values, and it certainly appears to leap 
over the risk of dimorphic essentialism in an un-gendered becoming. It does so by 
                                                 
64 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.117. 
65 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.235. 
66 Some critics have linked this quotation to Edward Carpenter’s notion of a ‘third-sex’ in The 
Indeterminate Sex (1912). For a summary of this see Hargreaves 1994, p.10-20. 
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risking, instead, de-contextualising and appropriating the affective body; interning the 
same dimorphic values whilst cutting the ground from critical interjection.’67 Becoming-
woman also marks a site of contention for Braidotti, where she suggests that there is a 
‘confrontation between Deleuze’s theories of multiplicity and becoming-minority and 
feminist theories of sexual difference and becoming subject of women.’68 She argues that 
where ‘Deleuze proceeds […] as if there was clear equivalence in the speaking positions 
of the two sexes’ it is important from a feminist perspective to remember that ‘points of 
exit from the phallogocentric mode takes asymmetrical forms in the two sexes’69 – a 
point that is familiar to readers of Woolf’s theory of androgyny. Braidotti therefore takes 
issue with what she sees as Deleuze’s suggestion that feminists ‘should instead draw on 
the multisexed structure of the subject and claim back all the sexes of which women have 
been deprived; emphasis on the feminine is restrictive […] Women, in other words, can 
be revolutionary subjects only to the extent that they develop a consciousness that is not 
specifically feminine, dissolving “woman” into the forces that structure her.’70 These 
criticisms point to challenging aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-
woman, where it can be seen to dispose of subjectivity at the very moment in history 
when feminism is beginning to gain a sense of identity, and as potentially another 
example of appropriation by masculine philosophy.71 Critics of becoming-woman could 
even point to Woolf’s own warning in A Room of One’s Own about how ‘woman’ can be 
appropriated and exploited by men: ‘Imaginatively she is of the highest importance, 
practically she is completely insignificant’ (RO 56).  
Whilst I think it is unfair to accuse Deleuze and Guattari of this kind of 
appropriation, it is easy to see some of the concerns about the type of terminology used 
when they talk about the women not having ‘ownership’ over their becomings (see 
above). But rather than seeing becomings as a negative loss of agency, it is important to 
remember in all this that for Deleuze and Guattari it is molar identities and major 
categories that are sedentary; becomings are fundamentally about molecular movement 
                                                 
67 Gillian Howie. ‘Becoming-Woman: A Flight into Abstraction.’ Deleuze Studies 2: Issue Supplement 
(2008), p.103. 
68 Braidotti 2011 [1994], p.251. 
69 Braidotti 2011 [1994], p.253.  
70 Braidotti 1994, p.78. 
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and creation. There is agency here, but, rather than belonging to an individuated subject it 
is a symbiotic form of agency that is shared with those other human and nonhuman 
elements that are entangled in becoming. Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari already 
anticipate questions such as those raised by Braidotti on ‘becoming-woman’, or, as Alice 
Jardine has put it, ‘[w]hy then do [Deleuze and Guattari] privilege the word woman?’72 
Deleuze and Guattari form their answer to this type of challenge by way of another 
question: ‘[w]hy are there so many becomings of man, but no becoming-man?’. The 
answer is that ‘man is majoritarian par excellence, whereas becomings are minoritarian; 
all becoming is becoming-minoritarian.’73 They certainly are not ignorant of the 
specifically feminist political struggles of women:  
 
the woman as a molar entity has to become-woman in order that the man also becomes – 
or can become – woman. It is, of course, indispensable for women to conduct a molar 
politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history, their own 
subjectivity: “we as women…” makes its appearance as a subject of enunciation. But it is 
dangerous to confine oneself to such a subject, which does not function without drying up 
a spring or stopping a flow.74 
 
In other words, becoming-woman, consistent with other becomings, goes beyond a 
politics of representation. Just as Woolf criticises Charlotte Brontë for ‘protesting that she 
was “as good as a man”’ (RO 96), ‘becoming-woman’ is not a question of women or 
indeed men becoming ‘like’ an idealised image of woman, an oversight often made in 
feminist discussions which tend to associate Deleuze and Guattari’s concept with an 
specifically female or feminine subjectivity. Braidotti herself acknowledges that ‘[t]he 
reference to “woman” in the process of “becoming-woman” does not refer to empirical 
females, but rather to topological positions, levels, or degrees of affirmation of positive 
forces and levels of nomadic, rhizomatic consciousness. The becoming-woman is the 
marker for a general process of transformation.’75 Woolf’s androgyny illuminates the 
relevance and importance of a nomadic model of sexual difference, but also the ways in 
                                                 
72 Alice Jardine. ‘Woman in Limbo: Deleuze and His Br(others).’ SubStance 44/45 (1984), p.53. 
73 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.320. 
74 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.302. 
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which this model can also be extended and combined with Deleuze’s becoming-woman 
rather than seen in opposition to it, to show the materially bound and theoretically useful 
way to move beyond the perceived impasse between conctructivism and essentialism. 
Extending Braidotti’s nomadic subject as exemplary of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
‘becoming-woman’, Woolf’s androgyny can signal a re-shaping of non-unitary 
subjectivity so that it is attuned to a multiplicity conceived beyond a binary model of 
sexual difference, and does so in a way that does not simply become a rearticulation of 
patriarchal dominance. As Butler puts it, ‘must the framework for thinking about sexual 
difference be binary for this feminine multiplicity to emerge? Why can’t the framework 
for sexual difference itself move beyond binarity into multiplicity?’76 
By sharing an affinity with nomadism as well as Deleuze and Guattari’s 
becoming-minoritarian, Woolf’s androgyny might be thought of as anticipating what 
Goulimari terms ‘minoritarian feminism’. In her discussion of Braidotti and Deleuze, 
Goulimari points to the contradiction in Braidotti’s emphasis on nomadism (which is 
confluent with Deleuzian philosophy) alongside a feminism founded on sexual difference 
(which disposes of Deleuze in favour of Irigaray).77 She argues that there is a problematic 
and often unacknowledged majoritarian strain in Braidotti’s work when she privileges 
sexual difference above other axes of difference. That is, Braidotti’s project is one of 
minoritarian feminism because it accounts for ‘an internally decentred feminism that 
interbreeds with other minoritarian movements rather than being separatist’, and yet this 
is undermined by ‘a “majoritarian” tendency that classifies, delimits, hierarchises and 
excludes: feminism as the only radicalism.’78 She remarks that far from being endangered 
by Deleuzian becomings, feminism is ‘perhaps the most successful minoritarian 
                                                 
76 Butler 2004, p.196. 
77 Braidotti refers to Irigaray’s criticism of Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-woman: ‘Irigaray concluded 
that Deleuze gets caught in the contradiction of postulating a general “becoming-woman” that fails to take 
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movement of the century.’79 Goulimari argues that Deleuzian becoming, and in particular 
the emphasis on becoming-woman as a necessary becoming that all others must pass 
through, is a recognition of ‘feminism’s success in opening the way to the desire of 
becoming otherthat is, other than one’s “self,” other than a branch on the tree of Man,
other than a subordinate referent of Majority Rule.’ It also ‘remind[s] us of feminism’s 
historic responsibility to keep this way open to its own and other minoritarian 
movements, to its own and other subordinate points, so that “woman” sheds its quality of 
being a universal referent and becomes a multiplicity.’80 If it is true, as Deleuze and 
Guattari suggest, that ‘[t]here is no history but of the majority, or of minorities as defined 
in relation to the majority’,81 then a feminism that is minoritarian might be precisely what 
is needed to bring together the past and future histories of the women’s movement in the 
context of our materially present, nomadically situated moment. As both nomadic and 
minoritarian, I would suggest that Woolf’s theory of androgyny continues to be a key 
marker of the becoming-minoritarian of feminism, a double process of deterritorialization 
– of the term ‘androgyny’ from its status as a ‘male-promoting concept’,82 and of 
feminism from the promotion of sexual difference in binary, hierarchical, static 
oppositions.  
 It is with this emphasis on androgyny as deterritorializing concept – one that 
offers lines of flight to the creation of new concepts – that I turn in the second part of this 
chapter to my reading of To the Lighthouse alongside Deleuze and Guattari. Bearing in 
mind that Woolf’s woman-manly/man-womanly formula for androgyny is put forward by 
a persona, Mary Beton, rather than Woolf herself, Gayatri Spivak reminds us that we 
should be wary of reducing her other texts to ‘successful articulations’ of her theory.83 By 
turning to To the Lighthouse, I would also hesitate to claim it (or indeed any of her other 
texts) as wholly representative of Woolf’s theory, but my discussion of androgyny does 
lead me to my own formulation of ‘tri-subjectivities’ or tri-s which I introduce to frame 
my analysis of the ways in which To the Lighthouse challenges notions of subjectivity 
founded in rigid paradigms of sexual difference. Therefore, my reading below is inspired 
                                                 
79 Goulimari 1999, p.98. 
80 Goulimari 1999, p.103. 
81 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.322. 
82 Helt 2010, p.132. 
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by, but not limited to, Woolf’s conceptualisation of androgyny. As Bazin puts it, ‘[t]he 
androgynous vision has its roots in the past, and its long history can help us understand its 
meaning and its importance. However, our concept of androgyny must be new’. Rather 
than limiting it to what Woolf might mean by it, ‘[w]e must expand it, alter it, and, above 
all, render it more concrete by defining it in terms of our own historical situation […] we 
must go beyond past definitions of androgyny.’84  
 
2.2. Lines of Becoming: To the Lighthouse  
2.2.1. Tri-s and ‘the constellation of voices’ 
It is a question of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, and of a 
process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again. No, this is 
not a new or different dualism.85 
 
The only way to get outside the dualisms is to be-between, to pass between, the 
intermezzo – that is what Virginia Woolf lived with all her energies, in all of her work, 
never ceasing to become.86 
 
Having discussed Woolf’s influence on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘becoming-
woman’, in this section I extend the dialogue between their writings and look at To the 
Lighthouse in relation to various Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts including ‘becoming’, 
‘smooth’ and ‘striated’ spaces, the ‘rhizome’, and ‘schizoanalysis’. In order to frame this 
reading – one that is intended to be reciprocal, suggesting why Woolf’s aesthetics might 
have influenced Deleuze and Guattari’s thought but also the ways in which new 
perspectives on Woolf can be illuminated by reading Deleuze and Guattari’s theories 
back into her writing – I will firstly introduce my formulation of ‘tri-subjectivities’ or   
tri-s, which grows out of my above discussion on androgyny.  
In the first part of this chapter I considered Woolf’s ‘sketch’ of androgyny in A 
Room of One’s Own as presenting a non-unitary, nomadic, materialist theory of 
subjectivity which points beyond sexual dualisms. Rather than simply reading 
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‘androgyny’ into To the Lighthouse as if it were a fixed term that can be applied to 
Woolf’s fiction, I am introducing tri-s as a concept inspired by Woolf’s androgyny 
without wishing to stand in for it. Following my reading of androgyny in the context of 
contemporary debates on sexual difference, my formulation of tri-s has three key 
components: 1.) As a reading strategy, tri-s involve/s, as a starting point, an analysis of 
subjectivity in groupings of (at least) three. As I hope to demonstrate in the following part 
of this chapter, in To the Lighthouse, even when Woolf appears to be focusing on one 
character in opposition to another character, she continually points outwards to other 
subjects/objects, and in the process complicates and undermines views of sexual 
difference as a binary construct. Tri-s remind/s us to try different combinations so as not 
to foreclose the relations between subjects in a fixed textual framework. 2.) As a 
theoretical model, tri-s is/are influenced by Braidotti’s three levels of sexual difference 
(differences between men and women, differences among women, and differences with 
each woman) whilst remaining open to the additional levels of differences among men 
and differences within each man. Therefore, tri-s encourage/s a more inclusive and 
flexible understanding of inter- and intra-subjective differences. 3.) As a grammatical 
construct, the term tri-s brings out the plural in the singular, the verb in the noun. Tri-s 
is/are simultaneously singular and plural, noun and verb, capturing both the rootedness 
and flowing of a non-unitary subjectivity that is also materially entangled. Following 
Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of triangular relationships in Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature, my neologism tri-s shares a concern with moving away from ‘the hierarchy of 
triangles’ and towards ‘making triangles transform until they become unlimited’.87 
Working through the remaining sections of this chapter, focusing on different 
combinations of human (and nonhuman) relations, I aim to highlight that the formation of 
tri-s in To the Lighthouse transforms triangles into multiplicities, setting into motion 
various creative becomings rather than a settling into fixed categories of being. 
Crucial to the movement of tri-s is Woolf’s use of free indirect discourse, evident 
in many of the passages from To the Lighthouse that I cite below, which allows her to 
explore ‘several distinct consciousnesses’ and also ‘consciousnesses that were several but 
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indistinct, a “group consciousness”.’88 In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari’s 
positing of indirect discourse as the ‘“first” language’, and therefore at the heart of any 
question of subjectivity and difference, emphasises its importance to my reading: ‘The 
“first” language, or rather the first determination of language, is not the trope or metaphor 
but indirect discourse.’ Deleuze argues that the prominence these figures of speech are 
given ‘proves disastrous for the study of language’; they ‘are merely effects; they are a 
part of language only when they presuppose indirect discourse. There are many passions 
in a passion, all manner of voices in a voice, murmurings, speaking in tongues: that’s 
why all discourse is indirect’.89 Woolf’s use of indirect discourse then could be a 
recognition that ‘[l]anguage is not content to go from a first party to a second party, from 
one who has seen to one who has not, but necessarily goes from a second party to a third 
party, neither of whom has seen […] Language is a map, not a tracing.’90 What is 
specifically created in free indirect discourse is a ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’, 
where ‘the variables of the assemblage enter into constant relations, however 
temporarily’:91 
 
[t]here is no individual enunciation […] indirect discourse, especially “free” indirect 
discourse, is of exemplary value: there are no clear distinctive contours; what comes first 
is not an insertion of variously individuated statements, or an interlocking of different 
subjects of enunciation, but a collective assemblage […] Indirect discourse is not 
explained by the distinction between subjects; rather, it is the assemblage, as it freely 
appears in this discourse, that explains all the voices present within a single voice.92 
 
                                                 
88 Michael Whitworth. Authors in context: Virginia Woolf. Oxford: OUP, 2005, p.95. So often conflated 
with ‘stream-of-consciousness’ writing, Whitworth goes on to outline some key differences between the 
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Ponty, Doyle proposes ‘intercorporeal narrative’ as a description of Woolf’s narrative technique in To The 
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private realms see Anna Snaith. Virginia Woolf: Public and Private Negotiations. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
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92 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.88. 
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Utterances, therefore, cannot be tied to an individual subject, and the subject (whether in 
writing or otherwise) involves ‘synchronis[ation] without a central agency’:93 
 
the collective assemblage is always like the murmur from which I take my proper name, 
the constellation of voices, concordant or not, from which I draw my voice. I always 
depend on a molecular assemblage of enunciation that is not given in my conscious mind, 
any more than it depends solely on my apparent social determinations, which combine 
many heterogeneous regimes of signs. Speaking in tongues. To write is perhaps to bring 
this assemblage of the unconscious to the light of day, to select the whispering voices, to 
gather the tribes and secret idioms from which I extract something I call my Self.94 
 
Where in the following sections I discuss the relations between specific characters in To 
the Lighthouse, it is in order to map their various movements away from totalising or 
symbolic representation and towards molecular enunciations. My focus is on the tri-s that 
the characters make, their attempts to form connections rather than fix subjectivity. 
 
2.2.2 Mr Ramsay – Mrs Ramsay – James: Suppleness and Schizoanalysis 
Where inter-subjective relationships are concerned, triangles, according to Deleuze and 
Guattari, too often resemble an Oedipal design. In Anti-Oedipus, they heavily criticise the 
fact that psychoanalysis ‘continues to ask its questions and develop its interpretations 
from the depths of the Oedipal triangle as its basic perspective, even though today it is 
acutely aware that this frame of reference is not at all adequate to explain so-called 
psychotic phenomena.’95 Their polemic against psychoanalysis in both Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia volumes consists of several interweaving strands, including an attack on 
the oedipalisation of the family and the organisation of a desire based on lack and 
interpreted through metaphor and metonymy. In chapter one of this thesis I discussed the 
question of metaphor and metonymy in a different context (namely in relation to Woolf’s 
‘granite and rainbow’ figuration and Braidotti’s conceptualisation of ‘transposition’), and 
in the following chapter I discuss Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of desire 
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more fully (in relation to Orlando). In the current section, however, I would like to focus 
specifically on Deleuze and Guattari’s turn towards ‘schizoanalysis’ as a way out of what 
they see as the insular environment or ‘intimate familial theatre’ (AO 335) of 
psychoanalysis, where ‘[t]he triangulation of the subject, familial in origin, consists in 
fixing one’s position in relation to the two other represented terms (father-mother-
child).’96 A key difference between psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis is that 
‘schizoanalysis attains a nonfigurative and nonsymbolic unconscious’.97 As Daniel Smith 
notes, ‘psychoanalysis begins with the symbolic and seeks out the “gaps” that mark the 
irruption of an “impossible” Real; whereas schizoanalysis starts with the Real as the 
immanent process of desire and seeks to mark both the interruptions of this process 
(reterritorializations) and its continuations and transformations (becomings, intensities 
...).’98 As Deleuze remarks in an interview included in Negotiations, Schizoanalysis was 
conceived of as a kind of ‘materialist psychiatry’ that ‘brings production into desire’ and 
‘desire into production’.99 Deleuze and Guattari present schizoanalysis as the task of 
‘tirelessly taking apart egos and their presuppositions; liberating the prepersonal 
singularities they enclose and repress; mobilizing the flows they would be capable of 
transmitting, receiving, or intercepting; establishing always further and more sharply the 
schizzes and the breaks well below conditions of identity.’100 In other words, where 
psychoanalysis relies on molar identities that are ‘totalizable and organizable’, 
schizoanalysis frees molecular becomings that are ‘intensive’ and ‘constantly construct 
and dismantle themselves in the cause of their communications’;101 it is the difference 
between ‘rigid segmentarity’ and ‘supple segmentation’.102 In this section I argue that in 
To the Lighthouse Woolf is similarly attempting a critique of rigid oedipalisation and a 
freeing of supple segmentation through the relations between Mrs Ramsay, Mr Ramsay 
and James – relations that provide an example of tri-s rather than Oedipal triangulation. 
                                                 
96 Deleuze and Guattari 1986, p.53. 
97 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p385.  
98 Smith 2004, p.645-646. 
99 Deleuze 1995, p.17-18. 
100 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p396. It is important to note here that Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
schizophrenia in ‘broad socio-historical rather than narrowly psychological terms, as a result of the 
generalized production of psychosis pervading capitalist society’. See Eugene W. Holland. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis. London: Routlege, 1999, p.2-3. 
101 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.36. 
102 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.221. 
  
101
Psychoanalytic critics such as Elizabeth Abel have focused on the triangular 
relationship between the Ramsays and their son James as highlighting ‘Woolf’s Oedipal 
plot’ in To the Lighthouse.103 Indeed, whilst acknowledging Woolf’s distrust of Freud,104 
Nicole Ward Jouve aligns Woolf’s writing with a psychoanalysis that is ‘forever fending 
off the threat of disintegration, blurred boundaries, insecure identities’.105 These 
psychoanalytic readings of Woolf also tend to point towards the autobiographical 
dimensions of her novel, focusing on the influence of Woolf’s parents on the characters 
and her own well-known reflection in ‘Sketch of the Past’ that writing it exorcised the 
ghost of her mother (MB 92). Contrary to this approach, I suggest that the relationship 
between Mrs Ramsay, Mr Ramsay and James in To the Lighthouse has little to do with an 
Oedipal triangle, and, whilst acknowledging their clear influence on her composition of 
the text, I do not wish to foreground Woolf’s own familial relations here. Rather than 
understanding Woolf’s writing as resisting the threat of ‘blurred boundaries’, the threat is 
instead, I would argue, the limitations of reading Woolf’s depiction of the Ramsay’s 
through an Oedipal lens. Woolf, as Driscoll puts it, explores ‘assemblages of subject 
positions which escape Oedipal frames’,106 and in this section I want to focus on the early 
part of To the Lighthouse in order to bring out the supple segmentations that intermingle 
and create new combinations later in the novel.   
Laura Marcus notes that in To the Lighthouse James’s role in particular is often 
understood in relation to Freud’s Oedipal complex. Pointing to a passage in the latter part 
of Woolf’s novel when, stationary on the boat, ‘[a] rope seemed to bind him [James] 
there and his father had knotted it and he could only escape by taking a knife and 
plunging it…’ (TL 212), Marcus suggests that ‘James is literally becalmed, like the 
Ancient Mariner, by this narrative, and metaphorically bound, as Oedipus was bound by 
the chains with which his father sought to secure his death.’107 Similarly, Minow-Pinkney 
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claims that ‘James inhabits a classical Oedipal triangle’,108 and Bowlby notes that ‘[t]he 
resentment of James […] for Mr Ramsay’s prior claims to his mother parallels Freud’s 
Oedipal scenario, where the boy wants nothing less than to put out of the way the father 
who asserts his rights to the mother.’109  But to see James’ narrative in To the Lighthouse 
as an Oedipal one risks overshadowing what Deleuze and Guattari call the ‘amazing 
nonfamilial experience that psychoanalysis has completely failed to take into account’, an 
experience that I would suggest is hinted at from the very beginning of Woolf’s novel.110 
In only the second paragraph of To the Lighthouse James connects with a range of objects 
which are not limited to the figures of his parents: ‘The wheelbarrow, the lawn-mower, 
the sound of poplar trees, leaves whitening before rain, rooks cawing, brooms knocking, 
dresses rustling – all these were so coloured and distinguished in his mind that he had 
already his private code, his secret language’ (TL 5). It may be that this ‘private code’ or 
‘secret language’ serves as an early reminder that ‘children don’t live as our adult 
memories would have us believe […] Memory yells “Father! Mother!” but the childhood 
block is elsewhere, in the highest intensities that the child constructs with his sisters, his 
pal, his projects and his toys, and all the nonparental figures through which he 
deterritorializes his parents every chance he gets.’111 If we recall Woolf’s own memories 
of childhood from ‘Sketch of the Past’, she seems to emphasise the importance of such 
nonparental connections: ‘It is true that I enclosed that world [of family life] in another 
made by my own temperament; it is true that from the beginning I had many adventures 
outside that world; and often went far from it; and kept much back from it’ (MB 96). In 
addition, the kind of nonparental attachments formed by James above are also evident in 
To the Lighthouse when Mrs Ramsay watches on as her daughter Cam  
 
dashed past. She was off like a bird, bullet, or arrow, impelled by what desire, shot by 
whom, at what directed, who could say? What, what? Mrs Ramsay pondered, watching 
her. It might be a vision – of a shell, or a wheelbarrow, of a fairy kingdom on the far side 
of the hedge; or it might be the glory of speed; no one knew. (TL 63) 
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If, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, children not only form connections with parents, they 
also enter into ‘the line of flight of the building, the street, etc.’,112 then here Cam’s line 
of flight takes on a more literal dimension as she runs away from the parental framework: 
‘she would not stop for her father […] nor for her mother’ (TL 63). 
It is not only nonparental connections of the children Woolf hints at; her depiction 
of the Ramsays points beyond the molar identities that they are so often seen as 
representing (whether as stand-ins for Woolf’s own parents, or as symbols of Victorian 
marriage). At the very beginning of the novel Mr Ramsay displays his dominance and 
severe manner in the patriarchal familial set-up: ‘“But,” said his father, stooping in front 
of the drawing-room window, ‘it won’t be fine’” (TL 6); ‘What he said was true. It was 
always true. He was incapable of untruth; never tampered with a fact’ (TL 6). But 
somewhat ironically, ‘severity’ is precisely what links Mr Ramsay to his wife and child in 
these opening exchanges: Mr Ramsay’s ruling against the lighthouse trip; Mrs Ramsay 
declaration ‘“Nonsense”’ is made with ‘great severity’ which she then turns against 
Nancy (TL 8); and even the young James outwardly ‘appeared the image of stark and 
uncompromising severity’ (TL 6). When the narrative later points to Mr Ramsay’s own 
‘compound of severity and humour’ (TL 37), it is almost as if Woolf is gently satirising 
the tendencies we have to polarise into extreme categories, to emphasise severe 
differences. Thus there is a self-reflexive hint early on of how such severity and extremity 
will be undermined by a more nuanced vision of these characters’ relations. From these 
opening pages then, and as I will attempt to show in the following sections by focusing 
on some of the further relations formed in To the Lighthouse –the tri-s that continually re-
draw the lines and re-shape the design of triangular relations – Woolf may provide 
another example of what Deleuze and Guattari recognise in Kafka’s novels: ‘triangles 
that remain in Kafka’s novels show up only at the beginning of the novels; and from the 
start, they are so vacillating, so supple and transformable, that they are ready to open into 
a series that break their form and explode their terms.’113 
Despite what initially seems like a reassertion of difference as rigid and 
oppositional, a more flexible, supple form of difference begins to appear through Mrs 
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Ramsay when, a few pages after the scene discussed above, the eight Ramsay children 
make way to their bedrooms ‘to debate anything, everything; Tansley’s tie; the passing of 
the Reform Bill; sea-birds and butterflies; people’ (TL 11). The reader is told of two 
kinds of ‘differences’:     
 
Strife, divisions, difference of opinion, prejudices twisted into the very fibre of being, oh 
that they should begin so early, Mrs Ramsay deplored. They were so critical, her children 
[…] It seemed to her such nonsense – inventing differences, when people, heaven knows, 
were different enough without that. The real differences, she thought, standing by the 
drawing-room window, are enough, quite enough. (TL 11) 
 
The ‘real differences’ for Mrs Ramsay appear to be felt in the molar, binary oppositional 
groups of ‘rich and poor, high and low’ (TL 11). Similarly, there are many often-cited 
examples of how Mrs Ramsay props up molar identities of well-defined male and female 
roles, and by upholding ‘the greatness of man’s intellect […] the subjection of all wives’ 
(TL 14) she has been compared to the idealised patriarchal looking-glass, as Woolf puts it 
in A Room of One’s Own, ‘possessing the magical and delicious power of reflecting the 
figure of man at twice its natural size’ (RO 45). Critics have pointed to instances in the 
novel where Mrs Ramsay is seen giving her husband sympathy (TL 45), her ‘mania’ for 
marriage (TL 58, 83, 199), her role as mother (TL 38, 45) and her short-sightedness (TL 
14, 36, 83, 182).114 But whilst it is tempting to view Mrs Ramsay as stuck within an 
oppositional framework, there are also moments when she looks beyond this. In the 
above passage her own relationship to these ‘real differences’ of rich and poor is 
somewhat ambiguous, with ‘the great in birth receiving from her, half grudging, some 
respect’ due to her own noble blood, and at the same time her concern with poverty, ‘the 
things she saw with her own eyes, weekly, daily, here or in London’ (TL 12). Mrs 
Ramsay’s engagement with political issues is more pronounced later, with her concern 
‘about hospitals and drains and the dairy. About things like that she did feel passionately, 
and would, if she had had the chance, have liked to take people by the scruff of their 
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necks and make them see. No hospital on the whole island. It was a disgrace’ (TL 67). 
More gravely, her concern for ‘the eternal problems’ of ‘suffering; death; the poor’ are 
twice repeated: ‘[t]here was always a woman dying of cancer even here’ (TL 70; see also 
74). But as well as her contradictory relationship to these class differences, it is intriguing 
that at the very moment Mrs Ramsay’s difference from her children is most pronounced 
in the above passage she is ‘holding James by the hand’ (TL 11) – a phrase that is 
repeated on the following page – hinting at a connection with his more molecular view of 
the world. Indeed James in this moment undermines her notion of what real differences 
are, for he escapes his own molar identity (as one of ‘her children’) ‘since he would not 
go with the others’ (TL 11). In relation to sexual difference, it is worth nothing here that 
the ‘molar aggregates’ par excellence, men and women, are not actually mentioned in the 
above quotation.115 Might Mrs Ramsay be less contented after all by the ‘relief of 
simplicity’ that ‘[m]en, and women too, letting go the multiplicity of things, had 
allowed’? Even here, the narrative quickly moves from the ‘simplicity’ of men and 
women to Mrs Ramsay’s sense of dissatisfaction with the ‘vanity’ she recognises in her 
own efforts to please and uphold societal and familial frameworks (TL 49). She is not, 
after all, entirely able reduce multiplicity to simplicity. 
In ‘The Window’ section of To the Lighthouse there are further examples when 
Mrs Ramsay does not appear to be as rigidly Victorian in her ideals, as unflinchingly 
supportive of the status quo, or as ‘short-sighted’ as is initially presented. As Goldman 
notes, we can see both ‘Mrs Ramsay’s complicity with patriarchy and her potential to 
overthrow it’.116 This more complicated view of Mrs Ramsay plays itself out at moments 
when she shows a level of awareness as to the ways in which her ‘singleness of mind’ 
consists of her ability to find ‘truth which delighted, eased, sustained’ but did so ‘falsely 
perhaps.’ (TL 34) The fragility of her supposed ‘instinct for truth’ (TL 64) is reflected 
when ‘she made herself look in her glass a little resentful that she had grown old, 
perhaps, by her own fault. (The bill for the greenhouse and all the rest of it.)’ (TL 114). 
This time viewing the looking-glass rather than acting as though she herself is one, its 
reflection enables Mrs Ramsay’s acknowledgement of the transience of life matched by 
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her awareness that things could and perhaps should be different in the future: ‘even if it 
isn’t fine tomorrow […] it will be another day’ (TL 31). It could be argued, then, that Mrs 
Ramsay is as aware of the fabrication of familial, sexed roles as Lily Briscoe becomes, 
but is perhaps less willing or less able to let go of that illusion:  
 
she let it uphold her and sustain her, this admirable fabric of the masculine intelligence, 
which ran up and down, crossed this way and that, like iron girders spanning the swaying 
fabric, upholding the world, so that she could trust herself to it utterly, even shut her eyes, 
or flicker them for a moment, as a child staring up from its pillow winks at the myriad 
layers of the leaves of a tree. Then she woke up. It was still being fabricated. (TL 122)  
 
Mrs Ramsay’s view that ‘windows should be open’ (TL 33) – and later in ‘Time Passes’ 
it is Mrs McNab who is ‘directed to open all windows’ (TL 148) – as well as the fact that 
herself, her husband and James all stand or sit by the window at various points in the 
‘The Window’ section of the novel, hints at a wish to maintain some connection with the 
world outside of the familial, perhaps a less polemical portrayal of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s frustration with family-centred psychoanalysts: ‘Do these psychoanalysts who 
are oedipalizing women, children […] know what they are doing? We dream of entering 
their offices, opening their windows and saying, “It smells stuffy in here – some relation 
with the outside, if you please”’!117 Or, as we read in A Room of One’s Own: ‘I thought 
how unpleasant it is to be locked out; and I thought how it is worse, perhaps, to be locked 
in’ (RO 31). 
Mrs Ramsay vision does not always, therefore, focus on the familial: ‘She took a 
look at life, for she had a clear sense of it there, something real, something private, which 
she shared neither with her children nor with her husband’ (TL 69). Moreover, whilst 
their specific concerns may be different, the short-sighted/long-sighted opposition of Mrs 
Ramsay and Mr Ramsay does not always ring true. As she regrets the lack of ‘[a] model 
dairy and a hospital up here – those two things she would have liked to do, herself’ but is 
unable to ‘[w]ith all these children’, and then immediately reflects upon the contentment 
of her position and that ‘she never wanted James to grow a day older, or Cam either […] 
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She would have liked always to have a baby […] was happiest carrying one in her arms’ 
(TL 68), we are reminded of her husband’s own simultaneous regret (‘the father of eight 
children has no choice’) and contentment (‘he was for the most part happy; he had his 
wife; he had his children’) (TL 52; see also 80-81). Indeed, we even see in these early 
chapters an example of Mrs Ramsay and Mr Ramsay and James combined in a vision that 
goes further than their familial relationship when, despite the fact all three of them are 
present to Lily’s gaze, it is their nonhuman surrounding which is emphasised: 
 
The sky stuck to them; the birds sang through them. And what was even more exciting, 
she felt, too, as she saw Mr Ramsay bearing down and retreating, and Mrs Ramsay sitting 
with James in the window and the cloud moving and the tree bending, how life, from 
being made up of little separate incidents which one lived one by one, became curled and 
whole like a wave which bore one up with it and threw one down with it, there, with a 
dash on the beach. (TL 55)  
 
In this passage Mrs Ramsay and Mr Ramsay are contained in parenthetical commas, and 
it is the way that ‘[t]he sky stuck to them’ and ‘birds sang through them’ – as well as ‘the 
cloud moving and the tree bending’ – which takes Lily’s thoughts on life away from 
‘little separate incidents which one lived one by one’ (as a sequence of subjective 
experiences) to life as ‘curled and whole like a wave’ (an insight which anticipates my 
discussion in chapter five of quantum materiality). Rather than a psychoanalytic familial 
portrait, is this, perhaps, the image of the schizoanalyst?   
 
2.2.3 Mrs Ramsay – Mr Ramsay – Lily: Bending Trees and Becoming Grass 
In Dialogues, Deleuze and Parnet argue that ‘trees are planted in our heads: the tree of 
life, the tree of knowledge, etc.’ Their interest lies not in the tree as metaphor, but as the 
dominant ‘image of thought’ in Western philosophy:118  
 
a whole apparatus that is planted in thought in order to make it go in a straight line and 
produce the famous correct ideas. There are all kinds of characteristics in the tree: there is 
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a point of origin, seed or centre; it is a binary machine or principle of dichotomy, with its 
perpetually divided and reproduced brachings, its points of arborescence; […] a 
hierarchical system or transmission of orders […] The whole world demands roots. 
Power is always arborescent.119 
 
They go on to contrast the tree as image of thought with grass: ‘Trees are the opposite of 
grass. Not only does grass grow in the middle of things but it grows itself through the 
middle […] Grass has its line of flight and does not take root. We have grass in the head 
and not a tree’.120 As Deleuze and Guattari clarify in A Thousand Plateaus, where the tree 
grows with arborescent rigidity, is rooted in phallogocentrism and promotes the binary 
machine, grass is aligned with the horizontal, multiple growths of the subterranean 
‘rhizome’: 
 
The tree imposes the verb ‘to be,’ but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, 
‘and…and…and’. This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb ‘to 
be’. Where are you going? Where are you coming from? What are you heading for? 
These are totally useless questions […] seeking a beginning or a foundation – all imply a 
false conception of voyage and movement.121  
 
What counts most for Deleuze then is always ‘the middle and not the beginning or the 
end, grass which is in the middle and which grows from the middle, and not trees which 
have a top and roots. Always grass between the paving stones’.122  
In relation to Woolf, this ‘grass between the paving stones’ brings to mind the 
opening episode of A Room of One’s Own, when the narrator provokes ‘horror and 
indignation’ by strolling onto the Oxbridge turf reserved for the male ‘Fellows and 
Scholars’ (RO 7), and the territory of sexual politics is clearly but also complexly 
marked. As Judith Allen has noted in her recent book Virginia Woolf and the Politics of 
Language (2010), this ‘gendered landscape […] holds within, in its sedimentary layers, 
the archaeological remains of its ancient past.’ An exploration of this geological and 
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textual site prompts readers to think about the ‘ground on which the social, political and 
economic events of the past have made their marks, developed their cultures and created 
their so-called “civilisations”’.123 But as well as prompting us to dig into the past, A Room 
of One’s Own also looks forward, and contemporary revisitings to this scene suggest that 
readers continue to ‘look carefully’ for that elusive ‘thought’ which was ‘laid on the 
grass’ precisely as we are presented with the image of a ‘burning tree’, and moments 
before the narrator trespasses (RO 6). In this section I want to link Deleuze’s emphasis on 
rhizomatic grassy conjunctions to To the Lighthouse and suggest that in Woolf’s novel 
we see a challenge to the tree as image of thought and phallogocentric symbol. Whilst 
Allen’s aforementioned book makes reference to A Thousand Plateaus in exploring 
Woolf’s rhizomatic ‘wild flowing grasses’ as a place where women are linked together at 
the ‘exclusion of men’,124 I will suggest that in To the Lighthouse Woolf points beyond a 
politics of exclusion (whether of women or of men); ultimately, her grass becomes an 
inclusive space in which no one is locked out or locked in. By focusing primarily on the 
relations firstly between Mrs Ramsay, Mr Ramsay and trees, and secondly between Lily, 
Mr Carmichael and grass, I want to emphasise that the movements of tri-s resist 
arborescence and are rhizomatic; in other words, the rhizome grows tri-s instead of trees.  
The fragility of arborescent foundations in To the Lighthouse is hinted at early on 
when a pear tree in the orchard is shaken by Lily’s ‘undeniable, everlasting, 
contradictory’ thoughts about Mr Ramsay, and ‘a flock of starlings’ (TL 29-30), and also 
the aforementioned passage when Lily watches Mr and Mrs Ramsay surrounded by a 
‘tree bending’ (TL 55). Later, Woolf’s exploration of the rhizomatic and arborescent is 
seen in the final two sections of ‘The Window’. In the opening paragraphs here Mrs 
Ramsay appears to be searching for clearly defined points: ‘She felt rather inclined just 
for a moment to stand still after all that chatter, and pick out one particular thing; the 
thing that mattered; to detach it; separate it off; clean it of all the emotions and odds and 
ends of things’ (TL 129). In contrast to the inseparability of rhizomatic connections, Mrs 
Ramsay even wishes to introduce ‘the moment’ to patriarchal judgement, to 
institutionalise it: ‘bring it to the tribunal […] the judges she had set up to decide these 
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things. Is it good, is it bad, is it right or wrong? Where are we going to?’ (TL 130). Thus 
rooted to arborescence – exemplified by this last question which echoes the ‘false 
conception of voyage and movement’ that Deleuze and Guattari outline above – she ‘used 
the branches of the elm trees outside to stabilise her position’ (TL 130). Her ‘sense of 
movement’ is here a restricted one where ‘[a]ll must be order. She must get that right and 
that right, she thought, insensibly approving of the dignity of the trees’ stillness’ (TL 
130).  
What follows, however, is a reminder that the arborescent and rhizomatic are not 
fixed oppositions creating their own binary framework but always already holding the 
potential to transpose each other. As Deleuze and Guattari put it: ‘there are two kinds of 
voyage, distinguished by the respective role of the point, line and space […] Tree travel 
and rhizome travel […] But nothing completely coincides, and everything intermingles, 
or crosses over’.125 And so here we witness a rhizomatic transformation of the tree itself, 
the becoming-cosmic of the tree: ‘It was windy, so that the leaves now and then brushed 
open a star, and the stars themselves seemed to be shaking and darting light and trying to 
flash out between the edges of the leaves’ (TL 130). In contrast to the ending of the 
previous section of the novel where Mrs Ramsay seems to abide by an arborescent point-
system of time and memory when she comments, following her dinner, that ‘it had 
become, she knew, giving one last look at it over her shoulder, already the past’ (TL 
128), now her rhizomatic metamorphosis refuses a settling into melancholic nostalgia, 
instead turning into something affirmative:  
 
They would, she thought, going on again, however long they lived, come back to this night; 
this moon; this wind; this house; and her too […] wound about in their hearts, however 
long they lived she would be woven; and this, and this, and this, she thought, going 
upstairs, laughing, but affectionately, at the sofa on the landing (her mother’s) at the 
rocking chair (her father’s) at the map of the Hebrides. All that would be revived again in 
the lives of Paul and Minta (TL 130).  
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As Mrs Ramsay becomes entangled with her surroundings, there is a diffusion of subject, 
object and time, and a rhizomatic movement prevails in which ‘the line frees itself from 
the point, and renders points indiscernible’126 and which emphasises the conjunction 
‘and…and…and’127 – ‘and this, and this, and this’, as Woolf writes in the above passage. 
This rhizomatic movement brings forth ‘that community of feeling with other people 
which emotion gives as if the walls of partition had become so thin that practically (the 
feeling was one of relief and happiness) it was all one stream, and chairs, tables, maps, 
were theirs, it did not matter whose’ (TL 131).  
While Mrs Ramsay’s resistance to arborescent thinking in this moment is, by 
definition, fleeting, it becomes apparent that some change has endured. For example, 
even when she is seduced again by the idea of marriage – ‘How extraordinarily lucky 
Minta is! She is marrying a man who has a gold watch in a wash-leather bag!’ (TL 134) – 
there is a hint of self-mocking as she is ‘tickled by the absurdity of her thought’ (TL 135). 
Moreover, it initially appears that Mr Ramsay brings his wife back to arborescence with 
his presence in the same vein in which he earlier appears to stifle Lily’s creativity: ‘she 
grew still like a tree which has been tossing and quivering and now, when the breeze 
falls, settles, leaf by leaf, into quiet’ (TL 136). But to Mrs Ramsay this stillness appears 
to have been reimagined, somehow liberated, perhaps becoming what Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to as ‘motionless voyage’128 where the question of beginning or ending is 
superfluous, where we ‘[v]oyage in place: that is the name of all intensities […] To think 
is to voyage’.129 In her motionless voyage Mrs Ramsay decides that ‘[i]t didn’t matter, 
any of it, she thought. A great man, a great book, fame – who could tell?’ (TL 136) In 
grasping at something beyond the confines of her familial relationship with her husband, 
‘dismissing all this’, Mrs Ramsay affirms ‘[t]here is something I want – something I have 
come to get’ (TL 136). As she murmurs of ‘trees and changing leaves’ from Charles 
Elton’s ‘Luriana Lurilee’, the description of her then reading lines from William 
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Browne’s ‘The Siren’s Song’ – in the book she finds on the table – is a rhizomatic one, 
and one which signals the becoming-rhizome of the tree itself: ‘zigzagging this way and 
that, from one line to another as from one branch to another’ (TL 137).130  
The sound of Mr Ramsay then ‘slapping his thighs’ would ordinarily signal another 
interruption and overcoding of the arborescent, but instead sees him swept up in a 
rhizomatic entanglement: ‘Their eyes met for a second; but they did not want to speak to 
each other. They had nothing to say, but something seemed, nevertheless, to go from him 
to her […] now, he felt, it didn’t matter a damn who reached Z (if thought ran from an 
alphabet from A to Z). Somebody would reach it – if not he, then another’ (TL 137-8). 
This ‘if not he, then another’ echoes the ‘it did not matter whose’ from Mrs Ramsay’s 
earlier stream (see above). In addition, the gender-neutral terms the narrator employs here 
(‘somebody’, ‘another’) are important, and the parenthetical use of the second conditional 
– a tense used for improbable events – indicates a doubting of the arborescent linearity 
through which he had previously thought of his philosophical endeavours. Again 
temporarily escaping his familial role Mr Ramsay reads Walter Scott writing about ‘these 
fishermen, the poor old crazed creature in Mucklebackit’s cottage made him feel so 
vigorous, so relieved of something that he felt roused and triumphant and could not choke 
back his tears’ (TL 138). In the mocking tone that follows as he ‘forgot himself 
completely (but not one or two reflections about morality and French novels and English 
words and Scott’s hands being tied but his view perhaps being as true as any other view)’, 
it seems as though this time Mr Ramsay is too in on the joke, which adds to the sense in 
which the arborescent Mr Ramsay who took himself and his philosophy so seriously is 
beginning to be uprooted. Feeling ‘more secure’ in his less rooted state of mind, he ‘could 
not remember the whole shape of the thing’. In what could almost be a direct response to 
Mrs Ramsay’s earlier depiction of her judges, Mr Ramsay realises he must ‘keep his 
judgement in suspense’ (TL 138). He now resists the temptation to demand sympathy 
from his wife: ‘One ought not to complain, thought Mr Ramsay, trying to stifle his desire 
to complain to his wife that young men did not admire him. But he was determined; he 
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would not bother her again’ (TL 139). Whilst it is important to remember that Woolf does 
not present us with a utopian vision here – after all, we do still see Mr Ramsay 
interrupting Mrs Ramsay (TL 134) and patronising her when she is reading (TL 140) – 
the fact Mr Ramsay is capable of being swept up (even if momentarily) in this resistance 
to arborescence would suggest that the particular form of sexual politics at play in the 
novel looks further than the male-female binary and towards a politics of inclusion. 
As difficult as it may be to let go of old traditions – and sections of ‘Time Passes’ 
are certainly an elegy of and for that – the vision Woolf presents us with as the novel 
continues is one of molecular connections rather than molar categorisations: ‘there was 
scarcely anything left of body or mind by which one could say “This is he” or “This is 
she”’ (TL 144). If, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, ‘the tree has implanted itself in our 
bodies, rigidifying and stratifying even the sexes’,131 then the ‘wind and destruction’ of 
‘Time Passes’ is therefore necessary to triumph over arborescence. In other words, to 
bend a tree requires a storm: ‘the trees plunge and bend and their leaves fly helter skelter 
until the lawn is plastered with them and they lie packed in gutters and choke rain pipes 
and scatter damp paths’ (TL 146). Crucially, it is here that the focus turns from the 
plunging and bending trees to the grass lawn on which part of ‘The Lighthouse’ section 
of the novel will be set. Amongst the death and ruin of ‘Time Passes’, this lawn becomes 
a site of the regeneration of art when Mrs McNab is clearing out the house and realises 
that the ‘mouldy’ books have ‘to be laid out on the grass in the sun’ (TL 154). 
In the next section I turn to the other setting of ‘The Lighthouse’, the sea, and in the 
final section of this chapter I go on to focus in more detail on Lily’s painting, but for the 
moment I want to conclude by returning to the connection between the rhizome and 
grass. That the final lines of both the painting and Woolf’s novel occur while Lily is 
sitting on this lawn seems significant enough in itself as an example of reclaiming the 
grass and rejecting the arborescent. But the fact that Lily shares this lawn with Mr 
Carmichael points to Woolf’s grass as an inclusive space which welcomes an inclusive 
politics beyond dualistic antagonisms between men and women. Silent for almost all of 
the novel, Mr Carmichael refuses the role of the dominating male – to borrow Goldman’s 
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description, he ‘does not threaten, but seems, muse-like, to assist Lily’s progress’.132 
Indeed he shares a thought-connection with Lily: ‘A curious notion came to her that he 
did after all hear the things she could not say’ (TL 203); he ‘seemed (though they had not 
said a word all this time) to share her thoughts’ (TL 220). Rather than being a ‘blank or 
absence in the text’, as Minow-Pinkney claims,133 we might say that he partakes with Lily 
in a becoming-grass, where sitting on the lawn is ‘sitting on the world’, a world 
envisaged beyond arborescent thought and patriarchal exclusion: ‘The lawn was the 
world; they were up here together, on this exalted station’ (TL 220). Have they achieved 
the kind of imperceptible, impersonal connection that Deleuze and Guattari claim makes 
one ‘like grass: one has made the world, everybody/everything into a becoming’ (TL 
309)? To the Lighthouse would therefore be refusing to steer clear of the grass just as the 
narrators (and readers) of A Room of One’s Own are caught ‘audaciously trespassing’ 
(RO 7) on the turf that patriarchy had tried to keep exclusively for men. It would mean 
that both Lily and Mr Carmichael, in silent collaboration with each other and perhaps 
even with the Ramsays, are affirming: ‘I refuse to allow you, Beadle though you are, to 
turn me off the grass’! (RO 98)  
 
2.2.4 Mr Ramsay – Cam – James: The Smoothing of the Sea 
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari argue that different molar and molecular, 
rigid and supple, movements are brought into play variously in what they term ‘smooth’ 
and ‘striated’ spaces, where the smooth is ‘an intensive rather than extensive space […] 
not of measures and properties’ and the striated where ‘one goes from one point to 
another’ (TL 528): 
 
The smooth and the striated are distinguished first of all by an inverse relation between 
the point and the line (in the case of the striated, the line is between two points, while in 
the smooth, the point is between two lines); and second, by the nature of the line 
(smooth-directional, open intervals; dimensional-striated, closed intervals). Finally, there 
is a third difference, concerning the surface or space. In striated space, one closes off a 
surface and “allocates” it according to determinate intervals, assigned breaks; in the 
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smooth, one “distributes” oneself in an open space, according to frequencies and in the 
course of one’s crossings [.]134 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari it is the sea that provides the perfect illustration that the smooth 
and striated is no simple opposition, but one that ‘gives rise to far more difficult 
complications, alternations, and superpositions’:135 
 
This is where the very special problem of the sea enters in. For the sea is a smooth space 
par excellence, and yet was the first to encounter the demands of increasingly strict 
striation […] the striation of the sea was a result of navigation on the open water […] 
bearings, obtained by a set of calculations based on exact observation of the stars and the 
sun; and the map, which intertwines meridians and parallels, longitudes and latitudes, 
plotting regions known and unknown onto a grid.136  
 
The smooth space of the sea is therefore described as having always been there ‘before 
longitude lines had been plotted’, where ‘there existed a complex and empirical nomadic 
system of navigation based on the wind and noise, the colours and sounds of the seas’.137 
In To the Lighthouse, smooth and striated spaces are crossed when Mr Ramsay, 
Cam, and James attempt to row out to the lighthouse in the final part of Woolf’s novel. At 
first it seems as though Mr Ramsay inhabits the sea as a striated space, or turns it into this 
with his presence. In her Deleuzian reading of this section of Woolf’s novel, Landefeld 
concentrates on the moment when Mr Ramsay mocks Cam’s ignorance of ‘the points of 
the compass’ (TL 190) and claims that Mr Ramsay provides a stark a contrast to Cam’s 
(and James’) freer experience of the sea: ‘In the same way that [Deleuze and Guattari] 
describe the sea as able to be both smooth and striated, so it is in To the Lighthouse. Mr 
Ramsay’s sea is knowable by the compass, whereas Cam’s sea erases the paths and trails 
that striate the land they are fleeing.’138 But whilst remaining true to Deleuze and 
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138 Ronnelle Rae Landefeld. ‘Becoming Light: Releasing Woolf from the Modernists Through the Theories 
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Guattari’s emphasis on ‘the sea as able to be both smooth and striated’, Landefeld too 
easily locates Mr Ramsay as illustrating one whilst the children illustrate the other. As 
Deleuze and Guattari again clarify, this time with the example of the land: ‘As simple as 
this opposition is, it is not easy to place it. We cannot content ourselves with establishing 
an immediate opposition between the smooth ground of the nomadic animal raiser and 
the striated land of the sedentary cultivator. It is evident that the peasant, even the 
sedentary peasant, participates fully in the space of the wind, the space of the tactile and 
sonorous qualities.’139 Mr Ramsay may be ‘acting instantly his part’ (TL 189) as 
sedentary regulator of the sea as well as ‘sedentary cultivator’ of the land in To the 
Lighthouse, but we cannot, I would argue, reduce him to pure striation.  
The possibility of a more subversive space occupied by Mr Ramsay is signalled 
by his becoming engaged with the smoothing of the sea. As Deleuze and Guattari 
repeatedly state, ‘becoming’ always happens ‘through the middle’,140 and it is worth 
pausing at the moment in Woolf’s novel when we are told that Mr Ramsay ‘sat in the 
middle of the boat’ which itself stops still in the ‘middle of the bay’ (TL 206). Abel views 
this motionless moment as the point where ‘[t]he Oedipal structure that dominates James’ 
childhood in “The Window” is completed [...]: in the motionless “middle of the bay” – 
which mirrors the empty middle of the text, in which Mrs Ramsay vanishes – James 
submits to his father’s will and “cease[s] to think” about his mother.’141 But rather than 
seeing this as a moment of Oedipal completion where James identifies with his father and 
becomes separated from his mother, I would argue that it is partly Mr Ramsay’s move 
away from his dominating role which means James can join him. Instead of representing 
a site where ‘thoughts have ceased, their velocity is no more and they stagnate in familial 
tensions’,142 what we see is a molecular, ‘motionless voyage’ similar to Mrs Ramsay’s in 
the previous section, where you ‘keep moving even in place’.143 Mr Ramsay in this 
moment is not opposed to Cam and James, but joins them as one of the ‘true nomads’: 
‘they do not move. They are nomads by dint of not moving, not migrating, of holding a 
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smooth space that they refuse to leave’.144 It is whilst ‘the boat made no motion at all’ 
(TL 184) that Mr Ramsay is portrayed more affectionately by his children, albeit that 
their other view of him as ‘tyrant’ is never quite erased. This is Mr Ramsay’s capacity to 
be both smooth as well as striated and challenges any straightforward depositing of his 
character into the ‘larger canon of enlightened masculine subjectivity’.145 For example, 
whilst Cam continues to feel the pressure of her father’s dominance, alongside this we 
also see her smoothing the way to pass ‘a private token of the love she felt’ for him: ‘no 
one attracted her more; his hands were beautiful to her and his feet, and his voice, and his 
words, and his haste, and his temper, and his oddity, and his passion, and his saying 
straight out before every one, we perished, each alone, and his remoteness’ (TL 191). As 
they are sitting in the middle of the sea, even James realises that it is the system of 
patriarchy – and not specifically his father – that he detests: ‘now, as he grew older, and 
sat staring at his father in an impotent rage, it was not him, that old man reading, whom 
he wanted to kill, but it was the thing that descended on him – without his knowing it 
perhaps’ (TL 209). Could this be James’ becoming-minoritarian or even his becoming-
woman?: ‘he would track down and stamp out – tyranny, despotism, he called it – making 
people do what they did not want to do, cutting off their right to speak’ (TL 209). 
 Importantly, it is at this moment that James goes on to think about the multiple 
potential actions of his father, showing a sensitivity to molecular creativity rather than 
molar fixity. Mr Ramsay becomes filled with the subversive potential of supple 
movement rather than rooted to his more despotic utterances such as ‘Come to the 
lighthouse. Do this. Fetch me that’ (TL 209): 
 
then next moment, there he sat reading his book; and he might look up – one never knew 
– quite reasonably. He might talk to the Macalisters. He might be pressing a sovereign 
into some frozen old woman’s hand in the street, James thought; he might be shouting out 
at some fisherman’s sports; he might be waving his arms in the air with excitement. Or he 
might sit at the head of the table dead silent from one end of the dinner to the other. Yes, 
thought James, while the boat slapped and dawdled there in the hot sun; there was a waste 
of snow and rock very lonely and austere; and there he had come to feel, quite often 
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lately, when his father said something which surprised the others, were two pairs of 
footprints only; his own and his father’s. They alone knew each other. (TL 209-210)  
 
‘What then was this terror, this hatred?’ James’ conclusion appears to associate his father 
with the childhood recollection of ‘a wagon crush[ing] ignorantly and innocently, 
someone’s foot’. But if Mr Ramsay’s is here becoming-wheel, it is important to note that 
‘the wheel was innocent’ (TL 210). As James tries to locate in his memory the episode of 
the wagon and the wheel, he recalls the enunciation: ‘“It will rain,” he remembered his 
father saying. “You won’t be able to go to the Lighthouse”’ (TL 211). If the wheel is not 
in full control of the wagon, then the voicing of this utterance, the narrative seems to 
imply, cannot be forever rooted to, and held against, his father.  
As their boat starts to move again, Mr Ramsay in this middle space raises his hand 
and lowers it ‘as if he were conducting some secret symphony’ (TL 213) – recalling 
James’ ‘secret language’ (TL 5) and Mrs Ramsay’s ‘secret chambers’ (TL 60) – in 
contrast to the more rigid linearity of his other preoccupation with walking ‘up and down’ 
(TL 18, 140, 168). Later, as they reach the lighthouse, the expectations of Mr Ramsay 
from Cam and James, and from the reader, are confounded when, instead of declaring 
once again in his self-indulgent tone ‘But I beneath a rougher sea’, he finally praises 
James: ‘“Well done!” James had steered them like a born sailor’ (TL 234). Immediately 
following this, James’ reaction is revealed through Cam’s thoughts, and the supple 
movements of tri-s are evident once again through the narrative’s shifting (free) indirect 
discourse, signalling a connection and collaboration between Cam and James, female and 
male:  
 
she knew that this is what James had been wanting, and she knew that now he had got it 
he was so pleased that he would not look at her or at his father or at any one […] He was 
so pleased that he was not going to let anybody take a grain of his pleasure. His father 
had praised him. They must think that he was perfectly indifferent. But you’ve got it now, 
Cam thought. (TL 234-5)  
 
Mr Ramsay is crucial to this collaboration, and plays his own part in resisting Cam and 
James’ instinct to offer him the chance to reassert his patriarchal rule. Both Cam and 
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James have the urge to ask him ‘What do you want?’ and they are poised to give him 
whatever is required. Yet, as with his earlier decision not to demand sympathy from Mrs 
Ramsay, ‘he did not ask them anything.’ Patriarchal demands are replaced by 
potentialities: ‘he might be thinking, We perished, each alone, or he might be thinking, I 
have reached it. I have found it, but he said nothing’ (TL 236).  
 
2.2.5 Lily – Canvas – Line: Becoming Paint 
I want to conclude this chapter by focusing on Lily’s art in order to suggest that what we 
find at the end of To the Lighthouse between Lily, her canvas and her final brushstroke, is 
not so much a celebration of the individual achievement of the female artist as it is a 
collective creation beyond molar divisions. What I term here ‘becoming-paint’ refers to 
the shaping of molecular intensities rather than molar forms, the latter of which, we know 
from early on in To the Lighthouse, Lily does not attempt to capture. Her first painting, 
recalling the ‘secret’ molecular world of James, Mrs Ramsay and Mr Ramsay, is ‘the 
residue of her thirty-three years, the deposit of each day’s living, mixed with something 
more secret than she had ever spoken or shown in the course of all these days’ (TL 61). 
Certainly not myopic, Lily has an ability to keep everything in view at once, the smallest 
detail and her larger environs: ‘Even when she looked at the mass, at the line, at the 
colour, at Mrs Ramsay sitting in the window with James, she kept a feeler on her 
surroundings’ (TL 22). From its very inception, then, Lily’s painting is much more than 
an attempt to present an image of Mrs Ramsay and James on a blank canvas. Indeed, as 
Deleuze argues in Francis Bacon: the Logic of Sensation (1981),  
 
[i]t is a mistake to think that the painter works on a white surface […] If the painter were 
before a white surface, he – or she – could reproduce on it an external object functioning 
as a model. But such is not the case. The painter has many things in his head, or around 
him, or in his studio. Now everything he has in his head or around him is already in the 
canvas, more or less virtually, more or less actually, before he begins his work. […] He 
does not paint in order to reproduce on the canvas an object functioning as a model; he 
paints on images that are already there [.]146 
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120
 
As a result, Deleuze suggests that it is important to ‘define […] all these “givens” that are 
on the canvas before the painter’s work begins, and determine, among these givens, 
which are an obstacle, which are a help’.147 As part of her surroundings, I want to 
consider the role of Mr Ramsay and the other men in To the Lighthouse as a part of Lily’s 
painting, where at the beginning they are seen to impede Lily’s creativity, to be an 
obstacle on the canvas, but where they collaborate more and more as the novel 
progresses. 
In section 2.2.3 I discussed the ways in which Woolf’s novel offers an inclusive 
politics modelled on the rhizome or grass, and such a model is found, I argue, in Lily’s 
painting, which she completes sitting on the grass lawn. Lily’s painting seems to 
anticipate the affirmation in A Room of One’s Own, and discussed in the first part of this 
chapter, that a writer’s pages should be filled with a ‘sexual quality’ that is ‘unconscious 
of itself’ (RO 121): ‘subduing all her impressions as a woman to something much more 
general; becoming once more under the power of that vision which she had seen clearly 
once and must now grope for among hedges and houses and mothers and children – her 
picture’ (TL 62). As the picture is dissociated from Lily’s own subjectivity – ‘it had been 
seen; it had been taken from her’ – we learn that by observing the painting William 
Bankes ‘had shared with her something profoundly intimate’ (TL 63). Crucially, Lily 
does not credit his sex for this intimacy, nor even him as a separated and individual 
subject: ‘thanking Mr Ramsay for it and Mrs Ramsay for it and the hour and the place, 
crediting the world with a power which she had not suspected, that one could walk away 
down that long gallery not alone any more but arm-in-arm with somebody’ (TL 63). As if 
to emphasise the connection to her painting, even her paint-box is entangled in this ‘most 
exhilarating moment’ as we are told that ‘she nicked the catch of her paint-box to, more 
firmly than was necessary, and the nick seemed to surround in a circle for ever the paint-
box, the lawn, Mr Bankes, and that wild villain, Cam, dashing past’ (TL 63).  
It is important to recognise Mr Ramsay as a part of the becoming-paint of To the 
Lighthouse. In ‘The Lighthouse’ section of the novel, Lily’s vision seems to be initially 
blocked by Mr Ramsay and his demands, where ‘he permeated, he prevailed, he imposed 
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himself. He changed everything. She could not see the colour, she could not see the lines 
[…] That man, she thought, her anger rising in her, never gave; that man took’ (TL 169-
170). For good or for ill, however, we cannot overlook the fact that ‘he permeated’ and 
‘changed everything’; any vision we attribute to Lily should not therefore be seen as a 
complete escape from, or erasure of, Mr Ramsay. That is, Lily’s ability to continue with 
her painting is not achieved by an outright rejection of Mr Ramsay or the men in the 
novel; there must be some collaboration between them despite their differences because 
opposition is an inadequate design: ‘For whatever reason she could not achieve that razor 
edge of balance between two opposite forces; Mr Ramsay and the picture; which was 
necessary. There was something perhaps wrong with the design? Was it, she wondered, 
that the line of the wall wanted breaking, was it that the mass of the trees was too heavy?’ 
(TL 219).  
The place of men in Lily’s art is noted by Goldman when she argues that ‘Lily is 
no longer painting in the same social and political space […] her picture must come, not 
from opposition to Ramsay, but from her new sense of collectivity’.148 Indeed, as well as 
her connection with Mr Carmichael on the lawn, there are clear instances elsewhere in the 
text where Lily connects with men. There is the revelation, for example, that ‘[o]ne could 
talk of painting then seriously to a man. Indeed, his friendship had been one of the 
pleasures of her life. She had loved William Bankes’ (TL 200). This world that ‘seemed 
to dazzle him’ is also a world in which, again recalling my discussion above, the tree is 
not given precedence, but is just another part of their surroundings: ‘they strolled through 
the courtyards, and admired, summer after summer, the proportions of the flowers […] as 
they walked, and he would stop to look at a tree, or the view over the lake, and admire a 
child (it was his great grief – he had no daughter)’ (TL 201). Domesticated roles are not 
fixed to any stereotypes and we even witness their becoming-carpet!: ‘he must buy a new 
carpet for the staircase. Perhaps she would go with him to buy a new carpet for the 
staircase’ (TL 201). Lily and William then share their androgynous gaze towards Mrs 
Ramsay as ‘[Lily] saw, through Williams eyes, the shape of a woman’ (TL 201). Whilst 
Goldman concludes that for Lily ‘it is a social, multi-subjective view of Mrs Ramsay that 
she comes to desire’, it is not, ultimately, a view that goes beyond the sexed binary: 
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Lily’s painting shows Mrs Ramsay as ‘the feminine object of the feminine gaze’, and her 
final ‘line [no longer a tree as in her first painting] suggests the feminine reclamation of 
the first person’.149 While there is certainly an element of this in Lily’s final line, taking 
into account the rhizomatic connections which involve many characters, male and female, 
in this novel, I would agree with Monaco that Lily’s painting expresses ‘the liberation of 
the psyche from social and sexual limitations’ of a binary nature,150 and would argue that 
the ‘lines running up and across’ suggests a rhizomatic aesthetic (and politics) of the 
painting – that there is the impossibility of determining the precise angle of the final ‘line 
there, in the centre’ (TL 237). Moreover, what the centre is, what the middle is, cannot 
easily be decided. We are not only left with a line that rejects arborescence, but this line 
could, conceivably, be anywhere on the canvas; it resists what Deleuze and Guattari call 
the ‘submission of the line to the point’.151 We could even say that the line exemplifies 
the kind of modernist brushstroke which Deleuze and Guattari claim is ‘without origin’, a 
line that  
 
begins off the painting, which only holds it by the middle […] it is without localizable 
connection, because it has lost not only its representative function but any function of 
outlining a form of any kind […] the line has become abstract, truly abstract and mutant 
[…] The line between points, in their midst, and no longer goes from one point to 
another. It does not outline a shape.152 
 
Lily’s line also coincides with the uncertainty that surrounds the lighthouse at the end of 
the novel, where this previously monolithic object ‘had become almost invisible, had 
melted away into a blue haze’ (TL 236). The becoming-paint of To the Lighthouse, which 
is the becoming-imperceptible of the lighthouse.  
Seen through this lens, Lily’s ‘vision’ (TL 137) at the end of the novel would 
therefore paint her as one ‘of those with long-distance vision, the far-seers, with all their 
ambiguities […] They see a whole microsegmentarity, details of details […] tiny 
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movements that have not reached the edge, lines or vibrations that start to form long 
before there are outlined shapes […] A whole rhizome’.153 As with the final brushstroke 
of the painting, this far-sightedness is evident in the use of the present perfect in the final 
sentence of the novel: ‘I have had my vision’ (TL 137). A tense ambiguous about its 
place in time, we do not know whether Lily is referring to the very recent past as she 
finished her painting or indeed to the decade before or before that still; it is in all these 
possibilities that her vision is perfectly present, that her far-sightedness reaches our own 
contemporary readings of Woolf’s text.  
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3 
 
Queering Orlando 
 
Following my focus in the previous chapter on Woolf’s theory of androgyny and 
materialist theories of sexual difference, I will now consider the issues of sexuality, love 
and desire in Woolf’s writing. This chapter presents a queer reading, or rather ‘queering’, 
of Orlando which reassesses these much-discussed themes in Woolf’s mock-biography. I 
begin with a section on Woolf and Vita Sackville-West, focusing in particular on the new 
perspective offered by Braidotti’s recent discussion of their relationship in 
Transpositions, and go on to consider the ways in which Woolf’s theorising of love and 
desire in Orlando involves an array of material objects including rings and motor-cars. I 
also provide an analysis of the differences between plurality and multiplicity, via Deleuze 
and Braidotti, and of Orlando’s history and bedrooms. Throughout this chapter I argue 
that in the relationship that most influenced its composition and the relations formed 
within the text itself, Orlando not only challenges notions of sexuality pertaining to 
identity categories and of desire founded on lack, but offers an affirmative 
reconceptualisation of love and desire as depersonalised and shared among human and 
nonhuman. Precisely because of this Orlando is all the more entangled in the material 
realities involved in a love story.  
 
3.1 Accidental Lovers 
Vita was here; & when she went, I began to feel the quality of the evening – how it was 
spring coming: a silver light; mixing with the early lamps; the cabs all rushing through 
the streets; I had a tremendous sense of life beginning; mixed with that emotion, which is 
the essence of my feeling, but escapes description […] I felt the spring beginning, & 
Vita's life so full & flush; & all the doors opening (D3 287). 
       
In Transpositions, Rosi Braidotti reads this diary entry by Virginia Woolf – dated 16th 
February 1930 – as evidence of the ‘shimmering intensity’ of her love affair with Vita 
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Sackville-West, which famously inspired texts including the mock-biography Orlando.1 
In her groundbreaking study Vita & Virginia, Suzanne Raitt uses similar language when 
describing how Woolf’s letters to Sackville-West ‘shimmer with the luminosity of shared 
sexual pleasure’2, and she emphasises that from the start Woolf’s writing of Orlando was 
‘bound up with her desire for Sackville-West’.3 Indeed, it is now commonplace for critics 
to refer to the correspondences and entangled biographies of Vita and Virginia in their 
readings of Woolf’s mock-biography and this has helped to uncover a particularly lesbian 
thematic in the novel (importantly countering Quentin Bell, among others, in his wish to 
downplay this aspect of Woolf’s life)4: Raitt shows that ‘[e]xplicit acknowledgement of 
sexual attraction was a part of their relationship, and a decisive factor in their experiences 
of one another’, an experience as ‘married lesbians;’5 Sherron Knopp sees Orlando as 
both ‘a public proclamation’ and ‘a way to heighten intimacy’ between Vita and Virginia, 
‘not as a substitute for physical lovemaking but an extension of it’;6 Kirstie Blair focuses 
on the gypsies in Orlando and in correspondences between Vita and Virginia as evidence 
of ‘an undercurrent […] a tug towards “gypsiness” that functions […] as a hint of same-
sex desire’;7 and, more explicitly, for Leslie Hankins Orlando ‘crafts a lesbian moment 
for all readers – refreshingly rare in the climate of 1928 […It is] a radical text that 
enables readers to experience panic-free lesbian desire [… Woolf] makes us all 
lesbians.’8 Others such as Elizabeth Meese have been scathing about scholars who do not 
foreground the lesbian in Woolf’s mock-biography: ‘it matters when a critic avoids (a 
form of suppression) the word lesbian; as long as the word matters, makes a social, 
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political, or artistic difference, it matters when lesbian is not spoken.’9 Louise DeSalvo 
sees the humour in Orlando as another example of ‘Woolf’s continuing inability to give 
full acknowledgement to her own lesbianism’.10 All of these readings add weight to 
Diana Swanson’s suggestion that ‘it is impossible to separate biography and literary 
analysis completely in discussions of Woolf and lesbianism’.11 
Viewing Orlando through a strictly lesbian lens does, however, have some 
important limitations. As Chris Coffman has recently pointed out, Orlando brings 
together shared concerns of gender, sex and sexuality and as such is most fruitfully read 
in the context of feminist studies, queer studies and transgender studies simultaneously. 
She encourages critics to go beyond the ‘logic of identity’ that lesbian readings often 
invest in ‘by asserting that all of its rhetorical multivalence is a disguise for a coherent 
identity that the critic then proceeds to unearth. This is most evident in efforts to 
demonstrate, often on biographical grounds, that the novel’s polyvocal narrative is 
nothing but an elaborate screen for lesbian desire’.12 Sharing Coffman’s concerns with 
foregrounding a lesbian reading at the expense of feminist, queer or trans- readings of 
Woolf’s text, in this chapter I will offer a ‘queering’ of Orlando which complements 
rather than conflicts with my discussion in the previous chapter on questions of feminism 
and sexual difference. Crucial to my analysis is an awareness that, as Tamara Ann 
Ramsey has put it, ‘a queer mode of reading cannot establish an oppositional matrix, in 
the same way that lesbian (and gay male) matrixes oppose a heterosexual reading matrix, 
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but must compete with the emotional and sensual responses that aesthetic readings 
provide […] a queer reading strategy that develops textual affiliations, rather than 
identities, will allow for a departure to a new paradigm of reading.’13 By forming textual 
affiliations between Woolf and various contemporary theorists who have written on 
issues of sexuality and desire, I hope to show that ‘becoming-queer’14 (like becoming-
feminist) involves going beyond oppositional models of identity politics. ‘Queering’, 
therefore, is more than an uncovering of marginalised identities; it is about 
acknowledging, as Erica Delsandro writes, that ‘the presence of the queer in literature, 
history, and culture has come to signify more than “transgressive” sexuality: queering has 
emerged as the means by which the power of signification and the very idea of identity 
are interrogated, disrupted, and continuously refigured.’15 Queering Orlando involves 
both undermining stable identity categories and opening up new conceptualisations of 
sexuality and desire. This includes the queering of ‘queer’ itself, a term that Butler 
reminds us is in Bodies that Matter (1993) is there precisely to be ‘redeployed, twisted, 
queered’.16 Or, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick puts it in Tendencies (1994): ‘Queer is a 
continuing moment, movement, motive – recurrent, eddying, troublant. The word 
“queer” itself means across – it comes from the Indo-European root –twerkw, which also 
yields the german quer (transverse), Latin torquere (to twist), English athwart.’17 
Queering enacts a move from categorising noun to continuous, changing verb. 
Returning to the above diary entry from Woolf, what is interesting about 
Braidotti’s discussion of Vita and Virginia – and what distinguishes her from the 
aforementioned critics who discuss their relationship within the discourse of lesbian 
studies – is the way in which she starts with biographical evidence of Vita’s and 
Virginia’s love affair not to emphasise the particular sexual preferences of either, nor to 
celebrate same-sex relationships or lesbian identities, but to spark a reading that moves 
                                                 
13 Tamara Ann Ramsey. ‘Producing Queer Affiliations: Feminist, Lesbian, Aesthetic, and Queer Reading 
Practices.’ Virginia Woolf and Her Influences: Selected Papers from the Seventh Annual Conference on 
Virginia Woolf, ed. Laura Davis and Jeanette McVicker. New York: Pace UP, 1998, p.276.  
14 Jeffrey J. Cohen and Todd R. Ramlow. ‘Pink Vectors of Deleuze: Queer Theory and Inhumanism.’ 
Rhizomes 11/12 (2005/2006), n.pag. 
15 Erica Delsandro. ‘“Myself – it was impossible”: Queering History in Between the Acts.’ Woolf Studies 
Annual 13 (2007), p.94. 
16 Judith Butler. Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”. London: Routledge, 1993, p.228. 
17 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. Tendencies. London: Routledge, 1994, p.xii. 
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beyond a concern with pinning down the ‘real’ lives of Vita and Virginia, or the 
importance of a specifically ‘lesbian’ identity.18 That is, Braidotti does not wish to 
cement biographical facts or fall back on identity categories, whether queer or otherwise. 
This chapter therefore follows Braidotti in starting with the materials of (auto)biography 
precisely to move beyond them, and starting with a real-life same-sex relationship in 
order to question the subversive potential of such identity positions. In this section, by 
summarising the key points of Braidotti’s discussion of Vita and Virginia and briefly 
looking at some well-known passages in Orlando, I do not wish to shore up the 
autobiographical influence in Woolf’s text, but rather to open the text up to an 
exploration of what the complex entanglements between Vita, Virginia and the 
composition of Orlando might reveal about a desire and creativity that is, as Braidotti 
puts it, ‘disengaged from the political economy of exchanges regulated by 
phallocentrism’.19  
For Braidotti, Woolf’s relationship with Vita Sackville-West brought about ‘a 
heightening of sensorial perception, the flowing of deep-seated affinity, of immense 
compassion’; a process of becoming, in other words, which, she claims ‘goes beyond 
their psychological, amorous and sexual relationship’.20 When considering the 
relationship between Vita and Virginia, a crucial aspect for Braidotti is that the category 
‘same sex’ does not sufficiently ‘account for the complex and multiple affects, generated 
in the relation between two beings.’ As Braidotti has argued at length elsewhere, any 
model of sexual difference has to take into account not only the nature of differences 
between men and women, but the differences that exist within the category ‘women’ as 
well as in each individual woman (see chapter 2.1.2). Therefore, 
 
[t]he fact that Virginia and Vita meet within this category of sexual ‘sameness’ 
encourages them to look beyond the delusional aspects of the identity (‘woman’), which 
they are alleged to share. This proliferation of differences between women and within 
each one of them is evident in the outcomes and the products of their relationship, be it in 
the literature which Virginia and Vita produced, or in the many social, cultural and 
                                                 
18 Karen Kaivola teases out the less fixed sexual identities of Woolf and Vita Sackville-West in ‘Virginia 
Woolf, Vita Sackville-West, and the Question of Sexual Identity’. Woolf Studies Annual 4 (1998), 18-40. 
19 Braidotti 2006, p.192. 
20 Braidotti 2006, p.191.  
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political projects they were engaged in. These included marriages, motherhood and child-
rearing, political activism, socializing, campaigning, publishing and working as a 
publisher, gardening and the pursuit of friendships, or pleasures and of hard work.21 
 
Braidotti claims that ‘[a] polymorphous and highly sexual text such as Orlando is the 
perfect manifesto’ for this non-dialectic, variegated entanglement of sexuality ‘which is 
productive of new meanings and definitions.’22  
In Woolf’s novel, Orlando’s multitude of encounters over four centuries provide 
many well-known examples of the proliferation of differences between and within sexual 
categories, differences that complicate the notion of ‘same-sex’ desire. The stability of 
the male/female binary is, for example, continuously challenged by the 
narrator/biographer’s reiteration that Orlando is only classified as male or female because 
this is what society – and language – expects. As is often noted by critics, when Orlando 
undergoes sexual metamorphosis there is no immediate feeling of essential difference in 
identity: ‘Orlando looked himself up and down in a long looking-glass, without showing 
any signs of discomposure […] The change of sex, though it altered their future, did 
nothing whatever to alter their identity […] The change seemed to have been 
accomplished painlessly and completely and in such a way that Orlando herself showed 
no surprise at it’ (O 87). Before the reader’s eyes Orlando has changed from a he to a she, 
a ‘himself’ to ‘herself’, yet we are reminded throughout that this classification is an 
arbitrary one and only ‘for conventions sake’ (O 87); after the sex-change, Orlando was 
still ‘in a highly ambiguous condition’ (O 108) where ‘her sex was still in dispute’ (O 
153). Moreover, even when the narrator/biographer appears to offer a more stable 
definition of sexual difference, it subtly undermines this very notion, as in the following 
passage: 
 
there is much to support the view that it is clothes that wear us and not we them […] That 
is the view of some philosophers and wise ones, but on the whole, we incline to another. 
The difference between the sexes is, happily, one of great profundity. Clothes are a 
                                                 
21 Braidotti 2006, p.196. 
22 Braidotti 2006, p.196. 
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symbol of something hid deep beneath. It was a change in Orlando herself that dictated 
her choice of a woman’s dress and of a woman’s sex. (O 120-121) 
 
Where the text appears to offer the possibility of essential sexual differences as an 
alternative to the philosophers’ theory, it ironically reinforces their ‘wise’ argument. For 
if ‘a change in Orlando herself’ (Orlando as ‘she’) can prompt the choice of ‘a woman’s 
sex’ (also Orlando as ‘she’) then exactly what type of change has occurred becomes 
unclear – the change is presented as ‘she’ becoming ‘she’, and therefore cannot be linked 
to a sexual metamorphosis within an oppositional binary framework. As Minow-Pinkney 
has argued, this ‘sentence becomes circular, its first and last phrases coinciding with each 
other. It is the word and fact of “change” itself that loses its obviousness’. Therefore, the 
‘vacillation from one sex to another’ becomes a change between states which themselves 
are not fixed or clearly defined.23 According to Christy Burns’ Butlerian reading, it 
‘points only to the essential instability of essence, the reversibility inscribed within the 
“truth.” What is essential here is to be without an essence.’24 Thus when the courts later 
attempt to impose an official sex upon Orlando it only emphasises the absurdity of 
society’s need to distinguish based on sexual difference, the question of “truth” doesn’t 
seem to come into it. Orlando’s sex becomes what DiBattista terms as a ‘legal fiction’.25 
Rather than reinforcing sexuality as a highly personalised aspect of a fixed sexual 
identity, for Braidotti depersonalisation is key in order to keep multiple possibilities in 
view, a willingness for a positive kind of self-effacement that is not an escape from 
embodied, material reality but, on the contrary, opens up space for various new 
encounters and entanglements. Beyond the sexual identities we usually think of as being 
involved in a love affair, the intensity of a love encounter, Braidotti argues, has 
something to say about the firmness of the boundaries between self and other: 
 
in the love encounter, in intense friendship, in the spiritual experience as in more 
everyday interpersonal connections, is the necessary premise to the enlargement of one’s 
fields of perception and capacity to experience. In pleasure as in pain, in a secular, 
                                                 
23 Minow-Pinkney 1987, p.129. 
24 Christy L Burns. ‘Re-dressing feminist identities: Tensions between essential and constructed selves in 
Virginia Woolf’s Orlando.’ Twentieth Century Literature 40:3 (1994), p.350.  
25 Maria DiBattista. Virginia Woolf’s Major Novels: The Fables of Anon. London: Yale UP, 1980, p.120. 
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spiritual, erotic mode that combines at once elements from all these, the decentring and 
opening up of the individual ego coincides not only with communication with other 
fellow human beings, but also with a heightening of the intensity of such communication. 
This shows the advantages of a  non-unitary vision of the subject. A depersonalisation of 
the self, in a gesture of everyday transcendence of the ego, is a connecting force, a 
binding force that links the self to larger internal and external relations. An isolated vision 
of the individual is of hindrance to such a process, as […] Virginia Woolf knew all too 
well.26  
 
Such a non-unitary vision of subjectivity is experienced, Braidotti claims, by Vita in her  
reaction to reading Orlando. In her letters to Virginia, we can see that Vita embraces the 
character of Orlando not through passive self-reflection, but active and affirmative 
depersonalisation. Consider the following letter from 11 October 1928 when Vita 
remarks: ‘Darling, I don’t know and scarcely even like to write so overwhelmed am I, 
how you could have hung so splendid a garment on so poor a peg. [...] Also, you have 
invented a new form of narcissism – I confess – I am in love with Orlando – this is a 
complication I had not foreseen’.27 For Braidotti this reaction is evidence that  
 
[t]he life that Virginia sees in her is something that Vita herself deeply aspires to. This is 
nothing to do with narcissistic delight – it is actually a sort of yearning on Vita’s part for 
potential that lies not so much in her, as in the encounter between herself and Virginia. It 
is simultaneously the slightly ashamed recognition of her own limitations: (‘I’m not that 
good, really!’), and the grateful recognition of what she owes to her lover’s passionate 
enhancement of the life that is in her (‘Thank God you saw that in me!’).28 
 
This reaction highlights the inadequacy of the relation, as it is conceived in 
psychoanalysis, between ‘the empirical level (the real-life Vita) and its symbolic 
representation (the leading character in Orlando)’ to account for the ‘intense 
transformation that takes place around the field of forces that is activated by Virginia and 
                                                 
26 Braidotti 2006, p.197. 
27 Vita Sackville-West. The Letters of Vita Sackville-West to Virginia Woolf, ed. Louise DeSalvo and 
Mitchell A. Leaska. New York: Morrow, 1985, p.288-289. 
28 Braidotti 2006, p.195. 
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Vita’.29 The letters themselves are neither empirical biographical documents, nor 
symbolic fictional representations: ‘The space of the letters is an in-between, a third party 
that does not fully coincide with either Virginia or Vita. It rather frames the space of their 
relationship. Read with Deleuze, it is a space of becoming.’30 
The allusion to Deleuze in relation to Woolf is crucial, and speaks to my 
discussion in chapter two of Woolf’s androgyny and Deleuze’s becoming-woman (see 
section 2.1.3), as well as my more detailed discussion below of desire in Orlando. 
Braidotti emphasises this connection between Woolf and Deleuze and its influence on her 
thoughts on sexuality and desire in an interview with Rutvica Andrijasevic in August 
2006 in Lodz, Poland:  
 
I start from the idea that sexuality means relations, which are actualized in encounters. 
It’s a matter of who, what, when, and where trigger the desire. This can be due to a 
thousand different modalities. Desire is not just about the choice of object, the sex or 
gender of the person involved. It has to do with the broader picture: the quality of the 
light at the moment of the meeting, the temperature of the air, and of course the hormonal 
level…What I am interested in talking about are the ways of destabilizing the categories 
of identity while regrounding them in a cartographic account of how actual instances of 
desire emerge. As I see it, they always emerge contextually, or territorially; they always 
emerge with a background; they always emerge rhizomatically across an infinite field of 
intensities of all kinds. Gilles Deleuze and Virginia Woolf write beautifully about this. 
For example, when Virginia Woolf writes about Vita Sackville-West, it’s always about 
the organization of space around her incredibly attractive legs and the elongated shape of 
her aristocratic face. A loved face is a landscape of desire, so it is about your “object” of 
desire, but fundamentally it’s about something else – it is pure acceleration or speed. 31 
 
Braidotti’s Deleuzian/Woolfian inspired desire is profoundly ‘apersonal’ and therefore in 
Orlando desire ‘does not coincide at all with the individual biographies of the 
protagonists’ but ‘actively reinvents them as they rewrite each other’s lives, intervening 
                                                 
29 Braidotti 2006, p.195. 
30 Braidotti 2006, p.192. 
31 Braidotti 2011 [1994], p.289. In a summary of this event see ‘Transformative Thresholds: Braidotti,                          
Butler & the Ethics of Relation.’ Mute: Culture and Politics After The Net. 2006 
(http://www.metamute.org/en/node/8508).  
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energetically in its course.’32 It is not simply that Orlando has become Vita, but that Vita 
becomes Orlando; what we find is less the autobiographical in the fiction, and more the 
fictionalisation of autobiography: 
 
Vita herself does justice to this process by accepting to become other than she is, 
engaging with great generosity with her own reflected image […] she becomes a mere 
reader and not the main star of the process of becoming-Orlando […] she displays 
surprising skills of adaptation by letting her narcissicm be gratified – ‘I love myself as 
Orlando!’ – but simulatenously blown to smithereens, not only in the sense of ‘I will 
never have been as fascinating and complex as Orlando’, but also ‘Orlando is the literary 
creation of a woman who is much greater than I will ever be!’33 
 
In other words, Vita transforms negative into positive in an ‘ethical moment’ which 
rejects both nihilism and an ‘ascetic withdrawal from the world of negativity’. It is 
through ‘shameful recognition of her failing’ and ‘destitution of the ego’ that she charges 
the intensity that shapes their encounter.34  
What we are given by Braidotti is a theory of desire as radically immanent, 
energised by a materialist ‘polymorphous vitalism’ that acts as ‘a sort of geometry, a 
geology, and a meteorology of forces that gather round the actors (V & V), but do not 
fully coincide with them.’35 This ‘polymorphous vitalism’ is important when considering 
a queering of Orlando in that it offers a theory of sexuality and desire which departs from 
psychoanalytic models founded on lack, is disentangled from identity politics and does 
not rely on a unified vision of the subject – all issues I will be returning to in relation to 
Deleuze in the following sections of this chapter. It should be noted here that Braidotti 
does not much use the word ‘queer’ in her work because of its association with a certain 
brand of identity politics, and the potential conflicts, as she sees it, of some aspects of 
queer theory to her nomadic feminism founded on embodied sexual difference. Whilst I 
share these concerns (the reason why I emphasise that this chapter is interested in a 
‘queering’ rather than queer Orlando) and yet also see some problems in Braidotti’s 
                                                 
32 Braidotti 2006, p.194. 
33 Braidotti 2006, p.197. 
34 Braidotti 2006, p.198. 
35 Braidotti 2006, p.191. 
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model of sexual difference (discussed in section 2.1.2), Braidotti’s reading of Vita and 
Virginia in Transpositions, and her view of sexuality and desire, I suggest, goes beyond 
the limitations of both positions. Braidotti herself clarified her openness to ‘queering’ in 
the 2006 interview with Andrijasevic: ‘It is absolutely true that my nomadic subject is 
very compatible with queering practices, so long as we agree on the terms and the 
structure of the exercise. Sexuality for me is not linguistically mediated, but rather an 
embodied practice of experimentation with multiple relations in an affirmative manner.’36 
Therefore, she adds, ‘I would agree to talk about queer, if by queer we mean a verb, a 
process, and not a brand of identity politics.’37 What Claire Colebrook has recently 
termed ‘queer vitalism’ may employ ‘queer’ as an adjective rather than a verb, but it 
might also have something to add to the Deleuzian/Woofian vitalism Braidotti describes. 
Queer vitalism involves the potential lines of flight from majoritarian politics towards a 
becoming-minoritarian, where part of this process is to ‘approach the world as the 
unfolding of events’ rather than see ‘bodies in their general recognisable form, as this or 
that ongoing and unified entity’.38 A queer/polymorphous vitalism lifts us out of a sexual 
politics which plays social constructivists off against biological determinists, where ‘the 
relations between terms are neither exclusive (either male or female, either 
social/political or genetic, either real or constructed) nor transcendent (where such terms 
organise and differentiate life, and do so on the basis of some grounding value, whether 
that be genetics, reproduction, liberty or the human).’39 Queering vitalism is to 
acknowledge differences on a molar scale, but to refuse to settle into identity groupings 
(whether constructed by social factors or biology) and instead ‘signal[s] the positive 
potentialities from which groups were formed: there could only be lesbian women 
because certain differences are possible (such as sexual difference, and difference in 
orientation), but that would then lead to further and further difference, not only to each 
individual but within each individual.’40  
Throughout the remainder of this chapter my ‘queering’ is an attempt to find new 
patterns of desire in Orlando which include an array of nonhuman as well as human 
                                                 
36 Braidotti 2011 [1994], p.291. 
37 Braidotti 2011 [1994], p. 293. 
38 Claire Colebrook. ‘Queer Vitalism.’ New Formations 68 (2009), p.83. 
39 Colebrook 2009, p.84. 
40 Colebrook 2009, p.86. 
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elements, and which do not settle into identity groupings. By grounding my focus on 
nonhuman objects Orlando engages with – for example rings and motor-cars – I hope to 
move towards the kind of ‘post-anthropocentric theory of both desire and love’ that 
Braidotti claims is required ‘in order to do justice to the complexity of subjects of 
becoming’: ‘In an intensive encounter that mobilizes the sheer quality of the light and the 
shape of the landscape […] non-human cosmic elements in the creation of a space of 
becoming. This indicates that desire designs a whole territory and thus cannot be 
restricted to the mere human persona that enacts it.’41 As examples of this queering, Vita 
and Virginia ‘activate a process of becoming which goes beyond their psychological, 
amorous and sexual relationship. Something much more elemental, rawer, is at stake’.42 
‘Call it falling in love,’ Braidotti writes, ‘if you wish, but […] if falling in love it is, it is 
disengaged from the human subject that is wrongly held responsible for the event’.43 Vita 
and Virginia may be entangled in a love story, but this story involves much more than the 
coming together of two individual women. As Braidotti states: ‘Two is quite a crowd, 
when one is a multiple, complex and depersonalised entity to begin with.’44 Whether we 
think of Orlando’s relationships, or of Vita and Virginia, they are only ‘accidental 
lovers’45 entangled in a love affair that is ‘not entirely Virginia’s or Vita’s or my own, or 
yours […] You can only share in the composition […] in the company of others.’46 
 
3.2 Queer/ring Love 
Whilst in the previous section I looked at the relationship that most influenced the 
composition of Orlando, on first reading of Woolf’s mock-biography one could argue 
that within the text itself, after Orlando’s sex-change and various lovers, the love story 
ultimately becomes a conventional one, with the meeting of Orlando and Shelmerdine 
quickly resulting in marriage (and later a child). Indeed, this aspect of Woolf’s mock-
                                                 
41 Braidotti 2006, p.197. 
42 Braidotti 2006, p.191.  
43 Braidotti 2006, p.197. 
44 Braidotti 2006, p.195. This echoes Deleuze and Guattari’s opening sentences to A Thousand Plateaus: 
‘The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was several, there was already quite a 
crowd.’ Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.3. 
45 Cf. Braidotti’s insistence in Nomadic Subjects that sexual difference is rooted in anatomy: ‘Sexual 
difference is ontological, not accidental […] the process of construction of femininity fastens and builds 
upon anatomical realities [..] sexual difference is a fact.’ Braidotti 1994, p.186. 
46 Braidotti 2006, p.194-195.  
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biography even irritated Vita Sackville-West, despite the otherwise positive impact 
reading it had on her. In a letter to Harold Nicolson on 12th October 1928 she criticised 
Woolf for  
 
making Orlando 1) marry 2) have a child. Shelmerdine does not really contribute 
anything either to Orlando’s character or to the problems of the story (except as a good 
joke at the expense of the Victorian passion for marriage) and as for the child it 
contributes less than nothing, but even strikes a rather false note. Marriage and 
motherhood would either modify or destroy Orlando, as a character: they do neither.47  
 
Most critics are more sympathetic to Woolf’s choice to marry Orlando and Shelmerdine, 
either playing on the humour that Sackville-West concedes and siding with Adam Parkes’ 
view that Woolf ‘mocks heterosexual romance’ by making the marriage and childbirth 
‘relatively unremarkable features on the landscape of Orlando’s journey through 
history’,48 or alternatively following Bowlby’s suggestion that after exploring ‘the 
interchangability in theory of masculine and feminine sexes’ it might point ‘to the actual 
dominance of the masculine and its construction of a femininity in or as its own image’.49 
Whilst highlighting certain passages which could be said to encapsulate these claims, in 
this section I will go on to suggest that Orlando’s marriage does not only serve as 
mockery of heterosexual institutions or love, or as a reminder of the very real patriarchal 
dominance after the theoretical playfulness of sex; rather it is precisely and paradoxically 
through Orlando’s marriage that Woolf points towards a subversion of the 
heteronormative frameworks of sexuality. That is, this more conventional aspect of 
Woolf’s text could actually be a more (or at least as) crucial site of subversion than 
Orlando’s sex-change and various lovers.50  
As a traditional symbol of heteronormative union, rings are central to Orlando’s 
exploration of sexuality and desire in the context of engagement and marriage. This is 
evident when, following a ‘repulsive’ (O 155) moment in which Orlando writes ‘the most 
                                                 
47 Cited in Madeline Moore (ed.). ‘Orlando: An Edition of the Manuscript.’ Twentieth Century Literature 
25:3/4 (1979), p.349. 
48 Adam Parkes. ‘Lesbianism, History, and Censorship: The Well of Loneliness and the Suppressed 
Randiness of Virginia Woolf's Orlando.’ Twentieth Century Literature 40:4 (1994), p.450. 
49 Bowlby 1997, p.53. 
50 For a discussion of Orlando and convention see Caughie 1991, p.77-84. 
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insipid verse she had ever read in her life’ (O 154), her body undergoes an ‘extraordinary 
tingling and vibration’ that reaches her ‘toes’ and ‘marrow’. The description is more than 
suggestive of an erotic, polymorphous and vital experience, as we are told that ‘[s]he had 
the queerest sensations about her thigh bones. Her hairs seemed to erect themselves. Her 
arms sang and twanged’ (O 155). But just when these vibrations appear to be reaching 
their climax, we learn that the sensation is located not so much in Orlando’s physiology 
as it is in an external object: ‘all this agitation seemed at length to concentrate in her 
hands; and then in one hand, and then in one finger of that hand, and then finally to 
contract itself so that it made a ring of quivering sensibility about the second finger of the 
left hand.’ Finally it is revealed to be ‘nothing but the vast solitary emerald which Queen 
Elizabeth had given her’ (O 155). At first the ‘second finger’ with the ring on it is 
ambiguous, as it could indicate the middle finger (second finger after the thumb) or 
wedding finger (if counted from the other side), but by the time Orlando questions ‘was 
that not enough? […] It was worth ten thousand pounds at least’, the reader is aware that 
it is the former, and the wedding finger is ring-less:  
 
The vibration seemed, in the oddest way (but remember we are dealing with some of the 
darkest manifestations of the human soul) to say No, that is not enough; and, further, to 
assume a note of interrogation, as though it were asking, what did it mean, this hiatus, 
this strange oversight? till poor Orlando felt positively ashamed of the second finger of 
her left hand without in the least knowing why. (O 155)  
 
The absence of a ring on her wedding finger is reinforced when Bartholomew, the 
housekeeper, appears and Orlando becomes conscious of something ‘she had never 
noticed before – a thick ring of rather jaundiced yellow circling the third finger where her 
own was bare’. The importance given to this jaundiced ring is gently mocked as we 
witness Bartholemew’s exaggerated reaction to Orlando’s attempts to remove it:  
 
Bartholomew made as if she had been struck in the breast by a rogue. She started back a 
pace or two, clenched her hand and flung it away from her with a  gesture that was noble 
in the extreme. “No,” she said, with resolute dignity, her Ladyship might look if she 
pleased, but as for taking off her wedding ring, not the Archbishop nor the Pope nor 
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Queen Victoria on her throne could force her to do that. Her Thomas had put it on her 
finger twenty-five years, six months, three weeks ago; she had slept in it; worked in it; 
washed in it; prayed in it; and proposed to be buried in it. In fact, Orlando understood her 
to say, but her voice was much broken with emotion, that it was by the gleam on her 
wedding ring that she would be assigned her station among the angels and its lustre 
would be tarnished for ever if she left it out of her keeping for a second. (O 156)  
 
Orlando is ‘amazed’ by the importance placed upon this ring in this Victorian era to the 
extent that ‘[i]t now seemed to her that the whole world was ringed with gold.’ At dinner 
‘rings abounded’, at church they ‘were everywhere’ (O 156).  
To be sure, beauty is not the reason for this obsession with rings, but their 
symbolic attachment to marriage: ‘thin, thick, plain, smooth, they glowed dully on every 
hand. Rings filled the jewellers’ shops, not the flashing pastes and diamonds of Orlando’s 
recollection, but simple bands without a stone in them’. A significant detail here in 
relation to this current chapter’s focus on desire is that Orlando notices that these rings 
coincide with a more reserved public display of sexuality: meeting ‘a boy trifling with a 
girl under a hawthorn hedge’ has now been replaced by couples who ‘trudged and 
plodded in the middle of the road’ (O 156). Woolf clearly satirises this restrained 
behaviour: 
 
Often it was not till the horses’ noses were on them that they budged, and then, though 
they moved it was all in one piece, heavily, to the side of the road. Orlando could only 
suppose that some new discovery had been made about the race; that they were somehow 
stuck together, couple after couple, but who had made it, and when, she could not guess. 
It did not seem to be Nature. She looked at the doves and the rabbits and the elkhounds 
and she could not see that Nature had changed her ways or mended them, since the time 
of Elizabeth at least.  
 
Such is the pervasive nature of this Victorian preoccupation with marriage and decency, 
Orlando comes to the swift conclusion that ‘[t]here was nothing for it but to buy one of 
those ugly bands and wear it like the rest’ (O 157) and then, following another failed 
attempt at writing, ‘to yield completely and submissively to the spirit of the age, and take 
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a husband’ (O 158). Importantly, marriage is not held out as natural, and Orlando’s 
decision to get married is itself ‘against her natural temperament’ (O 158). 
One thing that seems to concern Orlando in the above passages is the way in 
which marriage and the vibrancy of sexuality are conceived as mutually exclusive – this 
is reinforced both in the way that Orlando’s experience of the ‘queerest sensations’ is de-
eroticised by the ring that reminds her of the one absent from her wedding finger, and 
also in the mocking of restrained public coupling at the expense of a quickie ‘under a 
hawthorn hedge’. This concern is succinctly captured when Orlando recalls her previous 
desire for ‘“Life! A Lover!” not “Life! A Husband!”’ Her pursuit of a lover led her to go 
‘to town and run about the world’ but the ‘antipathetic’ nineteenth century replaces 
‘Lover’ with ‘Husband’ and ‘batters down’ such desires. Her body is now far from 
vibrancy, ‘dragged down by the weight of the crinoline which she had submissively 
adopted. It was heavier and more drab than any dress she had yet worn. None had ever so 
impeded her movements’. Where earlier Orlando experienced an ‘extraordinary tingling 
and vibration’ in her toes, marrow and thigh bones, now her ‘muscles had lost their 
pliancy’ (O 158). But Orlando does not obey convention for long, as in one paragraph her 
thoughts of loneliness and the need to find a Husband to lean upon ‘bore her down 
unescapably’, and in the next she seems to have recaptured her bodily vibrations and 
sensations: ‘some strange ecstasy came over her. Some wild notion she had of following 
the birds to the rim of the world and flinging herself on the spongy turf’. Orlando now 
‘quickened her pace; she ran; she tripped; the tough heather roots flung her to the ground. 
Her ankle was broken. She could not rise’ (O 160). Even though Orlando’s movements 
once again appear to have been ‘impeded’ (O 158), her ‘ecstasy’ has not entirely 
disappeared: ‘she lay content. The scent of the bog myrtle and meadow-sweet was in her 
nostrils. The rooks’ hoarse laughter was in her ears. “I have found my mate,” she 
murmured. “it is the moor. I am nature’s bride,” she whispered, giving herself in rapture 
to the cold embraces of the grass as she lay’ (O160-161) As Orlando lays on the grass 
where her ‘forehead will be cool always’ and anticipates (erotic?) ‘wild dreams’ while 
‘slipping [the ring] from her finger’, we seem to be witnessing an outright rejection of 
marriage. This is a moment of heightened sensation when Orlando looks up at the clouds 
and sees ‘camels’ and ‘mountains’ and hears ‘goat bells ringing’. But just as the 
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vibrations that ran through her toes, marrow and bones return now as ‘the heart in the 
middle of the earth’, these turn out to be, of course, ‘the trot of a horses hoofs’ carrying 
Marmaduke Bonthrop Shelmerdine, Esquire to whom Orlando becomes engaged ‘[a] few 
minutes later’ (O 162). It is here, then, at the very moment when the rejection of the 
desire for marriage appears to be most obvious that she decides that she will in fact get 
engaged. The crucial point I would like to make, and the reason I read this passage as 
entirely in keeping with Woolf’s disruption of sexual and gendered identities in Orlando, 
is that meeting and then marrying Shelmerdine allows Orlando to move beyond a concern 
with the opposition between ‘Lover’ and ‘Husband’, an opposition designed to uphold 
societal conventions with regard to sexuality. This is hinted at when we are told that 
Orlando did not actually learn of her new fiancé’s name until the morning after their first 
night together ‘as they sat at breakfast’. Orlando neither accepts the replacement of 
‘Husband’ for ‘Lover’ nor rejects the idea of a husband entirely, refusing to uphold the 
opposition between the terms, and therefore refusing to submit to a conceptualisation of 
love that fully obeys the conventions of the time. 
Therefore, whilst it may initially seem as though the Victorian age gets the better 
of her, by the time Orlando gets married the ring does not symbolise union in the way it is 
depicted in the Victorian period of the novel – plodding down the middle of the street 
together – but rather signals a speed and intensity: ‘She had been about to say, when 
Basket and Bartholemew interrupted with the tea things, nothing changes. And then, in 
the space of three seconds and a half, everything had changed […] There was the 
wedding ring on her finger to prove it’ (O 172). On the one hand the ring is the centre-
piece of the satire in the passages that follow, as Orlando now takes care ‘lest it should 
slip past the joint of her finger’ (O 172) and ‘doubts’ are expressed about what marriage 
means (O 173), but on the other hand Orlando is now able to write, having performed a 
delicate negotiation and passed the ‘examination successfully’ of her time (O 174). The 
metaphor she draws in the description of her negotiation with her age is revealing in both 
its lightness and seriousness: she now performed  
 
a deep obeisance to the spirit of her age, such as – to compare great things with small – a 
traveller, conscious that he has a bundle of cigars in the corner of his suit case, makes to 
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the customs officer who has obligingly made a scribble of white chalk on the lid. For she 
was extremely doubtful whether, if the spirit had examined the contents of her mind 
carefully, it would not have found something highly contraband for which she would 
have had to pay the full fine. (O 174) 
 
What seems like a light-hearted comparison of course has a stark realism when we 
consider that the year in which the novel is now set, 1928, is a time when homosexuality 
was a criminal offence and also the year of the obscenity trial of Radclyffe Hall’s The 
Well of Loneliness (1928) (with Woolf being one of those writers who appeared in court 
in support of the book’s publication) – the material realities of the ‘present moment’ (O 
195) are brought to the fore. Like Lily in To the Lighthouse, Orlando escapes Victorian 
stricture ‘by skin of her teeth’ (TL 200; O 174), just as Woolf narrowly avoids the 
censors with Orlando.51 But where Lily rejects marriage outright in To the Lighthouse, 
Orlando realises that, as Lily herself thinks in relation to her painting, opposition is an 
inadequate design (see section 2.2.5). Orlando’s wedding ring, then, is a distinctly queer 
ring; if it symbolises anything it is a queering of love and of desire. 
By making Orlando marry, Woolf not only shows how pervasive the societal 
customs were of the time but reconceptualises marriage in a way that creates a space for 
desire – including her writing – to flourish. That is, Orlando does not conform to the 
heteronormative rules of marriage, nor does she allow her own sexuality to be thought in 
direct opposition to marriage (and therefore negatively defined against 
heteronormativity). As Parkes comments, Orlando ‘finds that a wedding ring is the only 
cure for the “tingling and twangling” that afflicts her left finger in the nineteenth century. 
As it turns out, the union with Shelmerdine could not have been more appropriate, for his 
sexual identity is as unstable as Orlando’s’, which is of course highlighted by the well-
known exchange between them: “You’re a woman, Shel!” she cried./ “You’re a man, 
Orlando!” he cried” (O 164). Or as Burns writes, ‘[a]lthough she conforms by virtue of 
marrying Shelmerdine, Orlando resists the particular demands of Victorian marriage and 
womanly roles. She finds that she has conformed just enough to slip by unnoticed in the 
                                                 
51 For more on The Well of Loneliness trial and Orlando’s escape from the censors see Parkes 1994. 
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age, while she may also maintain a resistance to further constraint.’52 What Woolf 
manages to do so skilfully through her queering of love and of those ‘queerest sensations’  
is to disentangle them from an oppositional framework and instead emphasise intensity. 
Interestingly, this chimes with a particular remark Woolf herself makes in a letter to 
Molly McCarthy as early as 1912, where she describes moving from an ‘ideal’ of 
marriage to a rejection of it before finally seeing a third way of thinking about it: ‘I began 
life with a tremendous, absurd, ideal of marriage, then my bird’s eye view of many 
marriages disgusted me, and I thought I must be asking what was not to be had. But that 
has passed too. Now I only ask for someone to make me vehement, and then I’ll marry 
him!’ (L1 492). 
The question of whether or not the choice to marry necessarily conflicts with a 
subversive, nonheteronormative conceptualisation of love and desire is something 
Deleuze remarks upon in his ‘Letter to a Harsh Critic’ – a wonderfully sarcastic letter 
Deleuze wrote in response to Michel Cressole, who had contacted Deleuze whilst 
preparing publication of a highly critical book on him. After being accused by Cressole of 
being ‘domestically trapped’ because he was married and had children, Deleuze notes 
that what he calls ‘nonoedipal love’ is not simply a superficial rejection of social-familial 
structures, but comes about through ‘experimenting on yourself’ and ‘opening yourself 
up to love and desire’. In other words to be married is not,  per se, the problem, nor, as 
Deleuze stresses, is it about creating counter-categories: ‘Non-oedipal love is pretty hard 
work. And you should know that it’s not enough just to be unmarried, not to have kids, to 
be gay, or belong to this or that group, in order to get round the Oedipus complex’:53  
 
We have to counter people who think “I’m this, I’m that,” and who do so, moreover, in 
psychoanalytic terms (relating everything to their childhood or fate), by thinking in 
strange, fluid, unusual terms: I don’t know what I am – I’d have to investigate and 
experiment with so many things in a non-narcissistic, non-oedipal way – no gay can ever 
definitively say “I’m gay.” It’s not a question of being this or that sort of human […] but 
unraveling your body’s human organization, exploring this or that zone of bodily 
                                                 
52 Burns 1994, p.355. 
53 Deleuze 1995, p.10. 
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intensity, with everyone discovering their own particular zones, and the groups, 
populations, species that inhabit them.54 
 
In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari reinforce this point:  
 
It is a lie to claim to liberate sexuality, and to demand its rights to objects, aims, and 
sources, all the while maintaining the corresponding flows within the limits of an Oedipal 
code (conflict, regression, resolution, sublimation of Oedipus) […] no “gay liberation 
movement” is possible as long as homosexuality is caught up in a relation of exclusive 
disjunction with heterosexuality […] instead of bringing to light their reciprocal inclusion 
and their transverse communication in the decoded flows of desire (included disjunctions, 
local connections, nomadic conjunctions). In short, sexual repression, more insistent than 
ever, will surivive all the publications, demonstrations, emancipations, and protests 
concerning the liberty of sexual objects, sources, and aims, as long as sexuality is kept – 
consciously or not – within narcissistic, Oedipal, and castrating co-ordinates[.]55  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari we cannot judge subversiveness simply based on whether 
someone is married and heterosexual, unmarried and homosexual, or even presumably, 
married and homosexual or bisexual. What is important is the particular conceptualisation 
of desire at play, and they point to another modernist author, Lawrence, as exemplary in 
exposing ‘the poverty of the immutable identical images, the figurative roles that are so 
many tourniquets cutting off the flows of sexuality: “fiancée, mistress, wife, mother” – 
one could just as easily add “homosexuals, heterosexuals,” etc. – all these roles are 
distributed by the Oedipal triangle, father-mother-me’.56 We might think of Woolf, I 
argue, as also challenging these ‘figurative roles’, and in the following section I will 
                                                 
54 Deleuze 1995, p.11. Deleuze’s ‘I’m this, I’m that’ here echoes a phrase from Mrs Dalloway which 
Deleuze and Guattari draw attention to in A Thousand Plateaus and their discussion of haecceity: ‘Never 
again will Mrs. Dalloway say to herself “I am this, I am that; he is this, he is that.”’ See section 5.5 of this 
thesis. 
55 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p.384. 
56 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p.385. For an insightful discussion of Lawrence and Deleuze see 
Anneleen Masschelein. ‘“Rip the veil of the old vision across, and walk through the rent”: Reading D. H. 
Lawrence with Deleuze and Guattari.’ Modernism and Theory: A Critical Debate, ed. Stephen Ross. New 
York: Routledge, 2009: 23-39. 
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focus more closely on the ways in which queering Orlando moves beyond a politics of 
identity and a desire founded on lack. 
 
3.3 ‘Hail! natural desire!’ 
‘many variations can be played on the theme of sex, and with such happy results’57  
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, understanding sexuality through identifications with 
nouns such as ‘homosexual’, ‘heterosexual’ and ‘bisexual’ confines desire within molar 
categories of identity, and defines it in relation to a majoritarian standard: ‘[Sexuality] is 
badly explained by the binary organization of the sexes, and just as badly by a bisexual 
organization within each sex. Sexuality brings into play too great a diversity of 
conjugated becomings, these are like n sexes’.58 A similar frustration with the limitation 
of categorising desire in this way is evident in Woolf’s observations on ‘Perversion’, 
noted in a letter to Ethel Smyth on the 15th August, 1930: ‘Where people mistake, as I 
think, is in perpetually narrowing and naming these immensely composite and wide flung 
passions – driving stakes through them, herding them between screens. But how do you 
define ‘Perversity’? What is the line between friendship and perversion?’ (L4 200). In 
this chapter I have been suggesting that in the relationships that brought about its 
composition as well as those within the text itself, Orlando not only challenges binary 
frameworks of sexuality but attempts a reformulation of desire based on molecular 
connections rather than molar identities. Such a queering of Orlando, I argue, involves 
what Verena Conley has referred to as a particularly Deleuzian form of ‘vital desire that 
experiments with innumerable sexualities’.59 As Deleuze and Guattari emphasise in Anti-
Oedipus, desire is ‘apprehended below the minimum conditions of identity’60 and 
consists of ‘inclusive disjunctions, nomadic conjunctions: everywhere a microscopic 
                                                 
57 Virginia Woolf. ‘Old Bloomsbury.’ Moments of Being, ed. Jeanne Schulkind. London: Pimlico, 2002 
[1976]: 43-61. 
58 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.307. ‘Making love is not just becoming as one, or even two, but 
becoming as a hundred thousand. Desiring-machines or the nonhuman sex [later]: not one or even two 
sexes, but n sexes.’ Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p. 325. 
59 Verena Andermatt Conley. ‘Thirty-six Thousand Forms of Love: The Queering of Deleuze and Guattari.’ 
Deleuze and Queer Theory, ed. Chrysanthi Nigianni and Merl Storr. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, p.26. 
Nonetheless, Conley does point to potential limitations of Deleuze here, and how some of their thoughts 
have perhaps become out-dated (34). 
60 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p.385. 
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transsexuality’.61 It is also worth noting that their explanation of this microscopic 
transsexuality – as ‘resulting in the woman containing as many men as the man, and the 
man as many women, all capable of entering – men with women, women with men – into 
relations of production of desire that overturn the statistical order of the sexes’62 – echoes 
my reading of Woolf’s androgyny in A Room of One’s Own which I discussed the 
previous chapter (see section 2.1.3).  
Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of desire, then, is positive and 
productive – as simple as the creation of aggregates or contexts63 – and always invested 
in the social field.64 As Tamsin Lorraine has recently put it:  
 
Deleuze and Guattari present us with the provocative possibility that desire does not have 
to be about what a personal self wants, but could be about connecting with the world, 
making things happen, and experiencing what happens in ways that defy subject/object 
and self/other dichotomies. […] On Deleuze and Guattari’s view, a personal self or 
identity as a totalised point of origin to which to refer all desire operates as a kind of 
stranglehold on the individual and the capacities it could unfold as well as […] block off 
intensification of other tendencies insisting in me[.]65 
 
Opposed to psychoanalytic structures of repression and lack, desire is disengaged from a 
typical subject/object negotiation: ‘From the moment that we place desire on the side of 
acquisition, we make desire an idealistic (dialectical, nihilistic) conception, which causes 
us to look upon it as primarily a lack: a lack of an object, a lack of the real object.’66 
Contrary to this model, Deleuze and Guattari are insistent that desire is not structured as 
part of a three-tiered framework of desire, pleasure and lack as psychoanalysis, broadly 
speaking, would have it: ‘If desire produces, its product is real […] Desire does not lack 
anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or 
                                                 
61 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p.325. 
62 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p.325.  
63 See Deleuze and Parnet 2011 [1996]. Deleuze emphasises this simplicity of desire as assembling as the 
point of discussion for the letter ‘D’.  
64 For more on this, including a discussion of mis-readings of Deleuze’s conceptualisation of desire by 
Judith Butler among others, see Smith 2004, p.646-647; 650. See Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: 
Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France. New York: Columbia UP, 1999 [1987], p.214–15. 
65 Tamsin Lorraine. ‘Feminist Lines of Flight from the Majoritarian Subject.’ Deleuze Studies 2: Issue 
Supplement (2008), p.75. 
66 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p.26.  
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desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is repression. Desire 
and its object are one and the same thing’. Desire is consequently ‘not bolstered by needs, 
but rather the contrary; needs are derived from desire: they are counterproducts within the 
real that desire produces. Lack is a countereffect of desire’.67  
In the first two chapters of Orlando desire is linked to the majoritarian will to 
possess and gain status. In the first appearance of the term ‘desire’ in the text, the 
biographer remarks that Orlando is destined to climb the social/professional hierarchy 
with ease: ‘From deed to deed, from glory to glory, from office to office he must go, his 
scribe following after, till they reach what ever seat it may be that is the height of their 
desire. Orlando, to look at, was cut out precisely for some such career’ (O 4). Later, it is 
repeated that Orlando had a ‘[d]esire of Fame’ (O 48) and Orlando’s ‘desire to make 
[Nick Greene’s] acquaintance’ (O 50) is based on this. But in chapter three of Orlando, 
and, perhaps significantly, after the sex change has taken place, we begin to see an overt 
challenge to this desire to attain, possess or control. This is seen when the narrator 
describes how ‘[n]o passion is stronger in the breast of man than the desire to make 
others believe as he believes. Nothing so cuts at the root of his happiness and fills him 
with rage as the sense that another rates low what he prizes high’ (O 94). One example of 
this is in political allegiances – a macro politics based on molar parties: ‘Whigs and 
Tories, Liberal party and Labour party – for what do they battle except their own 
prestige? It is not love of truth, but desire to prevail that sets quarter against quarter and 
makes parish desire the downfall of parish’ (O 94). Several pages later we see a further, 
and more direct, challenging of the ‘desire to prevail’. This example is clearly linked to 
Orlando’s new position as a woman, with an outsiders view of the majoritarian rule: 
 
She remembered how, as a young man, she had insisted that women must be obedient, 
chaste, scented, and exquisitely apparelled. “Now I shall have to pay in my own person 
for those desires,” she reflected; “for women are not (judging by my own short 
experience of the sex) obedient, chaste, scented, and exquisitely apparelled by nature. 
They can only attain these graces, without which they may enjoy none of the delights of 
life, by the most tedious discipline”. (O 99) 
 
                                                 
67 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p.28. 
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In a further passage, when the narrator begins to describe what happens when Nell, Prue, 
Kitty and Rose join Orlando ‘round the punch-bowl’ to share ‘fine tales’ and ‘amusing 
observations’ (O 140), the desire of the (male) subject wishing to obtain an object even 
extends to the desire to possess desire itself:  
 
it cannot be denied that when women get together – but hist – they are always careful to 
see that the doors are shut and that not a word of it gets into print. All they desire is – but 
hist again – is that not a man’s step on the stair? All they desire, we were about to say 
when the gentleman took the very words out of our mouths. Women have no desires, says 
this gentleman, coming into Nell's parlour; only affectations. Without desires (she has 
served him and he is gone) their conversation cannot be of the slightest interest to 
anyone. “It is well known,” says Mr. S. W., “that when they lack the stimulus of the other 
sex, women can find nothing to say to each other. When they are alone, they do not talk; 
they scratch.” (O 140-141) 
 
The stuttering syntax here is gradually – first with a ‘step of the stair’, then entering the 
parlour, and finally through the direct speech of Mr S. W. – taken over by men who will 
not allow that women have desires of their own.  
But whilst the men succeed in silencing the women in this particular passage, 
Orlando has already moved beyond a majoritarian appropriation of desire; in an earlier 
passage we see the beginnings of a reconceptualisation of desire as she reflects that it is 
‘“better to leave the rule and discipline of the world to others; better to be quit of martial 
ambition, the love of power, and all the other manly desires” if so one can more fully 
enjoy the most exalted raptures known to the human spirit” (O 102-103). Named as one 
of these ‘exalted raptures’, ‘love’ is then opposed to ‘manly desires’ (O 103). Rather than 
being about the wished acquisition by the subject of an object, the frustrated attempt to 
satiate the lack, Orlando promotes a letting go, an affirmative dispossession of the object 
of desire, and an appreciation for what it is in itself – the ‘exalted rapture’ brought about 
by the creation of new minoritarian connections. By the final chapter this is more fully 
realised, and desire is conceived as a joyful interruption of patriarchal Empire-building:   
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Hail! natural desire! Hail! happiness! divine happiness! and pleasure of all sorts, flowers 
and wine, though one fades and the other intoxicates; and half-crown tickets out of 
London on Sundays, and singing in a dark chapel hymns about death, and anything, 
anything that interrupts and confounds the tapping of typewriters and filing of letters and 
forging of links and chains, binding the Empire together[.] (O 192) 
 
In this passage there is no subjective ‘I’ controlling desire, illustrating Deleuze and 
Guattari’s aforementioned claim that ‘the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that 
lacks a fixed subject […] Desire and its object are one and the same thing’. Objects, 
clearly named in this passage, are not lacking, yet are not possessed either; desire is 
precisely that which escapes ‘filing’, ‘binding’ and ‘chains’. Orlando hints at more than 
just a critique or opposition to majoritarian desire, but a reconceptualisation of it - a 
minoritarian desire that has something in common, perhaps, with the type of desire 
Jessica Berman sees in Orlando following the sex change, where it ‘becomes the 
principle of affiliation not in terms of a strict one-to-one, lover/beloved arrangement, but 
in a more open-ended social relationship’. 68 In the next section I will discuss the ways in 
which this more social, minoritarian model of desire opens onto Orlando’s history. 
 
3.4 A History of Bedrooms 
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari themselves comment on Woolf’s Orlando 
as operating ‘by blocks, blocks of ages, blocks of epochs, blocks of the kingdoms of 
nature, blocks of sexes, forming so many becomings between things, or so many lines of 
deterritorialization’.69 The emphasis is placed on a particular form of history in 
becoming, therefore as well as those passages in the novel in which we can find specific 
allusions to autobiographical happenings, or which consider domestic and marital 
relations between characters, Deleuze and Guattari draw attention to the fact that Woolf 
sets the novel over four centuries, engaging with a range of factual and fantastical detail. 
As Monaco puts it in her reading of Orlando, ‘Woolf practices a kind of hyperbolic 
historical materialism: she draws a sweeping and vivifying outline of “moments” of 
cultural change in England over the course of three centuries and fills them with material 
                                                 
68 Berman 2001, p.134. 
69 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.324. 
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detail.’70 I would add that Woolf’s theorising of desire in Orlando is bound up with this 
‘hyperbolic historical materialism’. Woolf emphasises the materiality of theory where the 
becoming-queer of Orlando is also the becoming of history:  
 
through its loves and sexuality […] the libido is continually re-creating History, 
continents, kingdoms, races, and cultures […] our choices in matters of love are at the 
crossroads of “vibrations”, which is to say that they express connections, disjunctions, 
and conjunctions of flows that cross through a society, entering and leaving it, linking it 
up with other societies, ancient or contemporary, remote or vanished, dead or yet to be 
born […] The desiring sexual relationships of man and woman (or of man and man, or 
woman and woman) are the index of social relationships between people. Love and 
sexuality are the exponents or the indicators, this time unconscious, of the libidinal 
investments of the social field. Every loved or desired being serves as a collective agent 
of enunciation. And it is certainly not, as Freud believed, the libido that must be 
desexualised and sublimated in order to invest society and its flows; on the contrary, it is 
love, desire, and their flows that manifest the directly social character of the 
nonsublimated libido and its sexual investments.71  
 
Desire is always already social, and history, as Deleuze and Guattari make clear in What 
is Philosophy?, is important to the creation of the ‘new’ that is becoming, but never 
determinate or a priori: ‘History today still designates only the set of conditions, however 
recent they may be, from which one turns away in order to become, that is to say, in order 
to create something new. […] How could something come from history? Without history, 
becoming would remain indeterminate and unconditioned, but becoming is not 
historical’.72 What we find in Orlando is a desire and a history filled with molecular 
events. As Monaco emphasises, ‘Orlando fashions, in effect, a historiography of flows 
[…] bodies, words, weather, buildings and vegetation through which the advancement of 
distinct epochs of the British Empire are mediated’.73 Monaco is referring here to the 
well-known passage in Orlando when, ‘the strokes sounded, the cloud increased, and she 
                                                 
70 Monaco 2008, p.156. 
71 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p.386. 
72 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. What is Philosophy?, trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson. 
London: Verso, 1994, p.96. 
73 Monaco 2008, p.157. 
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saw it darken and spread with extraordinary speed […] with the twelfth stroke of 
midnight, the darkness was complete. A turbulent welter of cloud covered the city. All 
was darkness; all was doubt; all was confusion. The Eighteenth century was over; the 
Nineteenth century had begun’ (O 145). This passage creates ‘an arena where everything 
is given agency’; the particular moment in all its historical specificity is an accident of 
intermingling agencies: ‘in Orlando history is not just something we write and authorise, 
but something which acts for, and which changes, itself. History is a multiplicity, the 
whole nature of which changes with each localised modification.’74  
The affirmation of desire, and of history, as multiplicity is also seen in the novel 
through the depiction of the house in which Orlando was born which ‘had 365 bedrooms 
and had been in the possession of her family for four or five hundred years’ (O 93). 
Orlando makes the mistake of assuming her own ancestry of ‘earls, or even dukes’ as the 
oldest, truest example of an ‘ancient and civilised race’ (O 93). But the multiplicity and 
scope of history is emphasised as Orlando comes to realise that Rustum and the other 
gypsies she is with judged a ‘descent of four or five hundred years only the meanest 
possible. Their own families went back at least two or three thousand years. To the gypsie 
whose ancestors had built the Pyramids centuries before Christ was born, the genealogy 
of Howards and Plantagenets was no better and no worse than that of the Smiths and the 
Joneses: both were negligible’ (O 93). The desire to build and possess hundreds of 
bedrooms was ‘vulgar’ to the gypsies, and Orlando comes to realise that  
 
from the gipsy point of view, a Duke […] was nothing but a profiteer or robber who 
snatched land and money from people who rated these things of little worth, and could 
think of nothing better to do than to build three hundred and sixty-five bedrooms when 
one was enough, and none was even better than one. She could not deny that her 
ancestors had accumulated field after field; house after house; honour after honour […] 
Nor could she counter the argument (Rustum was too much of a gentleman to press it, but 
she understood) that any man who did now what her ancestors had done three of four 
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hundred years ago would be denounced – and by her own family most loudly – for a 
vulgar upstart, an adventurer, a nouveau riche. (O 94)75 
 
Whilst Orlando refuses to give up her defence of her own particular ancestry – ‘had none 
of them been saints or heroes, or great benefactors of the human race’ (O 94), she asks – 
significantly she now speaks of how ‘[f]our hundred and seventy-six bedrooms mean 
nothing to them’ (O 94). The specificity of her history becomes muddled, and an extra 
111 bedrooms are added to her previous dwelling place. Rather than strengthening the 
fact of Orlando’s history, such quantitative detail appears to be satirised, the number of 
bedrooms becomes arbitrary or accidental. Once again Orlando is not held up as 
representative of opposition and instead refuses dichotomous choices; she neither wants 
to return to her old life nor to remain with the gypsies: ‘To leave the gipsies and become 
once more an Ambassador seemed to her intolerable. But it was equally impossible to 
remain for ever where there was neither ink nor writing paper, neither reverence for the 
Talbots nor respect for a multiplicity of bedrooms’ (O 95).  
By creating a ‘multiplicity of bedrooms’ that appears to be numerically arbitrary, 
Orlando brings to light the distinction between two kinds of multiplicity that we find in 
Deleuze’s philosophy: quantitative and qualitative, where the former is homogeneous and 
numerical, the latter is heterogeneous and intensive. Multiplicity, they explain in A 
Thousand Plateaus, ‘was created precisely in order to escape the abstract opposition 
between the multiple and the One, to escape dialectics, to succeed in conceiving the 
multiple in the pure state, to cease treating it as a numerical fragment of a lost Unity or 
Totality or as the organic element of a Unity or Totality yet to come, and instead 
distinguish between different types of multiplicity.’76 Deleuze’s emphasis on 
‘multiplicity’ is especially influenced by Bergson’s durée as a form of multiplicity that is 
‘qualitative and fusional’ as distinct from ‘metric multiplicity or the multiplicity of 
magnitude’,77 and in Bergsonism he outlines Bergson’s importance in offering a way out 
                                                 
75 Kirstie Blair and Sabine French probe the potentially lesbian significance of gypsies in Orlando. See fn.6 
of this chapter. 
76 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.36. 
77 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.533-534. Deleuze and Guattari also discuss how their 
conceptualisation of multiplicity is influenced by Riemann, Meinong, and Russell, amongst others. See 
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of dialectical thought which, Deleuze writes, deals with abstract concepts that are 
overblown and empty ‘like baggy clothes’:  
 
There are many theories in philosophy that combine the one and the multiple. They share 
the characteristic of claiming to reconstruct the real with general ideas. We are told that 
the Self is one (thesis) and it is multiple (antithesis), then it is the unity of the multiple 
(synthesis). Or else we are told that the One is already multiple, that Being passes into 
nonbeing and produces becoming. […] To Bergson, it seems that in this type of 
dialectical method, one begins with concepts that, like baggy clothes, are much too big. 
The One in general, the multiple in general, nonbeing in general…In such cases the real 
is recomposed with abstracts.  
 
As Deleuze stresses, the dialectic is a ‘false movement’ because ‘[t]he concrete will never 
be attained by combining the inadequacy of one concept with the inadequacy of its 
opposite. The singular will never be attained by correcting a generality with another 
generality.’78  
Deleuze and Guattari propose a whole range of ways to conceptualise these 
different multiplicities, using many terms I refer to elsewhere in this thesis:  
 
we distinguish between arborescent multiplicities and rhizomatic multiplicities. Between 
macro- and micromultiplicities. On the one hand multiplicities that are extensive, 
divisible, and molar; unifiable, totalizable, organisable; conscious or preconscious – and 
on the other hand, libidinal, unconscious, molecular, intensive multiplicities composed of 
particules that do not divide without changing in nature, and distances that do not vary 
without entering another multiplicity and that constantly construct and dismantle 
themselves in the course of their communications, as they cross over into each other at, 
beyond, or before a certain threshold.79 
 
In Transpositions, Braidotti helpfully captures these distinctions between two types of 
multiplicity in relation to her theory of nomadic, non-unitary subjectivity by describing 
                                                                                                                                                 
p.37; p.532. For an illuminating recent discussion of Bergsonian multiplicity in The Waves see Mattison 
2011.  
78 Bergson 1991, p.44. 
79 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p. 36-37. 
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the distinction between ‘quantitative pluralities’ that represent ‘merely a multiple of 
One’, and ‘qualitative multiplicities’ which ‘trace patterns of becoming’ and ‘express 
changes not of scale, but of intensity, force, or potentia (positive power of expression)’.80 
Seen in this light, the multiplicity of Orlando’s bedrooms is not so much a celebration of 
a plurality of lovers as it is a kind of qualitative polyamory, which depends not on one or 
many lovers but on a realisation that love is always already a question of intensity (as 
with Braidotti’s discussion of Vita and Virginia in the first section of this chapter, and my 
discussion of the inadequacy Orlando feels in defining love and desire within an 
oppositional framework of ‘lovers’ and ‘husbands’). Rather, love and desire involve 
much more than two individuals from the start, whether you stay in one bedroom or 
explore many, precisely because each individual, and each bedroom, is already a 
multiplicity. After all, as Deleuze puts it in Dialogues with Claire Parnet,  
 
What a depressing idea of love, to make it a relation between two people, whose 
monotony must be vanquished as required by adding extra people. […] The question 
about sexuality is: into the vicinity of what else does it enter to form […] particular 
relations of movement and rest? […] it is not simply from one to the other of the two 
‘subjects’ that this vicinity or combination takes place; it is in each of the two that several 
fluxes combine to form a bloc of becoming which makes demands on them both […] Not 
the man and woman as sexual entities, caught in a binary apparatus, but a molecular 
becoming[.]81  
 
Queering in Orlando is precisely this move from quantitative plurality to qualitative 
multiplicity, entering into/creating molecular events together in the company of other 
elements, human and nonhuman, always keeping a relation to the outside that each is 
entangled with.  
The nonhuman dimension of Orlando is touched on by Julia Briggs, where 
following Sasha’s departure there is a flood and the melting of the ice, and the river 
                                                 
80 Braidotti 2006, p.94. 
81 Deleuze and Parnet 2006 [1987], p.75-76. 
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becomes ‘a figure for time itself, carrying away a bizarre medley of human and non-
human life’:82 
 
The river had gained its freedom in a night. […] All was riot and confusion. The river 
was strewn with icebergs. Some of these were as broad as a bowling green and as high as 
a house; others no bigger than a man’s hat, but most fantastically twisted. […] For 
furniture, valuables, possessions of all sorts were carried away on the icebergs. Among 
other strange sights was to be seen a cat suckling its young; a table laid sumptuously for a 
supper of twenty; a couple in bed; together with an extraordinary number of cooking 
utensils. (O 35-36)  
 
This move towards the nonhuman, infused here with humour, is ‘at once the most 
imaginative and the most violent of Woolf’s moments of rupture’. Significantly, it 
follows the departure of Sasha, ‘the impossible and perfect love object’.83 Seen in this 
light, desire in Orlando cannot be attached or belong to any individual subject, be it real-
life figures such as Sackville-West and Woolf or indeed any of the characters from 
Woolf’s text, but would take place on a molecular level that involves so many nonhuman 
elements. ‘Desire’, says Deleuze, ‘is revolutionary because it always wants more 
connections’, and these connections should not be limited to the human.84 
The queering of Orlando’s bedrooms has as much to do with the queer nature of 
history as it does Orlando’s queer sex and sexuality, then. Neither her own personal 
history or that of the gipsies is appealing as Orlando realises that these histories are not 
determined by quantitative measures, but qualitative creation. Orlando’s desired return to 
England is not sparked by an attempt to find a lost object, but rather her desire produces a 
new England, where nature is part of a shared agency rather than reduced to a passive 
background:  
 
And then Nature, in whom she trusted, either played her trick or worked a miracle […] 
Suddenly a shadow, though there was nothing to cast a shadow, appeared on the bald 
mountain-side opposite. It deepened quickly and soon a green hollow showed where there 
                                                 
82 Briggs 2006, p.134. 
83 Briggs 2006, p.134. 
84 Deleuze and Parnet 2006 [1987], p.58. 
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had been barren rock before. As she looked, the hollow deepened and widened, and a 
great park-like space opened in the flank of the hill. Within, she could see an undulating 
and grassy lawn; she could see oak trees dotted here and there; she could see the thrushes 
hopping among the branches. She could see the deer stepping delicately from shade to 
shade, and could even hear the hum of insects and the gentle sighs and shivers of a 
summer’s day in England. (O 95) 
 
In his preface to the untranslated L'Après-Mai des faunes (1974), written by pioneering 
French queer theorist Guy Hocquenghem, Deleuze presents Proust as offering ‘a more 
multiple and “localized” homosexuality which includes all kinds of transsexual 
communications, such as flowers and bicycles’.85 In this above passage I would suggest 
that Woolf presents such multiple and localised connections with the ‘undulating’ grass, 
the ‘hopping’ thrushes, the ‘stepping’ deer and the humming insects which all combine in 
Orlando’s desiring-England. In the same preface Deleuze, discussing Hocquenghem’s 
writing on motorcycles, playfully asserts that ‘the motorcycle is another sex’.86 Like 
Proust’s flowers and bicycles, or Woolf’s grass and insects, the emphasis is on a desire 
that forms connections between an array of elements that are not limited to the human 
subject. In the next two chapters I discuss nonhuman, material connections in Woolf’s 
novels more fully – firstly by focusing on the question of the animal in Flush: A 
Biography in chapter four, and then by looking at quantum physics and posthumanist 
conceptualisations of life in chapter five. Before that, however, I want to conclude this 
chapter by considering whether Woolf’s motor-car, like Hocquenghem’s motorcycle, 
might also be undergoing its own ‘sexual becoming’,87 perhaps providing a further 
answer to the question Deleuze and Guattari pose in Anti-Oedipus: ‘what are your 
nonhuman sexes?’88 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 Gilles Deleuze. ‘Preface to Hocquenghem’s L'Après-Mai des faunes.’ Desert Islands: and Other Texts, 
1953-1974. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004, p.287. See also Deleuze 2008 [1972].  
86 Deleuze 2004, p.285. 
87 Deleuze 2004, p.288. 
88 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p.354. 
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4.5 Multiplicity in a Motor Car and ‘Monday or Tuesday’ 
It is in the throes of ‘the present moment’ that Orlando cruises through and out of London 
in her motor-car (O 195). In this section I want to suggest that the time Orlando spends in 
this motor-car  demonstrates a queering of subjectivity, time, and space, so that what 
results is a multiplicity of agency which involves the nonhuman as well as human. 
‘[C]hanging her selves as quickly as she drove’, Woolf’s protagonist somewhat 
frantically contemplates a multiplicity of selves to the point that it becomes ‘an open 
question in what sense Orlando can be said to have existed at the present moment’ (O 
201):  
 
“What then? Who then?” she said. “Thirty-six; in a motor car; a woman. Yes, but a 
million other things as well. A snob am I? The garter in the hall? The leopards? My 
ancestors? Proud of them? Yes! Greedy, luxurious, vicious? Am I? (here a new self came 
in). Don’t care a damn if I am. Truthful? I think so. Generous? Oh, but that don’t count 
(here a new self came in). Lying in bed of a morning listening to the pigeons on fine 
linen; silver dishes; wine; maids; footmen. Spoilt? Perhaps. Too many things for nothing. 
Hence my books (here she mentioned fifty classical titles; which represented, so we 
think, the early romantic works that she tore up). Facile, glib, romantic. But (here another 
self came in) a duffer, a fumbler. More clumsy I couldn’t be. And – and – (here she 
hesitated for a word and if we suggest ‘Love’ we may be wrong, but certainly she 
laughed and blushed and then cried out – ) A toad set in emeralds! Harry the Archduke! 
Blue-bottles on the ceiling! (here another self came in). But Nell, Kit, Sasha? (she was 
sunk in gloom: tears actually shaped themselves and she had long given over crying). 
Trees, she said. (Here another self came in.) I love trees (she was passing a clump) 
growing there a thousand years. And barns (she passed a tumble-down barn at the edge of 
the road. She carefully avoided it). And the night. But people (here another self came in). 
People? (she repeated it as a question.) I don’t know. Chattering, spiteful, always telling 
lies. (Here she turned into the High Street of her native town, which was crowded, for it 
was market day, with farmers, and shepherds, and old women with hens in baskets.) I like 
peasants. I understand crops. (O203) 
 
In this remarkable and well-known passage Orlando’s variegated selves are described as 
‘[t]ruthful’, ‘[s]poilt’, ‘romantic’, and ‘clumsy’ to name only a few. But this is much 
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more than a case of different adjectives being used to describe different aspects of one 
personality. The striking spatial and temporal dimension to this passage includes the 
coming together of form and content, where the brackets become a doorway through 
which ‘another self came in’, disrupting the temporal rhythm of the reader and the spatial 
flow of the text. When the parentheses are not introducing ‘another self’ they are 
updating the reader on the movement of the car, emphasising the motion and physicality 
of these changes (we are not to read this passage as transcendent powers of the 
imagination): ‘she passed a tumble-down barn’, ‘she turned into the High Street’, for 
example. After all, she was ‘changing her selves as quickly as she drove – there was a 
new one at every corner’ (O 202). Further examples – ‘[l]ying in bed of a morning 
listening to the pigeons on fine linen’ and ‘I love trees (she was passing a clump) growing 
there a thousand years’ – foreground both time and place, stretching from a specific 
morning to a millennium. As Andrew Thacker observes in Moving Through Modernity 
(2003), in this passage ‘the boundaries between psychic identity and physical place are 
being elided […] The words in brackets somehow exist embedded in the landscape 
through which Orlando travels, propping up when her gaze alights upon them, or flashing 
back from the landscape to the viewer’.89  
 Of all Woolf’s other writings, this scene from Orlando is most commonly read 
alongside her short posthumously published essay ‘Evening Over Sussex: Reflections in a 
Motor Car’ (1942), where the narrator describes how ‘the self splits up’ whilst driving 
through and perceiving the Sussex landscape (E6 453-456). In ‘Virginia Woolf and the 
Age of Motor Cars’ (2000) Minow-Pinkney reads these texts together in the historical 
context of the development of the motor-car in the first decades of the twentieth century 
and Woolf’s own changing response to this. In contrast to Leena Kore-Schröder, who 
argues that Woolf’s motor-car is a ‘metaphor for understanding the nature of embodiment 
in time and space […] revealing to us […] that human embodiment is at the centre of the 
subjective world’,90 Minow-Pinkney shows that ‘the link between motoring experience 
and aesthetic practices is not just a matter of trope or analogy but motoring, together with 
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Manchester UP, 2003, p.179. 
90 Leena Kore-Schröder. ‘Reflections in a Motor Car: Virginia Woolf’s Phenomenological Relations of 
Time and Space.’ Locating Woolf: The Politics of Space and Place, ed. Anna Snaith and Michael 
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other experiences distinctive to the modern age of technology, affects the human sensory 
organization itself, which, dissolving its linear cohesion, necessitates new modes of 
thought and aesthetic representation adjusted to it.’91 Of ‘Evening Over Sussex’, she 
places emphasis on the car’s movement – rather than that of the human mind – in the 
creation of multiple images,92 and this does indeed appear to be evident in Woolf’s essay: 
‘a haystack; a rust red roof; a pond; an old man coming home with his sack on his back; 
[…] Gone, gone; over, over; past and done with, past and done with. I feel life left behind 
even as the road is left behind’.93 According to Minow-Pinkney, the ‘“I” has no control 
over the concatenation of the images; the rhythm and the visual impression effected by 
the list of words, the use of commas and semicolons, coveys the sensation of the 
compulsive, fast movement.’ Woolf’s aesthetic imagination ‘extends itself to the future 
and to a nonanthropomorphous vision’.94 
 I would like to suggest that such a nonanthropomorphous, and indeed 
nonanthropocentric,95 vision is also evident in another of Woolf’s short pieces, ‘Monday 
or Tuesday’, and that here it is conceived directly in relation to desire. Written in 1920, 
the story is without an identifiable narrator, and, while offering an imagined insight into 
what the point of view of the ‘heron’ in the story might be, it certainly never fully 
anthropomorphises this bird: ‘Lazy and indifferent, shaking space easily from his wings, 
knowing his way, the heron passes over the church beneath the sky.’96 There is no ‘I’ in 
the story and the only personal pronoun is ‘his’, which is used twice in the first sentence 
to refer to the heron. What is immediately striking looking at ‘Monday or Tuesday’ 
alongside the above passage of Orlando in her motor-car, is their similar use of textual 
space, with bracketed parenthesis concerned with movement in a surrounding 
environment:  
 
                                                 
91 Makiko Minow-Pinkney. ‘Virginia Woolf and the Age of Motor Cars.’ Virginia Woolf in the Age of 
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93 Virginia Woolf. ‘Evening Over Sussex: Reflections in a Motor Car.’ Virginia Woolf: Selected Essays, ed. 
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96 Virginia Woolf. ‘Monday or Tuesday.’ The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf (2nd Edition), ed. 
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Desiring truth, awaiting it, laboriously distilling a few words, for ever desiring – (a cry 
starts to the left, another to the right. Wheels strike divergently. Omnibuses conglomerate 
in conflict) – for ever desiring – (the clock asseverates with twelve distinct strokes that it 
is midday; light sheds gold scales; children swarm) – for ever desiring truth. (CSF 137) 
 
In her wonderfully titled short article ‘Woolf’s Verb Impersonators (and Other 
Deviants)’, Molly McQuade describes how this story has the movement of poetry but 
with ‘brilliantly concrete language’.97 She points in particular to Woolf’s ‘deviant verbs’, 
occurring at a more frequent ratio than is often found in prose (McQuade counts 1 in 
every 6 words as verbs in the story; this is even more than the above passage from 
Orlando, which on my count stands at a ratio of 1 in 8 words), as well as Woolf’s use of 
dashes which combine to ‘introduce furious speed into her prose’.98 But I want to suggest 
that what is really central to the intensity of this piece is Woolf’s use of the gerund 
‘desiring’, the putting into continuous movement of desire, which punctuates the whole 
of the second paragraph. That we find a ‘desiring truth’ transposed through movement so 
vividly in a text without a definitive human presence – simply ‘children’, ‘men’s feet and 
women’s feet’ and ‘Miss Thingummy’ (CSF 137) – could be viewed as further evidence 
of the nonhuman connections Deleuze sees as part of desire (desire which we might also 
see evinced in the above passage from Orlando where nonhuman movements are 
pronounced, this time alongside the human, but queering, Orlando). After all, as Deleuze 
states in Dialogues, ‘Do you realize how simple a desire is? Sleeping is a desire. Walking 
is a desire. Listening to music, or making music, or writing, are desires. A spring, a 
winter, are desires.’99 Woolf’s ‘desiring’ is both her deviant verb and her queering verb. 
 If Orlando’s cruising out of London in her motor-car puts into motion a range of 
desires seen in the connections different selves make as every corner is turned, then we 
need not view these selves as simply plural or multiplied version of Orlando’s identity. 
As Minow-Pinkney notes, Woolf here ‘comes close to the complete disappearance of the 
subject itself’.100 Recalling the distinction made by Deleuze and Guattari and by Braidotti 
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between quantitative pluralities and qualitative multiplicitities, we might say that Orlando 
transports subjectivity from plurality to multiplicity. The idea of countable selves is 
satirised both here and with the changing and seemingly arbitarary (and inconsistent) 
numerical speculations as to how many selves one has (similar to the ‘multiplicity of 
bedrooms’ discussed in the previous section). For example, in just four pages we are told 
that ‘a biography is considered complete if it merely accounts for six or seven selves, 
whereas a person may well have as many thousand’ (O 202), that ‘there may be more 
than two thousand’ (O 205), ‘if there are (at a venture) seventy-six different times all 
ticking in the mind at once, how many different people are there not – Heaven help us – 
all having lodgement at one time or another in the human spirit’ (O 201), and Orlando 
might be ‘a million other things as well’ (O 203). We are left in little doubt about the 
inadequacy of numbers to quantify these selves: ‘she had a great variety of selves to call 
upon, far more than we have been able to find room for’ (O 202). This move from 
quantitative to qualitative is perfectly summed up when we read that ‘still the Orlando 
she needs may not come; these selves of which we are built up, one on top of another, as 
plates are piled on a waiter’s hand, have attachments elsewhere, sympathies, little 
constitutions and rights of their own, call them what you will (and for many of these 
things there is no name)’ (O 201). The quantitatively measured figuration of plates ‘piled 
on a waiter’s hand’ proves insufficient and so the sentence continues into a further clause, 
as if in realisation that these selves are already forming qualitative connections that 
cannot be counted, balanced, or gathered together; they have ‘attachments elsewhere, 
sympathies, little constitutions’ – a description that has more in common with Deleuze 
and Guattari’s statement that ‘everyone is a little group’101 than it does a simile involving 
the piling of plates. The point then is that one does not have any selves in the sense of 
being contained within or by a ‘Captain Self’ who ‘amalgamates and controls’ all these 
different selves and has ‘the power to desire’ (O 202). The motor-car scene contradicts 
the possibility of this controlling self, already undermined a few sentences later when we 
are told ‘in this we may well be wrong’ (O 203).  
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If Orlando, as Braidotti claims, is ‘one of the greatest love stories of all times’102 
(a statement to perhaps rival Nigel Nicolson’s ubiquitously quoted comment that it is the 
‘longest and most charming love letter in literature’), then I have tried to illustrate in this 
chapter the important involvement of Orlando’s motor-car, ring, bedrooms – along with 
the other nonhuman elements I have touched on – in an intensive, qualitative queering of 
desire and love. But to conclude this chapter we might plainly ask, as Woolf does in a 
diary entry in 1926, ‘[w]hat is this “love”?’ (D3 85), or as Deleuze and Guattari put it in 
A Thousand Plateaus, ‘[w]hat does it mean to love somebody?’ Deleuze and Guattari’s 
answer, and one that I suggest suits Orlando well, is that ‘[i]t is always to seize that 
person in a mass […] to find […] the multiplicities he or she encloses within himself or 
herself which may be of an entirely different nature. To join them to mine’. Crucially 
these multiplicities are always already formed in connection with other multiplicities, but 
it is not a question of individual and group, internal and external; rather, it is a co-
emerging, desiring, queering, and becoming entangled with ‘machines, cogs, motors, and 
elements that are set in motion at a given moment’ – whether in a motor-car or not – 
‘forming an assemblage productive of statements: “I love you” (or whatever)’.103  
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4 
 
The Question of the Animal in Flush: A Biography 
 
In this chapter I follow the turn toward the nonhuman at the end of the previous chapter 
by focusing on the question of the animal in Flush: A Biography. Starting with a review 
of the ways in which critics have dealt with the pertinent matters of allegory and 
anthropomorphism in Woolf’s mock-biography, I go on to discuss issues of nudity, 
mirrors, gaze, nonverbal communication, and vulnerability in a way that allows for 
various, and sometimes seemingly contradictory, theoretical perspectives on the material 
relations between human and animal to be considered. This includes reading sections of 
Woolf’s novel alongside Jacques Derrida’s feline-inspired thoughts on animality, Donna 
Haraway’s ‘companion species’ and Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘becoming-animal’. I also 
touch on some important developments in scientific animal research. Ultimately, I claim 
that Flush details the ordinary, everyday experiences of a dog interacting with humans, 
but that the text can also be understood as a journey away from the kind of hierarchical, 
essentialist categorisations satirised in Woolf’s description of the Spaniel Club and 
towards a more open, entangled zone of human and animal, nature and culture – what I 
term an ‘animalous society’. 
 
4.1 After Allegory and Anthropocentrism  
As Woolf’s underdog novel, Flush: A Biography has recently received increased levels of 
critical attention and gained entry into Woolf’s fictional canon,1 although it is still by no 
means afforded the same scrutiny as her more famous novels. Indeed, Flush’s 
(re)creation of Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s cocker spaniel – from early life in the 
country to a back bedroom in London’s Wimpole Street, dognapping and incarceration in 
Whitechapel, a journey abroad to Florence and finally his death on his owner’s lap – has 
                                                 
1 As recently as 2000, for example, The Cambridge Companion to Virginia Woolf did not include Flush in 
its list of Woolf’s novels. 
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often been written off as a relatively trivial escapade, with Woolf’s own description of the 
novel as ‘just a little joke’ frequently presented as justification for this (L5 140). To use 
these remarks as evidence of the novel’s unimportance is, however, to overstate their 
significance; it must be remembered that in the aforementioned comment Woolf is 
writing to Ethyl Smyth, the person she had earlier worried would ‘hate’ the novel (L5 
108). Similarly, Woolf refers to Flush again as being ‘by way of a joke’, but does so 
when writing to her publisher, apprehensive of his reaction (L5 155). By contrast, Woolf 
seems genuinely thrilled in a letter to Lady Colefax, in reaction to her praise for the book: 
‘I'm so glad that you liked Flush. I think it shows great discrimination in you because it 
was all a matter of hints and shades, and practically no one has seen what I was after, and 
I was elated to Heaven to think that you among the faithful firmly stood – or whatever 
Milton said’ (L5 236).  
Even when critics have taken Woolf’s fictional biography seriously, they have not 
necessarily taken Flush the dog seriously. For example, Susan Squier considers Flush as a 
‘stand-in for the woman writer’;2 for Michael Rosenthal he is a ‘satiric device’ there to 
illuminate ‘Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s escape from familial and class oppression;3 to 
Pamela Caughie Flush is ‘an allegory of canon formation and canonical value’;4 and for 
David Eberly the dogginess of Flush is merely a decoy, allowing Woolf to ‘bring to the 
surface the repressed emotional narrative of her childhood’ (in particular, her experience 
of sexual abuse).5 When it does seem as though the critical focus may be turning towards 
Woolf’s canine protagonist, this is often little more than a gesture. This is evinced when 
Ruth Vanita comments on Mr Browning’s introduction and ‘Flush’s silent suffering, his 
feelings of neglect, loneliness and helplessness’ being ‘movingly evoked’, but then shifts 
immediately to focus on the role of jealousy in Woolf’s own relationships with other 
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women.6 Vanita goes on to describe Flush’s relationship with Barrett Browning as ‘a 
metaphor for the socially created gap between members of the same gender’.7 Such 
readings are at risk of displaying what Craig Smith terms an ‘anthropocentric bias’, 
where critics claim that Woolf uses Flush (and its eponymous protagonist) for allegorical 
ends and is therefore ‘accepted as a serious object of study only to the extent that it may 
be represented as being not really about a dog.’8 Without wishing to deny that these 
critics offer insightful political, social, cultural and biographical interpretations of 
Woolf’s novel, it might be argued that none of their readings shift the focus further from 
the human than Guiguet did in his classic book-length study of Woolf’s writings. In 
Guiguet’s view, Flush is a mirror reflecting his owner’s life, where his own experiences 
are of little importance: ‘Flush’s incapacity either to interest us in his own story or to tell 
us his mistress’s effectively, leads one to wonder why Virginia Woolf chose this subject 
and this point of view.’9 Indeed he doubts the place in literature altogether of this branch 
of the Canidae family tree: ‘Flush’s inarticulate and primitive reactions, however 
penetrating, are incompatible with the resources of literature. After all, this was never 
meant for dogs’. For Guiguet Flush is interesting because of ‘the limits it seems to set to 
the author’s theories’ rather than opening up a space in which these theories can be 
discussed.10 Perhaps the most interesting part of his commentary comes, however, when 
he refers to ‘Flush’s mind and sensibility’,11 but fails to ask questions of the extent to 
which we can think of dogs as having such a mind and sensibility, let alone what the 
possible effects could be of representing Flush as having these faculties and what 
questions this may pose for the assumed human/animal divide. This is similar to the way 
in which Rosenthal unflinchingly refers to ‘the richness of [Flush’s] memory’12 and yet, 
                                                 
6 Ruth Vanita. ‘“Love Unspeakable:” The Uses of Allusion in Flush.’ Themes and Variations:  Proceedings 
of the Second Annual Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. Vera Neverow-Turk and Mark Hussey. New York: 
Pace UP, 1993, p.252. 
7 Vanita 1993, p.254. 
8 Craig Smith. ‘Across the Widest Gulf: Nonhuman Subjectivity in Virginia Woolf's Flush.’ Twentieth 
Century Literature 48:3 (2002), p.349. Smith also notes that such bias exists against studies of animal 
consciousness in science. 
9 Jean Guiguet. Virginia Woolf and Her Works, trans. Jean Stewart. London: Hogarth Press, 1965, p.347. 
10 Guiguet 1965, p.348. 
11 Guiguet 1965, p.346. 
12 Rosenthal 1979, p.211. 
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once again, the focus does not remain on Flush for long enough to reflect upon what 
Woolf’s canine protagonist may reveal about dogs, or about the question of the animal. 
Where critics have turned their focus to canine matters, Woolf has sometimes 
been criticised for displaying anthropomorphism in her depiction of Flush. This view is 
evident in Jutta Ittner’s recent comparison of Flush and Paul Auster’s Timbuktu (1999), 
when she raises concerns that Woolf fails to fulfil the ‘radical potential’ in presenting the 
animal in literature and concludes that Woolf’s anthropomorphic depiction leaves Flush 
as ‘a creature that is doubly instrumentalized’:  
 
First, because he has been created by Woolf as a conscious and emotive animal in order 
to tell a familiar story from an unusual angle, he has no agency of his own […] Flush is 
constructed less for the purpose of creating complexity or contrast than for amusement 
while reinforcing societal values. In fact, all the different layers of this anthropomorphic 
construct are human- rather than animal-oriented […] Second, the mock agency granted 
to Flush is Woolf’s ironic critique of Victorian constructs of class, rank, and gender 
relationships […] animal existence is diminished to an anthropomorphized caricature – 
animal alterity turned into a literary device. Flush's inner and outer world as constructed 
by Woolf does not challenge the reader to reconceptualize animalness but rather reaffirms 
human projections in a loving, if ironic and often condescending, way’.13 
 
I will discuss below the reasons why I think Ittner is too quick to dismiss the subversive 
potential of Woolf’s exploration of the animal, but her reading does point to the potential 
danger of anthropomorphism in that it subsumes the animal within a human ‘world’ 
without taking on board the different experiences specific to different species. In The 
Open: Man and Animal (2004), Giorgio Agamben comments on this danger by focusing 
on German ethologist Jakob von Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt (referring to each animal’s 
specific ‘environment-world’). Agamben warns against judging an animal’s sensory-
perceptual world based on our own. We must not fall into the assumption 
 
                                                 
13 Jutta Ittner. ‘Part Spaniel, Part Canine Puzzle: Anthropomorphism in Woolf’s Flush and Auster’s 
Timbuktu.’ MOSAIC 39:4 (2006), 181-196, p.189. 
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that the relations a certain animal subject has to the things in its environment take place in 
objects in our human world. This illusion rests on the belief in a single world which all 
living beings are situated […] The fly, the dragonfly, and the bee that we observe flying 
next to us on a sunny day do not move in the same world as the one in which we observe 
them, nor do they share with us – or with each other – the same time and the same 
space.14  
 
My reading of Flush in this chapter will at various points focus on instances in 
Woolf’s novel that could be seen as anthropomorphic, and I may at times also run the risk 
that readers also face of projecting anthropomorphic significance onto the animal. But 
whilst it is important to keep in mind the potential pitfalls in accounting for nonhuman 
animals through a human perspective, it is equally important, I argue, not to dismiss the 
subversive potential of what might on first reading appear to be a straightforward case of 
anthropomorphism. As Dan Wylie has pointed out, the aspects of novels like Flush that 
some critics have labelled simply as ‘anthropomorphic’ actually function in more 
complex ways. For example, it is important to remember that Woolf is ‘painfully aware 
of the linguistic limitations under which such an enterprise labours’.15 For Wylie 
anthropomorphism does have its limits, but  
 
anthropomorphic writing nevertheless seems to embody the proposition that animals – or 
at least certain animals – are in some sense understandable, and have enough in common 
with us to demand an ethically equivalent response and sense of responsibility from 
humans […] the use of the spaniel’s perspective seems more than merely instrumental or 
allegorical. Woolf also seems interested in the actuality of an animal’s consciousness.16  
 
In this view, then, it is the very process of imagining that is most important; the 
implications of this possible animal consciousness and of a ‘new kind of society’ that is 
‘inclusive of dogs and human’ is what matters: ‘[t]he issue is not whether or not 
                                                 
14 Giorgio Agamben. The Open: Man and Animal, Trans. Kevin Attell. Standford: Stanford UP, 2004, p.40. 
15 Dan Wylie. ‘The Anthropomorphic Ethic: Fiction and the Animal Mind in Virginia Woolf’s Flush and 
Barbara Gowdy’s The White Bone.’ Isle: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment 9:2 
(2002), p.116. 
16 Wylie 2002, p.116-117. 
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anthropomorphising is “true,” but that it is both imaginatively possible and fruitful. This 
is the ethic of anthropomorphism.’17  
This ‘ethic of anthropomorphism’ has something in common with what Marjorie 
Garber describes in Dog Love (1996) as ‘The New Anthropomorphism’ in science: ‘a 
new wave of “neo-anthropomorphists” has arisen: animal behaviourists who believe that 
anthropomorphism can actually help them “do their science,” as scientists like to say. 
“Anthropomorphism is just another word for empathy,” they claim.’18 At the very least 
anthropomorphism can lead to a willingness to consider that the animal is more capable 
than we ordinarily think. I would note here the significance of Woolf’s short story ‘The 
Widow and the Parrot: A True Story’19 when Mrs Gage talks to the Parrot, James, ‘as 
though he were a human being’ but in doing so thinks that ‘[t]he creature has more 
meaning in its acts than we humans know’.20 More recently Jane Bennett, whose theory 
of ‘vital materialism’ I discuss in the next chapter, has argued that ‘an anthropomorphic 
element in perception can uncover a whole world of resonances and resemblances – 
sounds and sights that echo and bounce […] revealing similarities across categorical 
divides’ that help to challenge human claims to privilege over nonhuman worlds. It may 
be, then, that a little anthropomorphism does not necessarily lead to an anthropocentric 
outlook, and that, in fact, the outright rejection of any sign of anthropomorphism allows 
the human/animal divide to remain unchallenged, limiting the sense to which nonhumans 
and humans are materially, socially and emotionally co-involved. As animal research 
scientist Jonathan Balcombe argues, it is possible to ‘use our own experiences as a useful 
template for interpreting the emotions of other beings’ without falling into the false and 
problematic assumption – not least because we already know that sensory systems work 
differently between species – that ‘human capacity for feeling’ is ‘the “gold standard” by 
which all other species should be measured.’21  
                                                 
17 Wylie 2002, p.122. 
18 Marjorie Garber. Dog Love. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, p.31. 
19 This story was written in the 1920s for the Bell children’s newspaper, The Charleston Bulletin, but the 
precise date is unknown. 
20 Virginia Woolf. ‘The Widow and the Parrot: A True Story.’ The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia 
Woolf (2nd Edition), ed. Susan Dick. San Diego: Harcourt, 1989 [1985], p.167. 
21 Jonathan Balcombe. Second Nature: The Inner Lives of Animals. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 
p.47. 
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A more sympathetic reading of Flush in this respect is provided by Smith who 
sets Flush apart from earlier novels that placed an animal as protagonist – for example, 
Anna Sewell’s Black Beauty (1877) and Jack London’s The Call of the Wild (1903) – by 
claiming that it ‘is neither specifically humane nor specifically humanist in its agenda’. 
Instead of this, he argues that Woolf maps ‘a canine subjectivity, as an experiment worth 
performing for its own sake.’22 Rather than shirking further consideration of the capacity 
of the dog’s mind or richness of the dog’s memory, Smith takes examples such as the 
episode where Flush dreams in order to argue that rather than being written-off as 
anthropomorphic, Woolf’s depictions may not be so implausible: 
 
He slept as dogs sleep when they are dreaming. Now his legs twitched – was he dreaming 
that he hunted rabbits in Spain? Was he coursing up a hot hill-side with dark men 
shouting ‘Span! Span!’ as the rabbits darted from the brushwood?23 Then he lay still 
again. And now he yelped, quickly, softly, many times in succession. Perhaps he heard 
Dr Mitford egging his greyhounds on to the hunt at Reading. Then he wagged his tail 
sheepishly. Did he hear old Miss Mitford cry ‘Bad dog! Bad dog!’ as he slunk back to 
her, where she stood among the turnips waving her umbrella?’ (F 104)  
 
Smith points to the general consensus amongst animal researchers that dogs do indeed 
dream and that it is the precise content we are unaware of. But as he notes, rather then 
claiming to know the contents of Flush’s dream, ‘Woolf humbly describes his dream in 
the form of postulations.’24 By refusing to claim certain knowledge of content at the same 
time as asserting dogs do dream, it turns out that Woolf is surprisingly close to the 
position of current animal researchers: ‘Woolf's imagining of Flush’s dream, written from 
the assumption that canine dreams like human ones emerge from a mixture of memory, 
anxiety, and desire, is as valid as any.’25 Again Woolf turns our focus towards the dog in 
this story rather than allegorical interpretations centred on his human “owner”: ‘[n]otably 
absent from the dream are any memories of Flush’s life with Elizabeth Barrett Browning, 
                                                 
22 Smith 2002, p.349. 
23 Woolf is here referring back to the beginning of the book when she lays out the etymology of the word 
‘Spaniel’ (F 5). See section 4.4 of this chapter. 
24 Smith 2002, p.357. 
25 Smith 2002, p.357. 
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affirming that this book has not been simply a secondary biography of the poet.’26 
Consequently, if Flush is taken ‘as an intuitive, clear-eyed attempt to represent a 
nonhuman subject’, we might see it as ‘one of Woolf’s most original and forward-looking 
achievements […] making a substantial gesture toward crossing the gulf of understanding 
between human and nonhuman subjects, and toward understanding the relationship 
between the two.’27   
Whilst I would take issue with the way in which Smith maintains the primacy of 
the ‘subject’ in his argument, the particularly important point for my argument in the 
remainder of this chapter is the emphasis Smith’s reading places on the possibility of 
viewing Flush in nonhumanist terms, especially if we accept Matthew Calarco’s recent 
claim in Zoographies (2008) that it is the humanist tradition which has upheld the 
human/animal distinction, and consequent marginalisation of (and violence against) 
animals. Calarco’s project is to disassociate the pro-animal discourse from the ‘rights’ 
based agenda of liberal humanism and instead cast it ‘as a direct challenge to liberal 
humanism and the metaphysical anthropocentrism that underlies it.’28 In his carefully 
argued book, Calarco exposes the ‘blind spots’ of ‘implicit anthropocentrism’ at the heart 
of the contemporary debates in continental philosophy, and argues that it is essential to 
turn to thinkers such as Derrida and Deleuze in order to counter humanist discourses, but 
also to the growing refusals seen in the works of neo-Marxist and neo-Lacanian thinkers 
such as Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou to abandon the subject as a ground for thought 
where 
 
even if this concept of subjectivity functions […] as a means of opening onto something 
other than metaphysical humanism, it is not at all clear that it opens onto something other 
than metaphysical anthropocentrism. When these theorists [Žižek and Badiou] speak of 
the subject as being called into being as a response to an event of some sort, it is always a 
                                                 
26 Smith 2002, p.357. 
27 Smith 2002, p.359. 
28 Matthew Calarco. Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida. New York: 
Columbia UP, 2008, p.6. The limitations of ‘animal rights’ that are based on a liberal humanist model are 
also discussed by Haraway: ‘We do not get very far with the categories generally used by animal rights 
discourses, in which animals end up permanent dependents (“lesser humans”), utterly natural 
(“nonhuman”), or exactly the same (“humans in fur suits”).’ Haraway 2008, p.66-67. See also Calarco 
p.128 and Derrida p.87-88. 
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human subject that is being described, and it is always an anthropogenic event that gives 
rise to the human subject.29  
 
Defending Derrida and Deleuze against accusations that their different critiques of 
subjectivity result in ‘a political dead end’, Calarco argues that their work is useful in that 
‘it leads us to see more fully the inner connection between metaphysical humanism and 
metaphysical anthropocentrism’. He therefore claims that ‘[i]t is essential that the 
signposts toward a nonanthropocentric or critically anthropocentric thought that Derrida, 
Deleuze, and related thinkers have opened not be shut down in the name of a hasty 
retrieval of anthropocentric subjectivity toward supposedly radical political ends.’30  
Arguing that Flush is indeed one of Woolf’s most ‘forward-looking’ texts, this 
chapter will go on to read her fictional canine biography alongside Derrida and Deleuze, 
as well as Donna Haraway. Taking the dog in this text seriously as well as the text itself – 
therefore worrying over, as Goldman puts it, the ‘dogginess of the dog’31 – throughout 
this chapter I am interested in the ways in which Woolf’s modernist canine experiment 
anticipates and intervenes in the wider context of our own contemporary debates on the 
question of the animal in literary studies, theory and philosophy, and posthumanities 
more broadly. The approach I take here does not mean to empty Woolf’s text of humour, 
but rather to ask whether the humour is not aimed at the ways in which we take our own 
human position too certainly, to ‘caricature the pomposity of those who claim that they 
are something’ (F 89). As Pamela Caughie comments: ‘To take Flush as a joke might not 
be to dismiss it but to keep from taking oneself too seriously as a leader or figure, to keep 
from taking a firm position’.32 Therefore, rather than attempting to reach a conclusion as 
to whether Woolf’s writing is either anthropocentric or illustrative of a truly animal 
agency, I want to suggest some of the ways in which Flush opens up a space where we 
                                                 
29 Calarco 2008, p.12. 
30 Calarco 2008, p.13. 
31 Goldman, Jane. ‘“Ce chien est à moi”: Virginia Woolf and the Signifying Dog.’ Woolfian Boundaries: 
Selected Papers from the Sixteenth Annual International Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. Anna Burrells, 
Steve Ellis, Deborah Parsons and Kathryn Simpson. Clemson: Clemson University Digital Press, 2007, 
p.100. 
32 Caughie 1991, p.154. Caughie points to a section in ‘A letter to a Young Poet’ where Woolf states: 
‘There’s no harm in it, so long as you take it as a joke, but once you believe in it, once you begin to take 
yourself seriously as a leader or as a follower…then you become a self-conscious, biting, scratching little 
animal whose work is not of the slightest value or importance to anyone’. 
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may (re)think the animal/human relation, and where there are more than these two 
options – anthropocentric allegory or animal agency – available to us. 
 
4.2 Derrida’s Cat and Woolf’s Denuded Dog 
It is generally thought […] that the property unique to animals, what in the last instance 
distinguishes them from man, is their being naked without knowing it. Not being naked 
therefore, not having knowledge of their nudity[.]33 
 
At the beginning of The Animal That Therefore I Am (2008), Derrida reminds us that one 
issue upholding the human/animal distinction in Western philosophy is a two-fold 
assumption concerning nudity; that the animal is naked, and the animal is unaware of this 
nakedness: ‘They wouldn’t be naked because they are naked. In principle, with the 
exception of man, no animal has ever thought to dress itself. Clothing would be proper to 
man, one of the “properties” of man.’ In the world, therefore, humans dress, adorning 
themselves with a layer of cultural expression and performance, where animals are 
reduced to their biological wear: ‘The animal, therefore, is not naked because it is naked. 
It doesn’t feel its own nudity. There is no nudity “in nature.”’34 Naked in his bathroom 
and facing his cat, Derrida uses the realisation of his own nudity to launch his 
philosophical treatise on the nature of the human/animal relationship. Whilst this chapter 
will at different points discuss both of Derrida’s main concerns in the essays in The 
Animal That Therefore I Am (where/how this human/animal distinction should be drawn, 
and the ethical implications of animal suffering), I will stay for the moment with this 
much-discussed encounter between Derrida and his cat: ‘Before the cat looks at me 
naked’ he asks, ‘would I be ashamed like a beast that no longer has the sense of its 
nudity? Or, on the contrary, like a man who retains his sense of nudity?’ What is 
interesting in this remark is not only the focus on shame (something we will return to), 
but Derrida’s emphasised simile suggests that from the start he is unwilling to go along 
with simple assumptions concerning animal nudity, as if he is not quite settled upon his 
own humanity/animality. From the beginning, from the double-meaning of the French je 
suis (‘I am’ and ‘I follow’), Derrida is asking us to consider the ontological uncertainty of 
                                                 
33 Derrida 2008, p.4-5. 
34 Derrida 2008, p.5. 
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both himself and his cat: ‘Who am I, therefore? Who is it that I am (following)?’ And 
these are questions not only for him to ask of himself: ‘Whom should this be asked of if 
not of the other? And perhaps of the cat itself?’35 
In Flush, cats themselves figure only as figures of speech (or rather, of silence) as 
their only appearance in the text comes when we are told that Flush ‘came to prefer the 
silence of the cat to the robustness of the dog’ (F 32).36 Through her own rich portrayal of 
the canine, however, I would like to argue that Woolf engages with the type of 
philosophical questions at the heart of Derrida’s naked encounter with his own silent cat, 
and perhaps goes even further in her literary rendering of a cocker spaniel than Derrida 
does in his philosophical consideration of the cat’s perspective in all of this. One key 
moment which invites a comparison between Flush and Derrida’s bathroom encounter 
with his cat comes towards the end of Woolf’s text when a fully clothed (as far as we can 
tell) Mr Browning clips off Flush’s fur whilst in Florence – a result of ‘red and virile’ 
fleas that ‘scourged’ him, that ‘nested in Flush’s fur’ and ‘bit their way into the thickest 
of his coat’ (F 88). Rather than Flush’s coat signalling his natural status as naked, he 
appears to be clothed by his fur and it is the fleas that are reduced to their ‘virile’, 
unkempt nature. It is also suggested that Flush’s coat, perhaps like human clothing, was 
seen as a sign of his status:  
 
He carried his pedigree on his back. His coat meant to him what a gold watch inscribed 
with the family arms means to an impoverished squire whose broad acres have shrunk to 
that single circle. It was a coat that Mr Browning now proposed to sacrifice. He called 
Flush to him and, taking a pair of scissors, clipped him all over into the likeness of a lion. 
(F 89)  
 
                                                 
35 Derrida 2008, p.5. 
36 Elsewhere Woolf herself is praiseworthy of cat qualities other than silence, seen when she describes 
Katherine Mansfield: ‘It struck me that she [Katherine Mansfield] is of the cat kind: alien, composed, 
always solitary and observant.’ Woolf empathises with this, and there is a connection between them: ‘And 
then we talked about solitude, and I found her expressing my feelings, as I never heard them expressed’  
(D2 44). Whilst beyond the scope of this current chapter, it might also be fruitful to compare Derrida’s cat 
to Woolf’s depiction of the Manx cat who appears in A Room of One’s Own as a ‘queer animal’ without its 
tail (RO 16).  
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The comparison of Flush’s coat to a watch and his now denuded body to that of a lion 
subtly hints at both human-animal likenesses as well as animal-animal differences. We 
learn that ‘as the travesty of quite a different animal rose round his neck, Flush felt 
himself emasculated, diminished, ashamed.’ (F 89) Whilst it could be argued that it is 
simply an anthropomorphic projection to claim that Flush being purged of his coat 
qualifies as animal nudity, I would suggest that this is precisely one instance, as with 
Woolf’s description of dog dreams, where a perceived anthropomorphism might in fact 
lead to insights into the question of the animal, allowing us to, at the very least, pose 
important questions that might otherwise be left unasked.  
Such imaginative possibilities are considered when the narrative informs us that it 
is Flush who this time ponders: ‘What am I now? he thought, gazing into the glass. And 
the glass replied with the brutal sincerity of glasses, “You are nothing”. He was nobody. 
Certainly he was no longer a cocker spaniel’ (F 89). Importantly, Flush’s aforementioned 
shame does not triumph over curiosity and he begins to feel positively about his changed 
appearance that he gazes not once but twice in the mirror:  
 
as he gazed, his ears bald now, and uncurled, seemed to twitch. It was as if the potent 
spirits of truth and laughter were whispering in them. To be nothing – is that not, after all, 
the most satisfactory state in the whole world? He looked again […] there could be no 
doubt that he was free from fleas. He shook his ruff. He danced on his nude, attenuated 
legs. His spirits rose. (F 89-90) 
 
Flush appears to revel in his nudity, indeed to ‘caricature the pomposity of those who 
claim that they are something’. Challenging the notion that an animal cannot experience 
nudity, and that the very questioning of such an experience need involve a human at all, it 
is revealing that Flush recognises his changed appearance in a mirrored encounter with 
his denuded self, rather than with Mr Browning. Derrida argues that these questions of 
animal nudity and of recognition are ones that ‘philosophical thinking […] has never 
touched on.’ Emphasising the heterogeneity within the category ‘animal’, he notes that 
‘one of the structural differences among animals is drawn there, between those who have 
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some experience of the mirror and those who don’t have any at all’.37 As one of those 
animals who appears to have some experience of the mirror, does Flush’s encounter with 
his denuded body show that Woolf is beginning to imagine in literature what philosophy 
has failed to do? It is worth noting that the passage cited above is not the only moment in 
the text where Flush is faced with himself in a mirror. In an earlier scene Miss Barrett 
makes Flush ‘stand with her in front of the looking-glass and ask him why he barked and 
trembled. Was not the little brown dog opposite himself? But what is ‘oneself’? Is it the 
thing people see? Or is it the thing one is? So Flush pondered that question too’ (F 32). 
This passage has been traced to a letter Barrett wrote to her friend Hugh Stuart Boyd in 
which she comments that Flush ‘can’t bear me to look into a glass, because he thinks 
there is a little brown dog inside every looking glass, and he is jealous of its being so 
close to me’ (F 122, fn.32). In Dog Love, Garber emphasises the significance of the fact 
that Woolf’s Flush is described differently in front of the mirror than Miss Barrett had 
originally put it: ‘Where Barrett’s Flush sees “another” dog, and is jealous, Woolf’s Flush 
sees “himself,” and ponders the problem of reality.’38 By re-writing Barrett’s 
                                                 
37 Derrida 2008, p.59. Various studies into animal cognition have attempted to tackle this question of 
animals’ self-recognition in relationship to the mirror. Such experiments have tended to have a very simple 
design (developed by Gordon Gallup Jnr in 1970 and commonly known as ‘The Mirror Test’), usually 
involving putting a mark somewhere on the animal’s body that could only be seen with the use of a mirror, 
and seeing whether the animal responds to this mark by touching or exploring it on their own body. John 
Pearce has provided an overview of research in this area which has indicated that such mirror-recognition is 
evident in some great apes, dolphins, and elephants. See Animal Learning & Cognition: An Introduction 
(3rd edition). New York: Psychology Press, 2008, p.319-325. It may be, however, that self-recognition 
extends beyond mammals, as Jonathan Balcombe has argued. In his most recent book, Balcombe has drawn 
attention to a 2008 study which showed that some magpies indicated self-awareness. See Balcombe 2010, 
p.65-67. Whilst these studies have not indicated that dogs can pass the mirror test, they are important in 
emphasising that we must not only think of humans as having a relationship to the mirror, and that Woolf 
was ahead of her time in imagining that a nonhuman may have such a relationship. In addition, Balcombe 
and Pearce both note that the relatively simple design of this study and the limitations of drawing 
conclusions about the inner lives of animals based on behaviour, and so future studies are needed to reveal 
more about animals’ relationships with the mirror, and what these relationships may reveal about self-
recognition. 
38 Garber 1996, p.47. Garber goes on to draw parallels between Flush’s mirrored encounter and Lacan’s 
‘mirror-stage’ formulation. Jacqui Griffiths has complicated this reading of Flush by arguing that unlike the 
infant in Lacan’s theory – or the child without language, ‘the child at the infans stage’ – Flush’s ‘encounter 
cannot be characterized as infantile in a pre-Oedipal sense.’ Griffiths argues that whilst Flush ‘occupies the 
subordinate position of a child in the family structure, he is obviously at an advanced (i.e. post-Oedipal) 
stage of childhood development.’ But where Griffiths suggests this episode shows Woolf’s 
‘anthropomorphic use of the Oedipalized dog as a human substitute’, I would argue that we again see an 
example of anthropocentric bias in the critic, who is primarily focused on ‘the child’ in this story. See 
‘Almost Human: Indeterminate Children and Dogs in Flush and The Sound and the Fury.’ The Yearbook of 
English Studies 32 (2002), p.166.  
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interpretation of Flush’s mirrored gaze, Woolf again turns the focus away from the 
human and towards the animal.  
With her re-creation of Miss Barrett’s canine companion, then, Woolf not only 
asks the questions, ‘Can one speak of the animal? Can one approach the animal?’, nor 
does she simply consider – and this would already be going further, according to Derrida, 
than the majority of Western philosophical tradition – whether ‘one from the vantage of 
the animal [can] see oneself being looked at naked?’39 Instead, Woolf seems to ask 
whether the animal ‘can see itself naked’, a question that according to Derrida ‘is never 
asked.’40 Derrida posits: ‘The animal looks at us, and we are naked before it. Thinking 
perhaps begins there.’41 Is Woolf opening up the possibility that Flush looking at himself 
naked (regardless of whether a naked human is present) may be where thinking begins? 
After being cured of fleas, like the beautiful woman freed from ‘clothes and cosmetics’ or 
the clergyman whose collar and is let off his leash, ‘“Flush,” Mrs Browning wrote to her 
sister, “is wise.” […] The true philosopher is he who has lost his coat but is free from 
fleas’ (F 90). When Flush returns to London with his coat growing back, we are told that 
he falls asleep one afternoon as the sun ‘burn[t] through his fur to the naked skin’ (F 
103). This is the moment when Flush dreams, as discussed in the previous section, but it 
is also the moment where the suggestion is reinforced that Flush is not, as an animal, 
always and already naked – his ‘naked skin’ being covered by his fur.  
By describing Flush’s denuded encounter with the mirror, focusing on his (self-) 
gaze, Woolf may invite accusations of anthropomorphism, but in the process she may 
also point to limitations in Derrida’s own consideration of the animal, nudity and the 
mirror. At the end of the first essay in The Animal That Therefore I Am, which shares the 
same title, Derrida introduces a ‘full-length mirror [une psyché]’ as a segue into his next 
discussion, ‘But as for me, who am I (following)?’:  
 
Wherever some autobiographical play is being enacted there has to be a psyché, a mirror 
that reflects me naked from head to toe. The same question then becomes whether I 
should show myself but in the process see myself naked (that is, reflect my image in a 
                                                 
39 Derrida 2008, p.21. 
40 Derrida 2008, p.59. 
41 Derrida 2008, p.29. 
  
176
mirror) when, concerning me, looking at me, is this living creature, this cat that can find 
itself caught in the same mirror? Is there animal narcissism? But cannot this cat also be, 
deep within her eyes, my primary mirror?42 
 
In passages such as these, the extent to which Derrida is ultimately concerned with the 
animal is in question. Haraway picks Derrida up on precisely this issue, insisting that 
whilst he ‘understood that actual animals look back at actual human beings […and] he 
was in the presence of someone, not of a machine […] he did not seriously consider an 
alternative form of engagement either, one that risked knowing something more about 
cats and how to look back, perhaps even scientifically, biologically, and therefore also 
philosophically and intimately.43 For Haraway, then, despite coming ‘right to the edge of 
respect’, where his cat was concerned ‘Derrida failed a simple obligation of companion 
species; he did not become curious about what the cat might actually be doing, feeling, 
thinking, or perhaps making available to him in looking back at him that morning […] he 
missed a possible invitation’.44 Unlike Flush, Derrida is perhaps more concerned with the 
shame of his own nudity, and the shame of Western philosophy, than curiosity about his 
cat:45 ‘in all this worrying and longing, the cat was never quite heard from again’.46 
Calarco holds a similar frustration that, given Derrida’s careful and rigorous probing of 
the human-animal distinction on ethical as well as ontological levels, and despite his 
taking Heidegger to task elsewhere on his insistence of an ‘abyssal’ gulf between human 
and animal (for example in his 1985 essay ‘Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand’), Derrida 
himself falls back on ‘a definitive division, or rather a series of divisions, between human 
beings and animals.’47 
Nonetheless, in his autobiographical and theoretical inquiry into the animal, 
Derrida does pose a range of important questions that he feels have been neglected, some 
of which I claim Woolf engages with, to a greater or lesser degree, in Flush:   
 
                                                 
42 Derrida 2008, p.50-51. 
43 Donna Haraway. When Species Meet. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2007, p.20. 
44 Haraway 2008, p.20. 
45 Haraway 2008, p.22-23. 
46 Haraway 2008, p.20. 
47 Calarco 2008, p.146. 
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The question “Does the animal dream?” is, in its form, premises, and stakes, at least 
analogous to the questions “Does the animal think?” “Does the animal produce 
representations?” a self, imagination, a relation to the future as such? Does the animal 
have not only signs but a language, and what language? Does the animal die? Does it 
laugh? Does it cry? Does it grieve? Does it get bored? Does it lie? Does it forgive? Does 
it sing? Does it invent? Does it invent music? Does it play music? Does it play? Does it 
offer hospitality? Does it offer? Does it give? Does it have hands? eyes? etc.? modesty? 
clothes? and the mirror?48 
 
To this we can add Haraway’s question: ‘can I learn to play with this cat? Can I, the 
philosopher, respond to an invitation or recognize one when it is offered’.49 And we could 
contrast Derrida’s naked encounter with his cat here with a similar meeting described by 
Balcombe in Second Nature, when sitting in the bath he uses suds to change his hairstyle 
into one upright peak (to which his cat Mica looked relaxed) and then form two horns (to 
which Mica’s ‘stare intensified, his pupils began to dilate, and he lowered himself 
gradually into a crouching position’). What is noticeably different in Balcombe’s 
bathroom encounter with his cat is his sense of curiosity for what the cat may be feeling, 
leading Balcombe to think of experiments ‘to test cats’ responses to familiar faces with 
various horns, some of which do and do not resemble those of real animals.’ For 
Balcombe, his own nudity is far from the focus of his reflections.50 Indeed, this touches 
on a further question posed by Haraway: ‘what if the question of how animals engage one 
another’s gaze responsively takes centre stage for people?’51 Perhaps it is a variation of 
this last question posed by Haraway – a question that we are left asking – which is also 
raised by comparing the encounters between Derrida and his cat and Woolf’s depiction of 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s denuded dog: what would happen if Flush’s gaze were to 
be directed towards Derrida’s cat? 
                                                 
48 Derrida 2008, p.62-63. For Jonathan Balcombe, ‘[t]he question is no longer Do animals think? But What 
do animals think?’ Balcombe takes issue with the way that science has often placed ‘the burden of proof on 
those who would ascribe thoughts and feelings to animals rather than on those who would deny animals 
these attributes.’ Once again, Woolf’s decision to ascribe thoughts and feelings to a dog may not be 
evidence of an anthropocentric attitude that doesn’t take into account the singularity of Flush, but rather 
‘humbly allow[ing] the likelihood that animals have more going on in their minds than our limited vantage 
points allow us to appreciate.’ See Balcombe 2010, p.29. 
49 Haraway 2008, p.22. 
50 Balcombe 2010, p.45-46. 
51 Haraway 2008, p.22. 
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4.3 On Four Gazes: Face-to-Face with Companion Species 
We are face-to-face, in the company of significant others, companion species to one 
another. That is not romantic or idealist but mundane and consequential in the little things 
that make lives.52 
 
Regardless of the extent to which it might be argued that Derrida is in the end more 
concerned with shame than curiosity, he insists that we do not generalise his cat, or 
elevate it to some mythical creature: ‘the cat I am talking about is a real cat, truly, believe 
me, a little cat. It isn’t the figure of a cat. It doesn’t silently enter the bedroom as an 
allegory for all the cats on the earth, the felines that traverse our myths and religions, 
literature and fables.’53 In his insistence that we recognise his cat’s ‘unsubstitutable 
singularity’, Derrida is keen to reinforce that we can not think of animals in one 
generalised and homogeneous grouping. In responding to his cat’s gaze, he is unwilling 
to assume that it is only he (and all humans) who have the capacity for response, whilst 
his cat (representing all animals) would only have the ability to react: ‘When it responds 
in its name (whatever “respond” means, and that will be our question), it doesn’t do so as 
the exemplar of a species called “cat,” even less so of an “animal” genus or kingdom.’54 
It is interesting to note here that a similar emphasis on the singularity of her dog is 
evident in Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s ‘To Flush, My Dog’ (1843), where it is repeated 
on several occasions that the poem is about ‘This dog’ as opposed to ‘Other dogs’, with 
eight lines beginning with one of these two phrases.55 In her later ‘Flush or Faunus’ 
(1850), the first line also repeats the demonstrative pronoun as specific marker of ‘this 
                                                 
52 Haraway 2008, p.93. 
53 Derrida 2008, p.6. 
54 Derrida 2008, p.9.  My aim in this section is not to answer definitively what constitutes a response, but to 
suggest that through Flush we are presented with a ‘response’ that it is not reserved for the human in direct 
opposition to a hard-wired, fixed ‘reaction’ of the animal. 
55 Elizabeth Barrett Browning. ‘To Flush, My Dog.’ Sonnets from the Portuguese and Other Poems, ed. 
Stanley Appelbaum. New York: Dover, 1992 [1843], p.12-15. 
  
179
dog’, albeit that Flush is here elevated in his association to the part man, part beast 
mythical creature of the Faunus or Pan.56 
Derrida distinguishes between his cat and Alice’s cat in Alice in Wonderland, 
which, he posits, ends with ‘Alice’s very Cartesian statement’ that ‘“On this occasion the 
kitten only purred: and it was impossible to guess whether it meant “yes” or “no.”’ He 
emphasises:  
 
my real cat is not Alice’s little cat […] because I am certainly not about to conclude 
hurriedly […] that one cannot speak with a cat on the pretext that it doesn’t reply or that 
it always replies the same thing […It] comes down to knowing not whether the animal 
speaks but whether one can know what respond means. And how to distinguish a 
response from a reaction.57  
 
This raises its own questions in relation to Woolf’s novel: is the singularity we are 
speaking of named Flush capable of responding? Does Flush’s gaze shed any light on the 
questions Derrida asks following the gaze of his cat? Are we capable of responding to his 
response? In Flush there are four key moments where Flush and Miss Barrett gaze at each 
other, moments where we see examples of mutual recognition and response of various 
forms. I will briefly describe these instances and the potential significance of each below. 
 
4.3.1. ‘For the first time Flush looked at the lady lying on the sofa’ 
After Miss Mitford gives Flush to Miss Barrett as a gift, the first face-to-face encounter 
between Flush and his new “owner” occurs: ‘“Oh Flush!” said Miss Barrett. For the first 
time she looked him in the face. For the first time Flush looked at the lady lying on the 
sofa’ (F 18). Immediately, we are left in no doubt that Flush has a ‘face’,58 but we are not 
yet certain that Flush is actually looking at Miss Barrett’s, as his gaze is described here as 
                                                 
56 Elizabeth Barrett Browning. Selected Poems, ed. Marjorie Stone and Beverly Taylor. Ontario: 
Broadview, 2009 [1850], p.188.  
57 Derrida 2008, p.8. 
58 The pity evoked in the dog led Emmanuel Levinas to conclude that the dog ‘has a face’, although he 
remained ‘agnostic’ on how far this would extend to other animals. See Calarco 2008, p.67. Carrie Rohman 
argues that Derrida’s cat has a face: ‘The cat looks at me and, Derrida insists, addresses me. We might say, 
at the very least, that Derrida asymptotically approaches the claim in these moments that animals have a 
face, that faciality as an ethical demand extends beyond the human.’ Carrie Rohman. ‘On Singularity and 
the Symbolic: The Threshold of the Human in Calvino’s Mr. Palomar.’ Criticism 51:1 (2009), 66.  
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non-specific, directed simply ‘at the lady’. In the next paragraph, as the narrator has 
described the similarities of their appearance – Miss Barrett’s ‘[h]eavy curls’, ‘large 
bright eyes’ and ‘large mouth’ reflecting Flush’s ‘[h]eavy ears’, ‘large and bright’ eyes, 
and ‘wide’ mouth – it is confirmed that this is indeed a face-to-face gaze. Whilst their 
mutual ‘surprise’ registers recognition of ‘a likeness between them’, it is soon their 
differences that are focused on: ‘As they gazed at each other each felt: Here am I – and 
then each felt: But how different! [...] Between them lay the widest gulf that can separate 
one being from another. She spoke. He was dumb. She was woman; he was dog. Thus 
closely united, thus immensely divided, they gazed at each other’ (F 18-19). Even here, 
however, when we are reminded of Miss Barrett’s access to human speech as opposed to 
Flush who is ‘dumb’, Woolf’s use of free indirect discourse refuses to mark the voice of 
Miss Barrett. The use of the semi-colon too is important in signalling an openness to 
boundaries between them, and the possibility that what they are ‘divided’ by is not 
essential and finally determined. Moreover, the response to this (mis)recognition is for 
Flush to join his new companion on the sofa, ‘on the rug at Miss Barrett’s feet’. 
Ironically, just as we are told that ‘the widest gulf’ lay between them, it is simply a matter 
of feet between Miss Barrett and Flush. What is important here, I would argue, is not the 
reinforcing of difference between human and animal, but the fact that there has been a 
moment of mutual recognition, that Flush seems to have responded, and that the narrative 
has at least posed the possibility of inter-species connection: ‘Broken asunder, yet made 
in the same mould, could it be that each completed what was dormant in the other?’ (F 
18) According to Derrida, there are ‘two types of discourse regarding the animal’, those 
written by writers ‘as if they themselves had never been looked at, and especially not 
naked, by an animal that addressed them’, an animal that is ‘something seen and not 
seeing’, and those ‘who admit to taking upon themselves the address that an animal 
addresses to them’, those who Derrida does not yet know of: ‘I have found no such 
representative, but it is in that very place that I find myself, here and now, in the process 
of searching.’ Simply asking the above question, showing the face-to-face recognition, 
allows us, from this first instance, to consider that Woolf is also in this place with 
Derrida, experimenting and ‘searching’.59  
                                                 
59 Derrida 2008, p.14. 
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4.3.2 ‘large bright eyes shone in hers’ 
Flush and Miss Barrett’s connection is also illustrated in their second reciprocal gaze, 
which this time, we are left in no doubt, is eye-to-eye (or eye-in-eye) as Flush’s ‘large 
bright eyes shone in hers’ (F 27). Rather than this being a case of Miss Barrett subsuming 
Flush, it is clear that she responds to his look, that it changes her mood and impacts upon 
her sense of reality as she is ‘transformed’ into ‘a Greek nymph’ being kissed by that 
‘bearded god’ named ‘Flush, or was it Pan?’ (F 27) Mirroring the early phrase that ‘[s]he 
was woman; he was dog’ (19), in this moment ‘she was a nymph and Flush was Pan’ (F 
27). I touched on the potential problems of raising the animal to mythical status above, 
something Woolf does here based on Barrett Browining’s ‘Flush or Faunus’, and this is 
an issue I will return to in the following section in relation to Deleuze. For now, however, 
I want to focus on the way that Flush appears to respond to her response: ‘So, too, Flush 
felt strange stirrings at work within him’ (F 27). Just as Miss Barrett imagines a time and 
place when they could be, perhaps, closer, so does Flush: ‘he longed for the day when his 
own rough roar would issue like hers in the little simple sounds that had such mysterious 
meaning’ (F 28). We might draw a comparison here with the ‘little language such as 
lovers use, words of one syllable such as children speak’ that Bernard desires in The 
Waves. In fact, Bernard barely wants to sound human at all when he declares ‘I need a 
howl; a cry […] I have done with phrases’ (W 246), and at one point he even specifies 
that what one really needs is ‘a bark’ (W 210). We might say that what we see with both 
Flush and Bernard is a longing to, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, ‘[s]tammer language, be 
a foreigner in one’s own tongue’.60 Indeed, Deleuze claims Woolf’s writing as one 
example of an author styling a ‘new syntax’ which breaks with dominant and 
conventional modes and creates ‘a foreign language within the language’.61 
If imagining Flush and Miss Barrett as Pan and a nymph is to imagine some state 
which blurs the human/animal distinction, then so is Flush’s description of this longing to 
communicate with her on different terms. Importantly, however, this is not a wish for 
anthropomorphism, as he does not long to understand or speak the human language, but 
                                                 
60 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.148.  
61 Gilles Deleuze. ‘Mediators.’ Negotiations: 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin. New York: Columbia UP, 
1995, p.133. 
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rather ‘innumerable sounds’, ‘little simple sounds’ with ‘mysterious meaning’ (F 28). 
Indeed a specifically human language, in this moment, is charged as hindering 
communication rather than aiding it: ‘The fact was that they could not communicate with 
words, and it was a fact that led undoubtedly to much misunderstanding. Yet did it not 
lead also to a peculiar intimacy? [...] do words say everything? Can words say anything? 
Do not words destroy the symbol that lies beyond the reach of words?’ (F 27) As Garber 
puts it, commenting on this same passage, ‘[p]recisely because our dogs cannot speak, we 
are able to hear – with uncanny and uncanine skill – what they have to say.’62 In 
emphasising the inadequacies of speech and suggesting that it is not a necessary 
component of close companion species bonding, Woolf posits the animal’s apparent lack 
of speech as not in fact a lack at all. As Derrida challenges: ‘It would not be a matter of 
“giving speech back” to animals but perhaps of acceding to a thinking, however fabulous 
and chimerical it may be, that thinks the absence of the name and of the word otherwise, 
and as something other than a privation.’63 Perhaps Flush is pointing us toward Deleuze 
and Guattari’s statement that ‘[l]anguage is not life; it gives life orders. Life does not 
speak; it listens and waits.’64 In any case, Flush would seem to imply that it is not 
sufficient to tie response to language, and therefore claim that humans ‘respond’ and 
animals simply ‘react’ in these terms.65 
 
4.3.3 ‘Miss Barrett refused even to meet his eyes’ 
Whilst in the two examples so far Flush’s meets Miss Barrett’s gaze, there is a revealing 
scene later in the novel, our third example, in which Miss Barrett momentarily refuses to 
do so: ‘though Flush might look, Miss Barrett refused even to meet his eyes. There she 
lay on the sofa; there Flush lay on the floor’ (F 46). Chastised after his jealous attack on 
Mr Browning, Flush is relegated to the floor, and his status is lowered to such a state that 
Miss Barrett refuses to respond. But the semi-colon again seems important here, 
                                                 
62 Garber 1996, p.117. 
63 Derrida 2008, p.48. 
64 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.84. 
65 Focusing on the importance the dog’s scent-centred world, Allen McLaurin argues that ‘[i]t is true in a 
sense that language “deforms” sensation, for the dog’s sense of smell is much richer and more concrete 
than the words “smell” and “aroma”.’ See Virginia Woolf: the Echoes Enslaved. London: CUP, 1973, p.46. 
For more on olfaction in Flush see Alison Booth. ‘The Scent of a Narrative: Rank Discourse in Flush and 
Written on the Body.’ Narrative 8:1 (2000), 3-22. 
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signalling that although Miss Barrett is angry there is still the possibility of reconciliation, 
and Flush does indeed respond even to this refusal to respond:  
 
exiled, on the carpet, he went through one of those whirlpools of tumultuous emotion in 
which the soul is either dashed upon the rocks or splintered or, finding some tuft of 
foothold, slowly and painfully pulls itself up, regains dry land, and at last emerges on top 
of a ruined universe to survey a world created afresh on a different plan. (F 47) 
 
The narrator ponders this unsettling moment in Flush’s life: ‘Which was it to be – 
destruction or reconstruction? That was the question.’ Going against the stereotype of 
animalistic, mindless reaction, Flush opts for reconstruction, his response is the 
realisation that ‘[t]hings are not simple but complex. If he bit Mr Browning he bit her too. 
Hatred is not hatred; hatred is also love. Here Flush shook his ears in an agony of 
perplexity. He turned uneasily on the floor. Mr Browning was Miss Barrett – Miss Barrett 
was Mr Browning; love is hatred and hatred is love’ (F 47). 
It may be argued that the narrative again displays anthropomorphism, but more 
importantly, I suggest, it refuses to fall into the type of assumptions about the limitations 
of animal psychology that would lead to such a claim. It seems to me that, consistent with 
the representations of response we have already seen, the most important point being 
made is that ‘[t]hings are not simple but complex’. To emphasise the complex 
intertwining of their relationship, Miss Barrett does, after looking at Flush again, respond 
by forgetting her idea ‘to buy a muzzle’ (F 47) and, ‘la[ying] down her pen’ (as if to 
signal once again that language is secondary to their connection) ‘she forgave him’ (F 
48). What follows is the description a few days later when Flush and Miss Barrett seem 
intimately connected in communication as Flush chooses to eat the cakes Mr Browning 
had previously brought because they were now ‘symbols of hatred turned to love’ (F 48). 
As Miss Barrett explains to Flush that he should not try to bite Mr Browning again, 
Flush’s response suggests an inter-species communication that crosses over this supposed 
abyss between them: ‘Flush solemnly repeated, in his own language, the words she had 
used – he swore to love Mr Browning and not bite him for the future’ (F 49). 
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4.3.4 ‘he leapt on the sofa and thrust his face into hers’ 
As it turns out, Flush’s ability to respond to his owner’s gaze is only denied by death. In 
the final moments of the novel, we have the fourth and final example of human and dog 
meeting face to face. As Miss Barrett responds to Flush jumping on the sofa and 
‘thrust[ing] his face into hers’ by recalling her sonnet ‘Flush or Faunus’, they seem to be 
connected by more than just their gaze (if you like they are not just face-to-face but face-
in-face, recalling the eye-in-eye gaze above) (F 105). As Haraway notes, we now know 
that the ‘molecular record’ of humans and dogs contain traces of each other,66 and if this 
material, molecular intermingling is being emphasised in Woolf’s text, then it is fitting 
that this should occur – perhaps as a reminder of the importance of Flush’s life on the 
shaping of his companion – moments before his demise. Woolf could not, of course, have 
been aware of today’s advances in molecular biology, but it is as though she wants to 
emphasise that Flush should not be thought of as some generalised figure that stands for 
all dogs, let alone as mere allegory for a strictly human concern (just as Derrida insists 
with his cat). If he is a figure at all, he illustrates those of Haraway, where ‘[f]igures are 
not representations or didactic illustrations, but rather material-semiotic nodes or knots in 
which diverse bodies and meanings coshape one another.’67 Goldman’s focus on Woolf’s 
canine tropes has taken a turn in precisely this direction, and she calls upon Haraway to 
suggest that in The Years it is ‘a material-semiotic node of knotted beings, canine and 
human, that Mira, Lulu and the Colonel are forming’. Goldman therefore posits that the 
identity of the humans in this knot, the Colonel and Mira, and the dog, Lulu, are not 
easily disentangled.68 I would add that such nodes or knots also seem to be evident in a 
short unfinished sketch written by Woolf entitled ‘The Dog’ (1989): ‘She attached herself 
[…] she would not let me out of her sight. She became like a supplementary limb – a tail, 
something attached to my person. I never had to call her. I had great difficulty in 
detaching her.’69  
The fact that the closing lines of Flush echo the description used when Flush and 
Miss Barrett first looked at each other is also revealing. We will recall that in the first 
                                                 
66 Haraway 2003, p.31. 
67 Haraway 2008, p.4.  
68 See Goldman 2010, p.186. 
69 Virginia Woolf. ‘The Dog.’ The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf, ed. Susan Dick. London: 
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example, we read: ‘Broken asunder, yet made in the same mould, could it be that each 
completed what was dormant in the other? She might have been – all that; and he – but 
no. Between them lay the widest gulf that can separate one being from another. She 
spoke. He was dumb. She was woman; he was dog’ (F 18-19). And in the final paragraph 
we read that: ‘Broken asunder, yet made in the same mould, each, perhaps, completed 
what was dormant in the other. But she was woman; he was dog’ (F 105). It could of 
course be argued that these final comments reinforce the gulf between Flush and his 
human companion one final time, although we can see that as with the earlier passage the 
semi-colon appears to leave the possibility of boundary crossing open. More tellingly, 
however, this latter passage is different from the former in two important ways: firstly, 
the possibility that each ‘completed what was dormant in the other’ is no longer followed 
by a question mark – although Woolf uses the word ‘perhaps’, she seems to be more 
certain of their cross-species connection by the end of the book; secondly, instead of the 
sharp ‘But no. Between them lay the widest gulf’, the conjunction Woolf uses at the end 
of the novel is far softer. In this instance the ‘but’ may not be in forceful contradiction to 
the statement preceding it, but might simply present the anomaly that Woolf’s text has 
illuminated: here is a human and a cocker spaniel whose lives are intertwined beyond 
language ‘But’ they belong to different species (we might note that this latter passage 
does not reinforce the statement concerning who could speak and who was ‘dumb’). As 
we read that Miss Barrett ‘looked at Flush again’ and that ‘he did not look at her’ we are 
aware that this must not be due to an incapacity of his species for response or an abyssal 
gulf between human and dog (indeed the very fact Miss Barrett expected Flush to return 
her gaze emphasises their inter-species connection) but rather because ‘[h]e had been 
alive; he was now dead. That was all’ (F 106). 
 
Does seeing Flush and Miss Barrett’s relationship through their shared gaze in 
these four examples point us towards the ‘mortal world-making entanglements’ that 
Donna Haraway terms ‘contact zones’?70 It is certainly true that Woolf’s examples of 
human-dog gaze turn out to anticipate current scientific research. In ‘The Secret Life of 
the Dog’, a Horizons documentary first broadcast on the BBC on 6th January 2010, we 
                                                 
70 Haraway 2008, p.4. 
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see animal behaviour scientist Daniel Mills’ experiment into dog recognition of human 
emotions, which previous research has shown to be expressed asymmetrically so that 
when humans look at a face they have a left-gaze bias (ie. they look at the right-hand side 
of the person’s face). The findings are startling: while dogs look randomly at pictures of 
objects or of other dogs, they also display a left-gaze bias when looking at a human face. 
Later in the documentary, cognitive psychologist Juliane Kaminski conducts an 
experiment which shows that dogs are even attuned to the direction of the human gaze, 
something not achieved by our closest ancestor, the chimpanzee. Moreover, these skills 
are specifically developed through the co-evolutionary stories of humans and dogs (dogs 
do not show these abilities with their own species, for example).71 Rather than 
emphasising ‘The Great Divides’ between animals (in nature) and humans (in culture), 
here differences appear to, as Haraway puts it, ‘flatten into mundane differences – the 
kinds that have consequences and demand respect and response’,72 the kinds that are 
evinced in ‘naturecultures’ where ‘[w]e are training each other’.73 In Flush, these learned 
and materially embedded capabilities for human-dog communication display ‘material-
semiotic dancing in which all partners have face, but no one relies on names. [… N]on-
linguistic embodied communication [which] depends on looking back and greeting 
significant others, again and again.’74 By asking us to respond to Flush’s responses, 
Woolf reminds us that we cannot adequately account for the relations between 
companion species ‘if the fleshly historical reality of face-to-face, body-to-body subject 
making across species is denied or forgotten in the humanist doctrine that holds only 
humans to be true subjects with real histories.’75 Even in Wimpole Street – ‘the heart of 
civilisation’ (F 20) – we are reminded, as Haraway writes in ‘The Companion Species 
Manifesto’ (2003), that ‘conceiving of “nature” and “culture” as either polar opposites or 
universal categories in foolish […] Instead of opposites, we get the whole sketchpad of 
                                                 
71 ‘The Secret Life of the Dog.’ Horizon. First broadcast on the BBC, 6th January 2010. 
72 Haraway 2008, p.15. 
73 Haraway 2008, p.16. Haraway’s ‘naturecultures’ are influenced by Bruno Latour: ‘Nature and Society 
are not two distinct poles, but one and the same production of successive states of societies-natures, of 
collectives.’ Bruno Latour. We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1993, p.139. 
74 Haraway 2008, p.26-27. 
75 Haraway 2008, p.66-67. 
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the modern geometrician’s fevered brain with which to draw relationality.’76 Indeed, 
Haraway alludes to Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own when arguing that ‘categorically 
unfixed dogs’ – which we might call ‘mongrels’, ‘random bred dogs’, ‘mixed breeds, or 
just plain dogs’ – need ‘“A Category of One’s Own”: ‘Woolf understood what happens 
when the impure stroll over the lawns of the properly registered.’77 The relationship 
between Flush, as a cocker spaniel, and the ‘properly registered’ is the focus of the 
following section.  
 
4.4 From Spaniel Club to Animalous Society 
In the opening pages of Flush, the dogginess of the dog is defined by the exclusive and 
hierarchical organisation of the Spaniel Club:  
 
By that august body it is plainly laid down what constitute the vices of a spaniel, and 
what constitute its virtues. Light eyes, for example, are undesirable; curled ears are still 
worse; to be born with a light nose or a topknot is nothing less than fatal. The merits of a 
spaniel are equally clearly defined. His head must be smooth, rising without a too-
decided stoop from the muzzle; the skull must be comparatively rounded and well 
developed with plenty of room for brain power; the eyes must be full but not gozzled; the 
general expression must be one of intelligence and gentleness. (F 7) 
 
Membership of the Spaniel Club (established since 1885 as an offshoot of The Kennel 
Club, itself founded in 1873) depends on categorisation based on physiology. It is not 
only a question of who is a member and who is not; behind the humour and elegance of 
Woolf’s prose is a matter of life itself: ‘[t]he spaniel that exhibits these points is 
encouraged and bred from; the spaniel who persists in perpetuating topknots and light 
noses is cut off from the privileges and emoluments of his kind’ (F 7). Perhaps most 
telling, however, is the fact that standing at the top of this hierarchy, on only two legs, is 
always a human judge ‘laying down the law, impos[ing] penalties and privileges which 
ensure that the law shall be obeyed’ (F 7). Indeed, Linden Peach has pointed out that the 
Spaniel Club’s focus on the ‘pure bred’ takes on an added significance when we consider 
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188
the publication history of Flush – this section of Woolf’s text appeared in the first 
installment in the October 1933 issue of Atlantic Monthly alongside a review of Adolf 
Hitler’s Mein Kampf by Alice Hamilton. 78 
If Woolf is opening up a space in Flush which offers the possibility of a more 
fluid and varied relation between companion species, then this space is quite different 
from the exclusive organisation of the Spaniel Club. The close relationship between 
companion species would seem to challenge the objectifying, hierarchical organisation of 
dogs, as well as between human and dog. For Haraway, it should never be a question of 
one species or being having control over another, but rather multiple stories of cross-
species entanglements: “Companion Species” ‘is less a category than a pointer to an 
ongoing “becoming with”’.79 As Susan McHugh explains, it is a term used ‘to inscribe 
people, animals, places, and technologies in relations that at their best inspire an ongoing 
sense of curiosity and reciprocity.’80 Claiming to be a ‘creature’ (and philosopher) ‘of the 
mud’81, Haraway is the self-styled choreographer of ‘a multipartner mud dance’ where 
‘[t]he partners do not precede their relating; all that is, is the fruit of becoming with: those 
are the mantras of companion species.’82 But whilst Haraway’s mud philosophy is 
important for emphasising the multiple ways in which our lives today – in domestic 
settings and in a coevolutionary sense83 – are bound up with those of dogs (and other 
companion species), and also for shedding light on the specific ways in which animals are 
(mis)treated in our contemporary stories, I would like to argue that her insistence on the 
‘ordinary’ and ‘domestic’ has its own blind spots when it comes to how we think about 
the human/animal divide – limitations which fail to explain the whole story of Flush. 
                                                 
78 Linden Peach. ‘Editing Flush and Woolf’s Editing in Flush.’ Eleanor McNees and Sara Veglahn (eds.). 
Woolf Editing/Editing Woolf: Selected Papers from the Eighteenth Annual Conference on Virginia Woolf. 
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79 Haraway 2008, p.16-17. 
80 Susan McHugh. ‘Queer (and) Animal Theories.’ GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 15 (2009), 
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81 Haraway 2008, p.2, p.28. 
82 Haraway 2008, p.16. 
83 In her discussion of canine history in Flush, Jeanne Dubino argues that Woolf’s text is ‘informed by a 
deep appreciation and knowledge of Darwinism.’ See ‘Evolution, History, and Flush; or, The Origin of 
Spaniels.’ Kristin Czarnecki and Carrie Rohman (eds.). Virginia Woolf and the Natural World: Selected 
Papers from the Twentieth International Conference on Virginia Woolf. Clemson: Clemson University 
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Haraway’s emphasis on ‘molecular differences’84 and ‘becoming-with’ has 
echoes of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘becoming-animal’, which I will discuss 
further below but will briefly define here as the shared event of becoming different, of 
becoming entangled with the other in a ‘creative line of escape’ from traditional 
ontological categories of human and animal.85 But despite herself sounding at times 
Deleuzian (and she does acknowledge in When Species Meet (2008), albeit tucked away 
in a footnote of further criticisms, that she is influenced by Deleuze and Guattari’s 
theorising of ‘assemblages’)86 Haraway is emphatic in her dislike of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ‘becoming-animal’: ‘I want to explain why writing in which I had hoped to 
find an ally for the tasks of companion species instead made me come as close as I get to 
announcing, “Ladies and Gentlemen, behold the enemy!”’87 Focusing on A Thousand 
Plateaus, what appears to make Haraway ‘so angry’ is what she sees as their ‘scorn for 
all that is mundane and ordinary’, for the ‘homely’88 and – in a more polemical version of 
her criticism of Derrida – ‘profound absence of curiosity about or respect for and with 
actual animals’.89 According to Haraway, they lack ‘the courage to look […] a dog in the 
eye’:90 ‘This is a philosophy of the sublime, not the earthly, not the mud’.91 She goes on 
to accuse Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-animal of demonstrating one of the clearest 
displays in all philosophy of ‘misogyny, fear of aging, incuriosity about animals, and 
horror at the ordinariness of flesh, here covered by the alibi of an anti-Oedipal and 
anticapitalist project.’92 If Haraway is engaged in a mud dance with her dogs, the 
problem, perhaps, is that she is also throwing mud. More pragmatically, Braidotti has 
suggested that what is shared between Haraway and Deleuze, and also her own ‘nomadic 
subjects’ (discussed in section 2.1.2 of this thesis) is a deep ‘alliance’ in presenting 
theories which are ‘materialist’ and ‘neo-literal’, and therefore not limited to the ‘textual’ 
                                                 
84 Haraway 2003, p.5. 
85 Deleuze and Guattari 1986, p.17. 
86 Haraway 2008, p.314, fn.37.  
87 Haraway 2008, p.27. 
88 Haraway 2008, p.29. 
89 Haraway 2008, p.27. 
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91 Haraway 2008, p.28. 
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and ‘resolutely not metaphorical’: ‘Haraway shares with Deleuze two key features: 
serious neo-foundational materialism on the one hand and a rigorous theory of 
relationality on the other’.93  
Although Haraway has taken issue with Deleuze and Guattari, then, I want to 
argue that a combination of her focus on domestic and coevolutionary stories and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s disruption of human-centred relations is important when 
considering the question of the animal in Woolf’s text. As Calarco, whose entire project 
in Zoographies is focused on the rejection of ‘human chauvinism’,94 notes, Deleuze and 
Guattari provide a rare example in Western philosophy of a non-anthropocentric 
treatment of the animal.95 In contrast to Haraway’s accusation that they lack a curiosity 
for the animal, for Calarco they demonstrate a  
 
“fascination” for the animal and other nonhuman perspectives that are at work in 
becoming-animal; for them, it is this fascination that motivates revolutionary literature 
and progressive discourses on animals […] a fascination for something “outside” or other 
than the human and dominant perspectives (and this “outside” might well lie within 
human beings, for example, in an inhuman space at the very heart of what we call 
human).96 
 
The point then is not that Deleuze and Guattari are incurious as Haraway has charged, but 
that they are more than curious. Their real fascination is not limited to the animal in its 
‘molar’ (that is, unified and unfixed) form but the ‘molecular’ changes and intensive 
interplay between species. Leonard Lawlor uses the example of the gaze to argue that for 
Deleuze and Guattari ‘it is this gaze from the singular animal and its cries that place the 
                                                 
93 Rosi Braidotti. ‘Posthuman, All Too Human: Towards a New Process Ontology.’ Theory Culture Society 
23 (2006), p.200. 
94 Calarco 2008, p.35. 
95 In The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida speaks of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘great, rich chapter’ on 
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animal within me: one in the other.’97 If we recall the example where Flush thrusts his 
face into Miss Barrett’s, we could perhaps think of this not simply as a ‘representational 
relation’ between molar forms, but a becoming-molecular. It is in this sense that 
fascination sparks becoming, where ‘[i]n the experience of becoming, when one is 
fascinated by something before oneself, when one contemplates something before 
oneself, one is among it, within it, together in a zone of proximity.’98  
Turning to Deleuze and Guattari helps to expand upon and complicate the 
domestic, material-semiotic entanglements between Woolf’s canine protagonist and his 
owner.99 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari outline three ways in which we 
can distinguish animals – two anthropomorphic and a third which challenges 
anthropocentric conceptualisations. First, there are the ‘Oedipal animals […] “my” cat, 
“my” dog.’ Importantly it is here, in their criticism of the ways in which this view of 
animals ‘draws us into a narcissistic contemplation’ and reinforces the tendency for 
anthropomorphism, that Deleuze and Guattari make the comment which Haraway finds 
particular distasteful: that ‘anyone who like likes cats or dogs is a fool’! This is indeed a 
startling statement, but taking this comment out of context, Haraway risks giving the 
impression that Deleuze and Guattari are cruelly dismissive of animals, when in fact they 
are exposing the ways in which such animals have been reduced to mere psychoanalytic 
facades with ‘a daddy, a mommy, a little brother behind them’;100 they are attempting to 
unsettle and complicate our conceptualisation of human/animal relations.101 In Deleuze 
and Guattari’s model, the second kinds of animals are ‘State animals’, those ‘with 
characteristics or attributes’ that fit them into ‘divine myths’. Here there seems to be an 
affinity with recognising Derrida’s real cat, rather than generalising and mythologizing. 
Finally, there are the more nomadic ‘pack or affect animals that form a multiplicity, a 
                                                 
97 Leonard Lawlor. Following the Rats: Becoming-Animal in Deleuze and Guattari.’ SubStance 37:3 
(2008),169-187, p.176. 
98 Lawlor 2008, p.176. 
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‘becoming-animal’. See Animal Stories: Narrating Across Species Lines. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
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becoming’.102 This third way of approaching the animal is to take into account their own 
capacity for world-making and rather than assimilating them into an anthropocentric 
‘classificatory or Oedipal schema.’103 Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari invoke Woolf when 
clarifying that their emphasis on ‘pack animals’ is not a comment on the fact ‘that certain 
animals live in packs’ or such ‘evolutionary classifications’: 
 
Virginia Woolf experiences herself not as a monkey or a fish but as a troop of monkeys, a 
school of fish, according to her variable relations of becoming with the people she 
approaches. […] What we are saying is that every animal is fundamentally a band, a 
pack. That it has pack modes, rather than characteristics, even if further distinctions 
within these modes are called for. It is at this point that the human being encounters the 
animal. We do not become animal without a fascination for the pack, for multiplicity.104  
 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this current study to expand upon the relations between 
Woolf and monkeys or fish (!), the important point here is the emphasis placed on 
moving away from individuated subjectivity (of humans or animals) and towards affect 
and movement of intensely interwoven multiplicitous agencies. In order to explore the 
full extent of Woolf’s fascination for the animal in Flush, I would argue that it is 
important not to abandon Deleuze and Guattari as ‘the enemy’, but to take on board their 
concerns about Oedipal and symbolic animals, and to ask whether this third kind of 
animal – the one that provides the line of flight from anthropocentrism – is located in 
Woolf’s novel. After all, ‘cannot any animal be treated in all three ways? [...] Even the 
cat, even the dog.’105 Even, we might add, Flush. Again, Deleuze and Guattari allude here 
to Woolf - this time to her ‘thin dog’ (which Woolf actually takes from Katherine 
Mansfield’s diary) to exemplify the symbiotic relations formed between the different 
elements that combine in an ‘event’ or ‘haecceity’ (a term I discuss in more detail in the 
following chapter, section 5.5): ‘Climate, wind, season, hour are not of another nature 
than the things, animals, or people that populate them, follow them, sleep and awaken 
within them. This should be read without a pause: the animal-stalks-at-five-o’clock […] 
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Five o’clock is this animal! This animal is this place! “The thin dog is running down the 
road, this dog is the road,” cries Virginia Woolf. That is how we need to feel’.106 
 Although Flush spends most of his time in a Victorian domestic setting, and 
although he is on a couple of occasions compared to Pan, he ultimately contradicts rather 
than conforms to the model of an ‘Oedipal’ or ‘State’ animal. Rather than settling into the 
domestic order or mythological associations, he has a central role in Woolf’s reimagining 
of the earthly space shared by humans and animals, where hierarchies are flattened and 
species categories blurred. Take, for example, the description of how the previous 
domestic order had created a gulf fuelled by hatred between Flush and his human 
companions, likened to ‘an iron bar corroding and festering and killing all natural life 
beneath it’. After ‘the cutting of sharp knives and painful surgery, the iron has been 
excised’ and what results is a kind of material-semiotic alliance between Flush and Miss 
Barrett, the fleshly reconceptualisation of human/dog relations: 
 
Now the blood ran once more; the nerves shot and tingled; flesh formed; Nature rejoiced, 
as in spring. Flush heard the birds sing again; he felt the leaves growing on the trees; as 
he lay on the sofa at Miss Barrett’s feet, glory and delight coursed through his veins. He 
was with them, not against them, now; their hopes, their wishes, their desires were his. (F 
49)  
 
Whilst this passage could again be read as an example of anthropomorphism, of another 
human appropriation of the dog, once again Woolf’s use of free indirect speech 
encompasses a more collective, connected arrangement. I prefer to view this passage as 
pointing towards a ‘naturalcultural assemblage’, to put together key terms used by both 
Deleuze and Guattari and Haraway (terms I will focus on in further detail in the following 
chapter), where Flush’s singularisation is intermingled with the ‘birds’, ‘trees’, as well as 
the ‘feet’ – which earlier signalled the so-called ‘gulf’ between them – of Miss Barrett. 
Moreover, he 
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could have barked in sympathy with Mr Browning now. The short sharp words raised the 
hackles on his neck. “I need a week of Tuesdays,” Mr Browning cried, “then a month – a 
year – a life!” I, Flush echoed him, need a month – a year – a life! I need all the things 
that you both need. We are all three conspirators in the most glorious of causes. We are 
joined in sympathy. We are joined in hatred. We are joined in defiance of black and 
beetling tyranny. We are joined in love (F 49). 
 
This passage evokes the image of Cam and James in the boat with Mr Ramsay in To the 
Lighthouse, resolving to fight tyranny, a scene which I argued in chapter two showed 
their becoming-molecular together (see section 2.2.4). Just as the tyranny they were 
defying was patriarchal chauvinism that divided women and men in hierarchical terms, 
here we see ‘some dimly apprehended but none the less certainly emerging triumph’ (F 
50) against the human chauvinism that would divide humans and animals, and seek to 
classify animals based on biologistic qualities (á la the Spaniel Club), deprived of their 
place in an exclusively human culture.  
But rather than simply another example of where dogs, as Haraway writes, are 
‘[p]artners in the crime of human evolution’,107 Flush and his companion species move 
here towards Deleuzian becoming which prefers the term ‘involution’ and which is not so 
much about ‘descent and filiation’ as it is about ‘alliance’ and ‘transversal 
communications’: ‘to involve’, they clarify, is to form a block that runs its own line 
“between” the terms in play and beneath assignable relations.’108 The alliance formed 
between Miss Barrett, Mr Barrett and Flush forms a shared becoming-other that involves 
human and animal at the same time as working between these terms and beneath species 
characteristics. Importantly, Miss Barrett’s becoming-animal is not a matter of her 
growing a tail, nor is Flush’s becoming-other a matter of walking on two legs; it is not a 
case of resemblance or imitation, nor is it simply a metaphor. As Deleuze and Guattari 
stress in Kafka, ‘[t]here is nothing metaphoric about the becoming-animal. No 
symbolism, no allegory. […] It is an ensemble of states, each distinct from the other, 
grafted onto the man insofar as he is searching for a way out. It is a creative line of 
escape that says nothing other than what it is. […] it constitutes a single process, a unique 
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method that replaces subjectivity.’109 Or as they write in A Thousand Plateaus, the 
important question becomes:  
 
which reality is at issue here? For if becoming animal does not consist in playing animal 
or imitating an animal, it is clear that the human being does not “really” become an 
animal any more than the animal “really” becomes something else. Becoming produces 
nothing other than itself. We fall into a false alternative if we say that you either imitate 
or you are. What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly 
fixed terms through which that which becomes passes […] becoming lacks a subject 
distinct from itself [.]110 
 
We might also recall here Deleuze’s theory – discussed in chapter three – that what is 
missing in desire is not a yet-to-be-attained object, but rather the subject (see section 3.3). 
 If the aforementioned passage from Woolf’s novel is a moment of 
‘deterritorialisation’, a moment of Flush and his human companions becoming-
minoritarian, it is followed by ‘reterritorialisation’, as predicted by Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conceptual paradigm. The reterritorialisation in this instance is the dognapping 
of Flush, the blocking of his line of flight. This moment of deterritorialisation is therefore 
not absolute but relative, and seems to be an example of what Deleuze and Guattari term 
‘negative’ deterritorialisation where it is ‘immediately overlaid by reterritorialisations on 
property, work, and money.’ As Flush is dognapped we are reminded of his position in an 
anthropocentric culture whereby he becomes a piece of property to be bargained over by 
humans – the gulf is reinforced as the agents are reterritorialised in their hierarchical 
positions. But as Deleuze and Guattari are keen to emphasise, deterritorialisation has 
‘highly varied forms’, and what initially appears to be ‘negative’ soon becomes a 
‘positive’ deterritorialisation which ‘prevails over the reterritorialisations, which play 
only a secondary role’.111 This is seen in the fact that this traumatic incident when Flush 
is captured and taken to Whitechapel leads to a discussion of Wimpole Street and its 
dangers, and in Miss Barrett’s resistance to the dominant, majoritarian viewpoint (of her 
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husband and father) that they should not save Flush: ‘For her it was madness. So they told 
her. Her brothers, her sisters, all came round her threatening her, dissuading her […] But 
she stood her ground. At last they realised the extent of her folly. Whatever the risk might 
be they must give way to her’ (F 66). The dognapping of Flush throws ‘doubts upon the 
solidity even of Wimpole Street itself’, undermining its ‘apparent solidity and security’ as 
the hub of Victorian civilisation (F 51).  
Woolf ironically uses the moment where the human most obviously and cruelly 
exerts its power over the animal in order to illuminate human failings; that there is no 
natural order of things. When Flush does return to Miss Barrett their reterritorialisation 
does not dominate their deterritorialisation. After Flush is ‘led out into the open air’ and 
returned to Wimpole Street, it is a setting that for Miss Barrett has changed, a place that 
now points outward rather than inward at itself as the safe and untouchable haven of 
civilisation: ‘The old gods of the bedroom – the bookcase, the wardrobe, the busts – 
seemed to have lost their substance. This room was no longer the whole world; it was 
only a shelter’ (F 67). We are told that ‘everything was different’ and that ‘[e]verything 
in the room seemed to be aware of change’ (F 69). Miss Barrett’s becoming-animal leads 
her to recognise and respond to the violence enacted against her companion species as 
she hears ‘the howls of tethered dogs, the screams of birds in terror’ (F 67). Flush, too, 
realises his perilous position as dog amongst men: having previously felt Mr Browning 
was with him in fighting against tyranny, what is ‘[b]ehind those smiling, friendly faces’ 
of Mr Browning and Mr Kenyon ‘was treachery and cruelty and deceit’ (F 67). The 
‘becoming-with’, to use Haraway’s preferred term, of Miss Barrett and Flush is a 
becoming-minoritarian-with, as they are closer now having somehow found a line of 
flight from the illusion of human superiority: ‘They had been parted; now they were 
together. Indeed they had never been so much akin. Every start she gave, every 
movement she made, passed through him too’ (F 68). Uncomfortable in her human skin, 
Miss Barrett ‘seemed now to be perpetually starting and moving’. Intriguingly, she also 
hides the ‘pair of thick boots’ that are delivered (F 68), and it was ‘[g]reat boots […] 
stumbling in and out’ (F 55), ‘hard, horny boots’ (F 57) that had haunted Flush when he 
was captive in Whitechapel. Tellingly, their communication is now carried out non-
verbally, in ‘tremendous silence’ (F 71).  
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Of course, this all leads to a more literal fleeing, as Flush and his companion 
escape to Italy ‘leaving tyrants and dog-stealers behind them’. Both Flush and Miss 
Barrett ‘had changed’ (F 75) and now that Flush was ‘independent’, his relationship with 
Mr Browning also improves. Mr Browning, like Mr Ramsay in To the Lighthouse, 
appears to have been swept up in their becoming (see section 2.2.3), so that ‘he and Flush 
were the best of friends now’ that Flush ‘was his own master’ (F 78). The deep empathy 
shared between Miss Barrett and Flush in their escape from hierarchies of oppression is 
reinforced here also: ‘Fear was unknown in Florence; there were no dog-stealers here 
and, she may have sighed, there were no fathers’ (F 78). The events immediately before 
and following Flush’s dognapping therefore illuminate lines of flight that cross the 
human/animal divide, and attempt to show a less hierarchical relation between 
companion species. In Dialogues, Deleuze describes becoming-animal as ‘the picking-up 
of a code where each is deterritorialized’,112 and true to their positive deterritorialisation 
Flush ‘had revised his code accordingly’ so that this ‘new conception of canine society’ 
(note again the mixing of canine and society, of nature and culture), is one where dogs 
are more liberated: ‘Where was ‘must’ now? Where were chains now? Where were park-
keepers and truncheons? Gone, with the dog-stealers and Kennel Clubs and Spaniel Clubs 
of a corrupt aristocracy!’ We learn that Flush ‘was the friend of all the world now. All 
dogs were his brothers. He had no need of a chain in this new world; he had no need of 
protection’ (F 77). This reads like an earlier canine version of Woolf’s famous statement 
in Three Guineas concerning the role of women as members of an ‘Outsiders’ Society’ 
and therefore not being controlled within any nationalistic boundaries: ‘“For,” the 
outsider will say, “in fact, as a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. 
As a woman my country is the whole world’ (TG 313). It may well be true that on one 
level Flush: A Biography acts as an allegory for, as Woolf puts it in A Room of One’s 
Own, the ‘dog’s chance’ (RO 141) women writers have been given in patriarchal culture, 
and for some of the other concerns of critics I outlined in section 4.1, but I would also 
like to suggest that by seeming to fit better with an Outsider’s Society as opposed to 
Spaniel Club, Flush the dog can be understood as offering a specifically 
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nonanthropocentric version of such an Outsider’s Society – what I term an ‘Animalous 
Society’.  
Anna Snaith has commented that Flush is ‘a text whose supposed anomalousness 
has often caused it to be read out of context – or not to be read at all’.113 Arguing that this 
novel is not so anomalous after all, Snaith’s reading makes an important and convincing 
case for taking Flush the text seriously as ‘part of Woolf’s anti-fascist writing of the 
1930s’.114 But focusing on the question of the animal, I have been suggesting that it is 
precisely the anomalous status of Woolf’s canine protagonist that enables us to explore a 
more entangled and non-hierarchical relation between human and animal. In Flush, we 
could say that the ordinary and extraordinary are intermingled to launch becomings-
animal, the becoming-anomalous through the animal: a becoming-animalous? In A 
Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of the ‘anomalous’ has much in 
common with their understanding of an Outsider – the anomalous is a ‘phenomenon of 
bordering […] a position or set of positions in relation to a multiplicity’ that is distinct 
from the ‘abnormal’ which ‘can be defined only in terms of characteristics, specific or 
generic’.115 As Joshua Delpech-Ramey notes, ‘the anomalous is the cutting edge, the edge 
of “deterritorialization” of the group itself. What is anomalous is not that which is outside 
of the group or divergent within it, but that individual who forms a porous border 
between the group and its Outside.’116 We are therefore reminded of the opening to the 
novel, when Woolf lays out the etymology of the word ‘Spaniel’, dog of ‘Hispania’ 
which ‘derives from the Basque word espana, signifying an edge or boundary’ (F 5). My 
neologism ‘Animalous Society’ implies that the anomalous and animal in Woolf’s text 
are coextensive; Flush, as a dog who ‘would meet with the approval of the Spaniel Club’ 
as ‘a pure-bred Cocker of the red variety marked by all the characteristic excellences of 
his kind’ (F 10) but also becoming-with and becoming-animal-with his human 
companions, should not be seen as simply an ‘exceptional individual’ trapped within the 
confines of his role as ‘the family animal or pet’, but as transforming human/animal 
relations and becoming nomadic even within his domestic arena. If the anomalous 
                                                 
113 Anna Snaith. ‘Of Fanciers, Footnotes, and Fascism: Virginia Woolf’s Flush.’ Modern Fiction Studies 
48.3 (2002), p.615. 
114 Snaith 2002, p.632.  
115 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p269.  
116 Joshua Delpech-Ramey. ‘Deleuze, Guattari, and the “Politics of Sorcery”.’ SubStance 39:1 (2010), p.13. 
  
199
functions to draw us into ‘a movement away from our molar identity’ and moves us 
towards a ‘zone of new ways of relating […] of novelty and possibilities’ then it would 
seem to me that this could also describe Flush.117 Taking account of the anomalous in 
Flush is not then a question of the abnormal and rejected or normal and included, nor is it 
about anomalies within a group; instead it is the creation of gaps in the divide, and the 
invitation to cross those divides, between inside and outside, culture and nature, human 
and animal. 
 
4.5 Conclusion: It’s a Cow’s Life  
In the preceding sections I have tried to keep in mind that in theorising the relation 
between animal and human, the ‘fleshly historical reality’ of dogs, 118 as Haraway would 
put it, are important in Flush: A Biography. That is, Woolf’s cocker spaniel is not be read 
simply as ‘an alibi for other themes’119 nor does our reading of Flush lead us to some 
sublime escape from reality, but draws out the complexity of this reality of intensely 
involved entanglements between companion species which includes the possibility for 
movement and becoming rather than a fixed and defined dividing line. Whether or not 
there are moments in Woolf’s novel that can be read as anthropomorphic, I have argued 
that it is not simply anthropocentric concerns we find in Flush, but a curiosity for animals 
(including humans) living together. As Jeanne Dubino has pointed out, these animals 
include more than simply cocker spaniels: ‘Woolf populates Flush with wild and tamed 
species – a menagerie of cats and lions and tigers, partridges and parrots and rooks, 
elephants and fish and fox, black beetles and blue bottles, hares and fleas, and dogs’.120 
We could of course add cows to this list, and I want to finish by briefly turning to 
                                                 
117 Lori Brown. ‘Becoming-Animal in the Flesh: Expanding the Ethical Reach of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Tenth Plateau.’ PhaenEx 2:2 (2007), p.266. Reading becomings-animal alongside Barbara Smut’s 
empirical documentations of her interactions with companion species – and therefore refusing to write-off 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept as being in opposition to the daily ‘becomings-with’ of the kind Haraway 
emphasises – Lori Brown suggests that we can read Smuts’ description of her dog, Safi, as being ‘more 
attuned and aware than perhaps many other animals, including humans’ (270).  
118 Haraway 2008, p.66. 
119 Haraway 2003, p.5. 
120 Jeanne Dubino. ‘The Bispecies Environment, Coevolution, and Flush.’ Contradictory Woolf: Selected 
Papers from the Twenty-first Annual International Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. Derek Ryan and 
Stella Bolaki, Clemson: Clemson University Digital Press (forthcoming 2012). 
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Woolf’s description of this particular species in order to consider further issues of flesh 
and suffering.121  
Following Jeremy Bentham’s famous plea for animal rights, Derrida claims that 
‘[t]he first and decisive question would […] be to know whether animals can suffer.’122 
Whilst Haraway has pointed out the limitations of focusing our philosophical and ethical 
concern for animals on this question of suffering, she nonetheless accepts it as an 
important issue amongst others.123 In addition, Calarco argues that rather than using 
Bentham’s question to launch an empirical investigation into the capacity animals have to 
experience pain and suffering, Derrida’s use has a more profound proto-ethical purpose: 
‘Derrida uses Bentham’s question to broach the issue of the embodied exposure of 
animals, their finitude and vulnerability […] the question points toward and contains 
within itself the trace of something more basic: an interruptive encounter with animal 
suffering that calls for and provokes thought.’124 In Woolf’s novel, after Flush’s 
dognapping from Wimpole Street and before we learn of his suffering in the seedy 
Whitechapel where he is held for ransom, we are presented with just such an interruptive 
encounter which highlights the ‘embodied exposure of animals’ and their ‘vulnerability’ 
when the narrator invokes Thomas Beames’ 1852 book The Rookeries of London: 
 
he was shocked. Splendid buildings raised themselves in Westminster, yet just behind 
them were ruined sheds in which human beings lived herded together above herds of 
cows – ‘two in each seven feet of space’. He felt that he ought to tell people what he had 
seen. Yet how could one describe politely a bedroom in which two or three families lived 
above a cow-shed, when the cow-shed had no ventilation, when the cows were milked 
and killed and eaten under the bedroom? (F 52) 
 
Whilst much of the remainder of the paragraph goes on to focus on the suffering of the 
human beings living in these and similar conditions, it is significant that the narrative 
expands on the pronounced and exposed vulnerability of these cows, and that the 
                                                 
121 In ‘Outlines’, Woolf suggests that ‘[o]ur brilliant young men might do worse, when in search of a 
subject, than devote a year or two to cows in literature’ (CR1 184).  
122 Derrida 2008, p.27. 
123 Haraway 2008, p.22. 
124 Calarco 2008, p.117. 
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sentence Woolf quotes directly ‘two in each seven feet of space’, refers to them. Instead 
of experiencing ‘the recognition of an animals “ability” or “capacity” for suffering’, this 
passage is most disturbing to a reader because it describes ‘an encounter with an animal’s 
inability or incapacity to avoid pain, its fleshly vulnerability and exposure to 
wounding.’125 What is so difficult for Beames to describe in the above passage, and what 
is most troubling for the reader, is the way in which these cows are already reduced to 
food and drink by the humans with whom they share such close living quarters. 
Moreover, when Flush’s experience of his dognapping is then described, we are 
confronted with not only Flush’s suffering, but his vulnerability which led to him being 
moved so easily and so quickly from his home to the ‘complete darkness’, the ‘chillness 
and dampness’ of his dognappers lair in Whitechapel. As if to emphasise the inability of 
the animal to avoid this plight, we are told that ‘the floor was crowded with animals of 
different kinds’, including ‘dogs of the highest breeding […] like himself’ (F 55). In 
Wimpole Street a dog’s vulnerability is doubled – either kept on a leash, or stolen. 
Indeed, comparing Flush’s later migration to Italy with the fact that Mrs Carlyle’s dog 
Nero ‘leapt from a top-storey window’ and was later run over by a Butcher’s cart (F 92; 
103), Dubino points out that the two options ultimately become ‘death or escape’.126 
The key in all of this is not to stop at pity, but to explore, as I have claimed Woolf 
does in Flush, the way in which these encounters create a new relation between, and 
conceptualisation of, human and animal. As Deleuze and Guattari note in What is 
Philosophy?, ‘the slaughter of a calf remains present in thought not through pity but as 
the zone of exchange between man and animal in which something of one passes into the 
other’.127 In Francis Bacon, Deleuze argues that Bacon’s paintings draw our attention to 
the fact that: 
 
[m]eat is not dead flesh; it retains all the sufferings and assumes all the colours of living 
flesh. It manifests such convulsive pain and vulnerability, but also such delightful 
invention, colour, and acrobatics. Bacon does not say, “Pity the beasts,” but rather that 
                                                 
125 Calarco 2008, p.118. 
126 Dubino 2011, p.148. 
127 Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p.109. 
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every man who suffers is a piece of meat. Meat is the common zone of man and the beast, 
their zone of indiscernibility.128 
 
Deleuze goes on to discuss the eighteenth century German writer Karl Philipp Moritz and 
his text Anton Reiser (1785-1790) and cites a particular passage which leads Deleuze to 
write that ‘animals are part of humanity […] we are all cattle’:  ‘a calf, the head, the eyes, 
the snout, the nostrils…and sometimes he lost himself in such sustained contemplation of 
the beast that he really believed he experienced, for an instant, the type of existence of 
such a being…in short, the question if he, among men, was a dog or another animal had 
already occupied his thoughts since childhood.’129 For Deleuze, this reveals ‘the real of 
becoming’, which is not a question of resemblance between man and animal but ‘a zone 
of indiscernibility more profound than any sentimental identification: the man who 
suffers is a beast, the beast that suffers is a man.’ ‘What revolutionary person’, asks 
Deleuze, ‘in art, politics, religion, or elsewhere – has not felt that extreme moment when 
he or she was nothing but a beast, and became to become responsible not for the calves 
that died, but before the calves that died?’130 
In this chapter I have tried to show that Flush’s multiple experiences – his gazing 
and his playing as well as his denuding and his dognapping – added to Mr Beames’ 
encounter with these cows, demonstrate the ‘various ways’ as Calarco states ‘in which 
animals might interrupt us, challenge our standard ways of thinking, and call us to 
responsibility.’131 By highlighting the specificities of Flush’s varied lives against the 
backdrop of the plight of other animals – be it cows or humans – Woolf is resisting the 
homogenisation of animality/humanity at the same time as challenging any 
straightforward distinction between animalities and humanities. In this sense she seems to 
be offering a way out of what we could perhaps see as the false dichotomy ultimately 
presented by Derrida, where he places ‘heterogeneities and abyssal ruptures as against the 
                                                 
128 Deleuze 2005, p.17. For a fascinating reading of Deleuze’s becoming-animal in relation to Art, and 
specifically Francis Bacon’s dogs, see Steve Baker. The Postmodern Animal. London: Reaktion Books, 
2000, p.137-152. 
129 Deleuze 2005, p.18. 
130 Deleuze 2005, p.18. 
131 Calarco 2008, p.120. 
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homogeneous and continuous’;132 to put it crudely, the choice here appears to be between 
maintaining the human/animal distinction at the same time as exploring heterogeneities, 
or subverting the distinction and reducing everything to homogeneity. Focusing on this 
issue at the end of Zoographies, Calarco argues that  
 
there is another option available beyond philosophical dualism, biological continuism, 
and Derrida’s deconstructive approach […] we could simply let the human-animal 
distinction go or, at the very least, not insist on maintaining it […] Might not the 
challenge for philosophical thought today be to proceed altogether without the guardrails 
of the human-animal distinction and to invent new concepts and new practices along 
different paths?133 
 
For Haraway this different path would be one of ‘naturecultures’, of non-hierarchical 
emtanglements of companion species in assemblages which do not privilege a notion of a 
human culture or an animal nature, and in the next chapter I will discuss such 
naturecultures further in the context of quantum ‘philosophy-physics’ and the matter of 
life in The Waves. What is up for debate here, however, is how convincing Calarco’s call 
to simply ‘let the distinction go’ is. For example, John Llewelyn has recently responded 
by arguing that in following Calarco’s lead in letting the distinction go, we are still 
holding on to it: ‘Must we not hang on to the distinction if we are to let it go? For even if 
we decide to avoid making this distinction in what we say, must we not, in order to carry 
out this resolution, retain the distinction in what we think?’134 It may well be going too 
far to claim that Flush takes us beyond all thoughts of a human/animal distinction, but it 
does provide a careful and playful consideration of the question of the animal that 
involves, to borrow Haraway’s words, ‘transposing the body of communication; 
remolding, remodelling; swervings that tell the truth […] Woo[l]f’!135 
                                                 
132 Derrida 2008, p.29. 
133 Calarco 2008, p.149. 
134 John Llewelyn. ‘Where to Cut: Boucherie and Delikatessen.’ Research in Phenomenology 40:2 (2010), 
p.187. 
135 Haraway 2003, p.21. 
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5 
 
Quantum Materiality and Posthuman Life: The Waves 
 
Having discussed the relations between human and animal in the previous chapter, I will 
turn here to the ways in which Woolf, primarily in The Waves, engages with the 
materiality of ‘life itself’. This chapter will be divided into two main sections: the first 
part will discuss the relationship between Woolf’s writing and the philosophical 
implications of quantum physics, including how The Waves engages with many of the 
theoretical issues concerning materiality arising out of the new physics in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, before turning to the ways in which the novel 
anticipates more recent debates which include Karen Barad’s work on ‘agential realism’ 
and ‘intra-action’. In the second part of this chapter I consider the conceptualisation of 
‘life’ in Woolf’s novel, drawing especially on Eugene Thacker’s consideration of the 
distinction between ‘Life and the living’, Jane Bennett’s ‘vital materialism’ and 
Deleuze’s ‘assemblage’ or ‘haecceity’, and ‘pure immanence’. Throughout this chapter I 
argue that The Waves presents a posthuman ontology of life that is entangled in the 
immanent intra-actions of materiality. 
 
5.1 Woolf’s Philosophy-Physics 
5.1.1 ‘This table […] about to undergo an extraordinary transformation’ (W 97) 
In The Phantom Table Ann Banfield sets Woolf’s ‘table’ as the meeting place for her 
writings and the philosophy of Bertrand Russell and the Cambridge Apostles. As ‘the 
paradigmatic object of knowledge’ in the tradition of British Empiricism, the table is 
‘planted squarely in the centre of Woolf’s novelistic scenery’;1 a place where Woolf can 
gather together her thoughts on ‘[s]ubject and object and the nature of reality’ (TL 28) 
and, according to Banfield, a place that aligns Woolf with Russell’s theory of knowledge. 
In a recent article Timothy Mackin also discusses Woolf’s tables as central to her 
                                                 
1 Banfield 2000, p.66. 
  
205
engagement with philosophy, but argues that she is not, like Russell, ‘trying to provide 
the foundation for a realist epistemology’ so much as she is attempting to work through a 
relation between internal emotions and the external world.2 Whilst these important 
studies provide insights into Woolf’s philosophical engagement with her contemporaries 
– contradicting Michael Lackey’s view that to understand Woolf’s work we must ‘banish 
philosophy’3 – I would like to emphasise some aspects of Woolf’s exploration of 
epistemology and ontology, internal and external, subject and object, which extend 
beyond Russell’s theory of knowledge and can be thought about more broadly through a 
quantum ‘philosophy-physics’ (more on this terminology later) born out of Planck’s 
discovery of quanta in December 1900 (did human character change then, perhaps?), 
Bohr’s atom (1913), Einstein’s special theory (1905) and general theory (1916) of 
relativity, and the work on wave and particle theories of Heisenberg, de Broglie and 
Schrödinger amongst others.4 In their own distinct contributions, these scientific theories 
revealed, as Coole and Frost have recently put it, ‘that the empirical realm we stumble 
around in does not capture the truth or essence of matter in any ultimate sense and that 
matter is thus amenable to some new conceptions that differ from those upon which we 
habitually rely.’5 
Several critics have illuminated the possible routes through which Woolf may 
have had access to contemporary developments in philosophy and physics. Regarding 
philosophy, Banfield argues that Woolf would have been introduced to Descartes, Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume (whom she also read) by her father’s History of English Thought in 
the Eighteenth Century (1876) and others of his books,6 and Jaakko Hintikka has noted 
that Woolf learned Plato’s dialogues as a child.7 In relation to the new physics, Gillian 
                                                 
2 Timothy Makin. ‘Private Worlds, Public Minds: Woolf, Russell and Photographic Vision.’ Journal of 
Modern Literature 33:3 (2010), p.118. 
3 Michael Lackey. ‘Modernist Anti-Philosophicalism and Virginia Woolf's Critique of Philosophy.’ Journal 
of Modern Literature 29:4 (2006), 76-98, p.95. Lackey’s provocative analysis does, however,  provide an 
interesting general discussion of the changing role of philosophy in the twentieth century. 
4 For a brief contextual summary of these developments see Werner Heisenberg. Physics and Philosophy. 
London: Penguin, 2000 [1958],  p.3-13. For Russell’s own philosophical discussion of the developments in 
relativity and quantum mechanics see Analysis of Matter. London: Routledge, 1992 [1927]. 
5 Coole and Frost 2010, p.11. 
6 Banfield 2000, p.29.  
7 Jaakko Hintikka. ‘Virginia Woolf and Our Knowledge of the External World.’ The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 38:1 (1979),  p.14, fn.43. We also know now that Woolf studied Greek at King’s College 
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Beer has shown how Woolf assimilated ideas from the bestsellers by Arthur Eddington 
and James Jeans, whom she was reading whilst writing The Waves,8 and Sue Sun Yom 
notes that Woolf would have learned about wave-particle duality and other aspects of 
light through newspapers such as The Times and The Saturday Evening Post,9 as well as 
the Listener.10 In addition to these sources, we know that Woolf often listened to 
scientists on the radio,11 and she would have been exposed to both philosophy and 
science through the table talk of those around her: ‘Woolf, we might say, had a 
knowledge ex auditu of philosophy’.12 Regardless of which particular source most 
influenced Woolf’s thinking, critics such as Michael Whitworth have argued that insights 
provided by the new physics coalesced with Woolf’s own developing philosophical 
ideas.13  
When linking these ideas to the new physics Woolf’s use of the ‘atom’ is often 
referred to, a term that occurs too frequently in her writing to cite all instances here.14 
One example Whitworth draws attention to is from the 1908 section of The Years, when 
Eleanor contemplates the atomic formation of a cup, whilst pointing to the ‘vast gaps’ 
and ‘blank spaces’ in her knowledge: ‘[t]ake this cup for instance; she held it out in front 
of her. What was it made of? Atoms? And what were atoms, and how did they stick 
together? The smooth hard surface of the china with its red flowers seemed to her for a 
second a marvellous mystery’ (Y 134). Of particular relevance to this current chapter, 
another revealing occurrence is in Woolf’s diary entry from November 28th, 1928, when 
she is at the early stages of conceiving what would become The Waves – at this point 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ladies’ Department between 1897 and 1900. See Anna Snaith and Christine Kenyon-Jones. ‘Tilting at 
Universities: Virginia Woolf at King’s College London.’ Woolf Studies Annual 16 (2010), 1-44. 
8 Beer 1996, p.114. For a specific discussion on Jeans see Beer, ‘Wave, Atom, Dinosaur: Woolf's Science’. 
The English Literary Society of Japan. Tokyo: Kentkyusha Ltd, 2000. For an excellent discussion of the 
influence of Jeans’ astronomy on The Waves, see Holly Henry, Virginia Woolf and the Discourse of 
Science: The Aesthetics of Astronomy. Cambridge: CUP, 2003, p.93-107.  
9 Sun Yom. ‘Bio-graphy and the Quantum Leap: Waves, Particles, and Light as a Theory of Writing the 
Human Life.’ Texts and Contexts: Proceedings of the First Annual Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. Beth 
Rigel Daugherty and Eileen Barrett. New York: Pace UP, 1996, p.145. 
10 Beer 1996, p.113. 
11 Beer 2000, p.11. 
12 Banfield 2000, p.30. 
13 see Michael Whitworth. Einstein’s Wake: Relativity, Metaphor, and Modernist Literature. OUP, 2001, 
p.162; Beer 1996, p.113; Louise Westling, ‘Virginia Woolf and the Flesh of the World.’ New Literary 
History 30.4 (1999), p.856. 
14 See Whitworth 2005, p.178-180 and 2001, p.166-169. 
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‘The Moths’ – and thinking about her ‘position towards the inner & the outer’ and that 
‘some combination of them ought to be possible’. Woolf writes that she wants to  
 
saturate every atom. I mean to eliminate all waste, deadness, superfluity: to give the 
moment whole; whatever it includes. Say that the moment is a combination of thought; 
sensation; the voice of the sea. Waste, deadness, come from the inclusion of things that 
don't belong to the moment; […] I want to put practically everything in: yet to saturate. 
That is what I want to do in The Moths. It must include nonsense, fact, sordidity: but 
made transparent. (D3 209) 
 
The significance of this passage is emphasised by Deleuze, when in A Thousand Plateaus 
he and Guattari link it to their ‘haecceities’, and in Dialogues he links it to the ‘plane of 
immanance’, both concepts that I will go on to discuss in the second part of this chapter 
(see section 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). Additionally, in What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari 
link Woolf’s ‘atom’ to their conceptualisation of the ‘percept’, a nonsubjective, 
nonhuman perception. Woolf, they write, shows us ‘urban percepts, or those of the 
mirror’: ‘Characters can only exist, and the author can only create them, because they do 
not perceive but have passed into the landscape and are themselves part of the compound 
of sensations. […] It is Mrs Dalloway who perceives the town – but because she has 
passed into the town like “a knife through everything” and becomes imperceptible 
herself.’15 
The extent to which Woolf’s writing explores the more radical philosophical 
implications of quantum physics is the subject of Paul Tolliver Brown’s recent work on 
Woolf, Leslie Stephen and Einstein. Brown points out that whilst several studies on 
Woolf have suggested correlations between her writing and the new physics, critics ‘have 
yet to establish the specific ways in which the ideas she shared with the preeminent 
subatomic scientists of her time work into the characters and themes of some of her most 
important novels’.16 In an attempt to do just this Brown neatly presents how two tables in 
To the Lighthouse – one associated with Mr Ramsay and the other with Mrs Ramsay –  
                                                 
15 Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p.172; p.168. 
16 Paul Tolliver Brown. ‘Relativity, Quantum Physics, and Consciousness in Virginia Woolf's To the 
Lighthouse.’ Journal of Modern Literature 32:3 (2009), p.40.  
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signal Woolf’s move from the theory of relativity to some of the more profound aspects 
of quantum mechanics that Einstein found so difficult to accept:  
 
The difference between Woolf 's viewpoint and that of her father and Einstein makes 
itself apparent through the contrast between the table as an object of permeability and 
connectivity versus the table as an object of independence and separation. The dinner 
table that acts as Mrs. Ramsay's primary domain of influence and unification is 
juxtaposed in the novel with Mr. Ramsay’s kitchen table that represents the isolated and 
unperceived object […] Mr. Ramsay's table exists independently of its observation, 
whereas Mrs. Ramsay's table is a participatory “object,” interacting and changing with 
the forces of her consciousness.17 
 
Crucially, Mrs Ramsay is aligned with a quantum reality whereby the ‘holistic 
relationship to the world around her [] confounds the notion that subjects and objects are 
specifically located and bounded’.18 This would seem to go further than simply refusing 
to see the world as ‘an unbroken whole’ or having ‘not one table, but many’, as Banfield 
puts it;19 it is a world that ‘cannot be explained by any attempt at reducing them to their 
parts’.20 Brown then focuses on Mrs Ramsay and the lighthouse beam to illuminate his 
claim that they ‘simultaneously reflect and project each other, so distinguishing between 
the two entities is a misapplication of formal rationalization or an a priori assumption of 
distinctness between subjects and objects.’21 Instead of choosing between wholeness and 
the fragmentation of this whole, the debate is already elsewhere – beyond arguments that 
depend upon a Cartesian or a priori subject/object split. Brown points to Niels Bohr’s 
famous assertion that ‘we are both onlookers and actors in the great drama of existence’22 
and argues that Bohr shares Woolf’s sentiments that ‘reality is not contained within a 
single perceptual consciousness, nor does it exist as a collection of multiple but rigidly 
divided perceptual consciousnesses […] The reality depicted in To the Lighthouse seems 
to be composed of multiple interpenetrating consciousnesses interconnected with one 
                                                 
17 Brown 2009, p.47-48.  
18 Brown 2009, p.48. 
19 Banfield 2000, p.108. 
20 Brown 2009, p.53. 
21 Brown 2009, p.49. 
22 Niels Bohr. Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature. Cambridge: CUP, 1934, p.119.  
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another and loosely housed within fluid subjectivities and objectivities that interactively 
create, as well as observe, their environment.’ 23 Mrs Ramsay’s relationship with objects 
therefore appears to reveal what Karen Barad has described as ‘the heart of the lesson of 
quantum physics: we are a part of that nature that we seek to understand.’24  
 
5.1.2 Intra-actions: the Entanglement of Agency 
Quantum physics takes us away from a reality of dis/connecting individualities, where 
there is a leap beyond both traditional Newtonian realism (what Heisenberg calls 
‘dogmatic realism’)25 and Einsteinian realism.26 In Meeting the Universe Halfway (2007), 
Barad outlines her notion of an ‘agential realism’ which, influenced by Bohr, is not 
reliant on ‘subject-object, culture-nature, and word-world distinctions’.27 Drawing on the 
work of Haraway, Butler and Foucault in her reading of Bohr’s ‘philosophy-physics’,28 
Barad’s ‘posthumanist performative’29 approach to realism is one in which ‘[a]gency is 
not an attribute’ of a being or thing, subject or object, but is entangled in ‘the ongoing 
reconfigurations of the world’.30 This world is less about representation and more about 
‘naturalcultural practices’,31 and Barad’s neologism ‘intra-action’ captures the new terms 
of debate brought about by quantum philosophy-physics:  
 
“intra-action” signifies the mutual constitution of entangled agencies. That is, in contrast 
to the usual “interaction,” which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that 
precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognizes that distinct agencies do 
not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. It is important to note that the 
“distinct” agencies are only distinct in a relational, not an absolute, sense, that is, 
                                                 
23 Brown 2009, p.54. 
24 Karen Barad. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and 
Meaning. Durham & London: Duke UP, 2007, p.26. 
25 Heisenberg 2000 [1958], p.43. 
26 See Marilyn Slutzky Zucker. ‘Virginia Woolf's Uncertainty Principle of Language.’ Virginia Woolf : 
Three Centenary Celebrations, ed. Maria Cândida Zamith and Luísa Flora. Porto: Universidade do Porto, 
2007, p.151 and Christine Froula. Virginia Woolf and the Bloomsbury Avant-Garde. New York: Columbia 
UP, 2005, p.204. 
27 Barad 2007, p.129.  
28 Barad 2007, p.24. I am following Barad’s preference for this term, because for Bohr ‘physics and 
philosophy were one practice’. 
29 Barad 2007, p.135 (italics in original) 
30 Barad 2007, p.141. 
31 Barad 2007, p.135. 
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agencies are only distinct in relation to their mutual entanglement; they don’t exist as 
individual elements.32  
 
Barad reaches this conceptualisation of reality by distinguishing Bohr’s philosophy-
physics from the work of Heisenberg, locating their difference on the matter of 
epistemology and ontology. Heisenberg’s uncertainty is based on ‘disturbance’ and 
primarily concerned with epistemology (in other words, whilst we cannot know the value 
of a particle’s momentum due to the disturbance that measurement entails, it is 
nonetheless ‘assumed to exist independently of measurement’)33 whereas ‘Bohr is 
making a point about the nature of reality, not merely our knowledge of it’:34  
 
[f]or Bohr, the real issue is one of indeterminacy, not uncertainty […] He understands the 
reciprocal relation between position and momentum in semantic and ontic terms, and 
only derivatively in epistemic terms (i.e., we can’t know something definite about 
something for which there is nothing definite to know.) Bohr’s indeterminacy principle 
can be stated as follows: the values of complementary variables (such as position and 
momentum) are not simultaneously determinate. The issue is not one of unknowability 
per se; rather, it is a question of what can be said to simultaneously exist.35 
 
Whilst critics working on Woolf’s relationship to the new physics have been keen 
to indicate examples of these ideas in her writings, it is often Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
that is focused on. For example, Zucker speaks of Woolf’s ‘uncertainty principle of 
language’, whereby her ‘literary “experiments”’36 are characterised by ‘disrupted syntax, 
                                                 
32 Barad 2007, p.33. 
33 Barad 2007, p.116. It is for this reason that one of the few literary references in Barad’s book comes 
when she takes issue with the question posed by T.S. Eliot’s Prufrock: ‘Do I dare disturb the universe?’: 
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34 Barad 2007, p.19. This is Barad’s own elaboration of his insights, and she notes that Bohr himself was 
focused on experiments in lab, less concerned with larger ontological implications’ (334). As ‘the 
cornerstones of the Copenhagen interpretation’ complimentarity and uncertainty ‘constitute fundamentally 
different, indeed arguably incompatible, interpretive positions’ (115). Barad notes that a commonly 
unreported fact is that ‘Heisenberg acquiesced to Bohr’s interpretation: it is complementarily that is at 
issue, not uncertainty’ (20). 
35 Barad 2007, p.118. ‘This can be contrasted with Schrodinger’s notion of entanglement, which is 
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ambiguous referents, apparent contradictions’ among other features.37 In addition, there is 
sometimes the very confusion between uncertainty and indeterminacy that Barad warns 
against – this is seen when Sun Yom talks of Heisenberg’s ‘indeterminacy principle’ 
(with no mention of Bohr)38 and also when Louise Westling comments on ‘[t]he 
indeterminacy of our access to accurate knowledge, which Heisenberg's Uncertainty 
Principle clearly established early in the century’.39 The fact that Brown, in the 
aforementioned study, therefore aligns Woolf with Bohr is important, and the reality he 
finds in To the Lighthouse where ‘fluid subjectivities and objectivities […] interactively 
create, as well as observe, their environment’ seems to point towards this notion of ‘intra-
action’.   
In all of Woolf’s writing I would suggest that the mutual entanglement of agency 
created by (and creating) intra-actions is perhaps most clearly evident in Bernard’s 
summing up in The Waves when he attempts ‘to break off, here at this table, what I call 
“my life”, it is not one life that I look back upon; I am not one person; I am many people; 
I do not altogether know who I am – Jinny, Susan, Neville, Rhoda, or Louis; or how to 
distinguish my life from theirs’ (W 230). It seems more than a coincidence that Bernard 
is accompanied by a table here as this key distinction between inter- and intra-action is 
brought to the fore, where the former is associated with epistemological uncertainty 
(there are six beings, I just do not know which one I am) and the latter with ontological 
indeterminacy (I cannot know which of these beings I am, because we are not distinct and 
separated).40 It is several pages later, however, that the question of whether Bernard is 
describing a purely epistemic concern or an ontological one becomes clearer. Bernard, 
now ‘begin[ning] to doubt the fixity of tables’,41 asks: ‘“Who am I?” I have been talking 
of Bernard, Neville, Jinny, Susan, Rhoda and Louis. Am I all of them? Am I one and 
                                                 
37 Zucker 2007, p.147. 
38 Sun Yom 1996, p.146. 
39 Westling 1999, p.868. 
40 Erica Roebbelen has linked this move away from Newtonian individuality to Woolf’s anti-imperialist 
project in The Waves. She points, for example, to the entanglements of the main characters and lack of a 
clearly positioned narrator as evidence of Woolf ‘drawing attention to the disintegration of many of the 
facets of imperialism inherent in classical physics through form in The Waves.’ See ‘Manifestations of 
Twentieth-century Physics in Virginia Woolf's The Waves: Undermining the Ideological Foundations of the 
British Imperial Project.’ Erudito 1 (2010), n. pag. 
41 Michael Whitworth also sees Bernard’s doubting of the table’s solidity as an ontological matter – terming 
it ‘ontological insecurity’ – and, whilst emphasising the influence of Russell here, like Gillian Beer he also 
points to the striking similarities between Eddington and Woolf. See Whitworth 2001, p.161. 
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distinct?’ As Bernard concludes ‘I do not know’ (W 240), there is a sense in which there 
is no clear answer to know other than where ‘[k]nowing is a matter of intra-acting […] 
not a bounded or closed practice but an ongoing performance of the world.’42 Such a 
network of ‘material-discursive’ intra-action,43 where meaning and matter are entangled, 
is reinforced when Bernard ‘cannot find any obstacle separating us. There is no division 
between me and them. As I talked I felt, “I am you”. This difference we make so much 
of, this identity we so feverishly cherish, was overcome’ (W 241). As Deleuze and 
Guattari claim when speaking of The Waves: ‘each of these characters, with his or her 
name, its individuality, designates a multiplicity […] is simultaneously in this multiplicity 
and at its edge, and crosses over into the others.’44 
Bernard goes on to describe ‘patterns of marks on bodies’45 caused by the intra-
active dynamism of his friends: ‘Here on my brow is the blow I got when Percival fell. 
Here on the nape of my neck is the kiss Jinny gave Louis. My eyes fill with Susan’s tears. 
I see far away, quivering like a gold thread, the pillar Rhoda saw, and feel the rush of the 
wind of her flight when she lept’ (W 241). That Jinny does not actually kiss Bernard, or 
that his eyes cannot in reality be filled with ‘Susan’s tears’, does not mean that this is all 
in his imagination. It is possible to think of them as material marks of intra-action where 
‘[c]onnectivity does not require physical contiguity. (Spatially separate particles in an 
entangled state do not have separate identities but rather are part of the same 
phenomena.)’.46 As Barad clarifies: ‘physics tells us that edges or boundaries are not 
determinate either ontologically or visually. When it comes to the “interface” between a 
coffee mug and a hand, it is not that there are x number of atoms that belong to a hand 
and y number of atoms that belong to the coffee mug.’ 47 When Bernard ‘come[s] to 
shape here at this table between [his] hands the story of [his] life’ (W 241), his conclusion 
returns us to his statement near the beginning of the novel that ‘when we sit together, 
close [ …] we melt into each other with phrases. We are edged with mist’ (W 11). Not 
                                                 
42 Barad 2007, p.149.  
43 Barad 2007, p.141.  
44 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.278. 
45 Barad 2007, p.140. 
46 Barad 2007, p.377. 
47 Barad 2007, p.156. 
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only is the ‘interface’ between his hand and the table indeterminate, but between him and 
his friends too. 
 
5.1.3 Naturalcultural Phenomena  
Rather than a reality consisting of individuated subjects and objects, a quantum reading 
of The Waves emphasises a reality consisting of ‘phenomena’, as foundational units 
which include all features in a given experimental arrangement: 
 
Phenomena are constitutive of reality. Parts of the world are always intra-acting with 
other parts of the world, and it is through specific intra-actions that a differential sense of 
being – with boundaries, properties, cause, and effect – is enacted in the ongoing ebb and 
flow of agency. There are no preexisting, separately determinate entities called “humans” 
that are either detached spectators or necessary components of all intra-actions. Rather, to 
the extent that “humans” emerge as having a role to play in the constitution of specific 
phenomena, they do so as part of the larger material reconfiguration, or rather the 
ongoing reconfiguring, of the world. Thus no a priori privileged status is given to the 
human […] “Humans” are emergent phenomena like all other physical systems.48 
 
Shared among agencies that can only be locally determined,49 this notion of reality is 
posthumanist, where ‘[r]efusing the anthropocentrisms of humanism and antihumanism, 
posthumanism marks the practice of accounting for the boundary-making practices by 
which the “human” and its others are differentially delineated and defined […] it refuses 
the idea of a natural (or, for that matter, a purely cultural) division between nature and 
culture, calling for an accounting of how this boundary is actively configured and 
reconfigured.’ Posthumanism challenges the hierarchical arrangement of the materiality 
of life which would place humans at the summit: ‘Posthumanism does not presume that 
man is the measure of all things […] Posthumanism doesn’t presume the separateness of 
any-“thing,” let alone the alleged spatial, ontological, and epistemological distinction that 
sets humans apart.’50 Where my previous chapter turned away from an anthropocentric 
relation between humans and animals, the issue here is a move away from a human-
                                                 
48 Barad 2007, p.338. 
49 Barad 2007, p.175. 
50 Barad 2007, p.136. 
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centred form of interaction between individual things and beings and towards a 
posthuman form of intra-actions of ‘emergent phenomena’ where ‘it is through such 
practices that the differential boundaries between humans and nonhumans, culture and 
nature, science and the social, are constituted.’51  
If intra-action depends upon the naturalcultural entanglements52 of agencies both 
human and nonhuman (and beyond this distinction), then from the beginning of The 
Waves there are examples of such a reality. Louis’s very embodiment seems to be 
erotically intertwined with the earth at the same time as it is marked by Jinny’s kiss:  
 
I am rooted to the middle of the earth. My body is a stalk. I press the stalk. A drop oozes 
from the whole at the mouth and slowly, thickly, grows larger and larger. Now something 
pink passes the eye-whole. Now a beam is slid through the chink. Its beam strikes me. I 
am a boy in a grey flannel suit. She has found me. I am struck on the nape of the neck. 
She has kissed me (W 8). 
 
With this kiss the nature/culture distinction is ‘shattered’ (W 8), and the humanist 
privilege given to individualism challenged, as Louis wishes to escape his other-ised 
identity – as Rhoda would say, having ‘to go through the antics of the individual’ (W 
186) – and ‘be unseen’ (W 8). This is emphasised a few pages later when Louis, again 
aware of his Australian accent, does not privilege knowledge over nature; the fact that he 
‘know[s] the lesson by heart’ including the grammatical rules of ‘cases’ and ‘genders’, 
and his (admittedly egotistical) view that he ‘could know everything in the world’ is less 
important than the sense that his ‘roots are threaded, like fibres in a flower-pot, round and 
round about the world’ (W 14). Significantly, the friend he then attempts to ‘imitate’ is 
‘Bernard softly lisping Latin’. Rather than choosing Neville, with his belief that words 
and grammatical systems show ‘[t]here is an order in this world; there are distinctions’ 
(W 15), in Bernard he has chosen to imitate the character most attuned to the complexity 
and instability (later to be inadequacy) of language with words that ‘flick their tails’ as he 
                                                 
51 Barad 2007, p.140. 
52 Barad is sharing this notion of ‘naturecultures’ with Donna Haraway. In When Species Meet, Haraway 
notes an affinity between Barad and herself: They ‘are in firm solidarity that this theory [of intra-action and 
agential realism] richly applies to animals entangled in relations of scientific practice.’ Haraway 2008, 
p.331, fn.4. 
  
215
speaks them, ‘now this way, now that way, moving all together, now dividing, now 
coming together’ (W 14). This is Bernard who himself seems to reject the primacy of 
human knowledge and instead evokes the perfect description of quantum-inspired intra-
action: ‘To speak of knowledge is futile. All is experiment and adventure. We are forever 
mixing ourselves with unknown quantities’ (W 97). As Erica Roebbelen has noted, ‘[t]he 
characters in The Waves express an increasingly diminished confidence in the human 
capacity to know throughout the novel.’53 
Being rooted to the earth does not mean being rooted in a fixed and eternal way to 
a solid and external earth. In other words, materiality does not consist of distinct and solid 
parts attached to one another (e.g. ‘the earth’ and ‘the human’), rather ‘everything  [even 
the ‘hard ground’] dances – the net, the grass; your faces leap like butterflies; the trees 
seem to jump up and down. There is nothing staid, nothing settled, in this universe. All is 
rippling, all is dancing; all is quickness and triumph’ (W 35). Later, when Louis’ body is 
this time linked to his being identified as ‘the best scholar in the school’, it is 
‘unenviable’ – thus when the body is not conceived of in its dynamic intra-actions it is an 
unwanted relic of individualism, of the self that defines Louis as an outsider because of 
his accent. Importantly, this does not mean that Louis wishes to escape the material world 
and delve into some mystic otherworldliness;54 on the contrary it is in ‘put[ting] off’ this 
particular image of the body that he can ‘inhabit space’ (W 41). Perhaps Louis is again 
following Bernard, who perfectly captures this move from representation (and identity) to 
intra-action: ‘I am only superficially represented by what I was saying tonight. 
Underneath, and, at the moment when I am most disparate, I am also integrated’ (W 62). 
To intra-act is to be ‘inextricably involved’ (W 60); to be ‘integrated’ at the same time as 
‘disparate’, is to feature within Bohrian phenomena. We can also think here about the 
                                                 
53 See Roebbelen 2010. We could align this intra-acting of humans and nonhuman ‘unknown quantities’ 
with Johanna Garvey’s sharp reading of Mrs Dalloway where London becomes a liquid cityscape, and 
human consciousness is inextricably part of it: ‘various forms of water imagery transform – as they also 
create – the city and Bourton, present and past, along with all of the consciousnesses to which the narrator 
has access’ (73). As we see ‘the consciousness wandering through’ – or rather swimming through – the 
city, Garvey argues ‘that consciousness and city are becoming indistinguishable […] Not only does the 
cityscape undergo metamorphoses, but the characters themselves are also often transformed through 
comparison to persons, objects, even animals associated with the aqueous element’ (60; 67). See 
‘Difference and Continuity: The Voices of Mrs Dalloway.’ College English 53:1 (1991). 
54 Julia Kane has, however, argued that quantum physics is entangled with differing forms of mysticism. 
See ‘Varieties of Mystical Experience in the Writings of Virginia Woolf.’ Twentieth Century Literature 
41:4 (1995), 328-49. 
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narrative style of The Waves, the way in which direct speech is used for each character 
and a new paragraph is always taken before a new character speaks, and yet these 
monologues nonetheless seem to be integrated.  
That Neville, arguably the character most attached to the idea of individuality and 
fixity, is involved in one of the clearest affirmations of intra-action in The Waves gives 
weight to the view that Woolf is engaging with this notion of reality. Having earlier 
‘hate[d] wanderings and mixing things together’ (W 11), Neville then laments that the 
choice to follow this identity or that leads to the conclusion that ‘[c]hange is no longer 
possible. We are committed’ (W 178). Now seeing past the ‘narrow limits’ of the identity 
he (thinks he) is known by, he is ‘immeasurable; a net whose fibres pass imperceptibly 
beneath the world’ (W 178). Similar to Louis’ body and the earth, what is at stake here is 
not two distinct elements – one being ‘the world’ and the other the ‘net’ (or himself); 
rather the net captures Neville’s intra-actions within the world, the ‘net is almost 
indistinguishable from that which it surrounds’ (W 178). Again there is no pre-
determined internal and external, or separation between matter and meaning, in this 
material-discursive world; or, as Susan says, ‘I cannot be divided, or kept apart’ (W 79) – 
a comment which echoes Heisenberg’s view that quantum physics ‘makes the sharp 
separation between the world and I impossible’.55 The ‘I’ in Susan’s statement is already 
more than a defined, distinct human individual:  
 
I am the field, I am the barn, I am the trees; mine are the flocks of birds, and this young 
hare who leaps, at the last moment when I step almost on him. Mine is the heron that 
stretches its vast wings lazily; and the cow that creaks as it pushes one foot before 
another munching; and the wild, swooping swallow; and the faint red in the sky, and the 
green when the red fades; the silence and the bell; the call of the man fetching car-horses 
from the fields (W 78)  
 
As in Between the Acts, ‘[s]heep, cows, grass, trees, ourselves – all are one. If discordant 
producing harmony’ (BA 157).56 What Susan cannot be divided from then is a 
                                                 
55 Heisenberg 2000 [1958], p.43. 
56 For more on Woolf’s cows and the intermingling of human and nonhuman elements in Between the Acts 
see Westling 1999. See also section 4.5 of this thesis for a brief discussion of cows in Flush: A Biography. 
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multiplicitous ‘I’ which includes creaking cows and an array of other nonhuman 
elements: ‘I am not a woman, but the light that falls on this gate, on this ground. I am the 
seasons, I think sometimes, January, May, November; the mud, the mist, the dawn’ (W 
79). Blurring the boundaries between human and nature in order to refuse any fixed 
concept of human nature, Woolf is here providing a naturalcultural picture of intra-action 
which rejects the notion of hierarchical distinctions between human and nonhuman, 
culture and nature. 
It is important that all of the characters in The Waves are part of these 
naturalcultural intra-actions, even if their feelings about such entanglements differ. 
Writing of Woolf’s ‘mood waves’, John Briggs links the novel to both chaos theory and 
neuroscience (in particular the nonlinearity of the brain) in order to emphasise that in 
Woolf’s vision of reality ‘it is not the mood itself that matters, but the way in which a 
mood – whether positive or negative – punctures the surface of everyday life, shatters for 
an instant habits of mind and emotion’.57 Taking on board the (often sudden) fluctuations 
from exultation to depression in the novel, Briggs posits that  
 
Woolf’s mood waves function at different scales: on the level of the novel as a whole, 
within sections, within sentences […] Like real waves – which even as they are rising and 
seem coherent, are, in fact, dissipating and incipient with the very disorder that will soon 
bring them down – Woolf’s mood waves contain wavelets, and wavelets within wavelets, 
a fractal structure. This rhythmic action – and the rhythmic eddying action within action – 
imbues her work with its paradoxical atmosphere of both infinite variety and wholeness.58  
 
Here Briggs’ talk of ‘action within action’ sounds a lot like intra-action, and the 
‘paradoxical atmosphere of both infinite variety and wholeness’ might be the reality of 
entanglements which do not adhere to an internal/external logic, but are always, as Barad 
writes, concerned with ‘exteriority within’.59 In relation to the characters in The Waves, 
the point is not that they the same, with consistent emotions and reactions, but neither 
                                                 
57 John Briggs. ‘Nuance, Metaphor and the Rhythm of the Mood Wave in Virginia Woolf.’ Virginia Woolf 
Miscellanies: Proceedings of the First Annual Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. Mark Hussey and Vara 
Neverow-Turk. New York: Pace UP, 1992, p.110. 
58 Briggs 1992, p.109. 
59 Barad 2007, p.93. 
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should they be thought of as fully distinct and separate individuals simply interacting 
with one another and with an external environment. This chapter will now go on to 
discuss the ways in which Woolf’s exposition of reality in The Waves as the 
entanglement of agencies that do not adhere to the opposition of between subject/object 
and internal/external can be aligned with an exploration of the concept of ‘life’. To what 
extent is an ontology of quantum realism founded on intra-action of human/nonhuman 
phenomena actually an ontology of ‘life in itself’?  
 
5.2 Woolf’s Life-Assemblages 
5.2.1 Life and The Living 
‘What is an assemblage? It is a multiplicity which is made up of many heterogeneous 
terms and which establishes liasons, relations between them, across ages, sexes and 
reigns – different natures. Thus, the assemblage’s only unity is that of co-functioning: it 
is a symbiosis, a ‘sympathy’.60 
 
In his recent book, After Life (2010), Eugene Thacker argues that there are two central 
challenges when considering the term ‘life’ in our contemporary context: ‘One of these 
challenges is to refuse a dichotomous concept of life, as caught between the poles of 
reductionism and mysticism, scientificity and religiosity, the empirical and romantic 
notions of life. […] This opens onto a second challenge, and that is the pervasive 
anthropomorphism of the concept “life”.’61 In The Waves, I would like to suggest that 
Woolf is also considering the possibilities of a concept of life that is neither divided 
between a naïve realism and idealism, nor human-centred. That is not to say Woolf’s 
conceptualisation of life is always consistent, however. This section will focus in the first 
instance on some of the occasions when we can see Woolf pointing to potential 
contradictions in a concept of life, and secondly when we witness her moving beyond this 
to experiment with and suggest notions of life as non-anthropocentric, immanent 
assemblages.  
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At the beginning of the concluding section of The Waves, Bernard conjures a 
‘life’ that is possessed by him whilst at the same time acknowledging that it is beyond his 
grasp, that life cannot be captured by, or reduced to, the human:  
 
“The illusion is upon me that something adheres for a moment, has roundness, weight, 
depth, is completed. This, for the moment, seems to be my life. If it were possible, I 
would hand it you entire. I would break it off as one breaks off a bunch of grapes. I would 
say, ‘Take it. This is my life.’  
      “But unfortunately, what I see (this globe, full of figures) you do not see. You see me, 
sitting at a table opposite you, a rather heavy, elderly man, grey at the temples. (W 199) 
 
On the one hand Bernard presents an image of ‘life’ as unified and tangible, under the 
control of its human possessor, but on the other hand this vision is only a subjective 
perceptual ‘illusion’. This passage illuminates an important problem The Waves raises 
and attempts to work through in its exploration of life, namely that in Western philosophy 
there is an internal split in the concept ‘life’ between the immanent life of a human (or 
nonhuman) agent, and the transcendent life as the force by which that agent is living. In 
Thacker’s terms, this would be described as the difference between ‘Life’ and ‘the 
living’, which can be thought of as a problem that goes back to the roots of philosophical 
concerns – specifically, as Thacker points out, in terms of Aristotle’s De Anima and the 
concept of psukhē (usually translated as ‘soul’ but more accurately understood as ‘vital 
principle’ or ‘principle of life’).62 The contradiction inherent to Aristotle’s psukhē is that 
on the one hand ‘there is no thing called “life-in-itself” that is ever present apart from its 
formal, dynamic, and temporal instantiations in the variety of living beings’ and on the 
other hand ‘Aristotle does not dispense with the archē-of-life altogether. He seems to 
imply its necessary existence if one is to think something like “life” at all’.63 
There is further evidence in Woolf’s novel of this tension inherent in psukhē 
between Life and the living, transcendence and immanence. Life is described as a discrete 
entity apart from the human by Neville, at the same time as it is connected to him. It is 
therefore seen as an obstacle to self-progress: ‘my life was unavailing’ (W 18). When life 
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is connected to the living, grammatical conventions often lead to it being possessed by a 
subject (and therefore by language itself); there are several other examples throughout the 
book when characters refer to ‘my life’. These provide instances of the possessive life 
used by Neville (W 37), Louis (W 41), Susan (W 48), Rhoda (W 169) and Bernard (W 
243), where, for example, ‘my life’ for Neville, Louis and Susan signals temporal life tied 
to their experience as ‘the living’. Intriguingly, it is Jinny who never refers in the novel to 
‘my life’ in this way, perhaps supporting the view of some critics have of her as most 
attuned to the nonhuman (more on this later). But as we have already seen in the above 
quotations from Bernard, and in relation to quantum philosophy-physics, the ‘my’ in 
question cannot be easily joined to a distinct, fully individuated subject (the same way 
that Susan’s ‘I’ is already more than a clearly-defined human individual – see above); it is 
a multiplicitous ‘my’ – as Louis puts it, ‘my many-folded life’ (W 138).64 
These examples are only hints in the text of the paradoxical, perhaps 
counterintuitive, notion of life founded on indeterminacy. But what moves The Waves 
beyond a concern with Life and the living as the irreconcilable conflict between 
transcendence and immanence is Woolf’s exploration of life as a 
nonanthropocentric/nontheistic, vital force. Although Bernard’s thoughts suggest the 
elusiveness of ‘life’, it is never a question of sublimating it within a theological 
framework. Slightly later in the novel he again betrays an awareness of this illusory 
nature of life and the pretence of human agency over it as though it is an object to be 
captured and cultivated: ‘Let us again pretend that life is a solid substance shaped like a 
globe, which we turn about in our fingers. Let us pretend that we can make out a plain 
and logical story, so that when one matter is despatched – love for instance – we go on, in 
an orderly manner, to the next’ (W 210). In the sentences before this, Bernard claims that 
‘what one needs is nothing consecutive but a bark, a groan’, and true to this his 
conceptualisation of life does not correspond to a wholeness which unfolds in an orderly 
progression as time passes; it is only pretending to be so. What is also interesting is the 
way in which this pretence that life is a tangible, solid object under control of human 
                                                 
64 We might think here of Deleuze’s concept of ‘the fold’ which disrupts simple interior/exterior relations 
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221
agency does open onto a material conceptualisation of ‘life’. In other words, it is not so 
much a pretence about the materiality of life as it is about the role of human agency in 
this materiality. This recalls Woolf’s view of ‘human beings not always in their relation 
to each other but in relation to reality’ (RO 149), or, as Deleuze and Guattari put it in 
Anti-Oedipus, ‘a bit of relation to the outside, a little real reality.’65  
This question of the materiality of life therefore takes us back to issues that have 
been central throughout this thesis, starting with my discussion in chapter one where 
Woolf’s figuration taken from the natural world of ‘granite’ and ‘rainbow’ complicated 
and undermined the binaries of fact/fiction, solid/intangible, materiality/theory and, in the 
context of this current discussion, we might say immanence/transcendence. Towards the 
end of The Waves ‘life’ for Bernard demonstrates both solidity and intangibility 
intermingling:  
 
The crystal, the globe of life as one calls it, far from being hard and cold to the touch, has 
walls of thinnest air. If I press them all will burst. Whatever sentence I extract whole and 
entire from this cauldron is only a string of six little fish that let themselves be caught 
while a million others leap and sizzle, making the cauldron bubble like boiling silver, and 
slip through my fingers. Faces recur, faces and faces – they press their beauty to the walls 
of my bubble – Neville, Susan, Louis, Jinny, Rhoda and a thousand others. How 
impossible to order them rightly; to detach one separately, or to give the effect of the 
whole – again like music. What a symphony, with its concord and its discord and its 
tunes on top and its complicated bass beneath, then grew up! (W 214) 
 
Just as music is a key inspiration for Braidotti’s concept of transpositions, also discussed 
in chapter one of this thesis, Woolf is here emphasising the musicality of the ‘transversal 
transfer’66 or, as she writes in the above quote, ‘leap and sizzle’ of qualitative 
multiplicities (see section 3.4 and 3.5). Like ‘a symphony with its concord and its 
discord’, life is material but evasive; it is ‘faces and faces’ against ‘walls of thinnest air’. 
Woolf is also describing the transpositions of language here, where, as Braidotti puts it, 
‘words grow, split and multiply, sprouting new roots or side branches and resonating with 
                                                 
65 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1984], p.367. 
66 Braidotti 2006, p.5. 
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all kinds of echoes and musical variations’ (see section 1.4).67 This again recalls 
‘Craftsmanship’ where Woolf describes words as ‘many-sided, flashing this way, then 
that’ (E6 97), and also those passages we have looked at in The Waves where the relations 
between the friends are based on an ontological indeterminacy. But where Woolf’s novel 
presents the meeting of quantum indeterminacy and ‘some rapid unapprehended life’ (W 
203), it does so with an emphasis on the creative potential for locally determinate 
arrangements. 
 
5.2.2 Things, Assemblages and Walking Haecceities 
materiality is always something more than “mere” matter: an excess, force, vitality, 
relationality, or difference that renders matter active, self-creative, productive, 
unpredictable.68 
 
In the first part of this chapter I highlighted some of the ways in which The Waves rejects 
a realism founded on humanist individualism in favour of a posthumanist, material and 
creative, array of intra-actions formed out of indeterminacy, and in the preceding section 
(5.2.1) I suggested that Woolf’s novel explores a nonanthropocentric/nontheistic 
conceptualisation of life. Crucial to this conceptualisation is the agency of nonhuman 
animals, but also seemingly inanimate objects. In Vibrant Matter, Jane Bennett calls this 
‘thing-power’, or ‘the curious ability of inanimate things to animate, to act, to produce 
effects dramatic and subtle’69: ‘A primordial swerve says that the world is not 
determined, that an element of chanciness resides at the heart of things, but it also affirms 
that so-called inanimate things have a life, that deep within is an inexplicable vitality or 
energy, a moment of independence from and resistance to us and other bodies.’70 This 
‘chanciness’ and ‘inexplicable’ force is reminiscent of Niels Bohr’s philosophy-physics, 
of an indeterminacy ingrained in the quantum materiality of life. It also shares similar 
aims with Braidotti’s call for a ‘vital politics of life itself, which means external non-
human relations, life as zoē, or generative force. The “others” in question here are non-
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anthropomorphic and include planetary forces.’71  Along with her aims to replace a focus 
on subjectivity with one on ‘developing a vocabulary and syntax for, and thus a better 
discernment of, the active powers issuing from nonsubjects’ and to create a political 
analysis that includes the ‘contributions of nonhuman actants’, Bennett, like Braidotti, is 
keen to dispel the onto-theological binary of life and matter.72 She follows a Spinozan-
Bergsonian-Deleuzian tract to ultimately posit a ‘vital materialism’ which is thoroughly 
nonanthropocentric and nontheistic: ‘What I am calling impersonal affect or material 
vibrancy is not a spiritual supplement of “life force” added to the matter said to house it. 
Mine is not a vitalism in the traditional sense; I equate affect with materiality, rather than 
posit a separate force that can enter and animate a physical body.’73  
In The Waves, Bernard’s denunciation of possessions might paradoxically be seen 
as an affirmation of the force of ‘things’. Leaving possessions behind would really be a 
affirmative letting go of human power over them (and the illusion of human power over 
life), a reconceptualisation of life as intra-actions between an array of nonhuman as well 
as human agencies. As such, there would be a positive disavowal of ‘life’ as a possession 
and a move from a human subject-centred conceptualisation of life-as-object towards an 
affirmation of life as vibrant matter. In the following passage where he contemplates his 
impending marriage, Bernard denounces individual ownership of objects and of ‘life’.  
 
But I do not wish […] to assume the burden of individual life. I, who have been since 
Monday, when she accepted me, charged in every nerve with a sense of identity, who 
                                                 
71 Rosi Braidotti. ‘On Putting the Active Back into Activism.’ New Formations 68 (2009), p.48. Zoē for 
Braidotti is affirmative, it is life as inhuman, generative, vital force. This is not to be confused with Giorgio 
Agamben’s zoē or ‘bare life’ which, Braidotti argues, is linked with a philosophy of finitude and a politics 
of loss and melancholia (Braidotti 2007). See Agamben. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. California: Stanford UP, 1998, p.1-11 and Braidotti 2006, p.36-43; 129-138; 
232-236. 
72 Bennett 2010, p.ix; x. Bennett is utilising Bruno Latour’s term ‘actant’ taken from Actor-Network 
Theory. An actant is ‘something that acts or to which activity is granted by others. It implies no special 
motivation of human individual actors, nor of humans in general.’ See ‘On Actor-Network Theory: A Few 
Clarifications.” Soziale Welt 47:4 (1996): 369-381. For more on Latour and ANT see Reassembling the 
Social: An Introductuion to Actor-Network Theory. Oxford: OUP, 2005. 
73 Bennett is influenced here by Deleuze and Guattari’s term ‘material vitalism’ in A Thousand Plateaus. 
See Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.454. For a discussion of the influence of the vitalisms of Hans 
Driesche’s ‘Entelechy’ and Bergson’s ‘élan vital’ on her see Bennett 2010, p.62-81. Bennett explains how 
‘Driesch and Bergson, in their attempts to give philosophical voice to the vitality of things, came very close 
to articulating a vital materialism. But they stopped short: they could not imagine a materialism adequate to 
the vitality they discerned in natural processes. (Instead, they dreamed of a not-quite-material life force.)’ 
(63). 
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could not see a tooth-brush in a glass without saying, ‘My tooth-brush,’ now wish to 
unclasp my hands and let fall my possessions, and merely stand here in the street, taking 
no part, watching the omnibuses, without desire; without envy; with what would be 
boundless curiosity about human destiny if there were any longer an edge to my mind. 
But it has none. I have arrived; am accepted. I ask nothing. (W 92) 
 
One striking aspect of this passage is that Bernard seems to move from a view of 
‘individual life’ as life possessed by the living (human), to a more humble form of human 
agency. As Tamlyn Monson notes, ‘Bernard experiences a feeling of claustrophobic 
horror at this phenomenon of individual life, which, he finds, is driven by agency 
exercised in response to “necessity”’.74 Although Bernard expresses the wish to consider 
‘human destiny’ apart from his own involvement in that destiny, he realises that he 
cannot erase himself entirely – ‘taking no part’, ‘without desire’, ‘without envy’ – from a 
consideration of life. This impossibility has less to do with negation than it does a very 
challenging of the subject-object relationship on which negation depends; what is more 
important is that there is no longer ‘an edge to [his] mind’, a clear border between his 
internal focus and external forces. Rather than a conscious relinquishing of possessions 
there is the realisation that he has already ‘arrived’ and is ‘accepted’ at this place where 
relations are not primarily between subject and object; the move from the ‘individual life’ 
to ‘omnipresent, general life’ (W 92), the ‘general impulse’ (W 93) into which he can 
‘sink down, deep, into what passes’ (W 92).  
Passages such as these in The Waves could then be an example of what Deleuze 
and Guattari describe as an ‘assemblage’ which includes ‘semiotic flows, material flows, 
and social flows simultaneously’75 and has ‘has neither base nor superstructure, neither 
deep structure nor superficial structure, it flattens all of its dimensions and mutual 
insertions play themselves out’.76 This more unassuming and shared notion of agency can 
also be understood as intra-acting with the ‘vitality’ and ‘energy’ of Bennett’s materialist 
‘thing-power’,77 and Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage is crucial to Bennett’s theory. 
                                                 
74 Tamlyn Monson. “‘A Trick of the Mind’: Alterity, Ontology, and Representation in Virginia Woolf’s 
The Waves.” Modern Fiction Studies 50:1 (2004), p.181. 
75 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.25. 
76 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.95. 
77 Bennett 2010, p.18. 
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We see the forming of a collective assemblage where instead of ‘standing in the street, 
taking no part’: ‘Am I not, as I walk, trembling with strange oscillations and vibrations of 
sympathy, which, unmoored as I am from a private being, bid me embrace these 
engrossed flocks; these starers and trippers; these errand-boys and furtive and fugitive 
girls who, ignoring their doom, look in at shop-windows?’ (W 93) The inadequacy of 
‘life’ that does not involve the human at all, one that is therefore transcendent of the self 
(as in Bernard’s above description of wanting to watch with no desire), is replaced by the 
turn towards multiplicitous intra-actions with the living, the creation of assemblages 
which include nonhuman as well as human agents,78 ‘[t]he growl of the traffic [which] 
might be any uproar – forest trees or the roar of wild beasts’ at the same time as 
‘sensations, spontaneous and irrelevant, of curiosity, greed, desire’ (W 93). Seen in light 
of Bennett’s vital materialism, the shop-windows in the above quotation are as much a 
part of the assemblage here as the ‘furtive and fugitive girls’ who look in them, in a 
similar sense in which I discussed Susan’s naturalcultural entanglements (in section 
5.1.3), where her ‘I’ signalled a multiplicity of human and nonhuman elements. 
Bernard shows further signs of entering into assemblages with the nonhuman 
towards the end of the novel: 
 
“Silence falls; silence falls,” said Bernard. “But now listen, tick, tick; hoot, hoot; the 
world has hailed us back to it. I heard for one moment the howling winds of darkness as 
we passed beyond life. Then tick, tick (the clock); then hoot, hoot (the cars). We are 
landed; we are on shore; we are sitting, six of us, at a table. It is the memory of my nose 
that recalls me. I rise; ‘Fight,’ I cry, ‘fight!’ remembering the shape of my own nose and 
strike with this spoon upon this table pugnaciously.” (W 188) 
  
Here I would claim that the passing ‘beyond life’ is not a transcendent escape from 
reality, but a subversion of a transcendent concept of life. Bernard is sonically attuned to 
the clock and the cars, which are materially intra-acting with the six friends at the table. It 
                                                 
78 This intermingling of human and nonhuman is also prominent in Between the Acts, as several eco-critical 
readings have suggested. For example see Isabel Andrés. ‘“O Let’s Keep Together!” The Blurring of 
Individual Consciousness in Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts.’ Consciousness, Literature and the Arts 
7:3 (2006), n.pag.; Kelly Sultzbach. ‘The Fertile Potential of Virginia Woolf’s Environmental Ethic.’ Woolf 
and the Art of Exploration: Selected Papers from the Fifteenth Annual Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. H 
H Southworth and E Kay. Clemson: Clemson UP, 2006: 71-8; and Westling 1999.  
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is these nonhuman and human entanglements that spark Bernard to rally and ‘fight’ in 
contrast to the nihilism expressed in the preceding lines by Susan, Rhoda and Louis 
(importantly, it is Jinny who offers the most optimistic viewpoint – something I will 
consider further below): 
 
“In this silence,” said Susan, “it seems as if no leaf would ever fall, or bird fly.” 
     “As if the miracle had happened,” said Jinny, “and life were stayed here and now.” 
     “And,” said Rhoda, “we had no more to live.” 
     “But listen,” said Louis, “to the world moving through abysses of infinite space. It 
roars; the lighted strip of history is past and our Kings and Queens; we are gone; our 
civilisation; the Nile; and all life. Our separate drops are dissolved; we are extinct, lost in 
the abysses of time, in the darkness.” (W 187-188) 
 
Bernard’s desire to ‘fight’ is also in response to his own reflection that ‘the earth is only a 
pebble flicked off accidentally from the face of the sun and that there is no life anywhere 
in the abysses of space’ (W 187). In addition, it is important to note that even as these 
characters express their worries on transience, they are still involved in an assemblage 
(recalling Woolf’s ‘mood waves’ discussed in section 5.3) which, as Bennett puts it, ‘are 
living, throbbing confederations that are able to function despite the persistent presence 
of energies that confound them from within.’79 It is also significant that Bernard returns 
in the above passage to the table, a table that does not simply act as a meeting place for 
the thoughts of subjects, but that the table is itself a vibrant, living object, materially and 
semiotically entangled here with the bodies of the friends. 
In The Waves we can view Bernard’s intra-actions with his environment - the 
human and the nonhuman - as creating a posthuman form of agency consisting of 
assemblages. According to Monaco, Bernard demonstrates this type of collective agency 
early on in the book when lying in bed he is ‘afloat in the shallow light which is like a 
film of water drawn over my eyes by a wave. I hear through it far off, far away, faint and 
far, the chorus beginning’ (W 20). For Monaco ‘[t]he child’s hearing is like a net catching 
the sonic assemblages and inter-assemblages composing life [or in my reading these 
assemblages are life] and connecting him to the wider world’: 
                                                 
79 Bennett 2010, p.23. 
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These early sections have a heightened luminosity, due to the two-fold purity: of both the 
poetic form, and of the quality of the child’s perception itself, which is unobstructed and 
untainted by habit, and whose senses penetrate, as we see above, in both a localised and a 
far-reaching way. The child’s psyche is a membrane of becoming, which fuses its 
emotional life with the material world.80 
 
Monaco also gives the example of Susan as a child, arguing that in the following passage 
‘[h]er suffering is inseparable from the environment’81 where, as Bernard describes, she 
‘trips and flings herself down on the roots under the trees, where the light seems to pant 
in and out, in and out. The branches heave up and down. There is agitation and trouble 
here. There is gloom. […] The roots make a skeleton on the ground, with dead leaves 
heaped in the angles. Susan has spread her anguish out. (W 9)  
This relation between human and environment is seen in other characters in The 
Waves. In a recent discussion of the inhuman in Woolf’s novel, Carrie Rohman has 
argued that it is Jinny who is most attuned to the material entanglements between earth 
and human. She asks:  
 
how do we connect such inhuman forces to the novel’s human characters? We do so by 
asking this question: how do Woolf’s characters relate to the vibrational? How do the 
characters function as forces of creative rhythm, or in relation to forces of creative 
rhythm. And interestingly, it is Jinny who attracts one most in this respect. It is Jinny who 
seems most vibrational, and ultimately then, perhaps most creative or artistic, in the 
posthumanist sense. […] Jinny is characterized by undulating movement and her 
connections to movement, by the bodily as such and her attraction to materiality, and by 
an awareness of and appreciation for […] qualitative experiential states. 82  
 
                                                 
80 Monaco 2008, p.162. 
81 Monaco 2008, p.162. 
82 Rohman 2011, p.19. Rohman also argues, using Deleuze’s concept of the refrain, that this is evident in 
the interludes: ‘These repetitions mark the most overt “natural” material in the text. The interludes attest to 
the inhuman rhythms, the cosmological forces that in one sense stand outside of narrowly human or 
conventionally humanist preoccupations’ (14). This corresponds with Beatrice Monaco’s view: ‘by way of 
the interludes [The Waves] contains the implication that there is much that is out of reach of human 
intelligence and perception.’ Monaco 2008, p.160. 
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For Rohman, ‘Jinny, while initially frightened by those forces, is nonetheless revealed as 
a character who becomes vibratory, or accepts her own becoming vibratory.’83 As she 
notes, this view of Jinny is at odds with those readings which have reduced her to the 
sexual (although Rohman’s description of a vibratory Jinny does perhaps have its own 
erotic aesthetic), including Jane Marcus’ provocative labeling of her as a prostitute.84 
Rohman gives examples where Jinny’s sense of creation is bound up with ‘animality, the 
floral, and even to birdsong’, and it is particularly salient that she emphasises the 
connection between human and inhuman in a similar sense to Haraway’s ‘naturecultures’. 
She picks out the following passage as a key example of ‘divergent natural and cultural 
arenas’ intermingling: 
 
In one way or another we make this day, this Friday, some by going to the Law Courts; 
others to the city; others to the nursery; others by marching and forming fours. […] The 
activity is endless. […] Some take train for France; others ship for India. Some will never 
come into this room again. One may die tonight. Another will beget a child. From us 
every sort of building, policy, venture, picture, poem, child, factory, will spring. Life 
comes; life goes; we make life. So you say. (W 145) 
 
This passage reveals that ‘[w]e don’t make art, or literature. We don’t live life or 
experience life. We make life. We create life. Could Jinny be recognizing the becoming-
artistic of life itself in its inhuman manifestations?’85 We could also return here to 
Woolf’s famous declaration in ‘Sketch of the Past’, discussed in my introduction to this 
thesis, ‘that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work’ (MB 85). 
When Woolf writes that ‘we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself’ (MB 
85), it would not then be an endorsement of an exclusively human subjectivity, but of the 
ways in which creation is about the material intra-actions between human and nonhuman, 
that words and music do not exist in a higher realm apart from life as ‘the thing itself’.  
In The Waves, rather than the ‘neat designs of life’ that are often created by 
stories, the characters (‘the living’) are attuned to ‘the panorama of life’ in all its complex 
                                                 
83 Rohman 2011, p.17. 
84 See Jane Marcus. ‘Britannia Rules The Waves.’ Hearts of Darkness: White Women Write Race. New 
Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 2004, p.70. 
85 Rohman 2011, p.20 
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entanglements (W 202). By the end of the novel Bernard’s vision is one whereby 
nonhuman forces are emphasised and his own sense of human subjectivity diminished: 
 
Lying in a ditch on a stormy day, when it has been raining, then enormous clouds come 
marching over the sky, tattered clouds, wisps of cloud. What delights me then is the 
confusion, the height, the indifference and the fury. Great clouds always changing, and 
movement; something sulphurous and sinister, bowled up, helter-skelter; towering, 
trailing, broken off, lost, and I forgotten, minute, in a ditch. Of story, of design I do not 
see a trace then. (W 200) 
 
If there is individuation here, then it is individuation in the form of Deleuzian assemblage 
– what he refers to as ‘haecceity’,86 as the creation of a new event formed of aggregates 
of bodies, objects, and spaces: ‘consist[ing] entirely of relations of movement and rest 
between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected’ (Bohrian Phenomena 
could therefore be viewed as a form of assemblage too – see section 5.1.3). Indeed, in 
Dialogues Deleuze refers to Clarissa’s walk through London at the beginning of Mrs 
Dalloway as providing an example of haecceity, and its link to the question of life:  
 
On her stroll Virginia Woolf’s heroine penetrates like a blade through all things, and yet 
looks from the outside, with the impression that it is dangerous to live even a single day 
(‘Never again will I say: I am this or that, he is this, he is that…’). But the stroll is itself a 
haecceity. It is haecceities that are expressed […] in proper names which do not designate 
people but mark events, in verbs in the infinitive which are not undifferentiated but 
constitute becomings or processes. It is haecceity which needs this kind of enunciation. 
HECCEITY = EVENT. It is a question of life.87 
 
                                                 
86 ‘Haecceity’ was commonly used in scholastic philosophy, in particular by Duns Scotus, to refer to the 
individuating principle or ‘thisness’ of beings. Deleuze’s own distinct use of this term is to designate ‘an 
individuation which is not that of an object, nor of a person, but rather of an event (wind, river, day or even 
hour of day).’ Deleuze and Parnet 2006 [1987], p.118, fn.9. 
87 Deleuze and Parnet 2006 [1987], p.68-69. Interestingly Deleuze focuses on Clarrisa’s walk rather than 
Peter Walsh’s, and my own examples below also include those of the female walker as well as the male, 
therefore offering a new perspective on the relationship between ‘women, walking and writing’ discussed 
by Bowlby in an essay of that title. See in Bowlby 1997, p.191-219. See also section 5.1.1 of this chapter.  
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In a diary entry from 27th February 1926, Woolf herself provides the perfect example of 
the event as haecceity when she recounts walking through Russell Square the previous 
night:  
 
I have some restless searcher in me. Why is there not a discovery in life? Something one 
can lay hands on and say ‘This is it’? What is it? And shall I die before I can find it? Then 
(as I was walking through Russell Square last night) I see mountains in the sky: the great 
clouds, and the moon which is risen over Persia; I have a great and astonishing sense of 
something there, which is ‘it’ […] Is that what I meant to say? Not in the least. I was 
thinking about my own character; not about the universe. (D3 62) 
 
This example is particularly revealing as at the very moment Woolf questions whether 
there is something determinate and fixed in life that she can find and grasp hold of, the 
‘it’ of life transforms subject/object distinctions into the creation of an assemblage or 
haecceity, a becoming-cosmic.  
Deleuze sees Woolf’s attempt to ‘saturate every atom’ (D3 209) as a desire to 
‘eliminate all that is resemblance and analogy, but also “to put everything into it”: 
eliminate everything that exceeds the moment, but put in everything that it includes – and 
the moment is not the instantaneous, it is the haecceity into which one slips and that slips 
into other haecceities by transparency […] Such is the link between imperceptibility, 
indiscernibility, and impersonality – the three virtues.’88 In Woolf’s short story ‘A Simple 
Melody’ (1985), written not long after Mrs Dalloway, we see another example of Woolf’s 
writing on walking – this time in the countryside – as a ‘haecceity’ or Deleuzian ‘event’. 
Here we read George Carslake’s reflections on a landscape painting which leads him to 
describe precisely this becoming-imperceptible and becoming-impersonal, the saturation 
of every atom of air until ‘walking thoughts were half sky’, a phrase which perfectly 
captures Deleuze and Guattari’s affirmation that ‘walking is a haecceity’:89 
 
to analyse this favourite theme of his – walking, different people walking to Norwich. He 
thought at once of the lark, of the sky, of the view. The walker’s thoughts and emotions 
                                                 
88 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.309. 
89 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.290. 
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were largely made up of these outside influences. Walking thoughts were half sky; if you 
could submit them to chemical analysis you would find that they had some grains of 
colour in them, some gallons or quarts or pints of air attached to them. This at once made 
them airier, more impersonal.90  
 
To be sure, these examples do not provide a straightforward distinction between 
individual and collective, but rather, as Deleuze and Guattari write in A Thousand 
Plateaus: ‘haecceities, affects, subjectless individuation that constitute collective 
assemblages […] Nothing subjectifies, but haecceities form according to compositions of 
nonsubjectified powers or affects.’91 Thus, ‘the proper name brings about an 
individuation by ‘haecceity’, not at all by subjectivity […] Virginia Woolf designates a 
state of reigns, ages and sexes.’92 
Returning to The Waves, in the following passage Bernard would then enter into 
composition with the ‘undifferentiated chaos of life’ which is not so much a 
homogenisation of difference, but the intra-acting, vital force of things including chiming 
bells, a ‘girl on a bicycle’ and even ‘the corner of a curtain’: 
 
while the fringe of my intelligence floating unattached caught those distant sensations 
which after a time the mind draws in and works upon; the chime of bells; general 
murmurs; vanishing figures; one girl on a bicycle who, as she rode, seemed to lift the 
corner of a curtain concealing the populous undifferentiated chaos of life which surged 
behind the outlines of my friends and the willow tree. (W 208)  
 
Life may have ‘surged behind the outlines’ of Bernard’s friends, but this does not mean 
we need to think of it as either separate from the living (that is, transcendent) or reduced 
to mere background. If we think of this as an example of Deleuzian haecceity, then 
 
[i]t should not be thought that a haecceity consists simply of a décor or backdrop that 
situates subjects, or of appendages that hold things and people to the ground. It is the 
                                                 
90 Virginia Woolf. ‘A Simple Melody.’ The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf (2nd Edition), ed. 
Susan Dick. London: Harcourt, 1989 [1985], p.206. 
91 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.294. 
92 Deleuze and Parnet 2006 [1987], p.89. 
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entire assemblage in its individuated aggregate that is a haecceity; it is this assemblage 
that is defined by a longitude and a latitude, by speeds and affects, independently of 
forms and subjects, which belong to another plane […] to become events, in assemblages 
that are inseparable from an hour, a season, an atmosphere, an air, a life.93 
 
The final word in this quotation is crucial as ‘a life’ for Deleuze is a-subjective and pre-
personal, as emphasised in his final essay ‘Immanence, a life’ which I will consider in the 
next section. Following Deleuze, Jane Bennett asks: ‘can nonorganic bodies also have a 
life? Can materiality itself be vital?’94 Her vital materialism is an attempt ‘to articulate 
the elusive idea of a materiality that is itself heterogeneous, itself a differential of 
intensities, itself a life. In this strange, vital materialism, there is no point of pure 
stillness, no indivisible atom that is not itself aquiver with virtual force.’95 This touches 
on one of the key challenges for Deleuzian philosophy, namely how to account for the 
concurrence of a flattening of hierarchical structures at the same time as the proliferation 
of heterogeneity – an issue which also speaks to my discussions of sexual difference and 
human-animal difference in previous chapters of this thesis. This chapter will now turn to 
the concepts of univocity and specifically Deleuze’s ‘pure immanence’ to suggest that 
this might be what ultimately brings together Barad’s philosophy-physics, Bennett’s vital 
materialism and Woolf’s The Waves, and might provide an ontology of life capable of 
creating such heterogeneity without hierarchy.  
 
5.2.3 Pure Immanence 
Absolute immanence is in itself: it is not in something, to something; it does not depend 
on an object or belong to a subject.96 
 
Absolute or pure immanence takes us beyond the false dichotomy of the choice between 
heterogeneous hierarchy and homogeneous flatness. As Deleuze puts it in his final essay 
‘Immanence, a Life’, ‘[w]e will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing 
                                                 
93 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.289. 
94 Bennett 2010, p.53. 
95 Bennett 2010, p.57. 
96 Gilles Deleuze. ‘Immanence, a Life.’ Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life, trans. Anne Boyman. 
Massachusetts: Zone Books, 2001, p.26. 
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else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. A life 
is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete 
bliss.’97 As Deleuze and Guattari put it in What is Philosophy?: ‘Immanence is immanent 
only to itself and consequently captures everything, absorbs All-One, and leaves nothing 
remaining to which it could be immanent.’98 Thacker’s After Life illustrates that to fully 
understand Deleuze’s concept of pure immanence – ‘immanence as not subordinate to 
transcendence’99 – it is important to recognise the influence of Scholastic philosophers on 
his thinking. Scholasticism, Thacker notes, is never far away from Deleuze’s philosophy, 
specifically in terms of his long-standing engagement with the issues concerning the One, 
multiplicity and pure immanence. There are direct references to Scholastic thinkers in his 
work, too. Perhaps the most notable example comes in a passage from Difference and 
Repetition where Deleuze considers Duns Scotus’ conceptualisation of ‘univocity’:   
 
There has only ever been one ontological position: Being is univocal. There has only ever 
been one ontology, that of Duns Scotus, which gave being a single voice. We say Duns 
Scotus because he was the one who elevated univocal being to the highest point of 
subtlety, albeit at the price of abstraction […] A single voice raises the clamour of 
being.100 
 
As Thacker points out, Deleuze is wrestling here with a similar problem to Scotus: ‘how 
to posit a univocity of being without flattening all distinctions within being’.101 Thacker 
poses further questions to challenge the idea of pure immanence: ‘If immanence is pure 
immanence, immanent to nothing but itself, then how can immanence also be a ceaseless 
creation and invention of the new? How can creativity emerge out of what is already fully 
actual?’.102 This goes to the heart of a common difficulty with Deleuze’s thought and in 
                                                 
97 Deleuze 2001, p.27. 
98 Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p.45. 
99 Thacker 2010, p.170. 
100 Deleuze 2004 [1994], p.44. This is the passage where Badiou takes the title of his scathing book on 
Deleuze. See Alain Badiou. Deleuze: The Clamour of Being, trans. Louise Burchill. Mineapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 1999. For an excellent recent survey of the relationship between the philosophies of Deleuze 
and Badiou in relation to literature, see Jean-Jacques Lecercle. Badiou and Deleuze Read Literature, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2010. 
101 Thacker 2010, p.137. 
102 Thacker 2010, p.213. 
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order to answer it we need to turn first to Spinoza.103 If one of the problems for Scholastic 
thinkers was that univocity signals ‘all relation’ (therefore failing to account for 
differences or causation between individuated creatures) then Spinoza allows us to 
reimagine causality ‘less in terms of a first cause or principle, and more in terms of a self-
causality or auto-creation’;104 in other words, causality becomes fundamentally 
immanent. Moreover, Spinoza’s emphasis on the generativity of univocity as affirmative 
becoming rather than neutral being (as in Scotus) allows Deleuze to think of univocity as 
creative. Univocity for the Scholastics ‘denoted not difference but identity’,105 hence 
Thacker is correct to emphasise Deleuze’s Scholasticism, via Spinoza, as heretical in a 
similar sense to his notorious formulation of the history of philosophy as a kind of 
‘buggery or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate conception […] taking an author 
from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous.’106 
Taking up this concept of univocity as pure immanence, Deleuze in Difference 
and Repetition sees it as central to his ontology of difference, of difference as primary, 
and against identity and representation: 
 
In effect, the essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single and same sense, but 
that it is said, in a single and same sense, of all its individuating differences or intrinsic 
modalities. Being is the same for all these modalities, but these modalities are not the 
same. It is “equal” for all, but they themselves are not equal. It is said of all in a single 
sense, but they themselves do not have the same sense. The essence of univocal being is 
to include individuating differences, while these differences do not have the same essence 
and do not change the essence of being […] Being is said in a single and same sense of 
everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs: it is said of difference 
itself.107  
 
                                                 
103 For an excellent recent discussion of Deleuze and Spinoza see Jeffrey Bell. ‘Between Realism and Anti-
realism: Deleuze and the Spinozist Tradition in Philosophy.’ Deleuze Studies 5:1 (2011). See also Gilles 
Deleuze. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin. Massachusetts: Zone, 1992. 
104 Thacker 2010, p.138. 
105 Thacker 2010, p.141. 
106 Deleuze 1995, p.6. 
107 Deleuze 2004 [1994], p.45. 
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Monaco sees in Woolf’s The Waves this role of ‘difference itself’ or a difference that is 
‘ontologically primary’ rather than, as in Western philosophical rationalism, following 
from identity and essence:  
 
everything is derived from it. […] Difference is life, it is movement […] the 
differentiating process and substance of Being; it is univocal. Likewise, The Waves forms 
a differentiating substance and process, a univocity, simultaneously substantial and 
mobile. The difference (of the six characters) is used to synthesise a unity that is not 
fixed, but dynamic and ‘living’, and thus which implies community. That life is 
fundamentally communal, as opposed to being singular or individual, is the motivating 
concept of The Waves’.108 
 
In order to expand on the confluence of difference and univocity in Deleuze’s 
philosophy, Thacker draws attention to a lecture Deleuze gave at Vincennes in 1974 
where he describes how ‘univocity implies total interconnectedness’, and thus we can see 
its influence on those terms we have encountered in this and preceding chapters: 
becoming, rhizome, assemblage, haecceity and so on. Here Deleuze also puts his finger 
on an important caveat in Scotus’ philosophy whereby ‘Scotus tempers his position of 
univocity between an assertion of being as “univocal metaphysically,” and yet 
“analogical physically”’.109 Deleuze notes in his Vincennes lecture that it was this 
important condition that saved Scotus: ‘“he was at the border of heresy, had he not 
specified metaphysically univocal and physically analogical, he would have been done 
for”’.110 Without such concerns, Deleuze can go further; he can use univocity at its most 
radical to think of Creator/creature, divine/earthly, supernatural/natural, and Life/the 
living as ‘fully immanent in relation to the other […] it requires thinking that which is 
“above” the human as equal to that which is “below” the human. The angel and the insect 
both exist immanently. As Deleuze notes, “God is a tick”’.111 Viewing Scotist univocity 
in terms of immanence means that ‘immanence would not be derived from transcendence, 
                                                 
108 Monaco 2008, p.175. 
109 Thacker 2010, p.147. 
110 cited in Thacker 2010, p.148. 
111 Thacker 2010, p.153.  
  
236
but the inverse: the ontological priority of immanence’.112 And for Monaco The Waves 
‘balanc[es] the material with the forces of life, providing a literary rendering of 
univocity’.113 
Life as pure immanence is, therefore, the difference between ‘a life’ and ‘the 
life’/‘my life’. It is therefore intriguing that Jinny is the only character in The Waves to 
refer to ‘a life’ (and we will recall that she is the only character who never refers to ‘my 
life’). This occurs when she is travelling north by train:  
 
“I sit snug in my own corner going North,” said Jinny, “in this roaring express which is 
yet so smooth that it flattens hedges, lengthens hills. We flash past signal-boxes; we make 
the earth rock slightly from side to side. The distance closes for ever in a point; and we 
for ever open the distance wide again. The telegraph poles bob up incessantly; one is 
felled, another rises. Now we roar and swing into a tunnel. The gentleman pulls up the 
window. I see reflections on the shining glass which lines the tunnel. I see him lower his 
paper. He smiles at my reflection in the tunnel. My body instantly of its own accord puts 
forth a frill under his gaze. My body lives a life of its own. Now the black window glass 
is green again. We are out of the tunnel. He reads his paper. But we have exchanged the 
approval of our bodies. There is then a great society of bodies, and mine is introduced; 
mine has come into the room where the gilt chairs are. Look – all the windows of the 
villas and their white-tented curtains dance; and the men sitting in the hedges in the 
cornfields with knotted blue handkerchiefs are aware too, as I am aware, of heat and 
rapture. One waves as we pass him. There are bowers and arbours in these villa gardens 
and young men in shirt-sleeves on ladders trimming roses. A man on a horse canters over 
the field. His horse plunges as we pass. And the rider turns to look at us. We roar again 
through blackness. And I lie back; I give myself up to rapture” (W 49; my emphasis).  
 
Jinny is here in the ‘rapture’ of ‘a life’ (recalling Orlando’s ‘rapture’ in section 3.2 and 
3.3), the material entanglement of her body with a ‘great society of bodies’ both human 
(the gentleman at the window, the man on horse) and nonhuman (the window curtains 
which ‘dance’, the horse). Her body does not live ‘a life of its own’ in the sense that it is 
                                                 
112 Thacker 2010, p.186. 
113 Monaco 2008, p.168. 
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possessed and fixed in its individuation, but in the sense of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
‘singularisation’: 
 
A body is not defined by the form that determines it nor as a determinate substance or 
subject nor by the organs it possesses or the functions it fulfils. [...] a body is defined only 
by a longitude and a latitude: in other words the sum total of the material elements 
belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness 
(longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or 
degree of potential (latitude). Nothing but affects and local movements, differential 
speeds.114 
 
That is, Jinny’s body is de-personalised in this moment of bodily affirmation, again in a 
similar sense to that discussed in chapter three in relation to Orlando and desire (see 
section 3.1). Although this paragraph ends with a seeming return to the possessive – ‘Life 
is beginning. I now break into my hoard of life’ (W 50) – there is a sense in which this 
‘my’, like Woolf’s Susan’s multiplicitous ‘I’, has been transformed by a ‘hoard of life’ 
that is always already intra-acting with the other human and nonhuman bodies mentioned 
above: ‘The life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that 
releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from 
the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens […] It is a haecceity no longer of 
individuation but of singularisation’.115 
This move from individuation to singularisation is encapsulated in The Waves by 
the multiplicity of Bernard: ‘They do not understand that I have to effect different 
transitions; have to cover the entrances and exits of several different men who alternately 
act their parts as Bernard . I am abnormally aware of circumstances. […] which of these 
people am I? It depends so much upon the room. When I say to myself, “Bernard”, who 
comes?’ (TW 61; 65) Bernard’s heightened awareness of ‘circumstances’ – aligned with 
his rejection of individualism and letting go of possessions – shows that he is not 
partaking in a complete dispersal or flight from material reality (indeed he is hostile to the 
thought that his friends might think of him as ‘evasive’ or that he escape[s] their own 
                                                 
114 Deleuze and Guattari 2004 [1988], p.287. 
115 Deleuze 2001, p.28. 
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world) (W 61); rather, there is a productive assembling: ‘Once more, I who had thought 
myself immune, who had said, ‘Now I am rid of all that,’ find that the wave has tumbled 
me over, head over heels, scattering my possessions, leaving me to collect, to assemble, 
to heap together, summon my forces, rise and confront the enemy’ (W 244). By scattering 
his possessions he now has to assemble something new, but this is not simply a re-piecing 
together the old order of things. What he has to ‘collect’, ‘assemble’ and ‘heap together’ 
has no object; the verbs are left floating and intra-acting with his ‘forces’, constructing 
assemblages of human/nonhuman as described above. Accepting that he has been unable 
to become ‘immune’ to everyday life,116 he realises the enemy is not so much life as it is 
death. The nonanthropocentric assembling of materiality (as immanent life), is his 
answer.  
This is not the individual battle of the living against death, but rather the very 
struggle not to fall into an easy opposition between the immanence of the living and a 
transcendent teleology: ‘we shouldn’t enclose life in the single moment when individual 
life confronts universal death. A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living 
subject goes through and that are measured by given lived objects: an immanent life 
carrying with it the events or singularities that are merely actualised in subjects and 
objects’.117 Where literature is concerned, Deleuze, as Lecercle notes, is interested in ‘the 
expression of life, not the individual or personal life of a character or an author, but a life, 
in its non-human, a-subjective and pre-personal development or becoming’.118 As an 
example of such literature, The Waves then is ultimately about (re)generation and about 
(re)conceptualising life as immanent, material assemblages. In the face of the enemy, 
death (and especially any notion of death as divine), Woolf’s novel moves away from life 
as something tied inextricably to a subject or object (‘the living’) that comes and goes 
based on a transcendent force (‘Life’). Instead, we discover the intra-actions of human 
and nonhuman as the creative immanence of ‘the emerging monster to whom we are 
attached’ (W 51), a life.  
                                                 
116 For an incisive discussion of ‘everyday life’ in The Waves see Randall 2007, p.167-184. 
117 Deleuze 2001, p.29.  
118 Lecercle 2010, p.203. 
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Afterword: Contemporary Interceptions 
 
For it is an age clearly when we are not fast anchored where we are; things are moving 
round us; we are moving ourselves. (E4 429) 
 
Transposing, becoming, queering, responding, intra-acting: all the forms of shared world-
making that I have explored in this thesis point not simply to inter-relations and blurring 
of boundaries between fact and fiction, male and female, homosexual and heterosexual, 
human and animal, nature and culture, materiality and theory; rather, I have tried to 
explore some of the specific intra-relational entanglements we find in Woolf’s texts 
which emerge in a more immanent and symbiotic, although never fixed and finally 
determinate, series of interceptions. Taking my focus on intra-actions in the final chapter, 
I would like to end by suggesting that just as intra-actions do not only describe a micro or 
quantum world as somehow separated from the macro or ‘real’ world, intra-acting is not 
only found by close textual analysis of Woolf’s writings but can also describe the 
methodology of our reading. To read intra-actively is to become entangled in what Hilary 
Thompson has recently described as the ‘interceptional time’ of ‘interhistoricising’. 
Reading Benjamin’s ‘messianic time’ and his well-known call to ‘blast open the 
continuum of history’,1 as well as Agamben’s more recent discussion of messianism, 
alongside Mrs Dalloway, Thomson notes that Woolf’s novel ‘insists on spawning times 
out of times’ so that its historically specific moment – the aftermath of the First World 
War – is ‘crucial without having to be sovereign.’ For example, the presence of Big Ben 
in the novel ‘is not the commanding monolith one might assume. Time has been 
slackened, stretched out, reconfigured and saved’. Thompson’s interceptional time allows 
us as readers and critics to be ‘attuned to the critical “now-time” of each text’s truth 
brought to light by their intertwining’2 and therefore ‘in the midst of historicizing, from 
time to time, we must interhistoricise.’3  
                                                 
1 Walter Benjamin. ‘Thesis on the Philosophy of History.’ Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt. London: 
Pimlico, 1999 [1968], p.254. 
2 Hilary Thompson. ‘Time and its Countermeasures: Modern Messianisms in Woolf, Benjamin, and 
Agamben.’ Modernism and Theory: A Critical Debate, ed. Stephen Ross. London: Routledge, 2009, p.94. 
3 Thompson 2009, p.94; p.98. 
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To interhistoricise here is not simply a case of giving the now or then precedence 
in a reading of what one text uncovers in another; rather a methodology of 
interhistoricising promotes reciprocity, a way to read Woolf’s contemporary context as 
interpenetrating, or we might say intra-acting, with our own contemporary moment. As 
Caughie adds in her response to Thomson’s essay, what this involves is placing ‘texts 
beside each other to show how texts situated in different times may be responding to 
similar conflicts and concerns and thus read together not anachronistically or ahistorically 
but interceptionally.’4 Using the example of Woolf’s final novel Between the Acts, 
Caughie emphasises this positive potential: 
 
In confronting the possibility that outsiders may not come to share a social vision, Woolf 
was compelled to face what postmodernist theorists identify as the crisis of the 
collectivity. Such a crisis need not produce despair but rather can serve to create a 
willingness to tolerate the incompatibilities and discontinuities that any collective concept 
engenders. Fragmentation and discontinuity , suspended moments and odd juxtapositions, 
can be understood as elements of, not obstacles to, the reading of literature and history… 
To stage an engagement between modernism and theory, then, to read Woolf’s fictional 
texts the same way we read theoretical texts rather than taking theory as offering 
explanatory paradigms for the fiction, is to change our ways of reading, not just our 
readings of Woolf.5 
 
Considering Woolf’s texts in relation to contemporary theory requires more than looking 
back to a prior context as though it is something already there and waiting to be 
recovered. The ‘contemporary’ t/here is in fact ‘untimely’, mixing texts and times in the 
perpetual intra-action of contexts (and concepts) through which we can and do read 
Woolf’s writing. As Caughie urges then, we should be prepared to ‘risk the untimely’ in 
our readings of modernist texts.6  
 In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze argues that ‘in the untimely there are truths 
that are more durable than all historical and eternal truths put together: truths of times to 
                                                 
4 Caughie 2009, p.104. 
5 Caughie 2009, p.102. 
6 Caughie 2009, p.100.  
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come.’7 And in What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari bring together the untimely 
with ‘becoming’: ‘Acting counter to the past, and therefore on the present, for the benefit, 
let us hope, of a future – but the future is not a historical future, not even a utopian 
history, it is the infinite Now […] the Intensive or Untimely, not an instant but a 
becoming.’8 In the vocabulary of quantum physics, we are not simply observers cut off 
from the experiments which we record, but are intra-actively, that is materially-
discursively, entangled within these experiments, within this interhistoricised, untimely 
‘contemporary’ where, Barad reminds us, ‘the past is never left behind, never finished 
once and for all, and the future is not what will come to be in an unfolding of the present 
moment’:9  
 
It’s not that the experimenter changes a past that had already been present or that atoms 
fall in line with a new future simply by erasing information. The point is that the past was 
never simply there to begin with and the future is not simply what will unfold; the “past” 
and the “future” are iteratively reworked and enfolded through the iterative practices of 
spacetimemattering […] all are one phenomenon.10 
 
Contextualising Woolf is not only about looking at the events, ideas, people and texts 
contemporaneous to when she herself was writing that may have influenced her work, but 
also looking at how she is intra-acting with our own contemporary debates. Context itself 
is always and already a theoretical concept where theorising ‘is not to leave the material 
world behind and enter the domain of pure ideas where the lofty space of the mind makes 
objective reflection possible. Theorizing, like experimenting, is a material practice.’11 
Where the entanglement between Woolf and quantum philosophy-physics is 
concerned, for example, reading context interceptionally is to say that quantum 
                                                 
7 Deleuze 2006 [1983], p.100. Deleuze is here linking the untimely with the very continuation of 
philosophy: ‘The succession of philosophers is not an eternal sequence of stages, still less a historical 
sequence, but a broken succession, a succession of comets. Their discontinuity and repetition do not 
amount to the eternity of the sky which they cross, nor the historicity of the earth which they fly over. 
There is no eternal or historical philosophy. Eternity, like the historicity of philosophy amounts to this: 
philosophy always untimely, untimely at every epoch.’ 
8 Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p.112. 
9 Barad 2007, p.234. 
10 Barad 2007, p.315. 
11 Barad 2007, p.55. 
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mechanics does not just provide neat analogies and metaphors for literature,12 nor have to 
adhere to ‘the “influence model” of investigation’;13 rather it  
 
provides important theoretical tools needed to move conversations in science studies, 
feminist studies, and other (inter)disciplinary studies beyond the mere acknowledgement 
that both material and discursive, and natural and cultural, factors play a role in 
knowledge production by examining how these factors work together, and how 
conceptions of materiality, social practice, nature, and discourse must change to 
accommodate their mutual involvement.14 
 
The various intra-actions I have focused on between Woolf’s writings and those of 
Deleuze (and Guattari), Braidotti, Derrida, Haraway, Bennett, Thacker and the many 
others discussed in this thesis, can all be said to warn, with Barad, that ‘the nature-culture 
dualism is not undermined by inviting everything into one category (man’s, yet again). 
The point of challenging traditional epistemologies is not merely to welcome females, 
slaves, children, animals, and other disposed Others (exiled from the land of knowers by 
Aristotle more than two millennia ago) into the fold of knowers but to better account for 
the ontology of knowing’.15 In my reading of Woolf’s intra-actions with (t/here) 
contemporary debates concerning various facets of sexual difference, sexuality and 
desire, the animal and nonhuman, quantum materiality and life itself, my aim has been to 
demonstrate some of the ways in which her writing might continue to open up new 
theoretical conversations, crossing disciplinary boundaries of literature, theory and 
philosophy, and science, not to mention the potential intra-actions with many of the other 
topics I was unable to cover in this thesis. Whichever discipline or context gains our 
attention, Woolf is always on hand to remind us that ‘[t]he time approaches when these 
soliloquies shall be shared’ (W 30). 
 
                                                 
12 Daniel Albright’s Quantum Poetics is, for example, concerned with using science only to provide 
metaphors with which we can read modernist writers, rather than considering how they may be engaging 
with the philosophical implications of science. His discussion of ‘the poetic atom’ or ‘wave aesthetics’ and 
‘particle aesthetics’ is the kind of analogy that Barad would take issue with. See Quantum Poetics: Yeats, 
Pound, Eliot, and the Science of Modernism. CUP, 1997, p.1; p.18-19. 
13 Barad 2007, p.94. 
14 Barad 2007, p.25. 
15 Barad 2007, p.378. 
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